An Introduction to Tantric Philosophy

The *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta with the Commentary of Yogarāja

Translated by
Lyne Bansat-Boudon and
Kamaleshadatta Tripathi

Introduction, notes, critically revised Sanskrit text, appendix, indices by
Lyne Bansat-Boudon



Routledge Studies in Tantric Traditions

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The *Paramārthasāra*, or 'Essence of Ultimate Reality', is a work of the Kashmirian polymath Abhinavagupta (tenth–eleventh centuries). It is a brief treatise in which the author outlines the doctrine of which he is a notable exponent, namely non-dualistic Śaivism, which he designates in his works as the Trika, or 'Triad' of three principles: Śiva, Śakti and the embodied soul (*nara*).

The main interest of the *Paramārthasāra* is not only that it serves as an introduction to the established doctrine of a tradition, but also advances the notion of *jīvanmukti*, 'liberation in this life', as its core theme. Further, it does not confine itself to an exposition of the doctrine as such but at times hints at a second sense lying beneath the evident sense, namely esoteric techniques and practices that are at the heart of the philosophical discourse. Its commentator, Yogarāja (eleventh century), excels in detecting and clarifying those various levels of meaning.

An Introduction to Tantric Philosophy presents, along with a critically revised Sanskrit text, the first annotated English translation of both Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra* and Yogarāja's commentary.

This book will be of interest to Indologists, as well as to specialists and students of Religion, Tantric studies and Philosophy.

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Preface

In the text, kārikās and pratīkas are set in boldface.

In general, an effort has been made to limit citation of Sanskrit terms in parentheses. However, it has been judged desirable to make the basic vocabulary of the doctrine visible to the reader. Thus, the Sanskrit term is instanced

— when it designates a key notion of the Trika, or one of its favorite metaphors, and at its first occurrence,

— when it is required in order to grasp the sense of a gloss (e.g., ad 33, where *krīḍā* is glossed by *khela*),

— in order to take note of the more or less uniform translation of diverse, but essentially synonymous, Sanskrit terms, e.g., X Y Z, all of which have been translated by 'consciousness' (note, especially, the variety of terms for 'liberation'),

— *mutatis mutandis*, in order to take note of the polysemy of certain crucial Sanskrit terms, *parāmarśa*, *paramārtha*, *smr̥ti*, etc.

Certain Sanskrit terms of wider, but often technical usage, whose meaning is not easily grasped, or which are expanded upon, have been treated in the notes. Literal translations are likewise to be found there.

Sanskrit terms that have become, or are used as, English words are left in Roman, and may accept a plural suffix: kārikā, śloka, mantra, avataraṇikā, guru, karman, etc.

Likewise, marks of suppletions have been limited as much as possible to those necessary to make sense of an often laconic Sanskrit, especially as concerns the many technical explanations of concepts and terms. The frequently occurring *āha*, referring always to Abhinavagupta, has been rendered by 'the master says'.

Glosses or terms to be understood as such are enclosed in *single* quotation marks. *Double* quotation marks indicate that the author 'wishes to single out a word or phrase, not quoting it from a specific document ... but referring it to a general background that will be recognized by the reader' (*Chicago Manual of Style*, 13th ed.).

Certain elaborations of notions treated in the notes have been grouped together in an 'Appendix'.

In addition to the key terms of the doctrine, certain recurring segments of its phraseology have been indexed, each with a translation, forming a glossary of the essential points of the system.

To this has been added an Index locorum and an 'Anthology of spiritual experience' (see Intr., n. 99).

The Sanskrit text reproduced here is based on the KSTS edition. It has been revised and corrected at places after collation of nine manuscripts; see 'On the Sanskrit Text'.

For the history of the work here presented, it may be useful to note that Prof. K. D. Tripathi is a disciple of Rāmeśvara Jhā, the author of the *Pūrṇatāpratyabhijñā*, cited frequently in the notes (see, especially, n. 314).

A work by D. B. SenSharma has appeared in 2007, to which I have had access only tardily, but have nevertheless consulted: *Paramārthasāra of Abhinavagupta. The Essence of the Supreme Truth, with the commentary of Yogarāja. Translation & introduction.* New Delhi, Muktabodha, and Emeryville, Calif. The work is however more a free gloss than a translation.

Acknowledgments

The work on the annotated translation of the *Paramārthasāra* and its gloss began in June 2000 in collaboration with Prof. Kamaleshadatta Tripathi, thus following the rigorous tradition of Indian scholarship. Since then, a number of versions have seen the light and have resulted in the present text, which has benefited from comments and advice offered by several learned scholars.

Special thanks go to Charles Malamoud, André Padoux, Raffaele Torella, Alexis Sanderson, Dominic Goodall, Marion Rastelli, David Seyfort Ruegg, Eli Franco, Karin Preisendanz, Ernst Steinkellner, Nalini Delvoye, Michel Hulin, Victoria Lissenko, Birgit Kellner, Seishi Karashima, who were generous enough to provide their expertise in response to my queries.

One of the pleasures attendant upon scholarly research is certainly this: the constant attestation of that simple and discreet fraternity to which the scientific community pays tacit homage.

I am particularly indebted towards three colleagues and friends. Not only did Yves Codet contribute to elucidating several difficulties raised by the text, but he also immensly helped by formatting my manuscript using the XeTeX software. This was a long and somewhat laborious task, during which his patience never abided.

With Judit Törzsök, I had long discussions concerning passages that required her grasp and knowledge of tantric Śivaism, particularly its rituals. Her unfailing support was central to the establishment of the Sanskrit text.

Finally, the bibliography is the result of a dedicated collaboration with Silvia D'Intino who generously shared her cataloguing skills and her sharp understanding of the "bibliographic object".

I also wish to express my deep gratitude to my friend and highly esteemed colleague Edwin Gerow, whose careful reading of my text ensured proper English wording. During our discussions, with talent and just the necessary touch of mischievousness, he fulfilled the role of an objector, commenting and challenging many terms and passages of earlier drafts of

this work. The present version has been materially improved by responding to, and indeed incorporating some of, his comments. Needless to say, any remaining infelicities should be attributed to me.

LBB



Śiva (?), with the *khaṭvāṅga*. Sirpur, Châttisgarh. 7th century. Photo by Nicole Ménant-Di Dio



Introduction

> As soon as the expanse of ignorance affecting the mind is dispelled by correct insight, then 'liberation while living' is present on the palm of the hand.
>
> — Abhinavagupta, *Tantrāloka*

1. The two *Paramārthasāra*

The *Paramārthasāra*, or 'Essence of Ultimate Reality', is a work of the Kashmirian polymath Abhinavagupta (end of the tenth, beginning of the eleventh century). It is a brief treatise,[1] a compendium[2] in which the author outlines the doctrine of which he is a notable exponent (indeed, the most fecund), namely nondualistic Śaivism, which he designates in his works as the 'Trika', or 'Triad' of three principles: Śiva, Śakti and the embodied soul (*nara*).[3]

According to Yogarāja (second half of the eleventh century), the author of its commentary, *Vivṛti*, the *Paramārthasāra* is of the nature of a *prakaraṇa*,[4] a 'manual' or 'précis' serving as introduction to the established doctrine of a tradition.[5] The work, appropriately, begins by

[1]The commentary ad 104 uses the term *śāstra*.

[2]*saṃkṣepa* or *saṃgraha*. See 2nd *maṅgalācaraṇa* of the commentary (*paramārthasārasaṃkṣepa*), *Paramārthasāra* [PS] 104 (*idam ... saṃkṣepam*), 105 (*tad idaṃ saṃkṣiptaṃ śāstrasāram*) and the colophon of the commentary (*paramārthasārasaṃgrahavivṛti*).

[3]See, for instance, *Tantrāloka* [TĀ] X 1, XIII 348 and (as the periphrastic expression 'ṣaḍardha', 'half of six') TĀ XIII 301 (where is established the supremacy of the Trika over all Śaiva currents), XVI 158, XXXVII 26, 68, etc. I use the term 'Trika' here in this sense. On the historical development of the Trika and other symbolic meanings of the term itself, see Sanderson 1995: 672; 2007. The preeminent concern of this essay, 'nondualistic' or 'nondual' (*advaita*) Śaivism of Kashmir, will be, when the context does not tend to confusion, referred to simply as Kashmir Śaivism or even as Śaivism. On this 'Triad', see avataraṇikā [avat.] ad PS 41 (n. 875) and 46.

[4]See avat. ad PS 2–3 and 105, and n. 276 on *prakaraṇa*.

[5]As YR puts it in his commentary ad 104, the theme underlying the entire text is '[that *brahman*], in reference to which a concise summary (*saṃkṣepa*) containing the essential purport (*tātparya*) [of our doctrine] has been stated, and explained, by Abhinavagupta, whose name is to be mentioned with reverence [i.e., celebrated]'. In his gloss of PS 105, YR underlines as well the esoteric dimension of such a tradition, thus "revealed", at least in part, to the

featuring a *mumukṣu*, one who 'aspires to liberation', a student desirous of learning from a master the means whereby he may put an end to his dolorous wanderings through the cycles of rebirth. [6]

The *Paramārthasāra* shares with the vast majority of Indian philosophical texts this propaedeutic purpose that is encoded as well in the title of the work, which may equally be understood as signifying 'The Core of the Teachings on Ultimate Reality', as Yogarāja explains in his gloss of the second and third verses. [7]

1.1. *The* Paramārthasāra *of Ādiśeṣa*

What makes the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta unique is the nature of its exposition of the doctrine. It does not in all respects correspond to the ordinary model of a *prakaraṇa*. [8]

In its second and third verses, which recount its "myth of origin", this *Paramārthasāra* is presented as a śaivite reworking of another *Paramārthasāra*, attributed to Ādiśeṣa, also called Ādhāra [9] (sixth or seventh cen-

sincere adept: 'This core of the teaching (*śāstrasāra*), that is, that essence (*satattva*) spread throughout numerous texts, has been condensed by me; that is, has been stated [by Abhinavagupta] after having mastered it himself, within the small span of hundred verses, though it can hardly be explained in a thousand texts. By this is stated [as well] the resourcefulness [of the author's] luminous consciousness (*pratibhā*)'.

[6] See YR ad 101, where the gods say, apropos the 'failed' aspirant (*yogabhraṣṭa*): *[...] yasya svātmani jijñāsārthaṃ prāgjanmani udyamo 'bhūt*, 'It is he [after all] whose striving in a previous life was motivated by a desire to know regarding his own Self'.

[7] The polysemy of the term *artha* makes other interpretations possible: 'The Essence of Ultimate Meaning' (see PS 59 and YR ad loc.), or, more pregnantly, 'Principles essential in attaining the Supreme Goal of life', namely *mokṣa* — see PS 103 and YR ad 104, quoted p. 33. The term 'sāra' (lit., 'sap', 'vivifying juice') itself participates in the pun, expressing on the one hand the 'kernel' or 'core' of the Real, from which the inessential has been stripped away, and on the other, the 'heart' of the teaching, from which superfluous or ancillary discussion has been abstracted.

[8] See p. 19.

[9] Also Ananta — all these being synonymous with Śeṣa, Viṣṇu's serpent. Hence the alternative titles of the work: *Ādhārakārikā*, or *Anantakārikā*, to which is sometimes added a descriptive title: *Āryāpañcāśīti*, 'The [work composed of] eighty-five āryās'. The tradition also makes this identification, conferring on the author a quasi-divine status (cf. the epithet *jagadādhāra*, 'support of the world', v. 87). And so, Rāghavānanda [R], a late Advaitin (probably 16th cent.), author of the *Paramārthasāravivaraṇa* [ĀPSV], the only commentary on the first PS to have come down to us, observes, in his gloss on v. 87: *śeṣaḥ anantas tu na yaḥ ko 'pi vipaścit*, 'Śeṣa, namely Ananta, not some sage or other'. But, in his gloss on v. 3, he qualifies this same Ananta as *jīvanmuktaṃ guruvaraṃ (papraccha)*, '[he asks] the most excellent teacher, liberated while alive ...' The same ambiguity is seen in YR's commentary, which sometimes presents Ādhāra as a sage (*muni*), a mortal, but also associates Ādhāra or Śeṣa directly with a divine figure, Anantanātha — 'Lord Ananta'— sometimes termed also the 'presiding deity of Māyā' (TĀ VIII 323a, with the commentary of Jayaratha [JR] (fl. ca. 1250; see Sanderson 2007: 418–419), the *Tantrālokaviveka* [TĀV]; references to TĀV will be made to Dwivedi and Rastogi's ed. 1987). Abhinavagupta [AG] seems generally to opt for a supra-mundane status; he cites, in his commentary to *Bhagavadgītā* [BhG] VIII 6, v. 81 of

tury),[10] of which the commentator, Yogarāja, has retained only the Sāṃkhya features.[11] This is perhaps in function of that text's verse seven, in which the *mumukṣu*, who now knows his catechism, presses the master to reveal the secrets implied in the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and just why knowledge of that distinction is salvific.[12] To this extent, Yogarāja only takes partial account of the doctrine of the older *Paramārthasāra*, which conflates Sāṃkhya dualism and the nondualism of the Vedānta — a kind of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta[13] halfway between the *dvaitādvaitavāda* of Bhartṛprapañca[14] and the *advaitavāda* of Gauḍapāda,[15] but one which, imprinted with devotion to Viṣṇu, remains profoundly theist, in the manner of epic Sāṃkhya.[16]

Ādiśeṣa's work, which he there terms a *śruti*; in his TĀ (XXVIII 309b), he attributes this same verse, without naming the text, to the 'Lord of the serpents, who bears the burden of the universe by supporting it' (*ahīśāno viśvādhāradhurāndharaḥ*). Another thread of the tradition (in fact, the edition of the text, published in the *Pandit*, 1871) identifies Śeṣa with Patañjali: *śrīmadbhagavaccheṣakṛtāryāpañcāśītiḥ samāptā* (colophon) vs. *śrīmadbhagavatpatañjaliviracitāryāḥ* (*incipit*). The Western mentality will of course attempt to resolve the ambiguity: the author is one Ādiśeṣa, so named, who is a devotee of Viṣṇu. The line between divinity and honored predecessor being always difficult to draw in India, such identifications serve as well as ways of claiming greater authority for the text in question. In these notes, the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādiśeṣa will be designated by the abbreviation ĀPS [= *Ādiśeṣaparamārthasāra*], the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta, by PS.

[10]The *Yuktidīpikā* ad *Sāṃkhyakārikā* [SK] 2 cites v. 83 of ĀPS. This anonymous commentary is situated ca. 550 AD by Frauwallner (1973, vol. I: 226), ca. 680–720, or even later, by Wezler and Motegi, *Yuktidīpikā*: 50.

[11]See YR ad 2–3.

[12]ĀPS 7: *guṇapuruṣavibhāgajñe dharmādharmau na bandhakau bhavataḥ/ iti gaditapūrvavākyaiḥ prakṛtiṃ puruṣaṃ ca me brūhi//*, 'Merit and Demerit do not bind him who knows the distinction between the Qualities and the Soul. In accordance with [these] sentences, as pronounced in the foregoing, explain to me Primordial Nature and Soul!' (tr. Danielson — as are all translations from ĀPS cited here, unless otherwise specified).

[13]See, notably, Bouy *Āgamaśāstra* [ĀŚ]: 23–28; Mahadevan 1975: 16–22; Bhattacharya ĀŚ: LXXIXff.

[14]See ĀPS 27. Ādiśeṣa shares notably with Bhartṛprapañca the conception of a *saprapañcabrahman*, in virtue of which *brahman*, in the course of evolution, passes through different states (*avasthā*), eight in number, according to Bhartṛprapañca (see Hiriyanna 1924), five, according to Ādiśeṣa (v. 27).

[15]See ĀPS 31.

[16]Thus, by some authors, the PS of Ādiśeṣa has been identified as essentially vedāntic, in reference, particularly, to v. 31, whose terminology is indubitably vedāntic, and to the last verse (which may nevertheless be a late interpolation): *vedāntaśāstram akhilaṃ vilokya śeṣas tu [...]* (Gaṇapati Śâstrî ĀPS: preface; Suryanarayana Sastri ĀPS: VII; Bhatttacharya ĀŚ: LXXX; Bouy ĀŚ: 18, 27; note that the *Śabdakalpadruma* identifies the text of the *Paramārthasāra* as the 'work of Śeṣanāga', in 79 āryās, s.v. *vedānta*); note also that the later vedāntic tradition, represented notably by the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* (14th cent.) appropriates the first *Paramārthasāra* for its demonstration of *jīvanmukti*, presuming to ignore Śaiva arguments entirely on that notion. Others consider it as more akin to Sāṃkhya (Pandey 1963: 63; Silburn PS: 19: 'un Sāṃkhya teinté de Viṣnouisme (*sic*), par conséquent théiste'), or vaiṣṇavite (Barnett PS: 708). P. Hacker (1965: 154) treats the ĀPS as one of the texts 'that profess Vaiṣṇavism and teach radical advaitism at the same time'. For Danielson (ĀPS: 4, 6, 10),

The doctrine that emerges from the earlier *Paramārthasāra* reflects at least a part of the conceptual apparatus of Sāṃkhya evolutionism, placing it within the general framework of a vedāntic metaphysics that posits from the start the unreality of the phenomenal world,[17] itself the result of the all-powerful *māyā* of Viṣṇu — a deity who, however, seems little but the personification of a principle that the text terms equally *brahman, ātman*, or *paramātman*. This doctrine, evidently eclectic, is none the less sufficiently coherent to be qualified as "synthetic". The text attempts, in effect, to integrate both the perspectives (*darśana*) of Sāṃkhya and of Vedānta, rather than considering them as alternatives, unifying them within the rubric of a Vaiṣṇavism whose "divinity", whatever his name, serves as unique principle — thus, in effect, privileging the nondual aspect of the doctrine and placing it squarely within the currents of early devotionalism.[18]

A programmatic verse at the beginning of Ādhāra's response to the disciple sketches the basic outlines of such a doctrine: 'I shall propound this "Essence of Supreme Truth" (*paramārthasāra*) after making obeisance to that Upendra [=Viṣṇu], by whom this unreal world was made from Primordial Matter as something seemingly real'.[19]

Moreover, one has the feeling that the questions put by the disciple are principally framed in terms of Sāṃkhya,[20] whereas the responses of the teacher are usually couched in advaitic terms, even though the latter continues to utilize (in order to make himself better understood?) several Sāṃkhya concepts — always careful, however, to establish equivalences, where possible, with key notions of the other system — for instance *prakṛti*, persistently identified with the *māyā* of Viṣṇu.[21] As a matter of fact, the disciple poses two questions: how liberation is achieved (vv. 4 and 6),[22] and how he is to grasp what is at issue in distinguishing *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* (v. 7). It is the master who, in the course of his response, unifies the two

despite numerous Sāṃkhya traits, 'the work as a whole belongs to a tradition of Vedānta, and one we may call Bhedābhedādvaita'.

[17] ĀPS 2: *ātmāmburāśau nikhilo 'pi loko magno 'pi nācāmati nekṣate ca/ āścaryam etan mṛgatṛṣṇikābhe bhavāmburāśau ramate mṛṣaiva//*, 'The whole world, though submerged in the ocean of the Self (*ātman*), neither drinks from nor looks at it. It is a mystery that [the world] just blindly lusts for the ocean of existences, which is like a mirage'; also ĀPS 9, cited infra.

[18] It might be said that the same tactic is employed in all the manifestos of devotionalism, including the *Gītā*, which may well have served as model for those that followed.

[19] ĀPS 9: *satyam iva jagad asatyaṃ mūlaprakṛter idaṃ kṛtaṃ yena/ taṃ praṇipatyopendraṃ vakṣye paramārthasāram idam//*.

[20] Even if he addresses (ĀPS 4) a master whom he celebrates as 'one who has mastered Veda and Vedāṅga', as him 'who speaks the truth' (*ṛtavaktṛ*) — that is, comments R, who knows 'the complete meaning of Vedānta [viz., of the upaniṣads], formed by the words of the Lord, Brahmā, etc.'.

[21] ĀPS 10b: *māyāmayī pravṛttiḥ saṃhriyata iyaṃ punaḥ kramaśaḥ//*, '[Then] this Manifestation, which consists of Magic (*māyā*), is absorbed again in [reverse] order'.

[22] ĀPS 4: *saṃsārārṇavataraṇapraśnaṃ pṛcchāmy ahaṃ bhagavan.*

requests by introducing a third term, *brahman* (or *ātman*), [23] an upaniṣadic notion, hence vedāntic, qualified as *advaita* in verse 57. [24]

Thus, doubtless, the liminary *caution* of the master, who warns the student that the response will be difficult, and who exhorts him to make the necessary effort to understand it: 'Although that which is to be said [about this] in the following is very hard to penetrate into even for those who have knowledge, do you hear it nevertheless!' [25]

One may wonder whether Ādiśeṣa's preamble offers the occasion for apprehending the manner in which the transition between the two systems may have taken place. The transition is conceptual, if not chronological, which may have been the work of a thinker or group of thinkers — though we must not infer from this any anteriority of one system vis-à-vis the other, be it Sāṃkhya dualism or the nondualism of the Vedānta. [26] Thus the analogy of the chrysalis, which the student employs to illustrate the problematic of liberation from bondage, [27] may also apply to the manner in which one doctrine emerges from the other — the same doctrine, to be sure, yet different, indeed perfected.

Nevertheless, as he arrives at the end of the exposition, the reader notices that the doctrine — despite its apparently composite character — takes great care to designate and to present itself as a *sarvātmavāda*, a 'doctrine of the Universal Self' or a 'doctrine holding that all is the Self' [28] — a term that proclaims the doctrine's coherence by allying it with a long-established tradition that sees the Ultimate as both immanent and transcendent, but which in effect amounts to asserting another type of nondualism. The *sarvātmavāda* of Ādiśeṣa, in effect, finds its place within the lineages of Advaita and the traditions of Kashmir Śaivism — monisms that proclaim, in consonance with many upaniṣads, that 'the Self is All': '[There is] not a single doubt as to this, [viz., the fact that] this all is only the Self. Only when one realizes [this Self] as both having and not having parts, does one become free from the impenetrable darkness of Delusion,

[23]In particular, ĀPS 13 (*ātman*), 16–18, 19 (*brahman*), etc.

[24]An *advaitabrahman* further described as *sakalaniṣkala*, an oxymoron that R interprets as referring both to the *saprapañcabrahman* of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta and to *brahman* as *sat, cit, ānanda*.

[25]ĀPS 8: *ity ādhāro bhagavān pṛṣṭaḥ śiṣyeṇa taṃ sa hovāca/ viduṣām apy atigahanaṃ vaktavyam idaṃ śṛṇu tathāpi tvam//*.

[26]See Shastri PS: IX. Bhartṛprapañca (5th or 6th cent.), cited by Śaṅkara in his commentary to *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* [BĀU], is there presented as an *aupaniṣada* whose doctrine is influenced by Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya (see Bouy ĀŚ: 27).

[27]ĀPS 6: *karmaguṇajālabaddho jīvaḥ saṃsarati kośakāra iva/ mohāndhakāragahanāt tasya kathaṃ bandhanān mokṣaḥ//*, 'The soul, bound by the net of Acts and Qualities, is in Transmigration like a chrysalis [in its cocoon]. How is it to be delivered (*mokṣa*) from bondage, which is hard to penetrate because of the darkness [consisting] of Delusion?'

[28]Verse 29c-d sketches already the outlines of the doctrine: *na vidanti vāsudevaṃ sarvātmānaṃ narā mūḍhāḥ//*, 'Deluded by this error, people do not recognize Vāsudeva as the Self of everything'.

and become Supreme Lord at the same time'.[29] Another aspect of the strategy of identification elaborated by the first *Paramārthasāra* is its claim of doctrinal uniqueness, which takes the usual form of asserting its universality with respect to rival doctrines, but such that they find a place within it as subsidiary moments: 'We consent to whatever [others], who are blind with greed, proclaim in their *Siddhāntas*, *Āgamas*, and *Tarkas*, since all that [testifies to the orientation of] their thought toward [our] doctrine, according to which everything is the Self'.[30]

Moreover, it is evident that vedāntic notions and the monistic argumentation that supports them take precedence over the exposé of Sāṃkhya categories: the theory of the *tattvas* appears only occasionally,[31] and there remains of Sāṃkhya ontology only the notion of the three 'qualities' (*guṇa*), and of Sāṃkhya eschatology only the insistence on discriminating *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*,[32] with a view thereby to gaining liberation — a teaching, for that matter, found already in the upaniṣads, as recognized already by Vācaspati in his *Tattvakaumudī* [TK] (citing specifically BĀU II 4, 5 and *Chāndogyopaniṣad* [ChU] VIII 15): 'Says the Śruti: "The Spirit should be known and discriminated from Primordial Matter"; (by so doing) "the agent does not return, he does not return (into this world)." '[33]

In effect, more even than an exposition of doctrine — a doctrine moreover that did not give rise to a discrete tradition — the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādiśeṣa presents itself as a treatise on liberation, to the extent that it constitutes the response of a master to his acolyte desirous of liberation.

Such is indeed the point of articulation between Sāṃkhya-type and Advaita-type reasonings in the first *Paramārthasāra* — the soteriological perspective.[34] And this is also, without a doubt — I will return to this point below — one of the justifications that might have prompted the second *Paramārthasāra* to undertake a rereading of the first.

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[29] ĀPS 63d–64: *na kaścid apy atra saṃdehaḥ// ātmaivedaṃ sarvaṃ niṣkalasakalaṃ yadaiva bhāvayati/ mohagahanād viyuktas tadaiva parameśvarībhūtaḥ//*. Here, the most evident divergence with respect to Śaiva monism or that of Śaṅkara is the maintenance of a *brahman/ātman* conceived as both provided with and devoid of parts. The final phrase, however, reads as Śaiva: '... and become the Supreme Lord at the same time' (*tadaiva parameśvarībhūtaḥ*).

[30] ĀPS 65: *yad yat siddhāntāgamatarkeṣu prabruvanti rāgāndhāḥ/ anumodāmas tat teṣāṃ sarvātmavādadhiyā//*. Similar strategy in PS 50 (see p. 9).

[31] See ĀPS 20.

[32] See ĀPS 7, 35, 44–45, 70, 75, 83.

[33] TK 2: *ātmā vā 're jñātavyaḥ prakṛtito vivektavyaḥ* (BĀU II 4, 5); *na sa punar āvartate na sa punar āvartate* (ChU VIII 15); tr. G. Jha.

[34] It has been suggested (Danielson ĀPS: 4) that the famous preamble to the second section of the received text of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* may have been based on the model furnished by the first PS: a *mumukṣu* asking a master to instruct him regarding means of acceding to liberation.

1.2. Rewriting

1.2.1. Appropriation

However that may be, the claim made by the Śaiva *Paramārthasāra* to have rewritten the older *Paramārthasāra* is quite unheard of in the history of Indian literature — where neither borrowing nor unattributed copying are much frowned upon [35] — for in this case it is not merely a matter of reproducing a text of well-known reputation, [36] making here and there a few adjustments or innovations, but rather of appropriating, transforming, even investing another text, to make it better able to express an improved doctrine. This appropriation is justified on the assumption that the improved doctrine (in effect, Trika Śaivism) is already present in seed form in the older doctrine (of Ādiśeṣa), and that it is nothing but the accomplishment of that older doctrine, from which it has erased all trace of dualism.

The second *Paramārthasāra* is thus a work that sees itself as the quintessential distillation of another — though, to be fair, in formal terms, it is also an expansion, having added twenty or so verses — which process Yogarāja illustrates by the analogy of butter extracted from clotted milk, [37] an analogy that cuts two ways. For, in effect, while the clotting of milk represents a transformation that is spontaneous, given the right circumstances, the production of butter requires will and effort. On the other hand, according to the Sāṃkhya doctrine of causality, *satkāryavāda*, the effect is pre-existent in the cause, and so may the Trika itself, which adopts the same *satkāryavāda*, be understood by its advocates as already present in the 'clotted milk' of Ādiśeṣa's "Sāṃkhya". What remains is that the transformation implies a supplementary effort, as well as a perfectioning — a threefold effort composed of reasoning (*yukti*), acquisition of experience (*anubhava*), and scriptural exegesis (*āgama*), as Yogarāja is fond of repeating. [38]

Thus the process of rewriting at work in the second *Paramārthasāra*

[35] See *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, chapters XI-XII — or *Dhvanyāloka*, chapter IV.

[36] See, for instance, the different versions of the *Madanaparājaya, The Defeat of Love* (Balbir, Osier 2004: 21ff.).

[37] 'That very Anantanātha, wise in teaching all the doctrines without exception, imparted instruction to the disciple, saying: "[Knowledge of] *brahman*, the ultimate, may be attained through the text entitled *Paramārthasāra*, also called the *Verses of Ādhāra*, via the discrimination of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*, according to the principles of the Sāṃkhya system". The teacher (*guru*, viz., Abhinavagupta), motivated by the need to show favor to others, [now] expounds the essence of it, just as one extracts butter from curds; that is, he expounds the essence of teachings on ultimate reality (*paramārthopadeśa*) in keeping with the Śaiva principle of ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality, in order to show favor to all creatures' (translations of AG's PS and its commentary are the author's).

[38] With, sometimes, a fourth term: meditative practice (*pariśīlana*); see YR ad 8, 10–11, 79–80.

makes it appear that the debate with Sāṃkhya has really never taken place, which justifies nondual Śaivism of Kashmir in borrowing the theory of the *tattvas*, all the while adapting it to the needs of a monistic system.[39] Even though it is true that the doctrine set forth in the Śaiva *Paramārthasāra* is framed polemically, as the commentary frequently attempts to demonstrate,[40] it is essentially directed against the Buddhists, particularly Dharmakīrti, and against Vedānta, referred to by Yogarāja as Brahmavāda at large, or as Śāntabrahmavāda.[41] I will return to this point later.

In support of this interpretation of the exercise of rewriting — in addition to the clotted milk analogy — I might point to the passage of the commentary where the term *guruḥ* of the third verse is understood to refer both to Ādhāra and to Abhinavagupta. Yogarāja's exegesis is supported by several liminary considerations: — the attribution of the first *Paramārthasāra* to an author designated not only as Śeṣa but as Patañjali; — the traditional identification of Patañjali (whether he be the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, or of the *Yogasūtra* [YS], or of both) with Śeṣa, in virtue of the epithetical designation *bhujaṅgavibhu*, implying that Patañjali is a devotee

[39]See p. 54. On the Saiddhāntika treatment of the *tattvas*, see *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa* [TAK], s.v. *tattva*.

[40]See, esp., PS 32 and the commentary ad loc., which, in the course of discussing rival conceptions of the Self, refers explicitly to the Mīmāṃsā (see n. 738, 740).

[41]See, for example, YR ad 10–11, 15, 27, 32 (where the 'Brahmavāda' is referred to for its version of the *śūnyavāda*: *neti neti*), and 35. YR's gloss permits us to complete Sanderson's observation: 'When Vedānta is expounded by its opponents in Kashmirian sources of our period it is the doctrine of Maṇḍanamiśra which is generally in mind [...]. To my knowledge no source betrays familiarity with the doctrines of Śaṅkara' (1985: 210, n. 41 — Sanderson refers here, notably, to the commentary of Rāmakaṇṭha on the *Paramokṣanirāsakārikā* of Sadyojyotis). It is in fact quite difficult to decide whether Śaiva authors discuss or are aware of the niceties involved in distinguishing Maṇḍana's from Śaṅkara's doctrines. They nowhere deal with the issues dividing later vedāntic schools; how then is it possible to know definitely which particular version of Vedānta they have in mind? All one can reasonably say, at least as regards the PS and its commentary, is that YR assigns to the 'Brahmavāda' category both the Vedānta *stricto sensu* — which he also refers to as the Śāntabrahmavāda (ad 10–11) — and the Śabdabrahmavāda of Bhartṛhari and his followers. Accordingly, YR ad 27 refutes the conception of Self of the 'Brahmavādins' and that of the 'Prāṇabrahmavādins', viz., of Bhartṛhari. And YR ad 35 applies the word 'Brahmavādin' to Bhartṛhari. Bhartṛhari (ca. 650 AD), of course, is substantially prior both to Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara, who are more or less contemporaneous with each other. The distinction between these two sorts of 'Brahmavāda' seems much clearer in YR's text than any putative distinction between the doctrines of Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara. One may wonder whether the Śaivas of the 10th–11th cent. were aware of or interested in doctrinal differences among later vedāntic "schools", which may not have come into vogue in any case much before the time of Vācaspati and his great commentary, the *Bhāmatī*. It may be added that one of the main points of contention between Śaivas and Advaitins, according to YR, concerns their respective interpretations of the epithet *śānta* as applied to *brahman*: *śānta*, for YR, does not mean 'inert', in the manner of a stone, but ' "serene", reposing [ever] in its absolute nature, in unison with its Śakti, for there is no disturbance arising from the dichotomy between the knower and the known' (YR ad 10–11). On the above discussion, see also n. 791; on Maṇḍana, see Biardeau 1969.

of the Serpent,[42] and thus, in some degree, its incarnation; — the evidence of a south Indian tradition, which holds Abhinavagupta also to be an incarnation of Śeṣa,[43] on the basis of a pun on his name when suffixed with the honorific *-pāda*: *abhinava-guptapāda*, 'he, utterly novel, whose feet are hidden'. Though the attribution may appear fanciful, this line of argument does suggest, if 'guru' is to be understood as referring to more than one teacher in this passage, that Abhinavagupta and Ādhāra were also sometimes understood as the same teacher. The passage in question might then be translated: 'The Teacher [Ādhāra] replied to him by [reciting] the *Ādhārakārikā* of which [as] Abhinavagupta, [he now] expounds the essence from the point of view of the Śaiva teachings'.

It should be noted also that verse 50 of Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra*: 'Though not an agent, it is *I* who compose the wonderfully varied Siddhāntas, Āgamas and Tarkas', besides echoing ĀPS 65, amounts to an implicit proclamation of the superiority of the Trika doctrine. Thus is disclosed one of the main purposes served, from the Trika point of view, by rewriting the Ādiśeṣa's text: to put an end once and for all to the disputes of precedence among the schools, by affirming the uncontested supremacy of the Trika. At the same time, PS 50 provides another, as it were "metaphysical", clue as to that rewriting: the true author of the *Paramārthasāra*, whether he be called Ādiśeṣa or Abhinavagupta, is none other than Śiva himself, the sole Agent, who is one's own Self in the form of the absolute 'I'. 'Thus, says Śiva, in Yogarāja's commentary, though not myself their creator, it is *I* who cause the multitudinous wonders that are the Siddhāntas, etc., [to come into being], having entered into the intentions of gods, sages and men, being [already] in essence their inner intuition (*antaḥpratibhā*) and desirous of expounding [these doctrines] either in abridgement or in more elaborate form'.[44]

1.2.2. Reasons for a choice

1.2.2.1. DESTINY OF THE FIRST *PARAMĀRTHASĀRA* Why has the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādiśeṣa been chosen as a text to be recomposed? It was, evidently, a text that enjoyed some celebrity in the Indian tradition — and may already have acquired by Abhinavagupta's time the status of a *śruti*. Might one suppose that Abhinavagupta, in "rewriting" it, expected some transfer of its authority in his favor?[45]

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[42]Note that TĀ XXVIII 285b, in quoting the *pratīka* of YS IV 27, refers to the author of the YS as 'Bhujagādhīśa', 'Lord of the serpents'. Similarly, TĀ XXVIII 309b refers to Ādiśeṣa, author of the first PS, as Ahīśāna, v. 81 of whose work TĀ XXVIII 312 quotes.

[43]See Pandey 1963: 10–11.

[44]See n. 946. On the question of Trika's supremacy, see also PS 27 and n. 661.

[45]See Chatterji 1914: 14.

The text's authority was not limited in time or by tendency. Abhinavagupta himself refers to Ādiśeṣa's work elsewhere, citing twice its verse 81 in his *Gītārthasaṃgraha* [GAS] ad VIII 6 (where it is termed a *śruti*) and ad VIII 14, as well as in TĀ XXVIII 312.[46] The same verse will be repeated *verbatim* by Abhinavagupta in his *Paramārthasāra*, as its verse 83. And when Vāmadeva, probably a disciple of Yogarāja,[47] quotes it (p. 21), he attributes it to '*bhagavān bhogipatiḥ*',[48] the 'Lord of the serpents', that is, presumably, Ādiśeṣa.

Similarly, the older *Paramārthasāra* was well known in circles that practiced a syncretistic version of Śaivism and Vaiṣṇavism. Thus, the *Spandapradīpikā* [SpP], a commentary on the *Spandakārikā* [SpK], the foundational text of the Spanda school, cites verse 66 (which has no direct correspondent in the Śaiva *Paramārthasāra*).[49] The *Spandapradīpikā*, a work of Utpalavaiṣṇava (also known as Utpalācārya, Bhāgavata Utpala,[50] ninth–tenth century), testifies to the same spirit of syncretism as does the *Cicchaktisaṃstuti* of Yoginātha (probably same period),[51] a Śākta who was familiar with the Spanda, and who as well cites Ādiśeṣa's verse 33 for its evocation of the *māyā* of Viṣṇu.[52]

Before this, the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādiśeṣa was authoritative for Sāṃkhya, as evidenced by the citation of its verse 83 in the *Yuktidīpikā*, a work composed sometime between the sixth and ninth centuries, of unknown authorship, but probably of Sāṃkhya affiliation. This verse, which the *Yuktidīpikā* attributes to the 'tradition' (*āmnāya*), is cited in support of its interpretation of SK 2, according to which interpretation 'liberation is obtained by knowledge' (*jñānān mokṣaḥ*) — the knowledge, that is, whereby *puruṣa* is discriminated from *prakṛti*: 'Just as a man falls to the ground from the top of a tree involuntarily, once he has lost his foothold, similarly, someone who knows the Qualities and the Soul (*puruṣa*) becomes "separate" (*kevala*), even involuntarily'.[53]

Even Advaitins make use of the first *Paramārthasāra*. The fourteenth-

[46] The entire passage (vv. 309–320ab) constitutes a meticulous exegesis of the cited verse, whose source, according to JR, is the *Anantakārikā*.

[47] See p. 22.

[48] With emendation: *bhogipatināpi* for *bhegipatināpi*.

[49] Cited n. 80.

[50] See Sanderson 2001: 35.

[51] By the testimony of the SpP which, in its long avat. (Dyczkowski SpP: 5–6), cites at length the *Cicchaktisaṃstuti*, one may infer that Yoginātha is prior to Utpalavaiṣṇava, or his contemporary. On Yoginātha, see Dyczkowski SpK: 290.

[52] ĀPS 33: *jvalanād dhūmodgatibhir vividhākṛtir ambare yathā bhāti/ tadvad viṣṇau sṛṣṭiḥ svamāyayā dvaitavistarā bhāti//*, 'As a variety of forms appear in the sky because of smoke rising from fire, so creation, expanded into multiplicity, appears in Viṣṇu by his own Magic'. By this citation, Yoginātha explains the fact that phenomenal diversity itself presupposes a unique divinity in which it must inhere, thus justifying an idealistic monism.

[53] ĀPS 83: *vṛkṣāgrāc cyutapādo yadvad anicchan naraḥ kṣitau patati/ tadvad guṇapuruṣajño 'nichann api kevalībhavati//*.

century *Jīvanmuktiviveka* of Vidyāraṇya cites verses 77 and 81, which present two types of *jīvanmukta*.[54] In the sixteenth, Rāghavānanda comments upon the entire text. And numerous are the Indianists who take the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādiśeṣa to be a possible source for the *Āgamaśāstra* of Gauḍapāda, the chef-d'œuvre of pre-Śaṅkara Advaita.[55]

In addition, the *Candrikā* (sixteenth century) on the *Prabodhacandrodaya* (ad V, v. 33) cites ĀPS 18, ascribing the verse to Śeṣa (*yathoktaṃ bhagavatā śeṣeṇa*).[56] Finally, in the eighteenth, the famous grammarian Nāgeśabhaṭṭa cites it several times in his *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā*, while discussing the status of error.[57]

The first *Paramārthasāra* has thus enjoyed a long and significant destiny, of which the most striking indication is no doubt its having been rewritten by a philosopher of another persuasion.

1.2.2.2. DIVERGENCES/CONVERGENCES The identification of Abhinavagupta, the 'new Śeṣa', with the author of the first *Paramārthasāra* is just the emblem, the mythical clothing, of a more profound affinity.

After all, nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, which Abhinavagupta has brought to its finished state, aims, just as did the work of Ādiśeṣa, at the integration of two points of view seemingly incompatible: realistic dualism — that of the Sāṃkhya, from which it borrows the hierarchy of 'principles' (*tattva*) — and idealistic nondualism, of which it retains the core notion of the 'world as appearance'. Even if the modalities of realization are different, the principle of integration is the same in both projects.

But, just as evidently, the fact that the two doctrines are analogous does not make them strictly commensurable. For the version of Kashmir Śaivism that eventuates in the Trika is a system of thought of considerable scope and coherence, lacking common measure with the relatively impoverished system of the older *Paramārthasāra* — which, as we said before, has not given rise to a discrete tradition.

Above all, the Trika, to which the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta is intended to serve as introduction, is a Śaiva doctrine, whose greater purpose is that of synthesizing the older currents of Śaivism itself. From

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[54]Respectively, pp. 74 and 49, ascribing them to Śeṣa (qualified as *bhagavat*, in citing v. 81; as the author of the *Āryāpañcāśīti*, in citing v. 77). ĀPS 77: *hayamedhasahasrāṇy apy atha kurute brahmaghātalakṣāṇi/ paramārthavin na puṇyair na ca pāpaiḥ spṛśyate vimalaḥ//*; v. 77 repeated almost *verbatim* by v. 70 of the second PS, as ĀPS 81 is repeated as such by PS 83.

[55]In particular, ĀPS 78 (*jaḍavad vicared agādhamatiḥ*) is paralleled by ĀŚ II 36d: *jaḍaval lokam ācaret*. See, esp., Sastri ĀPS: VIII; Bhattacharya ĀŚ: LXXIXff.

[56]Noted by Sovani 1912: 259–260. PS 8 reproduces ĀPS 18 in large part.

[57]Nāgeśabhaṭṭa cites ĀPS 49–50 (p. 232), 33 (p. 236), 9 and 30 (p. 246), 25 (p. 247), 28 (p. 268, 287), 29 (p. 268), 56–57 (p. 269), 47 (p. 283), 23 (p. 284), 27 (p. 287), 46 (p. 291), 65 (p. 295). He shows that Ādiśeṣa conceives error as *sadasatkhyāti*, not as *anirvacanīyakhyāti*; see Sastri ĀPS: XX.

them it borrows not only the notion of *śakti*, but many elements of ritual and yogic practice (mantras, *mudrās*, *kuṇḍalinī*, etc.) that serve to place it in a tantric context, deploying both a metaphysics and a praxis of considerable complexity within a system of thought situated under the aegis of esoterism. [58]

Still, the points of convergence of the two *Paramārthasāra* are not infrequent. Let me mention only a few most worthy of note. For the text of Ādiśeṣa has already forged a number of concepts that will become integral to the Trika.

sarvātman

In the first place, the notion of *sarvātman*, the universal Self, inherited from the upaniṣads, is fundamental to the doctrine of Ādiśeṣa. And though the Trika describes itself using terms other than *sarvātmavāda*, the idea of *sarvātman* is nevertheless at the heart of its doctrine — as the principle explaining the double status of the Self, serving also as divinity: both immanent and transcendent. And so Kṣemarāja teaches, in his auto-commentary to *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* [PH] (v. 8), that the notion of the double status of the Self is the criterion of excellence that places the Trika above all the other systems, even those of the Tāntrikas and Kaulas. [59]

Numerous are the occurrences of the notion of *sarvātman* in the Śaiva *Paramārthasāra*. Here are just two examples: verse 73, which serves to define the *jīvanmukta*, and whose first hemistich implies the notion of *sarvātman*: '*There is nothing at all separate from the [knower of the Self]* to be honored with an oblation or to be praised; would then he, who is liberated, who has no use for homages or ritual formulae, be satisfied with hymns of praise, etc.?'; [60] and verse 82, which repeats almost *verbatim* verse 80 of the first *Paramārthasāra*: 'He who knows the Self of all, thus described — [source of] supreme and incomparable bliss, omnipresent, utterly devoid of diversity — becomes one with that Self'. [61]

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[58] Note the recurrent reference in these texts to the notion of *rahasya*, 'secret'.

[59] Kṣemarāja cites from an Āgama: *viśvottīrṇam ātmatattvam iti tāntrikāḥ/ viśvamayam iti kulādyāmnāyaniviṣṭāḥ/ viśvottīrṇaṃ viśvamayaṃ ca iti trikādidarśanavidaḥ/*, 'The Tāntrikas maintain that the *ātman* principle transcends the universe. Those who are followers of the Kula tradition, etc., consider the *ātman* principle as immanent in [or 'constitutive of'] the universe. The Knowers of the Trika system, etc., consider it as both transcendent and immanent' (*Pratyabhijñāhṛdayavṛtti* [PHvṛ] 8). Similarly, YR ad 82 explains: 'He is the "Self of all" (*sarvātman*), the Self of all that cognizes and is cognized; or [taking the compound as a *bahuvrīhi*] he is that whose Self is [composed of] the entirety of knowers and things known; in other words, he is both the transcendent and the immanent'.

[60] PS 73: *stutyaṃ vā hotavyaṃ nāsti vyatiriktam asya kiṃcana ca/ stotrādinā sa tuṣyen muktas tannirnamaskṛtivaṣaṭkaḥ//.*

[61] PS 82: *vyāpinam abhihitam itthaṃ sarvātmānāṃ vidhūtanānātvam/ nirupamaparamānandaṃ yo vetti sa tanmayo bhavati//*; cf. ĀPS 80: *vyāpinam abhinnam itthaṃ sarvātmānāṃ vidhūtanānātvam/ nirupamaparamānandaṃ yo veda sa tanmayo bhavati//*. See also YR ad 69, which discusses the double meaning of *sarvabhūtātman.*

krīḍā

Another point of convergence is supplied by the notion of 'play' (*krīḍā*), which serves to explain, in the first *Paramārthasāra*, the double movement of phenomenal manifestation — away from, and return to, the One that is both immanent and transcendent, both extroverted and introverted: 'Having displayed himself, like a mirage, employing the infinite varieties of breath [and the other principles], Vāsudeva withdraws again [all into himself] through his own power, as if playing'.[62] Here the idea of 'play' is associated with the notion of *svavibhūti*, which anticipates the śaivite notion of *svātantrya*, 'freedom' or 'independence'. Note also that Rāghavānanda glosses *svavibhūtyā*, 'by one's own sovereignty', as *svātantryaśaktyā māyayā*, 'by virtue of *māyā*, the energy of freedom' — śaivite terminology indeed, and which does take the reader aback coming from an Advaitin! Nevertheless, though the theme of 'divine play' is common to Śaivism and to Advaita (even pre-Śaṅkaran), it should be noted that Advaitins privilege the term *līlā*, whereas Śaivas prefer *krīḍā*, as does Ādiśeṣa.[63]

sakṛdvibhāta ātmā

Equally remarkable is the presence of a phrase in Ādiśeṣa's text destined to find its place in the treasury of śaivite maxims: *sakṛd vibhātaḥ*, 'having appeared once [and for all]': 'The Self is devoid of all concepts, pure, [always and forever] waked, unageing, immortal, calm, spotless, having appeared once [and forever], spiritual, [and] pervasive, like space'.[64]

This very verse finds a parallel in the second *Paramārthasāra*, in reference to its verses 10 and 11, which attempt as well a definition of the Self. Yogarāja, after explaining that the compound 'devoid of dissolution and creation' (*layodayavihīnam*) means 'eternal' (*sanātanam*), goes on to cite the formula *sakṛd vibhāto 'yam ātmā*, 'The Self appears once and for all'.

[62] ĀPS 30: *prāṇādyanantabhedair ātmānaṃ saṃvitatya jālam iva/ saṃharati vāsudevaḥ svavibhūtyā krīḍamāna iva//* (translation is mine; cf. Danielson: 'After having extended himself through infinite varieties, viz., breath, etc., like [a feat of] magic, Vāsudeva [= Viṣṇu], by his own sovereignty, reabsorbs [everything] as if playing'). R reads *ākrīḍamāna iva*.

[63] In the *Brahmasūtra* [BS] (II 1, 33), creation itself is free play (*līlā*): *lokavat tu līlākaivalyam*, 'But [Brahman's creative activity] is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life' (tr. Thibaut). One should distinguish this theory from the teleological theory according to which the Lord creates in order to play; Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* [BSBh] II 1, 33 observes: 'Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature, without reference to any purpose' (tr. Thibaut, who adds in note: 'The nature (*svabhāva*) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Māyā joined with time and *karman*'). This is equally the view of ĀŚ I 9. R ad ĀPS 30, while commenting on the word he reads as *ākrīḍamāna*, cites as well BS II 1, 33. And he adds: *svārājyasamṛddhimanto narendrā yathā svavibhūtyā krīḍanti tadvad ātmanātmany eva vihartukāma iva*, 'Just as princes whose dominion is complete [continue to] play [at being kings] by exercising their majesty, so also [does Viṣṇu], for he loves to sport, in and by himself'.

[64] ĀPS 25: *sarvavikalpanahinaḥ śuddho buddho 'jarāmaraḥ śāntaḥ/ amalaḥ sakṛd vibhātaś cetana ātmā khavad vyāpī//* (tr. Danielson, modified).

Śaivite texts that take up this formula in more or less developed versions are numerous. Its origin is perhaps to be found also in the upaniṣads, as for instance, in ChU VIII 4, 1–2, where the 'world of *brahman*' is qualified as *sakṛdvibhātaḥ*. As far as the ontological implication of the formula is concerned, namely that this Self 'once and for all appearing' is the source of the appearance of all other things, is the 'unique Real', Rāghavānanda, while commenting on Ādiśeṣa's verse 25, recalls that the formula is already alluded to in *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* [MuU] II 2, 11: 'Every thing shines only after that shining light. His shining illumines all this world'.[65] Such an idea is also present in one of the leitmotifs of the Trika, the formula *nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate*, 'That which is not luminous cannot manifest itself',[66] with its complex network of implications.

In a śaivite perspective, the epithet *sakṛdvibhātaḥ* in effect establishes not only the eternality of the Self, but the contemporaneity of the Self's revelation and the advent of liberation — and as well that the experience itself is perennial. This is the truth, when apprehended, that "astounds" like a flash of lightning (the root *sphur*) — the sudden and simultaneous realization both of the Self and of one's liberation; on it is grounded the otherwise paradoxical idea of liberation in this life (*jīvanmukti*). For if the experience of the Self takes place in this life, the same must be said of liberation, whose realization is thereupon dependent. Such is the Traika usage of the old epithet applying to the Self, *sakṛdvibhātaḥ* — a usage that the second *Paramārthasāra* illustrates: 'Similarly, the [knower's] own essential Self remains in the condition it was in when it became manifest once and for all at the moment knowledge was acquired; it does not become otherwise when the body falls away'.[67]

Liberation through gnosis

The principle of 'liberation through gnosis' appears as the first correlative of the doctrine of *sarvātmavāda*: to know that all is the Self is to be instantaneously liberated. Several verses of the two *Paramārthasāra* propound this principle.[68] Two are particularly worthy of attention — if only for the way in which the second *Paramārthasāra* borrows from the first. Ādiśeṣa's verse 73 reads: 'There is neither any place for Release, nor [does Release consist in] going elsewhere. Breaking the fetter which consists of ignorance: that is what one knows as Release'.[69] It is taken up

[65] ChU VIII 4, 1–2 is quoted n. 455. MuU II 2, 11: *tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvaṃ tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti* (tr. Radhakrishnan — as are all translations from upaniṣads cited here, unless otherwise specified).

[66] See YR ad 30.

[67] PS 93: *evaṃ jñānāvasare svātmā sakṛd asya yādṛg avabhātaḥ/ tādṛśa eva tadāsau na dehapāte 'nyathā bhavati//*.

[68] Notably, ĀPS 39–40, 67–68, 72, 73, 81; PS 60 [= ĀPS 73], 83 [= ĀPS 81].

[69] ĀPS 73: mokṣasya naiva kiṃcid dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatra/ ajñānamayagranther bhedo *yas taṃ vidur* mokṣaḥ// (the words common to the two PS are in roman).

by verse 60 of Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra*, whose first hemistich is identical, but which shows śaivite modifications in the second: 'Neither has liberation any abode, nor does it involve a going elsewhere. Liberation is the manifestation of one's own energies realized by cutting the knot of ignorance'. [70]

Similarly, Ādiśeṣa's verse 81 [71] is repeated *verbatim* as verse 83 of Abhinavagupta's work — constituting one of the rare cases of word-for-word citation in the second *Paramārthasāra*: 'Whether he gives up his body in a place of pilgrimage or in the hut of an outcaste, be he conscious or not, he goes [thence] to a condition of transcendent Isolation, his grieving at an end, for he was liberated at the very moment he acquired knowledge'. [72]

There is no better example of the affinity of the two texts, inasmuch as, prompted, almost fortuitously, by the epithet *naṣṭasmṛtiḥ*, the later *Paramārthasāra* introduces another point of convergence: once acquired in this life, the fact of liberation cannot be abolished, even by the mindlessness and disorder of the final agony. Verse 81 of the initial *Paramārthasāra* just alludes to that question, which, as is well known, is much debated in Indian speculation. But the Śaiva *Paramārthasāra*, in the person of Abhinavagupta, develops the issue at length, over several verses, followed by Yogarāja who proceeds even to reinterpret in a śaivite sense several parallel passages of the *Bhagavadgītā*. [73]

Meditative realization (bhāvanā)

The means whereby one accedes to that final knowledge of the Self (or of *brahman*), according to the first *Paramārthasāra*, is 'meditation' (*bhāvanā*), or rather, as we have translated the term as it occurs in the second *Paramārthasāra*, 'meditative realization'. This is also the means privileged by the Śaiva *Paramārthasāra*, to the extent that it is this means that prevails in the *śāktopāya*, the 'way of energy' — of the four 'ways' the one whose perspective is chiefly adopted by Abhinavagupta in his *Paramārthasāra*. [74] Indeed, the notion is found as well in other doctrines (though sometimes in another context, or with different implication or significance), [75] but its understanding is here directly inherited from the older text.

The first *Paramārthasāra* devotes, in effect, three verses to *bhāvanā*: 'After one has discarded Illusion, which, being delusive, has the nature of fallacy [in that it produces] the idea of plurality, let him realize Brahman, which is without plurality, being both with and without parts. As water

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[70] PS 60: mokṣasya naiva kiṃcid dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatra/ ajñānagranthibhidā *svaśaktabhivyaktatā* mokṣaḥ//.

[71] Arguably the verse most frequently cited in later literature, particularly by AG; see p. 9.

[72] PS 83: *tīrthe śvapacagṛhe vā naṣṭasmṛtir api parityajyan deham/ jñānasamakālamuktaḥ kaivalyaṃ yāti hataśokaḥ//.*

[73] See PS 90–91, 94–95, with notes.

[74] See p. 49, and n. 858; also n. 1227.

[75] See n. 1054, the usage the Mīmāṃsā makes of it.

becomes one with water, milk with milk, wind with wind, so, by meditation (*bhāvanā*) on the spotless Brahman, [man] becomes one with it. If in that way, the sum total of plurality has receded into the state of Brahman by meditation (*bhāvanā*), no delusion, no sorrow [remains] for him, as he looks on everything as Brahman'.[76]

After an encomium of *bhāvanā* (v. 41), the second *Paramārthasāra* condenses in a single verse (v. 51) the teaching of its predecessor's verses 57–58: 'Thus, once the postulation of duality has ceased, [the adept] after overcoming the bewildering power of illusion, should merge in *brahman* as milk merges in milk, and water in water',[77] and in concatenation reproduces verse 59 of the first *Paramārthasāra*, verbally modified to suit śaivite metaphysics: 'Thus, once the host of principles has been reintegrated into Śiva through meditative realization, what sorrow is there, what delusion for him who views everything as *brahman*?'[78]

For its part, the first *Paramārthasāra* returns (v. 64) to the notion of *bhāvanā*, in the guise of the causative verb *bhāvayati*, which it associates with the idea of liberation (*parameśvarībhūtaḥ*, 'he becomes the Supreme Lord').[79] And, in verse 66, the term itself, though not mentioned as such, is ably etymologized as follows: 'By whichever appearance the Lord, who has all forms, is meditated upon, that appearance he adopts, as he is like a jewel [fulfilling all] wishes'.[80]

Similarly, at verse 68, the second *Paramārthasāra* associates again this notion with that of liberation: 'Thus awakened by the winds of his meditative realization, as he pours an oblation of all his thought constructs into the blazing Fire of the Self, he becomes Fire itself'.[81] And we note that the metaphor 'winds of meditative realization', which serves as ma-

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[76]ĀPS 57–59: evaṃ dvaitavikalpaṃ *brahmasvarūpāṃ vi*mohanīṃ māyām/ *utsṛjya sakalaniṣkalam advaitaṃ bhāvayed brahma//* yadvat salile salilaṃ kṣīre kṣīraṃ *samīraṇe vāyuḥ/ tadvad brahmaṇi vimale bhāvanayā tanmayatvam upāyati//* itthaṃ dvaitasamūhe bhāvanayā brahmabhūyam upayāte/ ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ sarvaṃ brahmāvalokayataḥ//.

[77]PS 51: itthaṃ *dvaita*vikalpe *galite pravilaṅghya* mohanīṃ māyām/ salile salilaṃ kṣīre kṣīram *iva brahmaṇi layī syāt//*.

[78]PS 52: itthaṃ *tattva*samūhe bhāvanayā *śiva*mayatvam abhiyāte/ kaḥ śokaḥ ko mohaḥ sarvaṃ brahmāvalokayataḥ//. Note especially the substitutions *śiva* for *brahman*, *tattva*° for *dvaita*°. The second hemistich, in both texts, recalls *Īśopaniṣad* 6–7, the first PS being somewhat closer to its source, since it respects the upaniṣadic order of the words (*ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ*): *yas tu sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmany evānupaśyati// sarvabhūteṣu cātmānaṃ tato na vijugupsate// yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmaivābhūd vijānataḥ// tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ//*, 'And he who sees all beings in his own self and his own self in all beings, he does not feel any revulsion by reason of such a view. When, to one who knows, all beings have, verily, become one with his own self, then what delusion and what sorrow can be to him who has seen oneness?'

[79]See ĀPS 64, quoted n. 29.

[80]ĀPS 66: *sarvākāro bhagavān upāsyate yena yena bhāvena/ taṃ taṃ bhāvaṃ bhūtvā cintāmaṇivat samabhyeti//*. This verse lacks a correspondent in the later PS.

[81]PS 68: *itthaṃ sakalavikalpān pratibuddho bhāvanāsamīraṇataḥ/ ātmajyotiṣi dīpte juhvajjyotirmayo bhavati//*.

trix to the extended metaphor of the verse, may well be a reemployment of a segment of Ādiśeṣa's verse 58, not otherwise utilized, *[...] samīraṇe vāyuḥ*, 'As [...] wind becomes one with wind' — verse 51 of the Śaiva *Paramārthasāra* having retained, in its exercise of transposition, only the two initial images: water and milk.

The Śaiva *Paramārthasāra* thus puts equal emphasis on the idea of *bhāvanā*, but with the difference that the notion is there placed among practices of an āgamic yoga, in which the Trika sets great store. Associated with mantric practice, with *kuṇḍalinī* yoga and with the practice of the *mudrās*, *bhāvanā* is the spiritual exercise par excellence, thanks to which the *mumukṣu* accedes simultaneously to knowledge and to liberation, while he yet lives. [82]

jīvanmukti

'Liberation in this life' is indeed the common project of the two *Paramārthasāra*, even though the second reserves to it a more explicit treatment. It provides also, doubtless, the first among the motives for rewriting the text itself. The Śaiva *Paramārthasāra* transposes the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādiśeṣa precisely because it has apprehended there the foundation for the doctrine of *jīvanmukti*. It is a *jīvanmukti* that does not speak its name clearly in the first *Paramārthasāra*, but which is there recognized by many indications, when viewed in the light of later developments, once the debate provoked by the oxymoron of the term itself ('jīvan' *while living* / 'mukti' *liberation* [*from this life*]) finally subsided, conferring on the notion its general legitimacy. Rāghavānanda, the Advaitin exegete mentioned earlier, makes no mistake when, in his commentary on verse 3, he presents Ādiśeṣa as a *jīvanmukta*. [83]

The entire labor of Abhinavagupta and Yogarāja is aimed at bringing to light that very truth: the 'liberation' that is at issue in the older *Paramārthasāra* is already the 'liberation in this life' that Abhinavagupta makes into the issue of the second. In this sense, the śaivite transposition is also an exegetical project. Underscoring the soteriological vocation of the first *Paramārthasāra*, the transposition reveals in addition that the soteriology, based doubly on Sāṃkhya and Advaita, establishes the notion of *jīvanmukti*.

Thus the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta makes the text of Ādiśeṣa into a treatise on liberation in this life. The best proof that may be given of this is that the stanzas of Ādiśeṣa's work cited in later literature — with

[82] See YR ad 9, 61, 62, 64–66, 83, 86, 96.

[83] ĀPSV 3: *[...] ātmatattvasākṣād bodhavantaṃ jīvanmuktaṃ guruvaraṃ yathāvidhy upagamya baddhāñjaliḥ papraccheti*, '[...] having approached in a proper way and with a gesture of salutation the most excellent teacher [Ādiśeṣa], who is liberated while still living and who possesses an intuitive grasp of the reality of the Self [or 'and who possesses an evident mastery of the reality of the Self'], he asks ...'

the possible exception of Nāgeśa's grammatical reference — concern more or less the idea of *jīvanmukti*. Two among them (especially 81, the most famously cited in any case) are part of the demonstration of *jīvanmukti* propounded by the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*; moreover, the quasi-totality of the second *Paramārthasāra*'s borrowings from the first concern liberation — and that means, as the commentary incessantly attempts to show, 'liberation in this life'.

Even if the term 'jīvanmukti' appears no more often in the second *Paramārthasāra* than it does in the first, it is possible to read it there in outline, twice, by the bias of periphrases where the concessive 'api' points to and resolves in one gesture the oxymoron that the notion represents. Thus, at verse 61: 'He who has cut the knot of ignorance, whose doubts have vanished, who has put aside error, whose merits and demerits have been destroyed, is liberated, though still joined with his body',[84] and at verse 86: 'In the same manner, consciousness, once it has been separated from the complex of sheaths [that is the body, etc.], is [forever] completely alien to their touch, even though, as a liberated Self, it remains there [for a time] due to root impressions [previously accumulated]'.[85]

Moreover, in comparing the strategies of composition of the two *Paramārthasāra*, one notes that, beginning with verse 76 of the first (= verse 69 of the second), the textual parallelism grows more obvious, the correspondences are more patent, and succeed one another in a rhythm that cannot be ignored. Whole sequences of verses are repeated *verbatim* or almost so, in many cases.[86] One observes also that verse 75 of the first *Paramārthasāra*, strongly colored with Sāṃkhya and not as such taken up by Abhinavagupta, itself clearly postulates the notion of *jīvanmukti*, via a periphrasis, and as such introduces the long concatenation of symmetrical verses in the two texts: 'As soon as the Soul has understood Matter as different [from itself], it becomes, [even though it still] exists in the midst of Transmigration, free from all acts, as a lotus leaf [is free] from the water [in which grows the lotus plant]'.[87]

The first *Paramārthasāra* even takes up the matter of obstacles to liberation as represented by the notion of the *yogabhraṣṭa*, the acolyte 'fallen from discipline' (vv. 84–85). Thus going out of its way, the text promises even to such as he access to the liberation that had been to him for so long a time denied (v. 86).

This is, in its way, also a manner of establishing the legitimacy of the

[84] PS 61: *bhinnājñānagranthir gatasaṃdehaḥ parākṛtabhrāntiḥ/ prakṣīṇapuṇyapāpo* vigrahayoge 'py asau muktaḥ// (the words at issue are in roman).

[85] PS 86: *tadvat kañcukapaṭalīpṛthakkṛtā saṃvid atra saṃskārāt/ tiṣṭhaty api muktātmā tatsparśavivarjitā bhavati//.*

[86] Compare ĀPS 76–78 and PS 69–71; ĀPS 79–82 and PS 81–84.

[87] ĀPS 75: *buddhvā vibhaktāṃ prakṛtiṃ puruṣaḥ* saṃsāramadhyago bhavati/ nirmuktaḥ *sarvakarmabhir ambujapattraṃ yathā salilaiḥ//.*

notion — that of envisaging equally all the obstacles that might be alleged to interfere between the *mumukṣu* and his liberation. And so a "rhetoric of solicitude" is put in place that Abhinavagupta also makes use of — his verses 100–101 repeating almost *verbatim* Ādiśeṣa's verses 84–85, while his verse 102 transposes Ādiśeṣa's 86, the principal difference being eschewal of any reference to Viṣṇu. And finally, this last point of convergence: the theistic dimension of the two doctrines, so evident that it often suffices, in the exercise of transposition, to replace references to Viṣṇu with those corresponding to Śiva.[88]

1.2.2.3. DESTINY OF THE SECOND *PARAMĀRTHASĀRA* In the same way most modern accounts take little note of the contribution of Śaivism to the issue of liberation — liberation in this life or not — likewise later Indian tradition, notably inspired by Vedānta, is careful to avoid Śaiva reasonings. Perhaps, for the orthodox, it is due to the reticence aroused by suspicion of tantric leanings.[89]

When the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* invokes, in the fourteenth century, the authority of the *Paramārthasāra*, it is the first *Paramārthasāra* that its author has in mind, though the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta contains the same verse, hardly modified: later tradition, it is true — Abhinavagupta included — accords to the first *Paramārthasāra* the status of *śruti*.

I have found references to the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta only in works of śaivite tendency: the TĀV ad I 37, I 39–40, and IX 50, as well as the *Parimala* [PM] ad *Mahārthamañjarī* [MM] 25 (probably thirteenth century),[90] which cite, respectively, vv. 15–16a, vv. 16b–17, v. 14 and v. 26. Note as well that, when Abhinavagupta cites ĀPS 81 in his TĀ XXVIII 312, and explains it in the following verses, it is as though he were using his treatment of Ādiśeṣa's work in order to comment, though allusively, on his own PS 83.

And so the destiny of Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra* has been limited to Śaiva circles.

2. The *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta

2.1. The text and its commentator

Yogarāja describes as a *prakaraṇa* the text he is commenting on. Though the text of Abhinavagupta does conform to the strictures of the genre in

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[88]This is not the place to pursue the discussion of the elder *Pāramārthasāra* and its relationship to the younger. A separate monograph will be devoted to the subject, to be published in due course.

[89]See p. 35.

[90]On the date of the MM, see Cox 2006; Sanderson 2007: 379, n. 479.

that it is indeed an epitome, a concise treatment of doctrine (see vv. 104 and 105), it does nevertheless diverge from the type in two principal ways: one is inherent in the need to reconcile the imperative of doctrinal coherence with the project of rewriting an older text of somewhat different persuasion; the other is that the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta does not confine itself to an exposition of the doctrine as such but at times hints at a second sense lying beneath the evident sense, namely esoteric techniques and practices that are at the heart of the philosophical discourse, as strikingly exemplified by verses 41–46.

Moreover it can be said that the doctrine itself is esoteric by nature, which does not prevent it however from being formulated in precise philosophical terms. At least, it is how the system perceives itself: 'Thus, the supremely recondite core of the teaching (*śāstrasāram atigūḍham*) has now been condensed in one hundred āryā-verses by me, Abhinavagupta, illumined [viz., inspired] by remembrance of Śiva's feet' (v. 105). Yogarāja never fails to expand upon that 'supremely recondite core of the teaching', the spiritual realization of nondualism — which is the ultimate truth of the system — and the means or ways to attain it. He refers frequently to the 'secret' (*rahasya*) that consists in the 'knowledge of one's own Self' (*svātmajñānarahasya*, vv. 87–88), in other words, in recognizing that one's own Self is not different from Maheśvara (v. 81).[91]

Even though he has not the breadth of Abhinavagupta, who commented on many of the key texts of the tradition, or of Jayaratha, who felt able to confront the monumental *Tantrāloka*, Yogarāja is nevertheless a profound exegete, sometimes even audacious — despite what Lilian Silburn says.[92] Not only is he sensitive to the subtle and ever reciprocal transitions in the text between the cosmic Self and the individual self, between Śiva and the 'knower' (*jñānin*), both of which appear in our text under the guise of the pronoun 'I' that verses 47–50 are at pains to represent, but he shows himself capable of decoding the *double entendres*. Thus he deciphers references to the articulation of the mantra *SAUḤ* throughout verses 41–46, and to the symbolic signification of its elements. As well, in his commentary on verse 104: *idam abhinavaguptoditasaṃkṣepaṃ dhyāyataḥ paraṃ brahma/ acirād eva śivatvaṃ nijahṛdayāveśam abhyeti*, 'To him who meditates on this transcendental *brahman*, as concisely expounded by Abhinavagupta, Śivahood comes without delay, once it has pervaded his own heart' — the apparently straightforward authorial signature is

[91] See YR ad 14 (*rahasyanaya*), 75 (*rahasyavid*), 81 (*rahasyaṃ paramārthamaheśvarākhyam ... upalabhya*), 87–88 (*svātmajñānarahasya*), 96 (*svātmasaṃbodhamukhāmnāyarahasya*) and 104 (*parabrahmarahasyātiśaya*).

[92] 'Contrairement aux grands commentateurs de cette école philosophique, Yogarāja n'est qu'un simple exégète qui ne possède aucune originalité; c'est la raison pour laquelle nous ne donnons qu'un résumé de sa glose' (Silburn PS: 20).

reinterpreted metonymically,[93] as a copulative compound (*dvandva*) of adjectives that qualify the term 'brahman': 'To him who meditates on this transcendental *brahman* in reference to which a concise summary has now been stated, [such that *brahman* is now understood as both] quite novel (*abhinava*), and [heretofore] hidden (*gupta*), Śivahood comes without delay [...]'. Moreover, Yogarāja proves himself very accurate when he finds in the discussion of liberation of verse 60 a reference to the Trika denunciation of the practice of yogic suicide (*utkrānti*), which is also condemned at greater length in the *Tantrāloka* — though with some misgivings, as the practice was taught in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* [MVT], the text that is otherwise considered authoritative in the Trika.[94]

It is equally obvious that Yogarāja is familiar with the immense literature of nondualist Śaiva tradition, which he cites abundantly, and without much regard to tendency — which in effect establishes his authority to comment on the *Paramārthasāra*. Nevertheless, a predilection for a Krama-oriented exegesis is felt in his commentary, in the manner of his guru, Kṣemarāja (1000–1050), who repeatedly concerns himself with the Krama doctrine, celebrated as the highest of all systems.[95] Yogarāja himself was probably initiated into Krama, as may be inferred from another text ascribed to him, the recently discovered *Śivāṣṭaka*.[96] This hymn to Caitanyaśiva, 'Śiva as consciousness', is of Krama affiliation and justifies our recognizing, at various places in the *Paramārthasāra*, Yogarāja's references as having a Krama coloration. For example, after referring to the *Kālikākrama* in his gloss on PS 41, Yogarāja, ad 42, quotes the text of Kallaṭa that Kṣemarāja himself quotes in his *vṛtti* ad PH 18 — a verse that is instrumental in defining *śaktivikāsa*, the 'blossoming of energy', also called *bhairavīmudrā*, which, as the context shows, implies a reference to Krama practice.[97] It is one example among many of Yogarāja's hinting at esoteric aspects of the doctrine ('esoteric' being understood in its narrow, technical sense), expanding on the diversity of yogic practices where the base text merely alludes to them.

Thus, within the apparent linearity of the *Paramārthasāra*'s philosophical discourse, Yogarāja finds many occasions to bring out more or less

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[93]Trika literature abounds in such reinterpretations of the name 'Abhinavagupta'.

[94]See n. 1031. Note that AG also finds a veiled reference to that practice while commenting on BhG VIII 13–14.

[95]See his *Spandanirṇaya* [SpN] ad I 1 (Kaul Shāstrī SpK: 6, l. 5); his quotations of the *Kālikākrama* in the *Śivasūtravimarśinī* [ŚSV]; his auto-commentary ad PH 15, where he reverently cites 'the *Kramasūtras* composed by ancient teachers in their own characteristic language' (*tad uktaṃ pūrvagurubhiḥ svabhāṣāmayeṣu kramasūtreṣu*), and ad 19, in which he refers again to the *Kramasūtras*, which he not only quotes, but explains at length, in dealing with the notion of *kramamudrā*, or *mudrākrama*; see also Sanderson 2007: 398ff.

[96]See Sanderson 2007: 380, n. 483.

[97]See also, *inter alia*, the reference to the notion of 'great Void beyond the Void' (*mahāśūnyātiśūnya*), in YR ad 14 (n. 495).

cryptic references to the notion of supreme Speech, to the doctrine of phonemic emanation and the role of the *mātr̥kās* (vv. 10–11), to *mudrās* (v. 42), to mantric practice (vv. 41–46), to the placing of the thirty-six *tattvas* on the body of the guru and of the initiand (v. 74), and to the *kuṇḍalinī*,[98] understood notably in its association with the articulation of the mantra *HAṂSAḤ* (v. 78).

However, the major contribution of Yogarāja to the understanding of the text is his emphasis, beginning with the commentary on verse 9, on what he considers its core issue, *jīvanmukti*. He does adopt a style that is his own — conscious doubtless of the reticences and the disagreements surrounding the notion, he makes constant reference to the interior experience of the yogin, of the *jīvanmukta* so incomprehensible to ordinary men. Of course, the framework is well known, both in the literature of Kashmir Śaivism (and in the *Paramārthasāra* itself; see v. 59), and in pan-Indian tradition, beginning with the upaniṣads — but Yogarāja gives its exposition a particular twist. For instance, he accents his account with a series of phrases in the first-person singular, presumably to be attributed to the yogin himself, wherein the yogin formulates the content of his "incommunicable" realization.[99]

Such are the originality and the lucidity of this commentary that it truly merits its appellation as a *vivr̥ti*, an 'elaborate explanation'.[100]

It might be noted also that Yogarāja could have figured in roles other than that of Kṣemarāja's disciple, exegete of the *Paramārthasāra*, and author of the *Śivāṣṭaka*, if he is the Yogeśvara or Yogeśvarācārya that Vāmadeva, the author of the *Janmamaraṇavicāra*, salutes as his master — thus furthering a preceptorial lineage or *paraṃparā*.[101]

Thus read in the light of its commentary, the text of Abhinavagupta presents a remarkably exhaustive exposition of Trika doctrine, which Yogarāja attempts to position, as much within the vast śaivite tradition as in the perspective of other Indian systems — sometimes in order to appropriate the others, as in the case of the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Mahābhārata*, sometimes in order to achieve distance from them, as in the case of idealistic monisms of the Advaita or the Buddhist Vijñānavāda sort, and

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[98] Covertly ad PS 78, more explicitly ad PS 97, again ad PS 98–99, through one allusion.

[99] Phrases that I have thought interesting enough to collect in an 'Anthology of spiritual experience' (see p. 461), to which should be added the "*ahaṃstuti*" that constitute verses 47–50 of the PS itself; see p. 25, and p. 55.

[100] Thanks to this commentary, we have been able to make sense out of such puzzling passages as kārikās 27, 63, 78 or 84–85, to cite only a few; see, for instance, the way YR discloses the 'implication' (*tātparya*) of kā 63 (n. 1065).

[101] Such is the hypothesis of Shâstri, in the preface to his edition of the *Janmamaraṇavicāra* — an hypothesis that might be corroborated by a few additional indices: 1) the occurrence of the image of the water-wheel (*araghaṭṭaghaṭīyantra*), in a similar context in both YR's commentary ad 47 and in the *Janmamaraṇavicāra*: 18–19; 2) Vāmadeva's citation (pp. 20–21) of the same two verses that YR had quoted in his commentary ad 83.

sometimes to "complete" their argumentation, particularly in reference to the Sāṃkhya.[102] Note especially the way in which Abhinavagupta[103] condenses the polemical demonstration of the Trika's supremacy into one verse, v. 27 — a verse that summarizes, sometimes idiosyncratically, several rival doctrines, and which is based, with significant alterations, on verse 27 of the first *Paramārthasāra*. It becomes, in the second, a doxography in miniature.

Thus the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta achieves a double goal: it rewrites an older text without compromising its own point of view, and it makes of itself both a doctrinal synthesis and a defense of *jīvanmukti*. And it does this within the confines of a tight argument, the articulations of which Yogarāja is at pains to emphasize, taking particular note of the various implicit objections to which such or such a verse may be said to be a response.

2.2. *Structure of the text*

The structure of the text is governed by a dialectic between bondage and liberation — a dialectic that is articulated in terms of instruction as to the means of abolishing bondage.

V. 1: programmatic verse, in which Yogarāja, following a well-known procedure, alludes not only to the essential principles of the system, but also, if covertly, to what constitutes its major theme, and that of the *Paramārthasāra* itself: the notion of *jīvanmukti*.

Vv. 2–3: the myth of origin of the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta, structured in terms of the myth of origin of the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādiśeṣa.

Vv. 4–13: condensed exposé of the system's nondualism: phenomenal diversity understood as the manifestation of the Lord's energies; successive and concentric manifestation of the four envelopes, or cosmic spheres (*aṇḍa*, v. 4), which comprehend the multiplicity of worlds and finite creatures; reaffirmation of nondualism: the *paśu* is none other than Śiva incarnate, who assumes as actor the infinity of roles in terms of which the theater of the world is characterized (5); series of examples (6–9, 12–13); doctrine of 'reflection' (*pratibimba*; 12–13) and the related doctrine of 'difference-and-non-difference' (*bhedābheda*). Yogarāja introduces (ad 9) for the first time the figure of the *jīvanmukta*, which he reads allusively in the notion of grace there set forth. Vv. 10–11, proposing to define the Self (or supreme principle), anticipate the later definitions of the *jīvanmukta*.

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[102] See p. 52.

[103] In supposing that the interpretation of YR reflects the views of AG.

Vv. 14–22: exposé of the thirty-six 'principles' (*tattva*), ontological categories or principles constitutive of the 'pure path' and the 'impure path', that are graduated manifestation of the Self, itself designated in what follows as *brahman*, or as 'supreme principle' (*paratattva*), or as 'Śiva beyond [the principles]' (*paramaśiva* — Śiva seen as the thirty-seventh principle). These principles, arranged progressively, explain the genesis of finitude — as they do in the prototypical Sāṃkhya, which serves as basis for this and other Indian theories of "objectivity". Allusions to the theme of error appear from v. 15 onward, where is introduced the notion of 'fallacious creative power' (*māyā vimohinī*).

Vv. 23–27: characterization of finitude as a 'sheath', 'constriction', or 'impurity' — all realizations of error, and consequences of *māyā*; allusive reference to three of the four 'envelopes/spheres' (*aṇḍa*, 23), the three 'impurities' (*mala*, 24); the fundamental misapprehension of taking the Self for the non-Self, expression of 'nescience' (*avidyā*), termed as well 'ignorance' (*ajñāna*) — in other words, Self-forgetfulness and the advent of subject-object dualism in the form of 'dualizing thought' (*vikalpa*, 25); nondualism reaffirmed (26); refutation of competing theories of the Self, all of which partake of error, though in different degrees (27, reprised in 32).

Vv. 28–32: introduction of the theme of 'all-powerful error', described as the obfuscation of the truth ('the darkness of error', 30), the constriction of the immemorial and eternal freedom of the Self (32); a theme that is omnipresent, inasmuch as on the dissolution of that error depends liberation in this life — the major issue here treated. Traika innovation: notion of the sequentiality of the two errors, that of taking the Self for the non-Self being prior to and more fundamental than that of taking the non-Self for the Self (31).[104] The two errors constitute the *mithyājñāna* of PS 53, 'false/apparent knowledge'. Similarly, 'dualizing thought' (*vikalpa*), which includes all the false constructions of the relation of Self and non-Self espoused by rival systems, is condemned as 'false' (*mithyā*, 32).

Vv. 33–38: reversibility of finitude and liberation, of which the freedom of the Lord is the explicative principle: Abhinavagupta's introduction of the theme of 'divine play' (*krīḍā*), expression of the Lord's sovereign freedom; beginning of the treatment of liberation, which is obtained by reversing the process that is instrumental in generating bondage; liberation prescribed in v. 33: 'One should unveil his proper Self ...', to which one accedes, symmetrically, by unveiling, by purification, by reconquest or recognition of 'Self-knowledge' (*svajñāna*); correspondence established between macrocosmic (creation, etc.) and microcosmic (the four states, waking, etc.) modes of the Self (34); justification of the apparent para-

[104]See n. 848, ad PS 39.

dox of a Self (or a *brahman*) both one and many (35); refutation of the objection that the Self is polluted by its particular realizations (36) and that the Self is compromised by the variety of its states of consciousness; refutation of the objection that the Self is subject to affectations: the "psychologization" of the Self being a mere matter of metaphor (38). Verse 38, which describes the Self 'as it is in reality' (*paramārthataḥ*), anticipates the descriptions of *jīvanmukti* that follow.

Vv. 39–40: eradication of the twofold error (*bhrāntidvaya*, avat. ad 40) and the simultaneous advent of knowledge and liberation. The same freedom of the Supreme Lord — that is, one's own Self (*svātmamaheśvara*) — which has the power to subjugate has also the power to liberate (ad 39). The liberation that was prescribed in v. 33 is acquired in v. 40, with the necessary implication that it is a liberation acquired in this life: 'In this way, when these twin delusions have been cut off, along with their roots, there is no penchant at all on the part of the supreme adept who has attained his goal to accomplish anything else'. Here we find, in Abhinavagupta's text, the first reference, even though veiled, to the *jīvanmukta*, described as the 'supreme adept' (*parayogin*). Yogarāja interprets v. 40 as implying a denunciation of external rites, preparing thus the way for an esoteric account of mantric practice (vv. 41–46) exemplifying the 'interiorized rite' (*antaryāga*).

Vv. 41–46: change of tone in the commentary that focuses on an esoteric and mystical interpretation of the philosophical concepts treated above (*bhedābheda*, etc.).[105] The stress is put upon the means of simultaneous access to both knowledge and liberation, by presenting, in terms that are ambiguous, a 'discipline' (*yoga*) based on scriptural sources (*āgama*) that is proper to the 'way of energy' (*śāktopāya*), this latter also called the 'way of knowledge' (*jñānopāya*) — the way of interiorizing ritual that is characterized by 'meditative realization' (*bhāvanā*) and mantric practice, notably that based on the mantra *SAUḤ*; description of the *jīvanmukta* as a yogin embarked on the way of energy. Vv. 41–46 constitute thus an esoteric parenthesis (or the beginning of such a parenthesis) in a discourse that is primarily philosophical — whose esoterism is recognized by its partial presentation and by the dissemination of occult teachings (YR ad 43, notably); symbolic correspondence between this section of the treatise — which describes the heart (*hṛdaya*), that is, 'energy', as well as the 'seed of the heart' (*hṛdayabīja*), that is, the mantra *SAUḤ* — and its place in the center of the treatise.

Vv. 47–50: self-proclamation of the 'I' as ultimate principle, on the model of the vedic 'self-praise' (*ātmastuti*).[106] The realization of the ab-

[105]See n. 865.

[106]I call it *ahaṃstuti*, '[self-]praise of the "I" '. Note that the first appearances of the key notion of the absolute 'I' are to be found in YR's commentary ad 6 (see n. 369), with the con-

solute 'I' (*aham*), equally that of the yogin and that of the Lord, is characteristic of the 'way of Śaṃbhu' (*śāṃbhavopāya*), defined, as well, as the 'direct way' (*sākṣādupāya*).[107] In consequence, the first-person pronoun expresses the 'undeniable' (*anapahavanīya*, YR ad 47, 50) faculty of experience (or consciousness) present in all beings. This 'I', the mode of affirmation of the 'Great Lord that is the Self of each person' (*svātmamaheśvara*), reduces all the other modes of valid knowing (including revealed texts, Āgamas), to a position of externality and relativity (YR ad 50).[108] This self-praise of the 'I' 'stamps the yogin in the way of Śaṃbhu', as is said in *Tantrāloka*.[109] On another level of interpretation, it is not the metaphysical principle of the 'I' that is solely at issue here, but the mantra *AHAṂ* as well, which represents that principle symbolically. Vv. 47–50 would in that case constitute a follow-up to the esoteric parenthesis of vv. 41–46, devoted to mantric practice and articulated in terms of the mantra *SAUḤ*. The mantra *AHAṂ*, defined elsewhere as the 'supreme great mantra' (*paramahāmantra*), source of all the other mantras' efficiency (*vīrya*), is thus in effect the counterpart, in the way of Śaṃbhu, of the mantra *SAUḤ* that pertains to the way of energy.

Vv. 51–59: the esoteric parenthesis is brief. From v. 51 onwards, we return to a properly philosophical account. At the very moment that knowledge is acquired (v. 51, 'after overcoming the bewildering *māyā* ...'), the yogin is liberated. He is henceforth a 'knower' (*jñānin*, YR ad 51 [first occurrence]). After this sketch of the yogin in majesty as the 'master of the Wheel of energies' (v. 47), that is, of the yogin following the *śāṃbhavopāya*, we return to the depiction of the yogin in majesty according to the *śāktopāya*: the avataraṇikā ad 51 places in the mouth of the yogin, at the moment of his awakening, the proclamation of ĪPK IV 12: 'This might is all mine'. The portrait of the *jīvanmukta* presented in vv. 51–59 answers the implicit objection that the notion of 'liberation while living' is incompatible with the karmic destiny that must be attributed to the yogin in virtue of his incarnate state. The response is that subjection to the

cept of *ahantācamatkāra*, and ad 8, with the concept of *ahaṃpratīti*, the cognitive experience of the 'first person' (see n. 397).

[107]See TĀ I 142.

[108]Cf. TĀ III 125b–127a, IV 212–218.

[109]See TĀ III 269: *[...] sa evāsau śāṃbhavopāyamudritaḥ*. The three principal traits of the *śāṃbhavopāya* are found in this PS's *ahaṃstuti*, as they are set forth in *Tantrāloka*, along with the same stylistic usage of the first person; see TĀ III 280–281: *matta evoditam idaṃ mayyeva pratibimbitam/ madabhinnam idaṃ ceti tridhopāyaḥ sa śāṃbhavaḥ// [...] sṛṣṭeḥ sthiteḥ saṃhṛteś ca tad etat sūtraṇaṃ kṛtam/*, ' "All this proceeds from me, is reflected in me, is inseparable from me". The way of Śaṃbhu is a triple one [...]. In this way follow one another emanation, maintenance, and reabsorption'. Cf. PS 48a: *mayyeva bhāti viśvaṃ darpaṇa iva nirmale [...]*; 48b: *mattaḥ prasarati sarvam [...]*; 49b: *sarvasmin aham eva sphurāmi [...]*, and YR ad 47–50: '[... the master] explains, using terms expressive of the pronoun "I", that Śiva is the very self of everything [that exists], that, being in evidence everywhere in virtue of being established first [as condition for everything else], he enjoins the creation and all that follows from it'.

law of karman is the product of 'faulty knowledge'. In consequence, the advent of 'true knowledge' suffices to free one from that law (53), without it being necessary to distinguish between acts dating from before the awakening and those posterior to it: in both cases, it is a question of detaching the consequence from the act, seen not as a momentary event, but as the setting in motion of a long process eventuating in its proper fruit (in Mīmāṃsaka terms, it is thus the *apūrva*, generated by the act and linking it with its fruit, that "disappears"). For him who has been consecrated 'liberated while living' by his awakening, those fruits in process of maturation (*prārabdhakarman*) are consumed by the fire of awakening itself (v. 55), while those set in motion after the awakening eventuate in no consequence, inasmuch as 'awakening' signifies the abolition of the desire for fruition (v. 56). The *jñānin* frees himself thus from all the modes of karmic realization (v. 58), the principal indicator and effect of which is his emancipation from all sorrow.

V. 60: this initial portrait of the 'knower' culminates in the Traika definition of liberation as 'the manifestation of one's own energies realized by cutting the knot of nescience', in other words, as liberation while living — against a backdrop of "dualistic" definitions of liberation, rejected because they account only for liberation at death.

Vv. 61–67: less allusive mention, in the kārikās, of *jīvanmukti* — albeit via a periphrasis: '[...] he is liberated though still joined with his body' (v. 61); sketch, in the commentary to 61, of a distinction between liberation in this life, *jīvanmukti*, and liberation at death, which later traditions, among them post-Śaṅkara Vedānta, will term *videhamukti*; reiteration of the principle underlying the notion of *jīvanmukti*: it is access to knowledge, that is, the recognition of one's own self as the universal Self (or the Lord, or Pure Consciousness), that sets aside the negative effects of the law of karman, together with the fatality of transmigration (61–62). Vv. 63–66 respond to this apparent paradox by contesting the necessity of any convergence between a mechanistic application of the law of karman and the so-called fatality of reincarnation. Such "fatality" applies only to the embodied soul laboring under the control of nescience, which obliges him to act in view of a fruit or result. As soon as his nescience dissipates and his identity with the universal Self is recognized, the 'knower' — incarnate, as he is (at least in the eyes of others) — accedes to a state of 'disincarnation' (*aśarīratva*), synonym of liberation[110] — responses that are hardly more than common places used by the commentator to further his demonstration. As proof that the benefit of an act may not pertain to the agent, v. 67, borrowing from ordinary experience, proposes the grammatical example of the verb *yaj-* 'to sacrifice', which, when inflected in

[110]Cf. BSBh I 1, 4: *aśarīratvaṃ mokṣākhyam*; See YR ad 63, 70, 72 (and n. 1062), 79–80 (and n. 1212).

the middle voice (*yajate*), implies that the *yajamāna*, the patron of the sacrifice, is its beneficiary, but, when inflected in the active voice (*yajati*), implies that the *yājaka*, the officiating priest, acts without acquiring that particular benefit which belongs to his patron. The *yājaka* thus becomes a metaphor for the man 'liberated while living'.

Vv. 68–73: exonerated henceforth from the corruption of his acts, the *jīvanmukta* can now be described in the light of the very acts that compose his daily life — indifferent to the injunctions and prohibitions that are the meat of the ordinary man, appearing to others not unlike a madman, wandering hither and yon, so deviant is he from the usual standard (71). His rituals of consecration are interior, metaphorical (68): the 'knower' makes oblation of his dualizing thoughts in the fire of his consciousness, fanned by the wind of meditative realization (*bhāvanā*) — the mention here of *bhāvanā* signals that the path taken by the 'knower', in this section of the *Paramārthasāra*, is that of 'energy'. Regardless of the accidents that may affect his life and acts henceforth, the characteristic of the 'knower' is his purity (70), unalterable because innate.

Vv. 74–80: description of the mystic practice of the 'knower' devoted to the way of energy; metaphorical extensions of the inner-outer parallelism noted above: construction of the body as temple (*devagṛha*, 74); one's own self as the divinity (*devatā*, 75); thought as oblation (*havana*, 76); unshakable awareness of the Ultimate as his own meditation (*dhyāna*, 77); contemplation of supreme ipseity as his silent (or whispered) recitation (*japa*, 78); surpassing of all duality as his vow (*vrata*, 79–80). The description of practice culminates with a characterization of the *jīvanmukta* as a Kāpālika (79–80) — although his vow, qualified as 'otherworldly' (*alaukika*) by Yogarāja, goes well beyond that of the ordinary *kāpālika*, whose practices are soiled by duality despite their terrifying rigor; pursuit of these images: the transmigratory world where abides the *jīvanmukta* is quite as terrifying as the burning-ground of the *kāpālika*; the symbolic *khaṭvāṅga* of the latter, a staff surmounted by a skull, becomes, literally, the body of the former; the *kāpālika*'s begging-bowl, in the form of a shard of skull, becomes the 'shred' of the knowable that sustains equally the *jīvanmukta*; the *kāpālika*'s liquor is the other's 'essence of the universe'. In sum, the *jīvanmukta* is 'liberated' because he is exempt from duality. Yogarāja concludes: 'Such is the vow of him who has cultivated the lotus feet of a true teacher. Beyond that is nothing but the desiccation of the body' — a comment that serves also to introduce a new motif (extensively developed in vv. 89–102), that death does not interrupt or modify the fact of liberation.

Vv. 81–88: new portrait of the *jīvanmukta*, again in quasi-philosophical terms (81): the commentary borrowing from the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* the famous image of the potter's wheel (without however acknowledging the

source [SK 67], which it cites almost *verbatim*), the living body of the 'knower' is said there, like the potter's wheel, to "spin" for some time after the last impulsion given to it by the potter. Here, the impulsion is the inertia provided by acts previously undertaken (*prārabdhakarman*), whose motion continues unrestrained: it explains why and how liberation occurs within this world;[111] introduction of two new elements defining *jīvanmukti* (82): that the experience is blissful (that is, positively felicitous, not merely absent of sorrow), and that it is open to all, without ritual prerequisites — and therefore does not require the social 'perfectioning' (*saṃskāra*) implied in the caste system. In his commentary to v. 83, Yogarāja sketches the distinction between liberation in this life and liberation at death,[112] and alludes to a theme that will be later developed (vv. 90–95): the significance of the yogin's final moments for his already acquired liberation. The vanity of injunctions and prohibitions is again noted (83–84). A new objection is raised (avat. ad 85–86), which, while admitting the simultaneity of 'knowledge' and liberation, denies the possibility of continuing to 'live in a body', for this is necessarily polluting — liberation being possible, in other words, only at the moment of death. In response, it is pointed out (85–86) that 'enlightenment' implies the disappearance of the three impurities that are responsible for the soul's finitude and transmigration. The persistence of a body does not compromise in any way the liberated status of the *jīvanmukta* — and his liberation is irreversible, established once and for all, according to the Śaiva maxim: *sakr̥d vibhāto 'yam*. A concession is made nevertheless to the adversary (YR ad 85–86): a gradation, or perhaps a sequencing, of two orders of liberation: liberation in this life, corresponding to the 'Fourth state' (*turya*), and liberation at death, corresponding to the 'state beyond the Fourth' (*turyātīta*).[113]

Vv. 89–95: theme of the irreversibility of liberation developed in detail. A paradoxical argument justifies this irreversibility by appealing to the law of karman — the same law that, for the ordinary man, condemns him to the fatality of transmigration. One becomes, in effect, that which

[111] The notion of *jīvanmukti* itself represents in all likelihood an effort to resolve the dilemma thus posed: how can "fruits" of action be abolished at the moment of awakening, and yet the motion imposed on the body during the period before awakening continue until the death of the body? To affirm both is in a sense to claim that certain acts or manners of acting have no result, nor do they propose any goal (see PS 67). The figure of the potter and his wheel seems to exclude another possible resolution of this dilemma — that seemingly adopted by the *Gītā* and by Mahāyāna Buddhism — that the fruits of such acts can be conveyed to others, more worthy or capable of receiving them, Kr̥ṣṇa, in the former case, a *bodhisattva* in the latter. A 'god' is indeed a convenient adjunction to any such system of thought.

[112] '... in other words, after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation (*kevalatā*) that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness], composed solely of blissful consciousness [...]'.

[113] 'This being the case, the [mind of the] knower of the Self (*jñānī*), while living (*jīvann eva*), is formed by the Fourth; and he transcends even that Fourth, once his body no longer exists'.

one has always been — whether he be a bound soul (*paśu*) or a 'knower' (*jñānin*). No intervening accident, no unexpected shock is sufficient to deflect one from the destiny he has sought.[114] Such is the teaching of v. 89, which on its face seems to concern only the bound soul; it is the commentary that supplies the missing link with this śaivite interpretation of the law of karman. In virtue of this principle, the final agony of the 'knower', whatever disorder of mind or body may accompany it, does not bring into question his status as 'liberated' (90–95). One reading of v. 91 suggests the possibility of comparing the opacity of the 'knower's' final moments to the condition of certain animals as they confront death (cf. the episode of *gajendramokṣa*, for example, taken up by YR): the animal condition itself does not obstruct the state of liberation to which the animal may have been entitled.

Vv. 96–97: *jīvanmukti* is now philosophically established. One question remains: why are some aspirants, though genuinely desirous of liberation, not accorded their release in this life? In other words, how does one account for "gradations" or "degrees" of liberation — and sometimes even failures? The response, even though it may appear not entirely satisfactory, makes appeal to 'divine grace' in the form of a 'descent of energy' (*śaktipāta*): it is that 'descent of energy' of the Supreme Lord, unconditioned, unrestricted,[115] and yet varied, that liberates. This apparent gradation of "descents" is of course correlated with the abilities of the aspirant, which notion would be difficult to see as anything but a restating of the question, rather than an "answer". In fact, a shift in point of view is in course: at the end of the treatise, it is solely Śiva's perspective that is at issue — *paramārthataḥ* — in terms of which the perspective provided by the law of karman is merely instrumental, and ultimately to be cast aside, as mere *vyavahāra*, inasmuch as it is valid for the embodied agent, who acts only by proxy; the sole real agent is Śiva. The 'descent of energy' thus amounts to the acquisition (or 'recognition') of a 'freedom' that is one's already — inasmuch as Śiva is here conceived as 'freedom' itself. Given the degrees of grace, one cannot escape the idea that different degrees of effort are also called for — on the part of different aspirants — and so the text, in these final sections, shifts from an emphasis on the *jñānin* to one on the *yogin*, he who is engaged in a 'discipline' (*yoga*) leading to

[114]'On the other hand, comments YR ad 89, when his body falls away, nothing at all befalls the man [viz., the *jñānin*] who has rehearsed no [acts engendering] latent dispositions; indeed, with whatever intention the cognizer rehearses (*abhyasyati*) [his actions], he becomes one with that [intention], and at the moment of death the object that he desires with clarity comes into evidence for the cognizer. In this way, there can be no reversal [or setting at naught] (*viparyaya*) of the matters that have been rehearsed [throughout life], nor can anything not of the nature of previously rehearsed activity come into play in some unprecedented fashion (*apūrvatvena*). Thus, previous rehearsal (*pūrvābhyāsa*) is alone the cause [of] whatever [effect ensues]. This is the purport'.

[115]*viśṛṅkhala*, as it is said in the avat. ad 9.

emancipation. If the echo of the *Gītā* is clear, the term 'yogin' implies as well a reference to the Śaiva system of *upāyas*. A reading of vv. 96–97 — without any reference to the commentary — finds there easily a description of *jīvanmukti* and the three 'ways' capable of leading to it. In 96 is described an aspirant who, benefiting from a grace that is 'very intense' (*atitīvra*), follows the 'way of Śaṃbhu', the immediate or direct path to liberation, characterized through the analogy of copper changed alchemically into gold by contact with mercury; such an aspirant accedes to final enlightenment, as it were, 'effortlessly' and in this life — the only mediation required being that of the teacher. V. 97 envisages an aspirant who has devoted himself to the sequential practices of the 'way of energy' (*śāktopāya*) — and probably, to the 'way of the finite soul' (*āṇavopāya*). The element that is common to vv. 96–97 is their reference to a yogin who has or will have succeeded in his quest, who has acquired liberation in this life or will in the next.

Vv. 98–102 are devoted to a lengthy exposition of the unsuccessful aspirant, the aspirant who has 'fallen from discipline' (*yogabhraṣṭa*), typically, by an unexpected death that has interrupted his practice — and who thus sees his liberation deferred. Vv. 98–99 promise to such a one a residence in 'divine worlds' and a rebirth that is guaranteed to produce a salutary result. Not only is no effort wasted, but his practice is taken up at just the point it was interrupted. Vv. 100–102 describe an aspirant even more imperfect, whose practice has utterly failed, who has, for instance, failed to grasp what has been clearly explained to him. After a sojourn lasting even longer in the divine worlds, he too is promised an ultimate liberation, but only after a subsequent death. The source of the notion of the *yogabhraṣṭa* is doubtless the *Gītā* (VI 37–49), as Yogarāja notes ad 102. The notion, strangely enough, is largely absent in other texts of nondual Śaivism of Kashmir — with the single exception of TĀ XXXVII 65 (which uses the synonym *yogacyuta* while referring to Kṛṣṇa's teaching apropos the *yogabhraṣṭa*) and *Tantrālokaviveka* ad loc., where the term *yogabhraṣṭa* figures in a citation of those very verses (viz., BhG VI 41b–43, in vol. VIII: 3713). Why this *Paramārthasāra*'s remarkable and quite detailed exception? In part, the answer must lie in the fact that Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra* is the rewriting of an extra-Śaiva text, the Ādiśeṣa's *Paramārthasāra*, of which the last verses (vv. 84–86) have been reproduced quasi *verbatim* in Abhinavagupta's verses 100–102 — preceding which, however, comes a preamble that refers, even though covertly, to the Traika notion of the three 'ways' (vv. 96–97) and supplies a philosophical foundation for the notion of the *yogabhraṣṭa* (vv. 98–99). This brings into focus, perhaps, the strategy of rewriting at issue here, where sometimes fidelity and coherence must be reconciled somewhat loosely. This borrowing from the older text does serve Abhinavagupta, however, in

facilitating his claim that liberation is universally accessible — witness the vibrant plea of Yogarāja in favor of the effort to obtain liberation (103).

V. 103: This verse contains the "moral" to be derived from vv. 96–102, which is that of the entire treatise: every effort bears fruit, provided that it be sincere; liberation is certain, be it now or later. Neither must the aspirant fear presumption: not only is his effort promised success, but it is legitimate.

Vv. 104–105: As expected at the end of a treatise like the *Paramārthasāra*, v. 104 returns to the text itself and its author, and finds an additional reason to believe in the inevitability of liberation: it is even more certain now that it has been explained in the best of all possible treatises, namely, the *Paramārthasāra* of Abhinavagupta. V. 105 goes even further, celebrating the work for its concision, and the author for his authority, conferred by the unequalled splendor of his mystical realization, in which he is likened to none other than Maheśvara himself.

2.3. Sketch of the doctrine

On the model of a doctrine that places in tandem servitude and emancipation, the text of the *Paramārthasāra* is constructed dialectically: to verse 24, which describes the installation of impurities, corresponds verse 57, which contemplates their abolition;[116] to verses 4–5, which introduce the motif of the 'sheaths' or 'envelopes' (*aṇḍa*), whose unfurling causes finitude, correspond verses 41–46, which describe the manner in which mantric practice proceeds to their being stowed away; to verses 30–31, which set forth the notion of twofold error, correspond verses 39–40, which consecrate its eradication; verse 15, which defines *māyā*, is reflected in verse 51, which makes *māyā*'s dissipation the precondition of liberation.

In effect, finitude and liberation are nothing but appearances, have no "reality" apart from worldly convention and linguistic usage.[117] To the extent that Śiva's game brings them into play, they assume alternating roles, endlessly, in a world that has no other destiny than transmigration, subject only to Śiva's will: 'Thus does the Supreme Śiva extend [within

[116] Theme taken up again at vv. 85–88.

[117] See YR ad 60: 'In just this way, consciousness, [when] constricted by the limitations deriving from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., is said to be "as if bound" (*baddham iva*); and similarly, once the bondage that consists of the conceit attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize has come to an end through the manifestation of the knowledge of one's own nature, that same [consciousness] is said to be "as if liberated" (*muktam iva*), [since now it is] fully deployed through the discrimination of its own energies [of independence, etc.] [...]. Hence bondage as well as liberation are both essentially [functions of] conceit of self affecting the limited cognizer; it is not that any events of this sort [really] take place in the reality that is consciousness — the ultimate truth [of this system]'; see n. 1039.

our sphere] his play [made] wonderful by [the alternation of] bondage and liberation'.[118]

On the level of ultimate reality (*paramārthataḥ*), in contrast, there exist neither servitude nor emancipation — just sovereign freedom, which is manifest in the play of the god, who is pleased sometimes to conceal himself, sometimes to reveal himself, rhythmically, in accordance with his two 'energies' (*śakti*), that of obscuration (*tirodhānaśakti*) and that of his grace or favor (*anugrahaśakti*).[119]

Everything, in this system of thought, extending even to notions and entities of little value, is a product of an 'energy' of the god. The doctrine is well suited then to the needs of the *mumukṣu*, the acolyte aspiring to emancipation, for it accords him assurance that he will reach his goal: even in the sphere of finite interests, there is nothing set in stone, nothing irremediable — even finitude itself is finite.

In this sense, emancipation is defined not so much as a motivated effort to undo bondage, as it is a positive *recognition* (*pratyabhijñā*) that one is already free — if anything, the paradoxical acquisition of a freedom that one has never lost. Although this paradox is, in some way, common to most Indian radical monisms, this school affirms in particular that the recognition at issue takes the form of the 'full deployment of one's own energies' (*svātmaśaktivikasvaratā*, YR ad v. 60). With the introduction of the notion of *śakti*, the Trika affirms both its doctrinal coherence (the other systems do not have recourse to such a notion in order to describe liberation) and its taste for paradox — a way to shore up a counterfactual view of the human condition. Liberation is freedom: in other words, there exists no liberation, but a freedom that plays at hiding itself.

At the heart of the doctrine, as we have seen, is the notion of *jīvanmukti*, 'liberation [from life] while one yet lives', the oxymoron par excellence — and scandalous as well for ordinary reasonable men, concerned, as all men should be, with executing their religious and ethical duties. The numerous objections to the notion point to that scandal, objections for the most part implicit in the texts themselves, but which the commentators delight in bringing out.

The challenge that *jīvanmukti* represents as well for the *Paramārthasāra* itself can be ascertained subliminally in the polysemy of the work's title, where *paramārtha* signifies not only 'ultimate (*parama*) reality (or truth, *artha*)', but (as the commentary to v. 104 at the end of the treatise somewhat belatedly reveals) 'the highest (*parama*) of the four goals (*artha*, scil., *puruṣārtha*) of human life', namely emancipation (*mokṣa*): 'Now the author [Abhinavagupta] proceeds to sum up the purpose of the text, saying that "it alone is the teaching that serves as a means for realizing the

[118] PS 33.

[119] See YR ad 60 and 69.

highest among the goals of human life." '

Likewise, in his commentary on the first verse, Yogarāja appears to descry a reference, albeit concealed, to *jīvanmukti* in the name 'Śaṃbhu', which he interprets etymologically as signifying 'whose nature is unsurpassed felicity'[120] — a not uncommon ploy, witness the similar readings of the name 'Śaṅkara' (cf. SpP 1, quoted below). He continues: 'With this summary sentence, which teaches that the supreme state to be attained is absorption in [what is already] one's own essence, the teacher has stated in abbreviated form the purport of the text in its entirety'.

In this system, the only freedom to which one should aspire, is emancipation in this life[121] — a notion that appears to follow from nondualism itself, if one understands by 'emancipation' going beyond the contraries and reintegration within the One: there is no reason why a person, in this world, should not be as free as is Śiva, for he is not-different from him, provided that he undertakes the real labor of recognizing that truth.[122] The existential difficulty of becoming Śiva may be read, in effect, between the lines of the doctrine of the four *upāyas* — which doctrine includes, nevertheless, at least for a handful of individuals, either the possibility of the 'non-means' (*anupāya*), that is, the absence of all existential difficulty in realizing one's own identity with Śiva; or that of the quasi-instantaneous 'way of Śaṃbhu'.

Indeed, one has the sense that Kashmir Śaivism is one of the first systems to seek to justify doctrinally the notion of *jīvanmukti*. As such, the treatment of the notion and its representation as a philosophical issue constitute in their own way major contributions to the development of Indian thought.

The theme of abandoning karmic life is nearly as old as Indian civilization itself, and has given rise to a debate that is a persistent leitmotif of Indian intellectual history. The asperity of that debate might be due as much to a lingering suspicion that Brahmanism had already surrendered too much to Buddhist influence, as to the newly popular devotionalism and its reinvigorated sense of ritual, menaced by any abandoning of worldly life.

The menace represented by the abandonment of karmic life had been first manifest in the late-vedic critique of the efficacity of the sacrifice itself (see, for instance, MuU I 2, 10–11). That critique was at least partially disarmed by the notion of the four stages of life (*āśramadharma*), relegating *saṃnyāsa* to the end of life, well after the householder had fulfilled his

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[120] *anuttaraśreyaḥsvabhāva* — or '[appropriation of] whose nature becomes [for the aspirant] the ultimate goal'.

[121] See SpP 1 [= ad I 1, in the textual organization of SpN]: *iha hi jīvanmuktataiva mokṣaḥ.*

[122] Concerning the conception of *jīvanmukti* in the Siddhānta, which is dualist at the time of the Kashmirian exegetes, see, especially, Brunner, *Somaśaṃbhupaddhati* [SŚP], vol. III: XIII, and TAK, s.v. *jīvanmukta* (vol. II: 275ff.).

ritual destiny (including the procreation of sons). In the same way, the ideal of liberation (*mokṣa*) was superadded to the three "normal" goals of human life, corresponding to this new "extra-human" condition.

From a strictly philosophical point of view, the debates that are echoed in the Śaiva texts on the degrees of liberation relate to a narrower issue, rather more technical in nature: can liberation — accepted by nearly everyone at the time — be reconciled with karmic life, or must one wait for the end of life in order to accede thereto? That is, is the notion of *jīvanmukti* defensible?

Many scholars, Renou among them, have remarked on the Indian genius for synthesis, reconciliation — a spirit that refuses to regard any contradiction as final. In this sense, the tension between the life of the hermit and worldly life is not a recent phenomenon, nor a fatality — and the notion of *jīvanmukti* offers once again the opportunity to palliate it. The dynamism of Indian intellectual history depends in large part on that dialectic, where compromises have been numerous (and not all congenial to Western fashions of thought), such as the interiorization of complex external rites, the Brahmanico-Buddhist amalgam, the notion of the 'guru', both "free" and socially engaged.

The quarrel reflected in these Śaiva texts is thus far from original, but is nevertheless felt as irremediably crucial.

As far as the terms *jīvanmukti/°mukta* are concerned, most modern interpreters consider them as relatively recent. To date, they have been noticed in several Advaita or Advaita-like texts of the epoch, such as the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (also it seems from Kashmir, and presenting several Śaiva traits), that some (including Dasgupta 1975, vol. II: 231) would attribute to the ninth century; and the *Ātmabodha*, traditionally assigned to Śaṅkara himself — though erroneously, according to the same authorities.[123]

The terms figure as well in Śaiva texts of the same period, as I will attempt to show, but their more certain dating should not hide the fact that the *idea* of *jīvanmukti* had long ago found its way into the conceptual apparatus of monists (of whatever stripe) — it is there in the *Gītā*,[124] as well as in some older upaniṣads,[125] and recognized as such by Śaṅkara.[126]

[123]On the notion of *jīvanmukti* in the *dvaitavedānta* of Madhva (13th or 14th cent.), see R. Mesquita 2007.

[124]See notably Dasgupta 1975, vol. II: 247.

[125]See n. 1405.

[126]See Dasgupta 1975, vol. II: 246; Oberhammer 1994: 15. Prof. Raffaele Torella has kindly referred me to the epic usage of *jīvanmukta*, or rather *jīvan ... muktaḥ*, to which Prof. Minoru Hara has devoted an article (1996). It is to be noted, however, that in the Epic the term does not occur as such, but rather as variations on a stock phrase, usually (in the MBh) in the negative: *na me jīvan vimokṣyase*, 'You will not escape from me alive', a phrase which expresses only the hero's determination not (*na*) to let his foe escape (*muktaḥ*) alive (*jīvan*) from the battle. The locution is found in the affirmative in the *Harivaṃśa*: *jitaḥ ... jīvan muktaś ca viṣṇunā*, 'vanquished, he was released alive by Viṣṇu'. The context here is clearly not "*mukti*"

Even its technical interpretation is there: are 'free while alive' those that "act" no more, but are obliged to live out their *prārabdhakarman*, because (as indicated by Śaṅkara and others) a karman once set in motion is not easily annulled.

Yet, the contribution of the vast śivaite literature to the debate on *jīvanmukti* cannot be ignored, as has been mainly the case, not only by modern scholarship (at least beyond the field of Śaiva studies),[127] but also by later Indian tradition. In effect, one can say without exaggeration that the Śaiva authors give us one of the first more or less complete accounts of an idea that had taken root for some time in Indian absolutist thought — although they do not deviate from the commonly received opinion as concerns the general character and importance of liberation itself, as shown by their constant references to prior discussions of this issue, and most notably to the *Gītā*.

There is no doubt as to the soteriological orientation of the quasi-totality of developed Indian philosophical systems — be they monist or dualist, as the Sāṃkhya — but the novelty of the Trika's approach lies in its viewing, indeed reevaluating, *mukti* in the light of its metaphysics, showing that, for instance, on the level of the absolute, there is no liberation, inasmuch as bondage exists only on the empirical level. A view with Mādhyamika overtones, it is true, but freed from the eristic and negative character of the latter — bondage itself being resolved in the absolute freedom of the Self, a state of dynamic plenitude (among other names, Trika confers upon itself that of *pūrṇatāvāda*) that suffices to define liberation as freedom itself. Thus, the Trika organizes under the heading of a 'doctrine of freedom' (*svātantryavāda*) the elements of the immemorial dialog on the liberated man.

Another important emphasis of the Trika, perhaps even an innovation, is, as I have already indicated, its privileging the acquisition of *jīvanmukti*, even to the point of denigrating the older notion of 'liberation at death'.[128]

Jayaratha, in his commentary on TĀ I 21— the concluding verse of the text's introit — observes, in effect, that 'the objective [of this treatise] is to confer emancipation in this life by recognizing the Self as such, by employing progressively such means as will be described in what follows', and that this goal 'although developed through the long sequence of verses that follow, is directly declared by the present verse (21), which begins

(as it is later understood) but the very worldly issue of a *kṣatriya*'s humiliation. M. Hara is of course justified in raising the question of the relationship between the philosophical and epic variants of the locution "*jīvan muktaḥ*"; it seems more appropriate, however, to see the two as distinct developments, different not only in context but in syntactic usage.

[127]See Oberhammer 1994: 15, with reference to BhGBh VI 27: 'Selon toute apparence, ce texte est la plus ancienne référence à la *jīvanmuktiḥ* et peut-être le seul passage où Śaṅkara emploie le terme technique de *jīvanmukta*'.

[128]See Utpalavaiṣṇava's exegesis, p. 41.

with "Śrīśaṃbhunātha" '.[129]

At the other extreme of the treatise, verses 32–33a of chapter XXXVII confirm: 'This treatise [concerning the] Real, [wherein is declared] the essence of the Trika itself, is evidently to be taken up [and studied], providing as it does without great effort the supreme benefit that is emancipation in this life, and arranged in such a way as to convey the highest satisfactions just as desired'.[130]

Jayaratha (ad TĀ XXXVII 32–33a) does not fail to stress the coherence of the treatise on which he comments, by relating these verses to those of the first chapter: 'Thus, [with the articulation of vv. 32–33a of ch. XXXVII] the main purpose of the work is accomplished, which had been set forth in [vv. 284b–286a of ch. I]: "The sage who continually occupies himself with [this work] of thirty-seven chapters will become an incarnate Bhairava; since he whose knowledge has been completed in [study of] these thirty-seven will become Bhairava, why should one be surprised when even finite creatures, by contemplation of him, attain to the state of Bhairava?" '[131] Recalling thus, in his commentary on verses 32–33 of the final chapter, the passage in the initial chapter where the *jīvanmukta* is described, along with his vocation of helping others on the same path, Jayaratha reaffirms that the theme of emancipation in this life is the thread of Ariadne stringing together the entire text — and I might add, the entire doctrine.

In effect, the key notions of the system — 'grace' (*śaktipāta*), the 'means' or 'ways' of liberation (*upāya*), the triad of 'impurities' (*mala*), to cite only a few — enter into its soteriological project. We learn, for instance, from the *Tantrāloka*'s treatment, and to a lesser extent, that of the *Paramārthasāra*, that *jīvanmukti* is accessible in the three inferior 'ways'. Supporting this notion is the alchemical metaphor, which is one of the Trika's favorite topoi.[132] According to Yogarāja (ad 96) the process at work in attaining *jīvanmukti* by the quasi-instantaneous 'way of Śaṃbhu' is similar to that involved in transmuting copper into gold by means of mercury — viz., the *paśu* into Śiva by the 'verbal transmission' (*āmnāya*) of Śaiva doctrine. By *āmnāya* is here meant, somewhat atypically, the direct audition of the doctrine, arguably once only, from the mouth of the teacher. In TĀ V 151,

[129]TĀV I 21: *vakṣyamāṇopāyakrameṇa svātmatayā pratyabhijñānāj jīvanmuktipradatvaṃ prayojanaṃ ślokāntarāsūtritam api śrīśaṃbhunātha ityādiślokena sākṣād uktam.*

[130]TĀ XXXVII 32–33a: *itthaṃ dadad anāyāsāj jīvanmuktimahāphalam/ yathepsitamahābhogadātṛtvena vyavasthitam// ṣaḍardhasāraṃ sacchāstram upādeyam idaṃ sphuṭam//.*

[131]TĀV XXXVII 32–33a: *anena ca asya granthasya — iti saptādhikām enāṃ triṃśataṃ yaḥ sadā budhaḥ/ āhnikānāṃ samabhyasyet sa sākṣād bhairavo bhavet// saptatriṃśatsu saṃpūrṇabodho yad bhairavo bhavet/ kiṃ citram aṇavo 'py asya dṛśā bhairavatām iyuḥ — ityādinā upakrāntam eva mahāprayojanatvaṃ nirvāhitam//.*

[132]... which serves also to describe the two final 'states' (*avasthā*), *turya* and *turyātīta* (see YR ad 96 and n. 1365).

that same analogy applies to *jīvanmukti* obtained by the 'way of the finite soul'.

Still, the imperative of emancipation in this life is not limited to the *Tantrāloka*, nor to the phase of development of nondual Kashmiri Śaivism of which Abhinavagupta's treatise is the summation. At the very beginning of his treatment, Abhinavagupta relies on the authority of various Āgamas on the question of emancipation, and particularly on that of emancipation in this life — notably, the *Raurava*, *Svāyaṃbhuva*, *Mataṅga*, etc. (I 46).[133] The *Niśāṭana* is cited in TĀ I 50–51 as positing in unambiguous terms the distinction between liberation at death and liberation in this life.[134] In these same verses one can also detect a sketch of the notions of *pauruṣajñāna* and *bauddhajñāna*, to which TĀ I 36ff. has just devoted a novel treatment: 'He whose mind remains subject to dualizing thoughts becomes Śiva after the dissolution of the body; but the other [who is not so subject] becomes [Śiva] in this very life — such is the main teaching of the śāstra [viz., the *Niśāṭana*]'.[135] In TĀ XIV 44b–45, Abhinavagupta alludes again to this passage of the *Niśāṭana*, which Jayaratha cites more elaborately, concluding: 'Thus it has been demonstrated that liberation is only for the living whose mode of being lacks dualizing thought constructs; but, as for the rest, it will be when the body falls away'.[136] Similarly, the passages TĀ IV 213–221a and 259–270 rely on the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*, a supreme authority for the Trika, in order to develop their notion of *jīvanmukti* as obtained via the 'way of energy' — a 'way' that implies the interiorization of ritual (MVT XVIII 74–82, TĀ IV 212).

Again, reference is made, in the texts of this school, to other Tantras or Āgamas, notably the *Svacchandatantra* [SvT], the *Mṛtyuñjit* (or *Netratantra*) [NT], the *Kularatnamālā* and the *Kālikākrama*, profusely cited by the *Śivasūtravimarśinī* (see n. 881) and the *Spandanirṇaya* [SpN], works of Kṣemarāja, who as well commented on the *Svacchandatantra* and the *Netratantra*. In some of these citations, the notion of *jīvanmukti* is explicitly formulated, notably: SvT VII 259a (in SpN II 6–7): *[...] jīvann eva vimukto*

[133] In the context of treating *pauruṣajñāna* and *bauddhajñāna*. On the dating of those texts, see below.

[134] Even though the terms *jīvanmukti* or *jīvanmukta* are not there found, JR ad I 50–51 is explicit: *evaṃ vikalpo 'tra sambhavan muktau vyavadhāyakaḥ iti na tadaiva muktiḥ, tasya punar asaṃbhave satyapi dehe muktiḥ*, 'Since dualizing thoughts, still possible, interpose themselves at the point of liberation, there is then no liberation; when they are no longer possible, there is liberation, even though the body exist'.

[135] TĀ I 50–51: *vikalpayuktacittas tu piṇḍapātāc chivaṃ vrajet/ itaras tu tadaiveti śāstrasyātra pradhānataḥ//*. See also TĀV ad loc., which completes the citation: *[...] vikalpahīnacittas tu hy ātmānaṃ śivam avyayam/ paśyate bhāvaśuddhyā yo jīvanmukto na saṃśayaḥ*, 'He who sees himself as the unchanging Śiva, his mind free of dualities, because his being is cleansed, is "freed while living"; of this there is no doubt'.

[136] TĀV XIV 44b–45: *evaṃ nirvikalpavṛttīnāṃ jīvatām eva muktir itareṣāṃ tu dehapātānantaram iti siddham* (vol. V: 2438).

'sau yasyeyaṃ bhāvanā sadā// (see also Appendix 20, p. 345); SvT IV 398b (in ŚSV III 28): *[...] dehaprāṇasthito 'py ātmā tadvallīyeta tatpade//*; SvT X 372b (in ŚSV III 45): *tatrastho 'pi na badhyeta yato 'tīva sunirmalaḥ//*; and *Kālikākrama* (in ŚSV III 31): *sarvaṃ śuddhaṃ nirālambhaṃ jñānaṃ svapratyayātmakam/ yaḥ paśyati sa muktātmā jīvann eva na saṃśayaḥ//*, 'He who sees all knowledge as pure, free of [external] support [viz., object], and having the nature of his own understanding, [is now such that] his self is liberated [or "has a liberated self"] while yet he lives. Of this there is no doubt'.

Here, a few remarks as to the dating of scriptural sources referred to by Abhinavagupta and his commentators in the context of *jīvanmukti* might be of some use.[137] Sadyojyotis, who was active between 675 and 725 according to Sanderson 2006: 76, certainly knew the *Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha*, the *Svāyaṃbhuvasūtrasaṃgraha* and the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, belonging to the Siddhānta canon. The last work is later than the fifth century AD, as Sanderson 2006: 78 also shows. We can also affirm with a fair amount of certainty that all these texts, as well as all other known scriptural sources, postdate the early layers of the *Niśvāsa*, which is probably the earliest of all known Tantras. Goodall and Isaacson (2007) have established 450–550 for the early *Niśvāsa*, thus 550 is a very likely *terminus post quem* for most of our sources (675 being the *terminus ante quem*).

The case of the *Mālinīvijayottara* is less straightforward, for Sadyojyotis's references or allusions to it are not established beyond doubt.[138] However, it is more likely than not that he indeed knew the *Mālinīvijayottara*, whose date can be tentatively established before 675 (and after 550). The *Svacchanda*, which is often considered relatively late,[139] may also come from this period (sixth–seventh century). For the *Mālinīvijayottara* knows and claims to be based on the *Siddhayogeśvarīmata*, whose short recension declares itself to be an abridged *Svacchanda*.[140] Since the dating of the *Mālinīvijayottara* is itself problematic and the *Siddhayogeśvarīmata* survives only in its short recension, we are not on firm ground here. Nevertheless, both the *Siddhayogeśvarīmata* and its near contemporary, the *Brahmayāmala*, of the Vidyāpīṭha canon, are likely to have been composed in or around the seventh century for various other reasons.[141] The *Brahmayāmala* also includes transformations of the cult of Svacchandabhairava,[142]

[137]I am grateful to Dr Judit Törzsök for detailed discussions on the subject.

[138]See Törzsök *Siddhayogeśvarīmata* [SYM]: 14 citing Sanderson.

[139]See Goodall: 'Tentative sketch of a possible relative chronology of some early Tantric works and authors, principally of the Śaivasiddhānta', 14th World Sanskrit Conference, Kyoto, September 1–5, 2009.

[140]Törzsök SYM: 16 and 262.

[141]See especially Hatley 2007: 200ff., establishing the period of composition of the *Brahmayāmala* from the 6th to the 8th cent.

[142]Hatley 2007: 223.

which suggests again that the *Svacchandatantra*, the scripture of that cult, predates the Vidyāpīṭha. As to the *Netratantra*, also referred to in the context of *jīvanmukti* by Kashmirian exegetes, Sanderson has concluded from iconographical evidence that it was composed between AD 700 and 850, probably toward the end of that period.[143]

Concerning the *Niśāṭana*, the *Kularatnamālā* and the *Kālikākrama*,[144] the dating of these texts has been discussed much less extensively than the above mentioned titles. Given their Kaula and Krama affiliations, they are likely to be later than the above listed works of the Siddhānta and the Vidyāpīṭha,[145] possibly going back only to the eighth century or later. In any case, they must predate the Kashmirian exegetes of the tenth.

This tentative dating of the relevant scriptural sources indicates that not only the idea, but also the very terms *jīvanmukti*, *jīvanmukta*, etc., were present at an early date in the Śaiva tradition.

The figure of the *jīvanmukta* is also present in the more easily datable texts of the Spanda and the Pratyabhijñā, all of which were composed within the span of one century, between 875 and 975.[146]

It is only hinted at in the *Śivasūtra*, particularly in the third section devoted (according to Kṣemarāja's exegesis) to the *āṇavopāya* (III 9ff., III 18–45), and it is the text's *Vimarśinī* that develops the idea, either through citations (notably *Kālikākrama*, in ŚSV III 31; see supra), or directly, as in III 42, which describes the state of the *jīvanmukta*.[147]

But the term itself is employed in the *Spandakārikā* (II 5).[148] Even better, *jīvanmukti* is the real subject of the treatise, as both the SpP and the SpN emphasize, and the *jīvanmukta* is described in the manner of the *śakticakreśvara*, 'Lord of the Wheel of energies'. The term, in its Kaula accep-

[143]Sanderson 2004: 273–293.

[144]On the *Kālikākrama*, see Sanderson 2007: 369–370.

[145]On the Siddhānta and the Vidyāpīṭha canons, see, esp., Sanderson 2007: 233–234.

[146]See Sanderson 2007: 411, 418.

[147]ŚSV III 42: *śarīravr̥ttir vratam ityuktasūtrārthanītyā dalakalpe dehādau sthito 'pi na tatpramātr̥tāsaṃskāreṇāpi spr̥ṣṭaḥ/ tad uktaṃ śrīkularatnamālāyāṃ yadā guruvaraḥ samyak kathayet tan na saṃśayaḥ/ muktas tenaiva kālena yantras* [perhaps an *aiśa* form for *yantram*, which appears in other citations of the same verse: TĀ XIII 231b, XXXVI 29] *tiṣṭhati kevalam//*, 'In accordance with the sūtra "*śarīravr̥ttir vratam*" (*Śivasūtra* [ŚS] III 26) though he still exists in the body which is to him like a mere sheath, he is not touched even by a trace of [the conceit that this body is] the subject. It has been said in the *Kularatnamālā*: "When the excellent teacher teaches him correctly, he is undoubtedly liberated at that very moment; the 'machine' [viz., the body — the implicit image being that of the potter's wheel] alone persists [viz., thereafter he inhabits a body merely moving like the revolving wheel of the potter]." ' Cf. the readings of the second hemistich in YR ad 83: *muktas tatraiva kāle 'sau yantravat kevalaṃ vaset*, and PM ad MM 66: *tadaiva kila mukto 'sau yatra tiṣṭhati kevalam*, and n. 1239.

[148]SpK II 5: *iti vā yasya saṃvittiḥ krīḍātvenākhilaṃ jagat/ sa paśyan satataṃ yukto jīvanmukto na saṃśayaḥ//*, 'Or he, who has this awareness, viewing the entire world as the play [of the Self], and constantly united [with it], is liberated while living; there is no doubt about it'.

tation,[149] figures both at the beginning and at the end of the treatise and is taken up also in v. 47 of the *Paramārthasāra* — as a way of reaffirming one of the fundamental traits of the doctrine: the inseparability of 'energy' and the 'possessor of energy' — *śakti* and *śaktimat*.

Utpalavaiṣṇava observes that, in the first verse, *jīvanmukti* is betokened in the very name of the divinity 'Śaṃkara', 'maker' (*kara-*) of 'felicity' (*śam-*), this last understood as the equivalent of *śreyas*, '[ultimate] goal', itself defined as enjoyment (*bhoga*) and release (*apavarga*).[150] Utpalavaiṣṇava continues by pointing out the major components of the exposé of *jīvanmukti*: SpK 30 [=II 5, in the textual organization of SpN], 10 [=I 10] et 51 [=III 19]. To be precise, SpP 30 attacks dualistic conceptions of emancipation, which recognize only emancipation at death, as well as practices such as *utkrānti* that aim at achieving such a death.[151]

As well, Kṣemarāja, in his explanation of the first and last verses, states that *jīvanmukti* is the goal of the *Spandakārikā*: 'What is to be taught in this treatise is that absorption in the [Lord] has for its fruit liberation while living' (ad I 1);[152] and commenting on the *cakreśvara* of III 19, he observes: 'Thus he becomes the Lord, that is, the Master, of the Wheel of energies described in the first sūtra. In other words, he attains the supreme sovereignty in this very body'.[153]

Finally, the notion of *jīvanmukti* is at play in ĪPK IV 12–16, and particularly in IV 12: 'All this might is mine',[154] and in the treatise's conclusion (IV 16), which Utpaladeva's *vṛtti* glosses: 'He who by applying himself intensely to this enters into the nature of Śiva, becomes in this very life a liberated soul'.[155]

Utpalavaiṣṇava's sarcastic dismissal of the yogic notion of *utkrānti* (relayed by YR ad 60) testifies also to the sharp debates that must have taken place on the question of *jīvanmukti*, not only in Śaiva precincts, but also

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[149] According to the Kaula, the *śaktis* are not *yoginīs*, as is the case in the Vidyāpīṭha and in the Bhairava-tantras, but internal energies. See Sanderson 2007: 402–403; 1988: 679ff.

[150] SpP 1 [ad I 1, in the textual organization of SpN]: *bhogāpavargākhyaṃ śaṃ śreyaḥ sukhaṃ vā karotīti śaṅkaraḥ/ amalaḥ svasvabhāvo yaḥ prāgabhidheyatayopāttaḥ/ iha hi jīvanmuktataiva mokṣaḥ.*

[151] SpP 30 [= ad II 5]: *ye tv āhuḥ vinotkrāntiṃ kuto mokṣaḥ/ tannirāsāyāha — vinā svabhāvānubhavena puṃsaḥ kaivalyam utkrāntibalād yadi syāt/ atra 'pi pakṣe nanu mokṣabhāg udbandhanaṃ yaḥ kurute pramūḍhaḥ//*, 'In order to refute those who maintain that liberation cannot be achieved without commiting ritual suicide, it is said "If one could achieve liberation by virtue of ritual suicide without experiencing one's own true nature, then, from this point of view, would not the deluded one who hangs himself achieve liberation?" ' On the notion, see YR ad 60 and n. 1031.

[152] SpN I 1: *tatsamāveśa eva hi jīvanmuktiphala iha prakaraṇa upadeśyaḥ.*

[153] SpN III 19: *tataś ca prathamasūtranirṇītasya śakticakrasya [...] īśvaro 'dhipatir bhavet/ anena ca dehena maheśvaratvam avāpnoty eveti yāvat.*

[154] *sarvo mamāyaṃ vibhava iti*, quoted by YR ad 33 and 51 (avat.).

[155] *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti* [ĪPvṛ] IV 16: *etatpariśīlanena śivatāveśāt jīvann eva mukto bhavati* (tr. Torella ĪPK).

among the Advaitins, as, for example, Śaṅkara ad BĀU IV 4, 6 makes clear. These debates proceed, in the first place, from the incredulity and skepticism that the notion arouses: given the iron law of karman, *jīvanmukti* offends common sense. The *jīvanmukta* is a walking paradox. And thus does the *Paramārthasāra* describe him as mad, a vagabond living a life of randomness — at least as the ordinary man sees him (vv. 69, 71). Both text and commentary are keen to stress that essential misunderstanding.[156]

Perhaps, as I have already indicated, resistance to the idea of *jīvanmukti* is related as well to its implied evicting of *dharma* from the system of values, or at least to paying it only an optional respect: 'Whether he performs a hundred thousand horse sacrifices, or kills a hundred thousand brahmins, he who knows ultimate reality is not affected by merits or demerits. He is stainless' (PS 70).[157] The scandal would be greater had the Śaivas not found a way to defuse it by relativizing their rejection of conduct universally admitted. Such could be one of the implications of the famous maxim describing the Śaiva brahmin: 'Kaula within, Śaiva without, Vedic for worldly affairs — like the coconut, the essential is kept within',[158] which is also a way of recalling the esoteric dimension of the doctrine. In the same spirit of reconciliation, Yogarāja (ad PS 40) refers to the pan-brahmanical authority of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* in order to distinguish between ordinary and supreme *dharma*. Whereas ordinary *dharma* consists of sacrifice, good conduct, and the like, 'the supreme *dharma* is to see the Self through discipline' (*Yājñavalkyasmṛti* I 8). Thus is the *jīvanmukta* justified in neglecting the lower *dharma* in pursuit of the higher one, that of his inner realization.

Alone among the texts of the system, it seems, the *Tantrāloka* develops, in the context of emancipation, the original doctrine of double-ignorance (I 36ff.): 'spiritual' (*pauruṣājñāna*) and 'intellectual' (*bauddhājñāna*) — and along with it its positive counterpart, the doctrine of double-awakening: 'spiritual' (*pauruṣajñāna*) and 'intellectual' (*bauddhajñāna*). If the rationale for these concepts is present in the Śaiva Āgamas, the terminology, which presents overtones of the Sāṃkhya, seems to be a creation of the *Tantrāloka*. It is in this doctrinal context that appears the definition of *jīvanmukti* that figures as an epigraph to this introduction.[159]

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[156]See YR ad 83: 'Moreover, by whom [else] can the last moment of the knower of the Self be directly experienced, apart from the witness (*sākṣin*) that is his own experience? — On the strength of which [witness] one might posit the existence in him of consciousness or its opposite, inasmuch as "those who see horizontally" [viz., fettered subjects] are not privy to any such realm of experience? Therefore, in this matter, let the omniscient ones be asked [their opinion]', as well as TĀ XXVII 319–320a and TĀV ad loc.

[157]See also TĀ IV 248–253.

[158]Quoted without attribution in TĀV IV 250: *antaḥ kaulo bahiḥ śaivo lokācāre tu vaidikaḥ/ sāram ādāya tiṣṭheta nārikelaphalaṃ yathā//*; see also Sanderson 2007: 232.

[159]*Tantrāloka* I 44: *bauddhajñānena tu yadā bauddham ajñānajṛmbhitam/ vilīyate tadā jīvanmuktiḥ karatale sthitā//*.

The *Paramārthasāra* refers not to these symmetric pairings. One may infer, however, from the citations that Jayaratha makes of vv. 16b–17 of the *Paramārthasāra*, in his commentary on the passages of the *Tantrāloka* (ad I 39–40) that concern *pauruṣājñāna* and *bauddhājñāna*, that these pairs correspond in the *Paramārthasāra* to the conjoined placement of finitude and double error. The *pauruṣājñāna* corresponds to the *āṇavamala*, the impurity of deeming oneself finite, that is, the wholly deceitful 'atomization' of universal consciousness — itself the product of *māyā* (PS 15) — and to the constitution of the *puruṣa*, finite (or mundane) man (PS 16a); the *bauddhājñāna* to the quintuple constriction of the *kañcukas* (PS 16b–17).

Still, the articulation of these notions in the *Tantrāloka*, and the rigor with which they are argued, constitute a singular contribution to their understanding. When spiritual ignorance, the metaphysical ignorance proper to incarnate man consisting in mistaking the Self for the non-Self, is dissolved by initation (*dīkṣā*), that is, by ritual, there subsists still an intellectual ignorance, marked by the unleashing of 'dichotomous thinking' (*vikalpa*). In consequence, spiritual ignorance by itself can be an instrument of liberation only at death, when the body (and so the *buddhi*, locus of *vikalpa*) is no more. On the other hand, when intellectual ignorance, consisting in mistaking the non-Self for the Self, is abolished by the study of the treatises and practices that they teach, this does not suffice for attaining emancipation in this life, nor in the following. It is spiritual knowledge, accompanied by (or preceded by) intellectual knowledge, that is the instrument of liberation in this life. In any case, it is intellectual knowledge that is decisive for determining whether or not one reaches enlightenment in this life.[160] By *pauruṣajñāna*, in effect, the *paśu-puruṣa* is delivered in essence, but, existentially, continues under the domination of his 'dualizing thoughts'.

Apart from the fact that these arguments seal the alliance of ritual and gnosis, they confirm that *jīvanmukti* is nothing else than the reconciliation of the plans of essence and existence.

For its part, the *Paramārthasāra* — at least as YR ad 85–86 reads it — introduces a correspondence unknown to the *Tantrāloka*, which is established between the two kinds of liberation — seemingly "consecutive": that obtained while living and that secured at death — and the two final 'states of consciousness' (*avasthā*), the 'Fourth' (*turya*) and 'Trans-Fourth'

[160]See TĀ I 45: *dīkṣāpi bauddhavijñānapūrvā satyaṃ vimocikā/ tena tatrāpi bauddhasya jñānasyāsti pradhānatā//* and TĀV, avat. ad I 44: *nanu yady evaṃ dīkṣayā dehānta eva muktir bhavet, tat kathaṃ "jīvann eva vimukto 'sau" ityādy uktam ity āśaṅkyāha/.*

(*turyātīta*)[161] — the latter appearing as a Śaiva innovation.[162] From the moment the 'state of liberation' (*mokṣa*) found a home in life existential (*jīvanmukti*), the insertion of the latter in the pan-Indian schema of the four states, and its designation there as the 'fourth' obliged the promotion of the old 'fourth' — 'liberation' universally understood as 'liberation at death' — to a 'fifth', or rather to a 'Trans-Fourth', position in the hierarchy of states having no name of its own, yet retaining something of its previous status.[163]

As mentioned above, the term itself (*jīvanmukti*, or *jīvanmukta*) makes some of its first appearances in tantric texts, whose aim was, among other things, to supersede the orthodox ritual system. As Sanderson (1995: 25ff. and 1988: 660ff.) shows, tantric doctrine and ritual attempted to demonstrate their superiority compared to orthopraxy in several ways, which included that tantrism presented itself as a more efficient means to the same end: on the whole, it proposed to liberate one through tantric initiation (even if liberation was not immediately fully effective). This meant that the average initiate could be considered liberated already in this life and did not need to make any particular effort for the attainment of *mokṣa* subsequently. Therefore it is not surprising that the term and the concept of *jīvanmukti* were not unknown to the early tantric tradition.

However, when nondualist Kashmirian exegetes make use of this notion, they tend to do so from the Kaula point of view, which is antiritualist.[164] Consequently, one is liberated in this world through internal realization, and ultimately through knowledge, rather than through ritual action. The *jīvanmukta* is a *jñānin*. This kind of liberation in life was in turn seen by proponents of the orthodox brahmanical religion as a paradox, and it is on their behalf that avat. ad PS 85–86 asks the following question: 'How can one continue to act after enlightenment, without accumulating further consequences of those acts? In effect, liberation is possible only at the moment of death'.

The fact that tantrism proposed more efficient means of liberation did

[161] A correspondence already sketched in ŚSV III 25 and ŚS III 41. See also YR ad 61: 'And he whose [ignorance] is destroyed, even while remains a rapport with the body, is at that very moment liberated (*muktaḥ*), though he still lives (*jīvann eva*). It is not that bondage involves necessarily a connection with a body. The removal of that ignorance is liberation. However [it may be added that], with the perishing of the body, complete (*pūrṇa*) liberation is attained', and ad 83: ' "He goes to a condition of transcendent Isolation" (*kaivalya*) [viz., reaches 'separation' from the limited world of bondage] through knowledge of the Self alone; that is, in other words, after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness] (*turyātītarūpāṃ kevalatāṃ yāti*), composed solely of blissful consciousness'.

[162] The term appears in some late upaniṣads of tantric coloration.

[163] See also YR ad 35.

[164] See p. 51. On the Kaula developments in general and their importance in the exegetical tradition, see Sanderson 1988: 692ff.

not imply that arguments of the brahmanical orthodoxy were refused by Kashmirian exegetes. The Trika, as set forth by the *Paramārthasāra* and its commentary, employs a rather virtuoso strategy that uses the law of karman in order to subvert that same law. And so the last portion of our text, from v. 89 onwards, multiplies references to the properly Mīmāṃsaka notion of *apūrva*[165] in arguments intended to establish not only the possibility of *jīvanmukti*, but its very legitimacy.

In parallel, the Trika is not loath to invoke authorities (*pramāṇa*) outside its own tradition,[166] though, to be fair, its readings are usually favorable to its own theses. In the first place, the *Bhagavadgītā*, whose omnipresence in Yogarāja's commentary and in other texts of the system is perhaps intended chiefly to affirm how the this-worldly ascesis[167] recommended by the *Gītā* is, in fact, this-worldly liberation.

Similarly, several indices furnished by the *Paramārthasāra* and its commentary permit apprehension of the relation of inheritance that Trika sustains with Sāṃkhya on the question of liberation: the commentary to PS 81 (which paraphrases without attribution SK 67) and 83, where we find mention of the potter's wheel; the reutilization of Sāṃkhya notions of *kaivalya* (at v. 83, itself the reprise of ĀPS 81) and of *apavarga* (YR ad 33); the important role assigned to the *antaḥkaraṇa* in the process of liberation (YR ad 90–91, 92–93); the citation of SK 44 by YR ad 92–93.

It is true that Sāṃkhya and Trika start from the same postulate: liberation is not accessible by ritual (SK 1), but rather by discriminating knowledge (*vijñāna*, SK 2). There comes to the surface, in the usage that the *Paramārthasāra* makes of these Sāṃkhya notions, a Traika rereading of Sāṃkhya doctrine according to which the notion of *jīvanmukti*, or at least a type of this-worldly release that has not yet received that name, is already germinating in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, *in re* vv. 67–68.[168] As such, the Trika proposes an interpretation of SK 67 that is not all that distant from that of Gauḍapāda.[169] The *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya* [GBh] on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, in effect, brings out the dynamic organization of the ensemble constituted by

[165] See p. 29. Compare the transformation of the Mīmāṃsaka notion of *bhāvanā*, 'efficient force' (PS 63) into the Traika notion of *bhāvanā*, 'meditative realization' (PS 41, 52, 68).

[166] For instance, the Śaiva Āgamas, such as the *Triśirobhairava* (cited TĀ XXVIII 320b–324a), and the *Gītā* (cited TĀ XXVIII 324b, and 325–326a) are put on the same level.

[167] This is an attempt to translate into English the formula: 'ascèse intra-mondaine', coined by Hulin (2001: 268) apropos the BhG.

[168] A rereading implicit in YR's borrowing from SK 67, while commenting on the paradoxical condition of the *jīvanmukta*, as described by PS 81. This Traika rereading of liberation according to Sāṃkhya appears equally in the TĀ, notably in IV 212, which associates explicitly the notion of *kaivalya* with that of *jīvanmukti*, and in XXVIII 307–320 and TĀV ad loc. (in particular, ad 317, which cites also SK 67). Hiriyanna (1995: 116, and 1993: 297) finds as well allusion to the notion of *jīvanmukti* in SK 67–68.

[169] Probably not the Gauḍapāda, author of the *Āgamaśāstra*; see Frauwallner 1973: 226; Larson 1998: 148–149.

vv. 67–68: contrasting the 'incarnate' state of v. 67 with the 'disincarnate' state of v. 68 (*prāpte śarīrabhede*) — life and death in effect. Moreover, the liberation that occurs 'when the body falls away' (GBh 67: *śarīrapāte*) is the liberation that v. 68 terms *kaivalya*, described as 'total' (*aikāntika*), that is, according to the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*, 'necessary' (*avaśya*), and 'definitive' (*ātyantika*), or 'which encounters no obstacle' (*anantarhita*) — the principal obstacle being the body, which no longer, in any way shape or form, afflicts the spirit, now liberated, of the departed. In sum, v. 67 refers to *jīvanmukti*, v. 68 to *kaivalya*, 'absolute' liberation, in the etymological sense of 'ab-solvo', 'loosen from'.

The Trika pretends however to ignore the appropriation of this gradation by the Advaita inspired by Śaṅkara. At the very most, one notices, especially in Yogarāja's commentary, the vedāntic idea of *aśarīratva*, the 'disincarnation' that characterizes the *jīvanmukta* in that he ceases to confuse his body with the Self.[170]

Another element of the definition of 'liberation' that Trika shares with Advaita, and which dissociates it from Sāṃkhya, is the notion of 'felicity' (*ānanda*) that accompanies the experience of liberation. That Sāṃkhya has ignored this 'felicity' is a reproach made by Śaṅkara ad BĀU III 9, 28, 7: 'Some, like the partisans of Sāṃkhya or Vaiśeṣika, opine that in liberation, one tastes no kind of joy'. The Trika does not confront Sāṃkhya directly on this point, but never ceases to stress the aspect of 'felicity', associating with it an aspect of experience that is absent from advaitic arguments: the 'marvelous' (*camatkāra*), a notion that Śaiva metaphysics shares with Śaiva aesthetics.[171]

Whatever may be the case with these similarities and differences, the Trika develops an original doctrine regarding liberation, of which a singular trait is the postulate that liberation in this life is inconceivable in the absence of the Lord's grace, described here as a 'descent of energy' (*śaktipāta*). It is this subordination of liberation to 'grace' that, according to TĀ XIII 276b–279a, constitutes the superiority of the Śaiva path in relation to other systems. As André Padoux observes, '[... la grâce] détermine la voie parcourue, le maître rencontré, l'initiation reçue et jusqu'au système religieux auquel on accorde sa foi'.[172]

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[170]See p. 27, as well as YR ad 63, 70, 79–80 (and n. 1212), and 85–86: 'The corporeal sheath is effective only so long as a relation with the sheaths of the [three] impurities [...] that arise from ignorance exists. But since the sheath created by ignorance has already been destroyed by [the guru's] instruction regarding knowledge of one's own [true] Self, how can any such corporeal sheath, [even] moribund, effect any control over the knower of the true Self at the end?' The idea of *aśarīratva* culminates in the idea (which is as well an experience) that the universe becomes, as it were, the permanent body (*svāṅgakalpa*) of the yogin now freed from his transitory body; see, esp., YR ad 87–88.

[171]See p. 55.

[172]Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 47. Others have seen, in other contexts, systems setting forth the dispensation of grace on the part of a merciful god; for instance, Hiriyanna (1995: 412–413),

From this point of view, Trika may be considered as a "mystique of grace". In this vein, the *Paramārthasāra* proposes at the very beginning (v. 9) that the key to the system is Śiva's grace (*śivaśaktipāta*).[173] Even if that mystique resonates perfectly with the emotional effusion proper to *bhakti* — an experience that is omnipresent in Trika literature[174] — it is still subject to reasoning and to argumentation. We observe in effect an attempt to theorize that mystique of grace, which not only adduces a complex hierarchization of its "degrees", set forth in ch. XIII of *Tantrāloka*,[175] but also establishes correspondences with the doctrine of the 'means' or 'ways' (*upāya*) of liberation. The progressive extenuation of grace is reflected, in effect, in the descending hierarchy of the 'means' — distinctions, of course, as we have seen, that apply only at the mundane level.[176] As the first five chapters of the *Tantrāloka* affirm, the 'ways' of liberation are themselves subordinated to the degree of grace accorded to the adept — in other words, to his relative capacity of receiving that grace.[177]

Such a conception of grace implies for the Trika the abandonment of social and ritual requisites, measured in terms of the acquisition of merit and demerit. No particular 'qualification' (*adhikāra*) is postulated: access to *jīvanmukti* is thus open to everyone, if only he make a sustained effort in that direction.[178]

It is thus clear that the *Paramārthasāra* articulates the quasi-totality of the doctrine it seeks to abridge around its defense and characterization of liberation. But this project is not without its costs, as certain accents are displaced that are required in order to establish the coherence of the work. On the one hand, an emphasis is put on the notion of the *aṇḍas*

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apropos the doctrine of Rāmānuja: 'The word (viz., *prapatti*) points to a belief that salvation is obtained through free grace. It is described as *śaraṇāgati*, flinging oneself on God's compassion [...]. In one of its forms described as 'resignation in extreme distress' (*ārta-prapatti*), it is believed to bring liberation immediately. A single moment of seriousness and sincerity is considered enough [...]'.

[173] Which motif is taken up again by YR, notably ad 18: 'When the bound soul becomes of purified heart, due to the Supreme Lord's grace, then the veil of sheaths that afflict us with finitude spontaneously disappears, on account of the coming into being of the knowledge of one's own Self (*svātmajñāna*) [consisting in the insight:] "I am myself the Great Lord." '

[174] See, for instance, YR ad 94–95, 100–101, as well as the rich *stotra* literature.

[175] See Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 44–47.

[176] On the doctrine of the *upāyas*, see n. 858. For the manner in which a practice engenders a practice associated with the immediately inferior path, or another practice of the same path, see TĀ V 155b–157. The process is comparable to the unfolding of the *tattvas*, and like it, is reversible. The yogin who is not accorded a 'very intense' grace (alone associated with the *anupāya*), may raise himself from one path to the next, seen as levels — from meditation to *bhāvanā*, for instance, and, as TĀ III 174 says, from *bhāvanā* to the experience of the 'I', characteristic of the *śāṃbhavopāya*. See also the general avat. ad PS 41–46.

[177] See YR ad 96; also TĀ V 158a.

[178] YR ad 103: 'Therefore, it is shown by the words "whosoever engages in this very beautiful path" — that is, in the path leading to the most excellent [form of] liberation — that there is no restriction of qualification [on such practice]'.

(vv. 4–5, 23, 41, 46); on the other, reference to the theory of the 'word' remains mostly implicit (vv. 10–11),[179] as is the treatment of the *upāyas* — a notion that became so important in Abhinavagupta's syncretistic exegesis,[180] that Kṣemarāja divides the text of the *Śivasūtra* into three parts organized in terms of the three inferior *upāyas*.

As I have attempted to show in examining the arrangement of the *Paramārthasāra* text, these three 'ways' are there alluded to, though not explicitly designated, with the exception of the avat. ad 41–46, which mentions the 'way of Śaṃbhu' (or the 'condition of Śaṃbhu', *śāṃbhavapada*) and that 'of energy' (*śāktabhūmikā*).[181] This confusion of boundaries between the 'ways' perhaps signifies by indirection their porosity — a porosity of practices proper to each of the ways, and especially, their porosity of essence. For, as the *Tantrāloka* insists, in the last analysis, little matters the way; it is the end that counts[182] — namely, absorption in Śiva (or in the Self),[183] that is, liberation itself. Indeed, it is to liberation in this life that lead the three inferior ways, for, in the 'non-way' (*anupāya*), there is neither servitude nor liberation (TĀ III 273).

For this reason, all the ways have a degree of legitimacy. Whether one enters without delay into one of the two superior ways (*anupāya*, *śāṃbhavopāya*), thanks to a spectacular 'descent' of grace that makes any further mediation unnecessary or useless,[184] or whether one raises himself progressively from one way to the next (excluding, of course, the 'non-way'), each way is instrumental either as such or as transitional, in virtue of a functional hierarchy that is, however, not a hierarchy of value. In effect, even the lowest way, that of the finite soul (*āṇavopāya*) is not without value. Apart from the fact that Abhinavagupta says that he was himself initiated into that way by his master Śaṃbhunātha,[185] it emerges from the organization of the *Tantrāloka* itself that the treatment of the *āṇavopāya* is not confined to the fifth chapter, but is prolonged well beyond that, even to

[179]It is YR who makes it explicit.

[180]As A. Sanderson (1983: 160) observes: 'The *upāyas* [...] out of their humble origin in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* (2.21–23) [...] had become in his [AG's] exegesis the defining core of his entire system, more than a thousand verses being devoted to their definition in his *Tantrāloka*'; see n. 858.

[181]See n. 865. Note that, according to YR's commentary, PS 96 alludes to the *śāṃbhavopāya*: 'The acquisition of the knowledge of one's own Self has for its unique means (*upāya*) the favor of the Supreme Lord. Here, such [acts] as silent recitation, meditation, offering sacrifice, etc., which arise thanks to the [Lord's] power of causal constraint, are ineffectual as means', whereas PS 97 implies a reference to the two other ways: the *śāktopāya* and the *āṇavopāya* (see n. 1376).

[182]TĀ III 293, IV 273–275a, V 153b–155a.

[183]See TĀ V 151: *[...] tādātmyaṃ yāty ananyadhīḥ/ śivena hematāṃ yadvat tāmraṃ sūtena vedhitam//*.

[184]See TĀ I 58a as well as PS 96 and YR ad loc.

[185]At least into two practices typical of that path, namely, reflection on the Wheel of energies, and raising the energy of breath (TĀ V 41, 50b–52).

the final chapter.[186] In the last analysis, the differentiation of the various ways is not very significant, in the sense that 'everything is Śiva'.[187] That is why the motif of *jīvanmukti* is associated with the three inferior ways in the chapters of the *Tantrāloka* devoted to them, whereas it is absent from the chapter devoted to the *anupāya*.

Another indication of the porosity of the ways and their partial overlapping is the reciprocity of yogic and mystic practices. In effect, the same practices postulate different modes of realization according to the way in which they are put into effect. Thus are present in the three ways mantric practice,[188] *kuṇḍalinī* (also utilized considerably in the *āṇavopāya*),[189] and meditation on the Wheel of energies,[190] whereas *mudrās* are shared by the *śāktopāya* (TĀ IV 194–211) and the *āṇavopāya* (TĀ V 79–85). In this sense, the 'ways' are so many 'approaches' to or specific points of view on the same content of experience. Texts like the *Vijñānabhairava* [VBh] show how, within the confines of the same practice, the yogin raises himself from one means to another. So does the commentary on PS 41–46 (avat.).[191]

Still, though perhaps covertly, the *Paramārthasāra* privileges, it would seem, the point of view of the *śāktopāya* (or *jñānopāya*, 'way of knowledge'), which allows in principle a certain plurality of practice, though one practice suffices.[192] This is one of the matters in which the *śāktopāya* is distinguished from the *āṇavopāya*, in which a plurality of practices

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[186]See TĀ I 231 and Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 31.

[187]TĀ IV 273–375a.

[188]See, respectively, TĀ III 200b–208a, 223b–225 (which cites *Siddhayogeśvarīmata*), on the mantra *AHAṂ*; IV 181b–193 (*SAUḤ* and *KHPHREṂ*); V 54–100 (*SAUḤ*); V 131b–155a (*SAUḤ* and others).

[189]In the context of a complex practice associated with raising the energy of breath (V 43–53), with the *uccāra* of *SAUḤ* (V 54–70 and 141–145), with the fusion proper to sexual union (V 70–74), and with *mudrās* (V 79–85); vv. 86–95, a citation from *Triśirobhairava*, again evoke it, as well as V 100b–128a, where it is again associated with sexual practice. For the *kuṇḍalinī* in the *śāmbhavopāya*, see TĀ III 137b–141a (which cites *Triśirobhairava*), and III 220–223a (which cites *Siddhayogeśvarīmata*), where it is described as phonemic energy, and identical with the totality of word (*vāc*). In the *śāktopāya*, the *kuṇḍalinī* is merely alluded to, in a citation from *Yogasaṃcāratantra* (TĀ IV 136–144) which evokes the *kuṭilā*, the 'coiled [serpent]' (IV 142), in its association with sexual practice (see Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 230), and with the practice of *haṃsoccāra* (IV 135–136). Similarly JR apprehends, sub IV 153–157, a reference to the *saṃhārakuṇḍalinī*, and, sub IV 200, a reference to the moment where the *kuṇḍalinī* arrives at the form of mystic drunkenness which is its culmination.

[190]See TĀ III 248a–267, IV122b–147, TĀ V 26b–42.

[191]See VBh 28–31, for instance, and TĀ XXXIV 2, quoted n. 868.

[192]Similarly, according to ŚSV III 4, the *śāktopāya* is the principal focus of the SpK: *iti śrīpūrvaśāstre dhyānādi eva āṇavatvena uktam/ etac ca sthūlatvāt śāktopāyaprakaśātmani spandaśāstre na saṃgṛhītam*, 'In the *Śrīpūrvaśāstra* [viz., the MVT] meditation, etc., are spoken of only in relation to the finite soul [viz., to the way of the finite soul]; they, because of their gross character, are not referenced in this *Spandaśāstra*, which is devoted to the exposition of the way of energy'.

is of the essence, associated with an intense sensory activity. Among the indications corroborating that interpretation: the emphasis placed on 'knowledge' (*jñāna*) and on the 'knower' (*jñānin*), as well as the importance attributed to the notion of *bhāvanā* (not present in the two superior ways).[193]

On the other hand, the mantric practice that Yogarāja discerns in vv. 41–46 is that prescribed by the *śāktopāya*:[194] not only does he apprehend, in the adjectives *śāntam* and *amṛtam* of v. 43, an occult reference to the mantra *SAUḤ*,[195] which evokes Parā, the divinity proper to the *śāktopāya*, but he emphasizes the effectiveness (*vīrya*) of mantras in general (avat. ad 41) — one of the main themes of the *śāktopāya*. An effectiveness that is not merely a function of correct enunciation, but presupposes the interiorization of a mystic realization. The yogin engaged on the 'way of energy' identifies, not with the divinity that the mantra expresses, as is the case with the Siddhānta, but with 'the universal sense of the mantra' (*mantrārthasārvātmya*, TĀ IV 258b–259a). In other words, for this yogin, the mantra is not a simple formula for ritual usage, but represents ultimate reality itself.[196]

Mantric practice and *bhāvanā* have as their consequence conversion of a discursive mode of thought into an intuitive and non-discursive awareness focused (if that is the word) on ultimate reality, an awareness of 'difference-and-non-difference' (*bhedābheda*).[197] Mantric practice and *bhāvanā* concern the interiorized sacrifice (*antaryāga*), drawn from the Kaula tradition, which itself involves the promise of liberation in this life.[198] This 'interiorized sacrifice' — touted by the *śāktopāya*[199] — defies description and is never better portrayed than by analogy. Thus, as I have already shown, vv. 74–80 of the *Paramārthasāra* transform the procedures of the "mundane" ritual metaphorically into their interiorized counterparts — in other words, transform practices proper to the *āṇavopāya* into those suitable to the *śāktopāya*.[200] Vv. 79–80 are particularly exemplary of this, to the extent that Yogarāja evokes the figure of the Kāpālika ascetic in order to oppose to him the figure of the *jīvanmukta* Traika. This also shows how the Trika of the exegetes has been able to integrate, while domesticating and purifying, the older tradition of the Kāpālikas, which reserved the most extreme practices to its *virtuosi* (*vīra*). The gloss of Yogarāja illus-

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[193] See PS 41 and n. 858. On *bhāvanā*, see also Appendix 20, p. 345.

[194] In fact, mantric practice is the principal characteristic of the *śāktopāya*.

[195] *SAUḤ* is, in effect, that mantra whose initial is *SA-* (or *S-*), and it is designated as the *amṛtabīja*; see YR ad loc.

[196] As taught also in ŚS II 1 (*cittaṃ mantraḥ*) and SpK II 1–2 (quoted in ŚSV II 1 and II 3).

[197] On this notion, see PS 12–13 (and its commentary), as well as avat. ad PS 41 and 46.

[198] See TĀ IV 211 (*antaryāga*) and 212 (description of the *jīvanmukta*).

[199] See TĀ IV 211 and PS 41–46, 74–80.

[200] Same rhetoric in TĀ IV 194–203.

trates this clearly: the ascetic who follows the Trika path is as worthy, or perhaps even more worthy, of the title of *vīra*, for he observes an otherwordly vow, whereas the Kāpālika's is merely mundane

The privileged place accorded to the *śāktopāya* in the *Paramārthasāra* derives as well from the fact that it is presented there as 'easier'. Such is the teaching of TĀ IV 257b–258a: '[The Siddhānta recommends], in order to identify [with Śiva], giving oneself up to restrictive practices such as wearing the topknot. The Kula prescribes their abandonment, for it teaches an easy way', or of PS 76: 'For him who is engaged in offering into the blazing fire of consciousness all the great seeds of difference [that blossom forth] on the presupposition of inner versus outer, the oblation is made without effort'.[201] Similarly, when PS 80 describes the vow of the yogin engaged on the 'way of energy' as 'both easy and very difficult', it signifies that the *śāktopāya* is both easier and more difficult than the *āṇavopāya*: easier in that the practitioner need no longer concern himself with the panoply of rites prescribed in the *āṇava* nor acquire their requisite ingredients and votive objects; more difficult in that all rites must be interiorized successfully. The *śāktopāya* is thus the way that occupies the middle ground between the *śāṃbhavopāya* and the *āṇavopāya*, just as the *bhedābheda*, the experience to which it gives access, occupies the middle ground between the *abheda* of the *śāṃbhavopāya* and the *bheda* of the *āṇavopāya*.

The two other ways are not for all that absent in the presentation of the *Paramārthasāra*, and the exhortation in the commentary to verse 103 to 'use all means' in order to accede to the supreme human goal is perhaps to be understood in that sense.[202]

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[201]See also PS 77: 'And unceasing is his meditation [...]' and YR ad loc.: 'Therefore, the meditation of such a yogin arises naturally (*svarasodita*)', as well as PS 78 and YR ad loc.: 'emerging naturally, [the energy of the middle breath] is said to be an innate [kind of] rosary, as it comprehends all the senses'.

[202]References to Bhairava (TĀ III 1, and passim), to Bhairava as *śabdarāśi*, 'mass of sounds' (TĀ III 198–200a), and to the 'condition/nature of Bhairava' (*bhairavībhāva*, III 271, 277) — a term for *jīvanmukti* realized in the manner of the *śāṃbhavopāya* (see JR ad 271) — are characteristic of the *śāṃbhavopāya*. As well, are the analogy of the mirror (TĀ III 1–66; 268–293), the mantra *AHAṂ* (TĀ III 20b–206), the celebration of the absolute 'I' (TĀ III 207–208a, 280–281), and the motif of the Wheel of energies (TĀ III 248a–267). The same themes may be read sub PS 9–13, 43, 47–50, 96. The avat. ad 41 refers to the manner in which the yogin raises himself from the *śāktopāya* to the *śāṃbhavopāya*. The point of view of the *āṇavopāya*, with its profusion of practices, is relatively rarely adopted in the PS. This point of view appears only by implication in the description of the *śāktopāya* (vv. 74–80) — the practices of concern to the *āṇava* are those that the *śāktopāya* transforms — and in that of the *śāṃbhavopāya* — the enlightenment that v. 96 describes has as its 'means' (*upāya*) the grace of Śiva alone, not the collection of means that characterizes the *āṇavopāya*: 'Now the purport of this is as follows: the acquisition of the knowledge of one's own Self has for its unique means (*upāya*) the favor of the Supreme Lord. Here, such [acts] as reciting the rosary, meditation, offering sacrifice, etc., which arise thanks to the [Lord's] power of [causal] constraint, are ineffectual as means (*upāya*)' (YR ad 96). The only positive reference

The manner in which the *Paramārthasāra* positions itself in relation to other systems deserves also to be noted in brief. With the signal exception of verse 27, which is a doxography in miniature, the only evident criticism of other systems is aimed at the rival idealisms of Advaita and Vijñānavāda — as though the dualism of the Sāṃkhya were nothing but a venial sin, destined to dissolve itself in the "complete" soteriology of the Trika. Once Sāṃkhya dualism is refuted in the commentary to verses 2–3, Yogarāja makes no further reference to that system, apart from some veiled borrowings of elements in its theory of liberation, such as the analogy of the potter and his wheel,[203] and the very terms of SK 47, of which he offers (ad PS 83) a Traika interpretation.[204]

It is interesting that the *Paramārthasāra* prefers to efface such differences in order better to bring out the relationship of one tradition to the other. The Sāṃkhya is not only a system that the Trika considers to have stopped short in working out the aspiration toward enlightenment and liberation; it is also a system with which the Trika sustains an affinity, indicated by its having adopted the doctrine of the *tattvas*, together with the notion of their evolution.[205]

For the Sāṃkhya doctrine of the *tattvas* implies two corollaries: on the one hand, that the empirical world is given a value[206] — by the 'enumeration' (*saṃkhyā*) that is made of its forms; on the other hand, that the world thus evaluated is also instrumentalized in the quest for liberation.

According to the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (and the commentary of Gauḍapāda particularly) the same attractions of the world that subject the *puruṣa* to incarnate existence — understood as both intellectual and sensible experience — and to the cycle of rebirths have also the vocation of conducting the *puruṣa* to its liberation — which amounts to establishing the final cause as a fundamental principle of the system. That is even their raison d'être: *prakṛti* deploys the creation (understood as the twenty-three remaining *tattvas*) only for the sake of the *puruṣa*'s separation from herself. She works

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to the 'way of the finite soul' is perhaps found in the following verse. YR ad 97 describes, in effect, the stages of the elevation of the *kuṇḍalinī*, a practice present in the three ways, but whose discursivity seems to attach, here, to the 'way of the finite soul'.

[203] SK 67 seems to be the origin of this image, which soon becomes a topos; see BSBh IV 1, 15.

[204] In the same way, TĀV XXVIII 312 cites SK 67.

[205] The Trika's affinity with Sāṃkhya is again manifested by its adoption of the *satkāryavāda*.

[206] In contrast with its devaluation, presented by the Advaita as necessary, to the extent that on that devaluation depends the status of *brahman* itself (see Hulin 2001: 83). The advaitic devaluation of the phenomenal world extends even to acosmism — the *ajātivāda*, 'view that [the world] never came into existence' — which serves the view that *brahman* only "truly" exists (Hulin 2001: 56; 102–103; Bouy ĀŚ: 48–49, 249–254, 266–272). Dasgupta (1975, vol. I: 423), however, finds an *ajātivāda* in Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās*, and considers this an indication of Gauḍapāda's putative Buddhism — a point of view much debated (on this debate, see Bouy ĀŚ: 42–43).

indefatigably (vv. 56–58) to that end, or better, she displays the creation before the *puruṣa*, as an actress before an audience (v. 59). Such would be the meaning of the arresting and sustained analogy of the *prakṛti*-actress playing before the *puruṣa*-spectator (vv. 59, 61, 65–66). The same "theater of the world" in which the *puruṣa* is imbricated so long as he is deprived of discernment is also the locale of his liberation, for that liberation is subordinated to the acquisition of 'discriminating knowledge' (*vijñāna*): once Creation is grasped as a complex of organized constituents, which must therefore be 'for another', the *puruṣa* is *ipso facto* 'differentiated' from it and from the complex; it is 'free', it recognizes itself as the independent term, 'that for which'.[207]

The *puruṣa*, in its essence freed of any taint of objectivity — objectivity as summed up in the twenty-four remaining *tattvas* — is that difference. And that discriminating principle is made the fundamental index of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*'s soteriology, from its second kārikā onwards, which enjoins the fundamental distinction between the 'manifest' (*vyakta*), the 'unmanifest' (*avyakta*) and 'the knower' (*jña* — lit., 'knowing') — that is, between the twenty-three 'produced' *tattvas*, beginning with the *buddhi*, and the two 'unproduced' or original *tattvas* — primal "matter" (*prakṛti*), designated as the unmanifest (*avyakta*), and primal "spirit" (*puruṣa*), the former also frequently referred to as *pradhāna*, the 'base', 'placed-before'.

This is taken up by Gauḍapāda in his *Bhāṣya*, who cites the following verse: 'He who knows the twenty-five principles, whatever his style of life, whether his hair be plaited or in a topknot, or his head shaven, is liberated — no doubt about it!'[208]

Thus, in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*'s manner of setting forth the *tattvas* can be seen *in ovo* the principle of reversibility of servitude and liberation. One has the feeling that Śaivism (nondualist and dualist) takes up this principle and puts it into practice sequentially, introducing two symmetrical movements of installation and 'dis'installation of the *tattvas*, now thirty-six in number. The Śaiva innovation consists in the reversal of these *tattvas*, from gross to subtle, in the ascending movement of the self's recognition of its Self.[209] Of course, the idea is similar to the strategy of the combined Sāṃkhya-Yoga, according to which the process of awakening, for

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[207] GBh 55: *[...] pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānaṃ syāt sattvapuruṣānyathākhyātilakṣaṇam idaṃ pradhānam iyaṃ buddhir ayam ahaṅkāra imāni pañca mahābhūtāni yebhyo 'nyaḥ puruṣo visadṛśa iti/*, 'The knowledge of the twenty-five principles is marked by the otherness of spirit and existence: "this is matter", "this is mind", "this is ego", "these are the great elements" — from all of which alien spirit is dissimilar'; see also GBh 60 and 64.

[208] GBh 1: *pañcaviṃśatitattvajño yatra tatrāśrame vaset/ jaṭī muṇḍī vāpi mucyate nātra saṃśayaḥ//*, repeated ad 2.

[209] See SpN III 19: *[...] dharādiśivāntasamagrabhogyakavalanena paramapramātṛtāṃ satīm eva pratyabhijñānakrameṇāvalambate/*, 'By gulping down the entire range of things to enjoy, from earth to Śiva, he reaches gradually through the process of recognition the state of supreme subject, which exists unconditionally'; see also PTLvṛ 21–24, quoted n. 621.

the yogin, is in some manner the reverse (*pratisarga*, or *pratiprasava*, YS IV 34) of the process described in Sāṃkhya, resulting in the world of our experience. Still, Yoga has not developed the notion of a "reversion" of the *tattvas*, one after another, as a means of access, or rather, of ascent to liberation. Therefore one can speak of a Śaiva "innovation",[210] at least in a technical sense. Besides, such a reversal of the *tattvas* is implied in the doctrine's logic of the system to the extent that it can be considered as conditioned on the introduction of the notion of *śakti*, which is itself dependent on the introduction of eleven supplementary *tattvas* whereby a dualism is converted into a monism. In effect, the idea of a "reversion" of the *tattvas* can only be conceived of dynamically, at the cost of a considerable effort capable of establishing the notion the Śaivas call *adhvaśuddhi*, 'purification of the paths'. It is a reversal that is implicit in the term *adhvan*, 'path', given to the differentiated manifestation of the Supreme Lord.[211] Apart from the fact that the 'world as path' lends itself to directionality, it seems destined to point to a "return path". In effect, in virtue of a folk etymology that derives *adhvan* from the root *ad*, 'eat', the path is not just a process, a moving toward something, it is also that which 'should be consumed', that is, the expected result of that movement: the 'path' (analogy of the empirical manifestation), which the act of returning itself abolishes.[212]

With the insertion of *māyā* and the 'sheaths' (*kañcuka*) associated with it, not only is the dualism of Sāṃkhya made to mesh with Śaiva nondualism, but, inversely, Śaiva nondualism attempts to fortify itself against logical defect to the extent that it is careful, in its philosophical discourse, to present *māyā* as one of the modes of realization of the Śakti. With the addition of the eleven superior *tattvas*, of which the first five represent the 'pure path' (*śuddhādhvan*), Śaivism reconciles the level of essence (*śuddhādhvan*) with that of existence (*aśuddhādhvan*).

Moreover, the Śaiva setting forth of the eleven superior *tattvas* permits the resolution of another problem that is raised by the borrowing from Sāṃkhya of the notion of the *tattvas*: the idea of evolution itself, in effect, is in principle incompatible with most Indian idealistic systems, which, establishing an equivalence between "change" and the "unreal", consider the very idea of evolution in and of itself faulty, erroneous.

The Trika's reconciliation of idealism with the "realistic" approach implied by the idea of evolution goes even to the extent of revising the notion of *bhedābheda*, 'difference-and-non-difference'. Evolutionism in effect can-

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[210] One that could be old; see, for instance, the notion of *tattvajaya*, 'conquest of the *tattvas*', in MVT (Vasudeva MVT: 149).

[211] Not only the *śuddhādhvan* and the *aśuddhādhvan*, but the notion of *ṣaḍadhvan*, the 'six paths'.

[212] See TĀ VI 30 and TĀV ad loc. cited n. 1387.

not be maintained apart from the notion of *bhedābheda*, for such an idea is implied in any theory of causation linking a cause with its effect, different from that cause, but in some sense also the same, for it is not the case that any cause can produce any effect. Thus the quadripartite distinction of the *tattvas* proposed by classical Sāṃkhya reposes implicitly on the notion of *bhedābheda*: that which, not produced, produces (*prakṛti*); those which are produced but produce nothing (the *mahābhūtas*); those that both produce and are produced (from *mahat* to the *tanmātras*); and that which neither produces nor is produced (*puruṣa*).

In the last analysis, the Śaiva treatment of *bhedābheda*, illustrated, somewhat atypically,[213] by the metaphor of the mirror and its reflection (PS 12–13), would derive as much from a doctrinal constraint — that of an idealistic system — as it does from the external constraint imposed by integrating a "realistic" evolutionism within an "idealistic" evolutionism. For that, the notion of evolution itself had to be reconsidered. While Sāṃkhya makes it dependent on *prakṛti* alone, active but unconscious, presented to a *puruṣa* conscious but inactive, Śaivism subordinates evolution (where the *puruṣa* is relegated to the 'impure path') to the agent par excellence, the unique ultimate principle, Śiva animated by his Śakti — in other terms, consciousness indissociable from self-consciousness. This agency expresses itself as the absolute 'I' (*aham*), which is given a central place in the *Paramārthasāra* itself, via the "*ahaṃstuti*" of verses 47–50, the self-proclamation of the 'I' as the ultimate Real.[214] Thus the idea of the ultimate principle as itself agent seals the difference, on the ontological plane, between Sāṃkhya and Trika, or rather consecrates the integration of the first in the second.[215]

The Trika distinguishes itself also from Sāṃkhya in that the reevaluation of the sensible world culminates in a sense of marvel (*camatkāra*), a 'marveling' that borders always on joy (*ānanda*), and which characterizes both the regard the yogin casts upon this marvelously variegated world and the open-eyed delight with which he contemplates his identity with that world and with the Lord.[216]

We find here perhaps the source of one of the characteristic features of the nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, which has developed, alongside a religious philosophy and a mysticism, an aesthetics that has become one of the leitmotifs of Indian speculation, and compelling enough as an aesthetics to overshadow all its rivals. A series of writers, preeminently śaivite, among

[213]In Advaita, the same analogy illustrates the notion of 'appearance', *bhedābheda* being rejected by Śaṅkara as a logical contradiction; see p. 57.

[214]See, esp., *Tantrasāra* [TS] VIII (p. 86) quoted n. 594, and TS VIII (p. 87), quoted n. 605, which speaks of the 'agentive part' (*kartraṃśa*) of the *ahaṅkāra*, itself nothing else than the devaluated form of the absolute '*aham*'.

[215]See also PS 10–11, PS 14, PS 45, and YR ad loc.; also ĪPvṛ III 2, 5, quoted n. 515.

[216]See YR ad 75 and 79–80.

whom Abhinavagupta was probably the most influential,[217] developed a "theory of beauty", or rather, of "aesthetic experience", that remains one of the jewels of Kashmir to this day.

Not only is aesthetic emotion described in the very terms that Kashmirian Śaivas apply to spiritual experience — *rasa*, 'savor', *ānanda*, 'bliss', *camatkāra*, 'wonder', *ātmaviśrānti*, 'repose in the Self'— but the 'amazement' (*vismaya*) of ordinary experience is transmuted into the 'sentiment' (*rasa*), as aesthetical as it is spiritual, of the 'Marvelous' (*adbhuta*). The yogin and the spectator of drama have in common the 'recognition' of the Self, or, what amounts to the same thing, their identification with the universe — a transitory experience for the spectator but established once and for all for the yogin,[218] who is thus nothing but an 'emancipated spectator'.[219]

What about the relation of Trika with Advaita? It is obvious that the former shares with the latter the notion of *māyā* (already present in the first *Paramārthasāra*) and its faculty of 'veiling' (*āvaraṇa*), inherited from the tradition; after all, even in its vedic occurrences, and in conformity with its etymology, *māyā* is a 'power of fabrication', and as such can be seen as to represent the advaitic version of the Śaiva *śakti*. Yet, whatever may be their fundamental affinity in this regard, it is still the case that the two systems differ considerably in their manner of treating *māyā*.

In the *Paramārthasāra*, we find, in effect, a polemical attack on Vedānta's views regarding *śakti* and *māyā*. Yogarāja (ad 15) reproaches the 'Brahmavādins' for having considered *māyā* distinct from *brahman*, whereas, from the Śaiva point of view, *māyā* is nothing but a realization of Śiva's *śakti*, understood initially as 'energy of freedom' (*svātantryaśakti*). It is because of this failure to recognize the essential freedom of the supreme

[217] See Bansat-Boudon 2004: 273ff.

[218] See *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* [ĪPV] I 1, 1, vol. I: 38, in the context of a debate on the function of memory in accounting for the experience of the yogin: *nūnaṃ sa eva īśvaro 'ham iti*, 'Yes, I am the Lord'; in the same context, see also ĪPV I 4, 3, vol. I: 165: *eṣa sa iti ācchāditasyeva pramātṛtattvasya sphuṭāvabhāsanaṃ kṛtam, idam iti, vismayagarbhayānayā uktyā pratyabhijñā eva sūcitā*, 'When one says "this is he" there is clear revelation of a cognizer, hidden as it were; [even in cases when one says only] "Aha!" (*idam*), a recognition is indicated by this utterance, whose central meaning is amazement'. As for the experience of the spectator, see *Abhinavabhāratī* [ABh] ad *Nāṭyaśāstra* [NŚ] I 107, vol. I: 36: *pāṭhyakārṇanapātrāntarapraveśavaśāt samutpanne deśakālaviśeṣāveśānāliṅgite … rāmarāvaṇādiviṣayādhyavasāye … bhavat pañcaṣair divasaiḥ sacamatkāratadīyacaritamadhyapraviṣṭasvātmarūpamatiḥ svātmadvāreṇa viśvaṃ tathā paśyan pratyekaṃ sāmājikaḥ* …, 'Once the conviction has developed that Rāma and Rāvaṇa, and so on, are before him, … thanks to the entrances of other characters and the hearing of lines spoken — [a conviction] unmarked by the irruptions of particular times and places — … the spectator thus view[s] every particular through the lens of his own self, [though the spectacle] continue (*bhavat*) for five or six days, for his attention is now one with his own self, which has entered into the midst of that action with a sense of wonder'. N.b.: This characterization is excerpted from a much longer passage describing the spectator's experience in response to the play. See Bansat-Boudon 1992: 151–152.

[219] Phrase borrowed from the title of J. Rancière's book (2008).

principle that Yogarāja (ad 27) finds fault with these Brahmavādins, even though such an account of the vedāntic system (especially that of Śaṅkara) must be taken as a serious abridgement, which fails to take note of the important cosmological role played therein by Īśvara, or of the complex interplay of *māyā* and the *jīva* in its account of the "perceptible" world.

As a consequence, one observes that the Traika view of the "real world" differs somewhat from that of Śaṅkara's Advaita, where notions of the "real" are based exclusively on the single unchanging Real, *brahman* (*sat*, τὸ ὄν), which can never be other than it is (in later Advaita usage, termed *pāramārthikaṃ sat*). By contrast, the "absolutely unreal" (*prātibhāsika*) can appear only verbally, is always other than it is (*asat*) — the 'son of a barren woman' (a contradiction in terms) or the 'horn of a hare' (an imaginary association). Between these two extremes is the "real world" (*vyāvahārika*) — or what we like to call the "real world" — which is 'inexplicable' (*anirvacanīya*) in the sense that it is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal (*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*) — the world, in other words, of change, where rules of cause and effect apply. Śaṅkara prefers the formula *sadasadvilakṣaṇa* to the older *bhedābheda* (different-and-not-different) for he considers this last a contradiction in terms.

While the Śaivas and the Advaitins agree in not denying a provisional reality to the world of normal experience, they seem to part company in their view of the "absolutely unreal", which notion has disappeared from the Śaiva lexicon, leaving us with a "bi-polar" universe consisting of the God on one side and his "creation" on the other. Such "entities" as sky-flowers and square circles are accorded no special status, for as ideas they "exist" in the same created universe.[220] In a sense, we have returned to a more Sāṃkhya-oriented view of the Real, where the created world is legitimated as a function of the absolute, no doubt motivated by the Śaivas' view that action is part and parcel of that absolute, conceived as inseparable from its Śakti.

Thus, in the schema of the Trika, Śakti appears twice, as the consort of Śiva, that is, as self-consciousness still indistinct from pure consciousness, and as the subtly "degraded" form of *māyā* — which, it will be remembered, figures as the sixth in the procession of the *tattvas*. In this sense, one can say that the Trika substitutes for the pair *brahman*/*māyā* of Advaita the couple Śiva/Śakti, once *māyā*, or more precisely, the goddess Māyā, is taken as a hypostasis of Śakti. It being understood that, in a Traika perspective, the dissociation Śakti/*māyā* is valid only in a worldly perspective,

[220]See PS 44 and n. 915. Trika theory holds that consciousness contains everything within its fold. Only that which is known exists; whatever is not an object of knowledge does not exist. It is curious that the same formulation of the relation of the idea and its object may be found also in the most extreme realistic doctrines — notably Prābhākaramīmāṃsā — where it cannot be admitted that an idea (even an erroneous one) has "nothing" for its object; see also n. 265.

vertically; it has no reality from the ultimate point of view, when envisaged horizontally. In some ways, it could be said that the Trika conception of *māyā* is closer to that of the *Gītā* — or in any case, to the version of the *Gītā* as commented upon by Abhinavagupta. Besides, it should be noted that the philosophical discourse of Advaita, though founded on the pair *brahman-māyā*, does not assign to the *tattvas* the soteriological role which is their due in Sāṃkhya and in Trika — although in varying ways.

As regards the integration of Sāṃkhya into the Trika, certain displacements are in evidence: the *māyā* of the Trika represents functionally the *prakṛti* of Sāṃkhya with the major difference that the former now embodies a goddess and is not an 'unconscious' principle; in contrast, the *prakṛti* of the Trika is a devalued form of the Sāṃkhya *prakṛti*, reduced to its *triguṇātmaka* function. Likewise, the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya becomes, in the Trika hierarchy, little more than the archetype of the finite, bound soul.

It is true that Indian soteriologies have as their principle the abrogation of a condition deemed unhappy, and one can argue that they are all organized around a dialectic of servitude and liberation. Still, the way proposed by Śaivism is distinguished from other systems by the dynamism and discursivity of that dialectic. A quality that relates evidently to its notion of the Absolute (called Śiva), which the throbbing essence of its energy predisposes to a series (limited in number) of manifestations. The geneses of finitude and of liberation operate, dynamically, by a progressive installation and disinstallation of the *tattvas*, by the emanation of diversity and its reabsorption. Thus does Śaivism interpret both Sāṃkhya and Advaita.

The thought-universe of the Trika is indeed that of an idealism based on the notion of universal consciousness, of which many variants exist, in the West as well. Still, the wide range and the complexity of the system make it unique, inasmuch as it develops, as a coherent tradition, over several centuries, and is graced by the works of some of the most acute thinkers of the Indian past.

Lyne Bansat-Boudon
Saint-Aubin-sur-mer, June 3, 2009

Translation

Salutation to the one having the form of ultimate reality, which is the Self, which is consciousness.

Now begins
the *Paramārthasāra*, the 'Essence of Ultimate Reality',[221]
composed by the revered master, Abhinavagupta, most eminent among the great Śaiva teachers[222]
together with the commentary of the revered master Yogarāja

[221]The compound *paramārtha* is equivocal as is the final term *artha*, which may be understood according to anyone of its various meanings, such as 'goal', 'object', 'truth', 'reality'; see Intr., n. 7.

[222]*māheśvarācārya* — lit., 'preceptor in the lineage of [teachers] devoted to Maheśvara'.

1. To the One who, although nothing but a mass of consciousness,[223] is yet solidified in the form of the world,[224] to the unborn One who is proficient in the play[225] of concealing[226]

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[223]*cidghana*: the image, much exploited in the Śaivism of Kashmir, of consciousness as 'solid' or 'compact' (*ghana*) is translated here more or less literally, though it probably seems quite paradoxical to the Western reader, as 'solidity' is normally associated with physical objects, especially weighty ones, not with events of the mind. But it also appears to be the case that Śaiva authors were quite aware of the paradox as well, and had good reason to stress it. Even in modern Sanskrit, the term *ghana* continues to be associated with the gross, rather than the subtle, as for instance 'ice' is commonly referred to as '*ghanībhūtaṃ jalam*'. Several rationales can be adduced for this strange metaphorical usage, among them the fact of paradox itself, which may serve (as it often does in Advaita and Mādhyamika explanations) to shock the mind out of its usual habits and to prepare it for supra-mundane insights. It may also be the case, especially for Kashmirian Śaivas — who do not dismiss the 'solid' world as a purely illusory phenomenon (as is usually done by Advaitins), but see it as an activity of the Lord himself — that, by this paradox, attributes normally associated with the effect are transferred to the cause, emphasizing thus the cause's truly substantial reality. Which suggests a third rationale for the usage, which is simply that it is the overtones suggested by the literal 'solidity' that are at issue — thus consciousness is 'compact', 'uniform', 'pervasive', etc. And finally, in stressing what amounts to the materiality of consciousness, our authors may be making a point that is often associated with the 'material cause' (in Aristotelian terms), namely, that, quâ matter, all form is superadded and ipso facto extrinsic. As *Chāndogya* says, what is 'real' is the clay, not the pot or the dish or the toy formed of it. *Mutatis mutandis*, the clay (as matter) is 'inexpressible' except as or through form — one cannot encounter clay as such, and yet all clay objects are nothing but clay. Taken together, these interpretive possibilities present a strong justification for this apparently anomalous metaphor. However that may be, the formula has upaniṣadic antecedents: cf. BĀU IV 5, 13: *evaṃ vā are 'yam ātmā [...] kṛtsnaḥ prajñānaghana eva*, and BĀU II 4, 12: *idaṃ mahad bhūtam [...] vijñānaghana eva*; also MāU 5, referred to n. 792; see also n. 234 on *cidānandaikaghana*.

[224]*jaganmūrti*: in spite of the solidity implied by the term *ghana*, the same *cit* is seen as *rasa*, fluidity (cf. the expression '*cidrasa*' in PH 4, quoted below), which, when oriented toward objectivity in the process of *bhedavyakti*, 'manifestation as difference', is again described in terms of gradual solidification, or crystallization, which process ends in *pṛthivītattva*. Solidification is also emphasized through terms such as *śyāna* (or *āśyāna*, or *prāśyāna*) and *mūrti*. In the sense of 'image', *mūrti* (derived from the root *mūrch*, 'to solidify', 'to coagulate') signifies the coagulation of the essential fluidity of the divinity. In this *maṅgala*, YR seems to echo the words of his direct guru Kṣemarāja's auto-commentary on PH 4, pp. 55–56: *śrīparamaśivaḥ [...] cidrasāśyānatārūpāśeṣatattvabhuvanabhāvatattatpramātrādyātmatayāpi prathate/*, 'Paramaśiva [...] manifests [lit., 'displays'] himself both as the totality of principles, worlds and entities and as their respective experiencers, that are only a solidified form of the essential fluidity of consciousness'. See also Kṣemarāja's SpN I 2 quoted n. 226; also YR ad 46. Quoted in Utpalavaiṣṇava's SpP (Śâstrî Islâmpurkar: 6), the *Cicchaktisaṃstuti*, which develops the image, uses the same terminology: *prāśyānaś cidrasasyoghaḥ sākāratvam upāgataḥ/ avaśyāyaḥ prabodhārke tūdite svasvabhāvabhāk//*, 'The stream of the essential fluidity of consciousness solidifies, assuming [concrete] forms. However, it recovers its own essential nature [i.e., its fluidity], as does the morning dew, when the Sun of consciousness rises'.

[225]*krīḍā* — a key term of the doctrine.

[226]*pracchādana* points here to a central concept of the Śaivism of Kashmir: the *tirodhānaśakti*, power (or energy) of concealment of the Lord, itself a realization of his *svātantryaśakti*, his energy of absolute freedom. Cf. Kṣemarāja in SpN I 2: *tato 'yaṃ cidātmā bhagavān nijarasāśyānatārūpaṃ jagad unmajjayatīti yujyate*, 'Therefore, it is perfectly valid to say that the Lord who is consciousness brings about the emergence of the world by solidifying his own essence', and *Śivasūtravimarśinī* [ŚSV] I 2: *yaḥ parameśvareṇa svasvātantryaśaktyā-*

his own Self, glory to this Supreme Lord!

2. On the compendium[227] *Paramārthasāra*, artfully[228] composed by the master, I, Yogarāja, make this brief commentary, at the request of the learned.

Kārikā 1

[The master] being of the opinion that the completion of this treatise — in keeping with the system of nondualistic Śaivism (*śivādvayaśāsana*) — requires first the removal of the unceasing flow of obstacles, such as apprehension,[229] fear, idleness and doubt,[230] which arise when one imagines oneself as primarily determined by that condition wherein the body and the like is taken to be the cognizer (*dehādipramātṛtā*),[231] now first

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bhāsitasvarūpagopanārūpayā mahāmāyāśaktyā svātmany ākāśakalpe 'nāśritāt prabhṛti māyāpramātrantaṃ saṃkoco 'vabhāsitaḥ sa eva […] bandhaḥ, 'A limitation is made to appear by Paramaśiva in his own being which is pure like the sky. Taking the form of [experiences, beginning with those of] Anāśritaśiva and ending with [those of] the *māyāpramātṛ*, this limitation is the effect of [Paramaśiva's] energy of *mahāmāyā*, which itself consists [for the Lord] in the veiling of his own nature brought about by his energy of freedom. That limitation alone […] is bondage'.

[227] *saṃkṣepa* — cf. YR's symmetric statement in the colophon and n. 1445.

[228] *yuktyā* could be understood more literally as 'by means of, by having recourse to, reasoning', inasmuch as the exponents of the Śaivism of Kashmir claim a rational justification for the doctrine; see n. 427. However, taking into consideration the context, we have opted for the translation: 'artfully', 'skillfully', as pertaining more directly to the composition of a text; this is all the more justified, inasmuch as YR can thus be seen as alluding to AG's *Paramārthasāra* as a (skillful) rewriting of the *Paramārthasāra* of Ādiśeṣa.

[229] In this context, where the *dehādipramātṛ* is referred to, *śaṅkā* is probably to be taken in the sense of *vicikitsā*, 'uncertainty' ('incertezza', in Gnoli's translation [TĀ: 309]), 'apprehension'; see YR ad 58 (avat.) and YR ad 83, which gives this definition: '[...] doubts occasioned by [the presence of] choice (*vikalpa*)'; cf. *Tantrāloka* [TĀ] XIII 198b, for a general description of *śaṅkā*: *śaṅkā vikalpamūlā hi śāmyet svapratyayād iti*, 'Doubt originates from mental constructs. It may be pacified by one's own [firm] conviction [viz., 'when possessed of intense or average grace' (*tīvramadhyaśaktipātavataḥ*)]'. In his commentary, JR quotes from the *Niśāṭana* (referred to in TĀ XIII 197–198) a definition of doubt as bondage par excellence: *vikalpāj jayate śaṅkā sā śaṅkā bandharūpiṇī/ bandho 'nyo na hi vidyate ṛte śaṅkāṃ vikalpajām// vikalpāyāsayuktasya na hi syāc chreyasī gatiḥ/*, 'The doubt that arises from mental constructs takes the form of bondage. There is no other bondage than the doubt arising from mental constructs. The one who is concerned with exertions resulting from mental constructs cannot attain to the highest goal'; also TĀ XII 24: *śaṅkyā jāyate glāniḥ śaṅkyā vighnabhājanam*, and 25, which quotes Utpaladeva's *Śivastotrāvalī* [ŚSĀ] II 28: *sarvāśaṅkāśaniṃ mārgaṃ numo māheśvaraṃ tv iti*. Note Sanderson's usual translation of *śaṅkā* as 'inhibition' (1985: 199, and n. 69; 1986: 181). See also *Parātrīśikālaghuvṛtti* [PTLvṛ] ad 18: *kevalaṃ parikṣīṇaśaṅkātaṅkatvam atropayogi śaṅkāyāḥ […] ekarasatadvimarśātmakasamāveśavighnabhūtatvād*, 'The destruction of the doubt that is perplexity is alone useful, for this doubt is an obstacle to the absorption that consists in constant awareness of him only'. Sanderson (2007: 379) casts doubt on the attribution to AG of the PTLvṛ, but observes that this attribution is attested at an early date in the PM, probably 12th or 13th cent.

[230] Sanderson 2005: 91, n. 7, translates: 'the multitude of hinderers, namely, such [states of mind] as hesitation, uneasiness, laziness, and uncertainty'.

[231] *pramātṛ* — lit., 'agent of [presumably valid] cognition (*pramā*)'. The two families of terms based on the roots *jñā* (*jñāna*, etc.) and *mā* (*māna*, esp. *pramāna*, etc.) present particular

considers his reverence[232] to the Supreme Lord (*parameśvara*).

The essential meaning of the entire treatise is inherently present in this reverence, and it is through this reverence that is enabled absorption (*samāveśa*) in the divinity who is but one's own Self (*svātmadevatā*),[233] a uniform mass of blissful consciousness (*cidānandaikaghana*),[234] once the

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difficulties to the translator. We have tended to prefer 'know' and its derivatives for the former, and 'cognize', etc., for the latter — although both translations are etymologically closer to Skt. *jñā* than either is to the original sense of *mā*, 'to measure, determine'. Rather than become embroiled in the Germanic / Latinate constrast, some have preferred the Greek-based 'gnosis' for *jñāna*, for obvious reasons (Skt. *jñāti* would be an exact transpositon of this term), but of course this too is, etymologically, just another variant of the IE root *gnō. To the extent, however, that the terms based on the root *mā* retain an associative nuance with their origins in the Naiyāyika-Bauddha debates on 'valid means of cognition', it was thought at least permissible to employ here the rather more 'academic' associations of 'cognize', reserving the solid Germanic 'know' for *jñā* and its derivatives — whose applications are both mundane and esoteric, but less often "technical" — in the sense of serving to disambiguate the concrete problems of the "knower" enmeshed in the trammels of mundane awareness. Along with *pramātṛ* 'cognizer' must be accounted an entire family of terms that serve to characterize the problematic of the concrete knower — *prameya*, 'object of cognition' (for the Nyāya, there is no 'knowledge' without a corresponding object — a position common to most "realisms"); *pramāṇa*, 'means' of establishing a correct relation between the prior two; and *pramā*, the 'valid' cognition thus derived. If these associations are to be thus retained, the distinction in translation may to that extent be justified. In some contexts, however, stylistic and other constraints may operate to suggest a less rigid adherence to this strict distinction. See PS 30–31, 39–40, 60–61 concerning the two levels of error, as sources of bondage.

[232]*pravaṇatā* — lit., 'his [constant] submission'. Cf. ĪPV I 1 (vol. I: 18ff.), in which *prahvatā* is synonymous with the *pravaṇatā* found here. Commenting upon Utpaladeva's first words: *kiṃcid āsādya maheśvarasya dāsyām [...]*, 'Having somehow realised my condition as being Maheśvara's servant [...]', ĪPV I 1, 1 (vol. I: 18) elaborates the meaning and the connotations of this salutation: *iha parameśvaraṃ prati yeyaṃ kāyavāṅmanasāṃ tadekaviṣayatāniyojanālakṣaṇā prahvatā sā namaskārasyārthaḥ*, 'In this system, salutation means the reverence consisting in the dedication of body, speech and mind exclusively to Him' (tr. Pandey); see Sanderson 2005: 89ff.

[233]ĪPV I 1, 1 (vol. I: 21) explains that the salutation and the vow, or celebration, of divine victory it implies, whether expressed or not, are interrelated: *śuddhaprakāśaṃ [...] prakhyopākhyākrameṇa svātmaparāvabhāsaviṣayabhāvajigamiṣayā niḥśeṣotkarṣābhidhīyijayatyādiśabdānuvedhena parāmarśanīyam*, 'Pure Light [i.e., consciousness, or the Lord] [...] should however be clearly apprehended by calling to mind some words like "*jayati*", "he is victorious", which stands for all-surpassing greatness, with the intention of bringing it before one's own as well as others' consciousness by means of inner visualisation and its external expression [through the utterance of the salutation itself] respectively' (tr. Pandey, vol. III: 2, modified).

[234]*cidānandaikaghana* — lit., 'mass consisting solely of consciousness and bliss' (if the compound *cidānanda* be understood as a *dvandva*, as is generally the case); or 'mass consisting solely of the bliss that is consciousness' or 'mass consisting solely of the bliss of consciousness' (if the compound be understood as a *karmadhāraya* or *tatpuruṣa*). For an inventory of more-or-less equivalent expressions gleaned from the commentary (*cidekaghana*, *cidekavapus*, *cidekamūrti*, *cinmūrti*, *cinmūrtatva*, *cinrūpa*, *citsvarūpa*, *cidghana*, *abhinnacidghana*) suggests, beneath the diversity of style, an insistence on (1) the sole reality of *cit* — by appropriating qualifications normally associated with its "objects", viz., *vapus*, *mūrti*, *rūpa*, etc.; (2) the materiality of *cit*, as the sole basis of the visible world. The mention *ānanda* in the longer versions of the compound seems destined to add a "sensible" dimension to that uniqueness. All of which might be alleged to favor the interpretation of the compound itself, not as a *dvandva*, but as a *karmadhāraya* or *tatpuruṣa* — for, precisely, *cit* and *ānanda* are not two; therefore our translation: 'a uniform mass of blissful consciousness'.

condition of finite cognizer (*parimitapramātr̥*) has been overcome:[235]

1. To You, the transcendent, situated beyond the abyss, beginningless, unique, yet who dwell in manifold ways in the caverns of the heart, the foundation of all this universe,[236] and who abide in all that moves and all that moves not, to You alone, O Śaṃbhu, I come for refuge.[237]

To You, whose form is the god that is my own Self, who are the essence of what is present (*sphurattā*)[238] in every cognizer,[239]

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[235]The *avataraṇikā* — lit., 'descent', is the preamble to the commentary proper, serving to introduce the verse, and clarifying the sequence of the text from one kārikā to the next.

[236]Silburn translates: 'qui reposes en toute chose'.

[237]The verse (a *triṣṭubh*) is nearly identical to ĀPS 1 (on the title and authorship of the first *Paramārthasāra*, see Intr., p. 2), substituting *parasthaṃ gahanāt* for *parasyāḥ prakr̥ter*, and *śaṃbhum* for *viṣṇum*. The editions of the ĀPS add to this *maṅgala* a verse (ĀPS 2: *ātmāmbu-rāśau nikhilo 'pi loko magno 'pi nācamati nekṣate ca/ āścaryam etan mr̥gatr̥ṣṇikābhe bhavāmbu-rāśau ramate mr̥ṣaiva*), to which nothing in AG's PS corresponds. The Pandit edition of the ĀPS omits those first two stanzas, beginning directly with the long narrative frame (*garbha-gr̥ha°* ...) that precedes the exposition proper. Thus is the title *Āryāpañcāśīti* justified: if the concluding verse is excepted, the text does consist of 85 āryās; see Intr., n. 16.

[238]The term *sphurattā* is one of the key words of the Trika. Mayrhofer, Monier-Williams (*Sanskrit-English dictionary* [MW]), and other authorities consider the roots *sphur*, *sphar*, and *sphāy* more or less related; the various senses that may attach individually to each root are often confounded in the usage of all, extending from 'be enormous' to 'explode'. By reason of the frequency of their occurrences alone, and given the preponderance of the notion of light in this doctrine, the roots *[pra-]kāś*, *[pra-, vi-, ava-]bhā*, *bhās*, *sphur*, etc., appear to be employed without major differentiation of meaning. Thus, we have preferred to translate them in a more or less anodyne fashion and indifferently with terms such as 'appear', 'become evident', 'become patent', 'manifest', etc. A passage from TĀV V 123 supports this interpretation: commenting on *bhāsate durghaṭā śaktir* of the verse, JR says: *bhāsate svātmaikātmyena prathate*, '[and so, that energy] "manifests itself", [that is] it extends itself [as everything visible] inasmuch as it is [ever] identical with itself [viz., incapable of abolishing its own nature]' (see the entire passage, n. 872); also TĀV IV 14, where *sphuṭayet* is glossed as *sākṣātkuryāt*. However, to fully understand the connotations of these usages will require a complete exposition of the Śaiva doctrine, which is rather the business of PS itself. The term *sphurattā* appears in ĪPK I 5, 13–14, in the context of defining *citi* — 'consciousness', or, as translated by Pandey, 'sentiency', or 'principle of consciousness' (ĪPK, vol. III: 73), a term that is glossed by the *Vimarśinī* as *yā citiḥ citikriyā tasyāḥ pratyavamarśaḥ*, 'the act of consciousness which has self-reference' (tr. Pandey, vol. III: 73). Being essentially reflective awareness (*pratyavamarśa*), consciousness (*citi*) is represented also as 'supreme Speech' (*parāvāc*), 'freedom' (*svātantrya*) and 'sovereignty' (*aiśvarya*) of the supreme Self (*paramātman*) (ĪPK I 5 13); as the 'manifestation' (*sphurattā*), 'absolute being' (*mahāsattā*), and 'heart' (*hr̥daya*) of the Supreme Lord (ĪPK I 5 14). ĪPV I 5, 14 glosses again *mahāsattā* as *mahādevī*, through the citation (vol. I: 261): *mahāsattā mahādevī viśvajīvanam ucyate*. On the Vaiśeṣika and Vaiyākaraṇa concept of *mahāsattā*, see Appendix 15, p. 339. Here, the use of the root *sphur* in the sense of 'to manifest' is significant, for the Trika phenomenal world is neither an illusory appearance (*vivarta*), as Advaitins hold, nor a real transform (*pariṇāma*), as stated by followers of Sāṃkhya and Pāñcarātra, but the luminous manifestation of the Lord (or *spanda* principle) that is implicit in every act of consciousness and which "surges forth" periodically as the insight determining even the possibility of awareness. See SpN I 3.

[239]See PS 49 and YR ad loc.

Śaṃbhu, [appropriation of] whose nature becomes [for the aspirant] the ultimate goal (*śreyas*),[240] who are as well [absolute] Being (*sattā*),

I come for **refuge** to You as my protector in order to attain absorption in You;

By the word '*eva*' the author means: 'I take [refuge] in Śaṃbhu, not in some other god operating within the realm of Illusion (*māyā*), who is [therefore] different from me — Śaṃbhu, the divinity who has taken the form of my own Self'.[241] Thus the master excludes any connection with another divinity.[242]

Moreover, what sort of Śaṃbhu?[243]

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[240]Or 'whose nature is unsurpassed (*anuttara*) felicity'. One might suspect here a play on the word *śreyas* — a term commonly used by the Mīmāṃsakas in the sense 'the goal par excellence'; that is to say, the reward, in the largest sense, deriving from strict performance of the sacrifice: the maintenance of the good order of things (*dharma*) and, ultimately, the personal reward thereto pertinent, long life and, at its conclusion, residence among the gods. Where the text declares no explicit purpose deriving from the ritual, the Mīmāṃsakas posit this "general" end, for every act should be undertaken in view of some result, whatever it may be. So, in later loose usage, *śreyas* becomes a term for the 'purpose of purposes', something akin to the Platonic 'Good', human felicity in its most abstract form, or (even better) 'heaven' — but generally to be distinguished from the 'other-worldly' purpose (which is not an "end"), *mukti*, liberation. In our text, however, some occurrences of *śreyas* appear to refer to *mukti*; see also n. 150 and 1421.

[241]*śaṃbhuṃ svātmadevatākāram eva prapadye na ca punar māyāntaścārinaṃ kiṃcid bhinnaṃ devam*. See ĪPV I 1, 1 (vol. I: 29): *saṃbhavanti hi māyāgarbhādhikāriṇo viṣṇuviriñcādyāḥ*, 'There do exist [deities] powerful within the pale of *māyā*, such as Viṣṇu, Viriñca (= Brahmā), etc.'; and ĪPV I 5, 13 (vol. I: 254–255): 'Those operating within the pale of *māyā* are Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Indra, etc.'; cf. BĀU I 4, 10 (quoted by R ad ĀPS 80), characterizing the *paśu*: *atha yo 'nyāṃ devatām upāste anyo 'sau anyo 'ham asmīti, na sa veda/ yathā paśur evaṃ sa devānām*, 'So whoever worships another divinity (than his self) thinking that he is one and (*brahman*) another, he knows not. He is like an animal to the gods'.

[242]*anyayogaṃ vyavacchinati*: the indeclinable *eva* is used in two different senses: *avadhāraṇa*, 'determination', 'ascertainment' (viz., 'that very X'); and that of *anyayogavyavaccheda*, 'exclusion' (viz., 'X only'), as is the case here. Cf. ĪPV I 1, 1 quoted n. 241.

[243]The syntax of commentaries on versified texts is relatively free; two exegetical procedures are followed: the *daṇḍānvaya*, 'rod-like syntactic construction', and the *khaṇḍānvaya*, 'syntactic construction [made clear] by [having recourse to its] elements (*khaṇḍa*)'. Beginning with the subject (if expressed), ending with the verbal form, the *daṇḍānvaya* method places the intermediary words in their respective cases in keeping with the normal prose order. Such is the style of Mallinātha's commentaries on Kālidāsa's works. Here, and throughout his commentary, YR follows the *khaṇḍānvaya* style: the long sentence constituting the entire kārikā is first reduced to its core sentence: *tvām eva śambhuṃ śaraṇaṃ [prapadye =] saṃśraye*, which is then explained in the order of its words. Then, the exegete explains the other words of the sentence — all here adjectives qualifying '*śaṃbhum*' — by asking questions that elicit the qualifications as responses: 'what sort [of Śaṃbhu]?' One will find excellent illustrative examples of this style in YR's commentary ad 98–99. Note that the question: 'what sort [of Śaṃbhu]?' (*kiṃ bhūtam*) will be again answered in kārikās 10–11, 43, and, even more elaborately, in kārikās 64–66. At the same time, YR's commentary adheres to the general principles of Indian hermeneutics in stressing the inner coherence (*saṃgati*) of the text, and in raising possible objections and offering solutions (*ākṣepasya samādhānam*); cf. Grimal 2000: 765–785.

Transcendent (*para*) [244] means 'full' (*pūrṇa*), namely, 'replete with all five energies': Consciousness (*cit*), Bliss (*ānanda*), Will (*icchā*), Knowledge (*jñāna*), and Action (*kriyā*), [245] and who has thus the nature of the Unsurpassed.

Thus is he **'situated beyond the abyss'.**

Now, **beyond the abyss** [246] means 'beyond the principle of *māyā*' (*māyātattva*) [viz., beyond the category of apparently objective existence], [247] ever remaining in his transcendent (*para*), or all-encompassing (*pūrṇa*) nature, that is, remaining on the pure path (*śuddhādhvan*) [248] [composed of the five principles] beginning with Śiva and ending with *vidyā*.

And although he manifests himself (*sphurat*) as marvelously differen-

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[244] Same gloss in YR ad 43. In this acceptation, '*para*' appears to have been derived from the *guṇa* degree of the verbal root *pṝ*, 'fill' (present: *piparti*), with suffix *-a*.

[245] On the Lord's *śaktis*, especially his five fundamental *śaktis*, see PS 4, YR ad loc., PS 10–11, YR ad loc., and PS 14.

[246] On the meaning of *gahana*, see ĀPS 6b: *mohāndhakāragahanāt tasya kathaṃ bandhanān mokṣaḥ*, and R ad loc. According to R, the adjective *gahana* (lit., 'dense', 'impenetrable'), as qualifying the noun *bandhana*, means 'difficult to destroy' (*duruccheda*). In this understanding, ĀPS 6b means: 'How is the limited soul to be delivered from bondage, [which is] difficult to eradicate because of the darkness that is delusion?' (We differ from Danielson's understanding of the verse.) See also TĀ VIII 322a, which associates *māyātattva* with *gahana*: *māyātattvaṃ vibhu kila gahanam arūpaṃ samastavilayapadam/*, '*māyātattva* is indeed pervasive, impenetrable, formless. It is the abode of dissolution of the entire universe'. This rather cryptic statement is further explained by JR: *vibhu vyāpakam ata eva gahanam/ arūpam iti sūkṣmatvāt/ samastavilayapadam iti sūkṣmeṇa krameṇātra viśvasyāvasthānāt*, '*vibhu* means "pervasive", therefore "impenetrable" (*gahana*). It [viz., *māyātattva*] is "formless", due to its subtlety. It is the "abode of dissolution of the entire universe", for the entire universe remains there in a subtle sequence'. In other words, since phenomenal diversity in its entirety (*meya*) arises from the *tattva* named *māyā*, it is considered to abide there in a subtle form. As such, *māyāguhā* is also defined, in TĀ VIII 308a, as *jagadyoni*, the 'womb of universe'. We will devote a separate study on the Trika notion of a threefold *māyā*, namely, *māyāgranthi*, the 'knot' (or *māyābila*, the 'cavity'), *māyātattva*, the 'principle' (or *māyāguhā*, the 'cavern') and *māyāśakti*, described in PS 15. Cf. BĀU IV 4, 13: *yasyānuvittaḥ pratibuddha ātmā/ asmin saṃdehye gahane praviṣṭaḥ/ sa viśvakṛt sa hi sarvasya kartā/ tasya lokaḥ sa u loka eva*, 'Whoever has found and has awakened to the self that has entered into this perilous inaccessible place (the body) (*saṃdehye gahane*) [note that Senart translates: 'engagé dans les ténébreuses complexités du corps'], he is the maker of the universe, for he is the maker of all. His is the world. Indeed, he is the world itself', and Śaṅkara [= Ś] ad loc.: *gahane viṣame anekaśatasahasravivekavijñānapratipakṣe viṣame*, 'a place inaccessible, that is a place with hundreds and thousands of obstacles to attaining enlightenment through discrimination'.

[247] In the nondualist Śaivism of Kashmir, creation is nothing but the Lord's manifestation; the *tattvas* are thus the categories, or 'principles', constitutive of this manifestation; in some cases they are better rendered as 'reality-levels' (see Sanderson 2005: 104, n. 45); on this concept and its etymology, see PS 10–11 and YR ad loc. The first five *tattvas* are grouped together as the *śuddhādhvan*, the pure path; the *aśuddhādhvan* includes the other 31. On *māyātattva*, see also n. 246.

[248] This notion accounts for that ideal, or internal, level of manifestation, which has not yet materialized into actual creation. As Michel Hulin (1978: 305) states, at the level of the *śuddhādhvan*, 'Śiva [fait], si l'on ose dire, le tour de sa nature' ('Śiva, so to speak, takes an overall view of his own nature').

tiated, when manifesting various states of consciousness,[249] he does not deviate from his transcendent nature, which is all-encompassing.

As it has been said in the *Spandaśāstra*:

> Even though different [states of consciousness, such as] waking, etc.,[250] that are not [truly] different from him,[251] proceed from him,[252] he never departs from his own nature, which is that of pure agent of experience (*upalabdhṛ*).[253]

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[249]Reflecting on the states of consciousness (*avasthā*) — waking (*jāgrat*), dream (*svapna*), deep sleep (*suṣupti*) — has, from the time of the earliest upaniṣads, the BĀU and ChU, been a way of discovering the inner *ātman*, for *suṣupti* is taken to be the stage (*avasthā* or *sthāna*) where objectivity resolves into its source, as it were. See BĀU II 1, 15–19 (*svapna* and *suṣupti*), IV 3, 9–34 (*jāgrat*, *svapna* and *suṣupti*), with the famous image (IV 3, 18) of the *ātman/puruṣa* continuously wandering through the two states of waking and sleep, as a great fish swims from one bank of the river to the other; see also BĀU (II 1, 15–19, IV 3, 9–20); ChU IV 3, 3; VIII 6, 1–3; VIII 10–11; KauBU III 13; ŚB X 3 3, 6 and 5 2, 11–15; BSBh I 1, 4 and I 1, 23. In accordance with a recurring pattern where + 1 completes a series of three in an enumeration (see Malamoud 1989: 140ff.), some texts, like MuU III 2 8 (quoted by R ad ĀPS 70), postulate a state (not yet designated as the 'Fourth', *turīya* or *turya*) transcending all three: *vidvān nāmarūpād vimuktaḥ parāt paraṃ puruṣaṃ upaiti divyam*, 'He who knows, delivered from name and form, attains the divine Being, higher than the highest'; see also ChU VII 24, 1: *yatra nānyat paśyati [...] sa bhūmā*. It is MāU 7 and 12 that, for the first time, explicitly adduces a *caturtha*, 'fourth' state (on the MāU and its exposition by Gauḍapāda, who lived before Śaṅkara, see PS 35 and YR's gloss). The Śaivism of Kashmir adds a fifth, *turyātīta*, 'beyond the Fourth', the 'trans-fourth' state. Thus is developed the logic of transcendence, in consequence of which the Śaivism of Kashmir postulates above Śiva himself, Paramaśiva; see YR ad 14 (and n. 513), which establishes the correspondence of *turya* with the 'pure path' (*śuddhādhvan*), i.e., the totality of the first five *tattvas*; also YR ad 15 and 85–86.

[250]According to the SpN (Singh: 34), 'etc.' includes not only dream (*svapna*) and deep sleep (*suṣupti*), states of consciousness common to all (*lokaprasiddha*), but also concentration (*dhāraṇā*), meditation (*dhyāna*) and intense absorption (*samādhi*) that are proper to yogins. SpN I 3 seems to establish a term-by-term correspondence between waking / *dhāraṇā*, dream / *dhyāna*, and deep sleep / *samādhi*. On this point, see ŚSV I 8–10 (Singh: 43).

[251]According to SpN I 3, *tadabhinne* may be understood as a *hetugarbhaviśeṣaṇa*, an 'adjective containing an implicit reason'. Thus one could understand: 'Even though different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., proceed [from him], he never departs from his own nature, which is that of a [pure] agent of experience (*upalabdhṛ*), for those [states of consciousness] are not [truly] different from him'.

[252]Or else (according to the gloss *prasarpati* = *pravahati sati*): 'flow on', i.e., 'go on appearing'. However, our translation of *prasarpati* as 'proceed from' is also supported by the SpN which emphasizes the process of manifestation, expression of the Lord's absolute freedom: *anena cātidurghaṭakāritvam eva bhagavato dhvanitam/ yasmāj jāgarādivibhedaṃ ca prakāśayati tatraiva ca svābhedam iti bhedātmanā tadabhedātmanobhayātmanā ca rūpeṇāparāparāparāparāśaktitrayasvarūpeṇa sphurati*, 'This [adjective 'tadabhinne'] suggests that the Lord accomplishes [what is otherwise] difficult to construe. Inasmuch as he [is the one who] manifests (*prakāśayati*) the different states, waking, etc., [he manifests] his own lack of difference vis-à-vis that [manifestation of difference]. Thus, he manifests himself as differentiated, as non-differentiated and as both differentiated and non-differentiated when he assumes the form of the triad of his energies, viz., non-supreme, supreme, supreme-non-supreme'.

[253]SpK I 3. Ancient commentators, as well as modern scholars, have variously interpreted this verse (see Silburn, Singh, Dyczkowski ad SpK), largely for the reason that the syntactic construction of the first hemistich may be analyzed in two ways, as shown by Kṣemarāja in

Beginningless means 'ancient',[254] due to the presumption of priority (*ādisiddhatva*)[255] [that necessarily devolves] from his status as the

his *Spandanirṇaya*. In the first interpretation, the first hemistich is to be taken as a locative absolute in which the *tatpuruṣa* compound *tadabhinne* is an adjective qualifying *jāgradādivibhede 'pi*, and *prasarpati* is the locative of the present participle. We have preferred to retain this interpretation in our translation inasmuch as Kṣemarāja also seems to prefer it (see the beginning of the gloss: *lokaprasiddhe [...] bhede yogaprasiddhe 'pi vā [...] prasarpaty anyānyarūpe pravahati sati arthāt tat tattvaṃ [...] naiva nivartate*). In the second interpretation, *tad* becomes an autonomous pronoun, and the subject of the present indicative *prasarpati*. *tat* would then refer to the *spanda* principle, and the meaning would be: 'Although that [*spanda* principle] flows on (*prasarpati* = *prasarati*) [i.e., 'assumes diversity' (*vaicitryaṃ gṛhṇāti*)] in different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., which are not [truly] different from it, it never departs from its own nature which is that of a [pure] agent of experience' (see Silburn SpK: 71); or else, if one retains the alternative understanding of *jāgradādivibhede 'pi* as *jāgradādivibhede 'pi sati*, offered by SpN: 'Although that [*spanda* principle] flows on [i.e., 'assumes diversity'], when different [states of consciousness such as] waking, etc., take place [...]'. The two interpretations — equally supported by SpN — are not fundamentally different, except for the emphasis that the first puts on the absolute freedom of the Lord. The kārikā means that Śiva, or the *spanda* principle, is the condition permitting such states of consciousness; the essential nature of Śiva is that of pure agent of experience (*upalabdhṛ*), and this persists even when one dreams, or is in deep sleep. In other words, states of experience such as waking, etc., may differ phenomenally, but Śiva, as Experiencer, remains one and the same as consciousness. See SpN I 3: *nivartate nijān naiva svabhāvād upalabdhṛtaḥ: tat tattvaṃ nijād anapāyinaḥ sarvasyātmabhūtāc cānubhavitṛrūpāt svabhāvān naiva nivartate*, 'This [*spanda*] principle never departs from its immutable nature, which consists in being the universal Self and the [pure] agent of experience' (on the meaning of *upalabdhṛ*, glossed as *anubhavitṛ*, see n. 337). As observed by SpN, this metaphysical truth has its practical counterpart in spiritual practice and experience: *ataś ca jāgarādidaśāvasthito 'py evam imaṃ svasvabhāvaṃ pariśīlayan yaś cinute sa śaṅkara evety upadiṣṭaṃ bhavati*, 'Thus, this verse teaches that, although himself the basis of differentiated states, such as waking, etc., he who persists essentially (*cinute*) while contemplating his own undifferentiated nature is that very Śaṅkara'. PM ad MM 19 [PM 19] quotes SpK I 3.

[254]Cf. BĀU IV 4, 18: *te nicikyur brahma purāṇam agryam*, 'They have realised the ancient primordial *Brahman*'.

[255]See Utpaladeva's ĪPvṛ I 1, 2, where the term *ādisiddha* of the kārikā, lit., 'established from the beginning', or 'logically prior', is glossed both by *pūrvasiddha* 'formerly established' and *purāṇa* 'ancient'. It means that the cognizer is prior to the cognition, that he is its condition *sine qua non*. The subject precedes the object, which is but the object of his cognition, and as such is established (*siddha*) first. This question of the Lord's *ādisiddhatva* is discussed at length in SpN I 2, while answering the Buddhist objection that there is no Self, no ultimately real Knower; that which we consider real is, for want of a better word (cf. SpN I 4) a continuum, a series, of cognitions (*jñānasantāna*). Kṣemarāja demonstrates that a denying subject is needed for denying the Self; in other words, that without a denying Self, there cannot be denial of the Self, for this denial would be then a painting without a canvas (*abhittikam etac citram*). The proof of the reality of the Lord is precisely his manifestation as denying subject. Therefore the text can conclude: *bhagavān ādisiddhasvaprakāśamūrtir astīti*, 'The Lord, being logically prior (*ādisiddha*), and in the form of self-luminosity, does exist'. Such arguments as to the logical priority of the Self or consciousness are found in all the Indian idealisms: cf. Śaṅkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī* 97: *siddhā tarhy ātmanaḥ pramātuḥ svataḥsiddhiḥ pramāṇanirapekṣatayaiva*. In ĪPVV I 1, 2 (vol. I: 51), AG, while answering the objection that in the case of fire inferred from smoke, it is smoke that is established first, contrasts that sort of priority with the priority of the Self, which is qualified as *purāṇa*, since there cannot be any objectification of the Self, the pure subject. See also SpP avat., p. 6, which deals with the concept of *ādisiddhatva*

cognizer present in all possible perceptions as the principle of experience itself (*anubhavitṛtā*);

unique means 'unaccompanied', for the attribution to him of difference makes no sense, inasmuch as he is universally present (*sphuraṇāt*) as the unity of consciousness (*cidaikya*).

The master goes on: **'who dwell, etc.'**.

Even if he is of this sort, yet, out of his own freedom (*svātantrya*), he has penetrated **in manifold ways**, that is, in many different ways, **into the caverns** (*guhā*), that is, into the caverns that are the hearts (*hṛd*)[256] [of all limited cognizers], whether they be Rudras or ordinary souls (*kṣetrajña*).[257]

In other words, even though his nature is [unitary] consciousness, he situates himself as the variety of cognizers, manifesting (*ābhāsya*) himself freely (*svayam*) as insentient or sentient, just as an actor [assumes various roles].[258]

Therefore he is **'the foundation of all this universe'**.[259]

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while demonstrating the irrefutability of the Spanda doctrine. Thus ĪPK (I 1, 2) affirms the logical priority of the Self, i.e., the *spanda*: *ata eveśvarapratyabhijñāyām ādisiddhir ity uktam* (correcting a misprint [*ādisiddhar*] in Dyczkowski's edition). In ĪPV I 1, 2 (vol. I: 55), AG glosses the term *ādisiddha* with *avicchinnaprakāśa*, 'of uninterrupted light', and relates it to the next word of the kārikā, *maheśvara*, the 'sovereign Lord' — who is such on account of his being uninterrupted light, manifesting himself thereby as omniscient (*jñātṛ*) and omnipotent (*kartṛ*). AG attributes the meaning 'eternal' (see Pandey's transl., p. 10), or 'eternally present', to *ādisiddha* — a meaning that can be retained in YR's commentary, where *ādisiddha* glosses *anādi*, 'beginningless'. On *purāṇa*, see YR ad 7; also the avat. ad 47–50, which refers to the concept of *ādisiddhatā*.

[256]The expression addresses the problem common to all monisms: how can one reconcile the oneness of the Lord, the only Real, with phenomenal diversity? The Lord's immanence consists in his being the consciousness of each and every finite being, from the Rudras to the *kṣetrajñas*. *guhā*, 'cavern', is a designation of *māyā*, 'power of differentiation', or 'delusion'. It is not to be taken as a mere metaphor; rather, it is a technical term that designates one aspect or level of *māyā*, seen as threefold; see n. 246.

[257]The phrase associating *rudras* and *kṣetrajñas* recurs as a motif in Trika texts; cf. YR ad 5, 6, 14, 23 and ŚSV, *maṅgalācaraṇa*: *rudrakṣetrajñavargaḥ samudayati yato yatra viśrāntim ṛcched [...] caitanyaṃ śāṅkaraṃ taj jayati*, 'Victory to this consciousness of Śaṅkara from which proceeds the host of Rudras and *kṣetrajñas*, and in which they come to rest'. It is a way of classifying the multitude of cognizers (*pramātṛ*) — or, as stated by PS 5, of 'enjoyers' (*bhoktṛ*) — endowed with bodies (or, more generally, 'forms'), faculties (*karaṇa*) and the corresponding attributes (*guṇa*), into a hierarchy of categories, according to the degrees of excellence of their faculties: gods (Rudra, etc., viz., Brahmā and Viṣṇu), men (among which the yogins enjoy extraordinary faculties and powers), and 'animals', this latter category including stationary beings (*sthāvara*) such as plants; see Appendix 1, p. 317.

[258]The analogy of the actor is recurrent in Indian speculation, one of the better-known examples being the danseuse (or actress) of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. The theory of the seven subjects (*saptapramātṛ*) is implicitly referred to here. See YR ad 14, and SpN I 1 quoted in Appendix 10, p. 330. For the same analogy of Śiva as an actor, see YR ad 5 and 26.

[259]The juxtaposition of the two epithets *sarvālaya* and *sarvacarācarastha* points once again to the simultaneous transcendence and immanence of the Lord. The epithet *sarvālaya* is another formulation of SpK I 2: *yatra sthitam idaṃ sarvaṃ kāryam [...]*, '[The One, i.e.,

The **foundation**, the place of repose (*viśrāntisthāna*) **of all this universe** (*sarva*) [viz., 'the place whereon reposes', that is, 'on which depends', all this universe] — namely, this [manifest] world (*jagat*), consisting of all cognizers, whether they be Rudras or ordinary souls, and, as well, of all objects of cognition (*prameya*).[260]

For is it not well known[261] that this universe, which indeed is grounded in the universal knower (*pūrṇapramātṛ*) [viz., the Lord, or consciousness],[262] is nevertheless referred to in various ways, manifesting (*prakāśamāna*) itself through difference, as though emerging[263] [from the placid sea of unity], urged on by a pressing need[264] to articulate everything into pairs of knowers and knowns (*grāhyagrāhaka*)?

If this were not the case, this universe would not exist at all — for it would be on such hypothesis other than Light (*prakāśa*).[265]

Consciousness] in whom is situated all this product, i.e., all this world [produced by that Agent who is the Lord, or Consciousness ...]'.

[260]On *jagat*, see, esp., n. 465.

[261]*kila* — see Emeneau 1969: 241ff. The commentator wishes, as it were, to distance himself from such a report, without denying it.

[262]Cf. ĪPK I 4, 8: *tan mayā dṛśyate dṛṣṭo 'yaṃ sa ity āmṛśaty api/ grāhyagrāhakatābhinnāv arthau bhātaḥ pramātari*, 'Therefore, when there is the reflective awareness "that is seen by me, that was seen by me", "this", "that", the two elements though divided into perceiving subject and perceived object are manifested within the [true] cognizer (*pramātari*)' (tr. Torella ĪPK: 110).

[263]In SpK I 2, the term corresponding to *unmagna* is *nirgata*: *yatra sthitam idaṃ sarvaṃ kāryaṃ yasmāc ca nirgatam.*

[264]Cf. the *apekṣā* of the grammarians — the 'expectation' or 'need' aroused by one word for another in a tight syntactical relationship, as the *apekṣā* of an active transitive verb for an accusative direct object.

[265]This is the first statement, in YR's commentary, of a major thesis of the Śaivism of Kashmir: only that exists which shines, i.e., that alone exists which is known. This fundamental principle will come up again in the discussion of kā. 5, 7 and 8, as well as in kā. 30 and its commentary, where it will be given as a formula, unfortunately truncated, quoted by YR: *[...] nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate*, '[...] That which is not luminous cannot manifest itself [lit., 'illumine']'. — or 'the absence of appearance does not appear'. Cf. SpN I 2: *iha yat kiñcit [...] tad yadi na prakāśate na kiñcit*, 'Whatever is here, in this world, [...] if it does not shine forth [viz., appear], it is nothing [i.e., it does not exist]'; again in PS 49; also ĪPK I 5, 3b (quoted in SpN I 5): *prakāśātmā prakāśyo 'rtho nāprakāśaś ca siddhyati//*, 'The object that is made manifest [lit., 'that is illumined'] has Light/consciousness for its essence. That which is not Light does not exist [lit., 'cannot be established']'; also *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi* [APS] 13, quoted in SpN I 5 and ĪPV I 1, 5 (part of the second hemistich) and I 5, 3 (entire verse): *evam ātmany asatkalpāḥ prakāśasyaiva santy amī/ jaḍāḥ prakāśa evāsti svātmanaḥ svaparātmabhiḥ//*, 'Those objects, insentient, are treated as (or "seem to be") inexistent vis-à-vis the Self; nevertheless, they do exist as belonging to Light; the Light of one's own Self alone exists, [whether it comes] from the selves of others or one's own'. The context in which ĪPV I 1, 5 quotes this verse (second hemistich) may aid in its understanding: *paratvaṃ kevalam upādher dehādeḥ sa cāpi vicārito yāvan nānya iti viśvaḥ pramātṛvargaḥ paramārthata ekaḥ pramātā sa eva cāsti/ tad uktaṃ prakāśa evāsti svātmanaḥ svaparātmabhir iti/ tataś ca bhagavān sadāśivo jānātīty ataḥprabhṛti krimir api jānātīyantam eka eva pramātā*, 'Otherness only derives from limiting conditions such as the body, and these [limiting conditions themselves], as soon as they are investigated, [turn out] not [to be] different [from the universal Self]; therefore the

Reflection[266] on the pronoun ['all' (*sarva*)][267] gives rise to the question: 'whence emerges this all (*viśva*)?'[268]

Yet, for all that, the nature of the Lord is not merely transcendent (*samuttīrṇa*); therefore the master says: **'[You] who abide in all that moves and all that moves not'**, for he is ever present also in the form of this sentient and insentient universe, as has been said:

> Since You are indeed the creator of All, O You, who permeate all, therefore,You alone are this All.[269]

In accordance with this rule, it makes no sense to posit as an effect some other unmanifest (*aprakāśamāna*) entity that is not part of that [manifesting cause].[270]

According to the *Spandakārikā*:

> It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment,[271]

it is the Lord himself who appears (*cakāsti*), now one way, now another.

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entire crowd of knowers is, in truth, one knower, and this [knower] alone exists. This has been said [by Utpaladeva]: "The Light of one's own Self alone exists, [whether it comes] from the selves of others or one's own". So there is just one knower, whether expressed as "Lord Sadāśiva knows" or even as "the worm knows." ' An echo of that verse may be found in YR's gloss ad 58. The Trika notion according to which there is no other reality than Light/consciousness, and the correlated concept of 'reflection' (*pratibimba*) are anticipated in *Kāṭhakopaniṣad* [KāU] II 2, 14–15: *tad etad iti manyante 'nirdeśyaṃ paramaṃ sukham/ kathaṃ nu tad vijānīyāṃ kim u bhāti vibhāti vā// na tatra sūryo bhāti na candratārakaṃ nemā vidyuto bhānti kuto 'yam agniḥ/ tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvaṃ tasya bhāsā sarvam idaṃ vibhāti//*, 'This is that and thus they recognise the ineffable, Supreme Bliss. How then may I come to know this? Does it shine (of itself) or does it shine (in reflection)? The sun shines not there, nor the moon and the stars, these lightnings shine not, where then could this fire be? Everything shines only after that shining light. His shining illumines all this world'; note that KāU II 2, 15 = MuU II 2, 10, *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad* [ŚvU] VI 14.

[266] *pratyavamarśa*.

[267] Such reflections are ancient; see Appendix 2, p. 318. Cf. YR ad 17.

[268] The question is likely inspired by the grammatical notion of the pronoun (*sarvanāma*) — a (single) noun capable of representing a multiplicity of other nouns: 'whence comes this multiplicity to which we refer by a single word, the Lord?' In a sense, the Lord is the prototype of the pronoun.

[269] The source of the quotation has not been discovered. For the reasoning, see SpN I 2, quoted n. 265. See also the lost commentary of Somānanda on the *Parātrīśikā* [PT], quoted in *Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa* [PTV] 4 (Singh PTV: 32, Skt. text): *kiṃ bahunā sarvam evānuttaram anuttaratvāt*, 'Why say more? All [this universe] is unsurpassed, because he [the Lord] is unsurpassed'.

[270] For if it were an effect, it would *ipso facto* be manifest. YR presumes here a "world" that would not be part of the Lord, which would be nothing but an "effect" separated from him and therefore devoid of "luminosity". But such a supposition contradicts itself, for how would such a "world" make itself known? Similar phraseology and reasoning in YR ad 27: *anyasyaitadvyatiriktasya aprakāśarūpasya prakāśamānatābhāvāt*; also in YR ad 5 and 10–11.

[271] SpK II 4b. ŚSV I 14 observes that this verse hints at the *bhedābheda* state of experience. YR quotes again SpK II 4b in his gloss ad 74.

In other words, **to You**, who are such, that is, who are unsurpassed, who take the form of that god who is the Self of everything, and who, though in essence the marvel of supreme ipseity (*parāhantācamatkāra*), [272] have yet assumed diversity; and, even more, to You who are supreme Light, free from duality (*advaya*); to You who are, as well, extreme, infrangible freedom; to You, O Lord Śaṃbhu, **I come [for refuge]**. I absorb myself (*samāviśāmi*) in You alone who are such, that is, who are my own Self in the marvelous form of supreme ipseity to be experienced by making use of the adventitious ego (*kṛtrimāhaṅkāra*) [273] [that limits the Self] to the body, etc.

With this summary sentence, [274] which teaches that the supreme state to be attained is absorption in [what is already] one's own essence (*svasvabhāva*), the teacher has stated in abbreviated form the purport of the text in its entirety, via notions of what must be done and what must not be done that will be explained in detail later. [275]

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[272] First occurrence in this text of a key concept of this school: *camatkāra* is one of the notions common to Kashmiri aesthetics and speculation. The term characterizes both an aesthetics (*rasāsvāda*) and a mystical experience (*brahmāsvāda*) — which are 'analogically related, but differentiable' (Gerow 1994: 188) — via a shared aspect: that of 'wonder', 'wonderment'. In the attempt to understand or describe and name this experience, other concepts have been forged that emphasize its other dimensions, involving two main semantic fields: *nirvṛti*, 'serenity', *ānanda*, 'bliss', *ātmaviśrānti*, 'repose in the Self', on the one hand, and *rasa*, 'flavor', *carvaṇā*, 'delectation' (lit., 'mastication'), on the other. All these terms are common to both fields of experience, even if they appear to have greater scope in aesthetics; see ABh ad NŚ VI 31, vol. I: 279, which justifies such technical terms on the basis of their common use: *tathā hi loke sakalavighnavinirmuktā saṃvittir eva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabhogasamāpattilayaviśrāntyādiśabdair abhidhīyate*, 'For, in ordinary life, by the various words "wonderment" (*camatkāra*), "immersion" (*nirveśa*), "relishing" (*rasanā*), "tasting" (*āsvādana*), "perfect realization of enjoyment" (*bhogasamāpatti*), "absorption" (*laya*) [lit., 'dissolution'], "resting" (*viśrānti*), etc., is expressed that [form of] consciousness which is free from any obstacle'; see Appendix 3, p. 320.

[273] That is, by instrumentalizing the adventitious, 'manifest', ego in the quest for transcendence. The concrete ego is, as Śaṅkara observes, the existential form of the transcendent absolute.

[274] *grahaṇakavākya*.

[275] What is to be attained is identification with the *anuttara*, that is, with one's own Self; what is to be abandoned is the *kṛtrimāhaṅkāra*, the 'adventitious ego', that considers the Self limited to the body, and identifies with wordly experience. Similar statement in Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on SpK, commonly known as the *Vivṛti*, "Extensive Explanation" [SpV], although entitled *Spandasūtrārthāvalī*, the *Necklace of Meanings [Strung Upon] the Thread of the Spanda* [a pun on 'sūtra']; see SpV I 1: *vyākhyātaś ca ayam ādiślokaḥ samastaprakaraṇārthopakṣepagarbhaḥ*, 'Thus we have shown that this first verse contains, in a nutshell, the meaning of the entire work (or manual)'.

Kārikās 2–3

Thus, through the intermediary of this verse of praise, the author has stated the essential purport of the manual,[276] namely, nonduality. Now, making explicit [as is required at the beginning of a treatise of this sort] the 'descent of the śāstra',[277] he explains, in the following two āryās, its subject matter, its relation [to that subject matter, that is, the relevance thereto of this work and of the entire Śaiva doctrine there expounded], etc.:[278]

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[276]*prakaraṇa* — AG's verses are also referred to as a *prakaraṇa* in the avat. ad PS 105. See *Vācaspatya* s.v.: *śāstrasiddhāntapratipādake granthabhede*, '[*prakaraṇa*] means a category of text expounding the established doctrine of a system', and, quoting *Vedāntasāra* 3, refers to it as an example of the textual genre: *asya vedāntaprakaraṇatvāt [...]*, '[It is thus called] because it has for its topic the Vedānta [...]'. In fact, the primary sense of *prakaraṇa* is 'topic' (*asmin prakaraṇe*, etc.), but the term is employed, by synecdoche, to designate a text that introduces a topic, which therefore constitutes an 'introduction' to it that is considered elementary; the term also designates one of the ten types of *rūpaka*, which has for its subject "topical" matters, that is, does not deal with otherworldly gods or heroes. See also the *Vidvanmanorañjanī* ad *Vedāntasāra* 3, which quotes *Parāśaropapurāṇa* XVIII 21–22: *śāstraikadeśasaṃbandhaṃ śāstrakāryāntare sthitam/ āhuḥ prakaraṇaṃ nāma granthabhedo vipaścitaḥ//*, 'The learned call *prakaraṇa* that particular category of texts which deals with one part of a system or is established in [service of some] other purpose of the system [e.g., as a manual]'. Note that the *Spandakārikā* is defined by Rāmakaṇṭha (see n. 275) as belonging to the same class of texts, that of *prakaraṇa*.

[277]*śāstrāvatāra* — a śāstra involves transmission through a tradition, which transmission may be of five sorts, which SpP, avat., p. 2 expounds in detail: *tatrāmīṣāṃ śāstrāṇāṃ saṃbandhas tāvat pañcavidhaḥ/ paro mahān divyo divyetara itaretaraś ceti*, 'The relationship [between those who reveal] these śāstras [and their disciples] can be of five kinds, namely, "supreme", "great", "divine", "human", or "mutual" '. For further details on this classification, see Dyczkowski SpK: 360.

[278]The 'etc.' covers the two remaining aspects of the 'descent', namely, the aptitude of the pupil ('is he qualified?') and the goal presupposed by the teaching ('is it possible of realization?'). Here is an example of the methodology of Indian hermeneutics, whose objective is to establish, at the threshold of the text to be commented upon, the *anubandhas*, that is the 'preliminary considerations' or 'requisites' as Hiriyanna translates the term in his edition of the *Vedāntasāra* (pp. 20 and 45), without which no study of śāstra should be undertaken. The main *anubandhas* are four: the determination of the disciple's aptitude (*adhikāra*) to study the matter at issue (it concerns as well his ritual and social qualifications), the subject (*viṣaya*), the mutual relation (*saṃbandha*), the end to be attained (*prayojana*). As the *Vedāntasāra* explains, *saṃbandha* means 'the relation of what has to be made known — that is, in the vedāntic system, the identity between *brahman* and the individual self — to the means of making it known, namely, in this case, the upaniṣads, which are the [right] propounder' (*saṃbandhas tu tadaikyaprameyasya tatpratipādakopaniṣatpramāṇasya ca*). Here, PS 2–3 present the same four *anubandhas*, namely, the description of the *adhikārin* ('Wandering at a loss in the cycle of suffering that starts with our residence in the womb and ends with dying, a disciple inquired of the revered Ādhāra concerning ultimate reality'); the subject-matter (*viṣaya*, or *abhidheya*), namely, 'ultimate reality'; the relationship (*saṃbandha*) the treatise bears to its subject, namely, that of expounder (*pratipādaka*) to expounded (*pratipādya*), in keeping with the Śaiva nondualistic doctrine; the objective (*prayojana*) of the treatise, namely, attaining the realization of the identity of Śiva and *paśu*, culminating in liberation from the 'cycle of sufferings'. As observed by YR, PS 2–3 has recourse to a fifth

2. Wandering at a loss in the cycle of suffering that starts with our residence in the womb and ends with dying, a disciple inquired of the revered Ādhāra concerning ultimate reality.

3. The Teacher replied to him by [reciting] the *Ādhārakārikā*. [279] **[Now] Abhinavagupta expounds the essence of that [instruction], from the point of view of the Śaiva teachings.** [280]

A certain [student], having cultivated dispassion [281] through the grace (*prasāda*) of the Lord, and having withdrawn his mind from the world of transmigration, [282] came to realize that he needed to be instructed by a teacher. Having propitiated properly [283] **the revered Ādhāra**, who was for him the true teacher (*sadguru*), namely, the sage called also Śeṣa, he inquired of him concerning the nature of ultimate reality [and whether it was attainable] through instruction.

Thereupon, considering, in order, [the disciple's] entitlement, his maturity, and his determination, [284] and having thus judged **him**, the disciple, to be endowed with a receptive heart, [285] that very Anantanātha,

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anubandha: the *abhidhāna* or title, namely, *Paramārthasāra* — hinted at in the two āryās by *paramārtham* (kā. 2) and *tatsāram* (kā. 3). Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on SpK I 1 is a remarkable example of the application of these hermeneutical rules; such is the case with the SpP, avat., p. 2–3, respectively: *vācyo 'rthaḥ/ vācakaṃ śāstram/ spandābhidho 'rtho 'tra vācyaḥ/ tadvācakatvād upacārāc chāstrasyāpy etatsaṃjñā/*, 'The denoted [subject] is [supreme] reality; the denotator is the *śāstra*. The reality denoted here is called *spanda*, and, by extension (*upacārāt*), insofar as it denotes it, *spanda* is also the name of the śāstra'; and (p. 6): *upāyopeyapratipādanam eva śāstrasya prayojanam/ yā tadavabodhād upeyasvarūpāpattiḥ sthirā tad eva prayojanaprayojanam iti*, 'The purpose (*prayojana*) of the treatise is to explain the means and goal [of spiritual realization]. The purpose of the purpose is to achieve a permanent realization of one's own nature, which is the [supreme] goal attained by an enlightened insight [into the means and goal]' (tr. Dyczkowski 1994: 142).

[279] On the authorship of the first *Paramārthasāra* and its different titles, as well as on the relationship between the two *Paramārthasāra*, see Intr., p. 2ff.

[280] Kārikās 2 and 3 are in the *āryā* meter, as is the rest of the text, with the exception of the first verse, which is a *triṣṭubh*. AG's PS 2–3 correspond to a longer narrative in ĀPS 3–9 (omitted in the edition of the *Śabdakalpadruma*, probably because it does not directly rely on the canonical exposition of the Vedānta that is expected). Besides, it should be noted that PS 2a (*garbhādhivāsapūrvakamaraṇāntakaduḥkhacakravibhrāntaḥ*) echoes both ĀPS 3a (*garbhagṛhavāsasaṃbhavajanmajarāmaraṇaviprayogābdhau*) and 54b (*janmajarāmaraṇamaye cakra iva bhrāmyate jantuḥ*).

[281] *vairāgya*. Cf. TĀ XIII 98: *vairāgyaṃ bhogavairasyaṃ*, '*vairāgya* is disgust with [respect to] objects of enjoyment' and TĀV XIII 100: *vairāgyaṃ nāma bhogebhyo vaimukhyam ucyate iti*, 'Repugnance [felt] toward objects of enjoyment is called *vairāgya*'.

[282] Cf. ĀPS 4b: *saṃsārārṇavataraṇapraśnaṃ pṛcchāmy ahaṃ bhagavan*, 'Thee, O Lord, I ask the question of how to cross the ocean of transmigration'.

[283] ĀPS 3 shows the pupil 'making obeisance with his hands' (*prāñjali*) and eulogizing the guru (kā. 4).

[284] *pariśīlana*.

[285] *vigalitāntaḥkaraṇa*. Or 'whose heart has been emptied [of its cares]'. A probable explanation of this expression is given further in YR ad 2–3: 'whose heart is pierced with (*viddhahṛdaya*) the energy of the Supreme Lord's favor (*anugrahaśakti*)'; see also YR ad 103:

wise in teaching all the doctrines without exception,[286] imparted instruction, saying: '[Knowledge of] the transcendental *brahman* (*parabrahman*),[287] may be attained through the text entitled *Paramārthasāra*, also called the **"Verses of Ādhāra"** (*Ādhārakārikā*), via the discrimination of *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*, according to the principles of the Sāṃkhya system'.[288]

The **teacher** [viz., Abhinavagupta], motivated by the need to show favor (*anugraha*) to others, [now] expounds the **essence of it**, just as one extracts butter from curds;[289] that is, he expounds the essence of teachings on ultimate reality in keeping with the Śaiva principle of ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality (*paramādvaya*), in order to show favor to all creatures. It is he who realized that the teachings concerning *brahman* are supplied with irrefutable arguments when expounded from the point of view of [the notion of] one's own freedom, in the form of ultimate nonduality. [By his very name,] which, even as a sequence of syllables, is auspicious, that teacher may be said to be **hidden** (*gupta*); and is himself a

vivekārdrahṛdayaiḥ, 'by those whose hearts are softened by discrimination [that is, whose minds have been rendered susceptible to this doctrine by their powers of insight]'.

[286]Note the pun: the one who is Śeṣa ('remainder') knows all (*niḥśeṣa*, 'without any remnant') the doctrines.

[287]This 'qualification', in constant usage, should be taken more or less hyperbolically: it is not thereby suggested that 'other' *brahman*(s) of lower quality are to be noticed. Rather the compound is understood more or less as an appositional *karmadhāraya* — the *brahman* that is the ultimate, or the transcendental *brahman*. It is for this reason that we have generally avoided the translation 'supreme' — suggesting quasi-political dominance — in preference to 'ultimate', or 'transcendental', which looks only to the limit beyond which there is nothing. The same principle has been applied to the translation of *parapramātṛ*.

[288]YR offers here a summary of what is at stake in the disciple's query, after the manner of AG, who gives in two kārikās (2–3) the essential meaning of the introductory passage of Ādiśeṣa's PS: (kā. 3–7: '[...] explain to me *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*'), to which the guru responds (kā. 8–9): 'I shall propound this "Essence of Ultimate Reality", after making obeisance to that Upendra [Viṣṇu], by whom this unreal world was made from *prakṛti* as something seemingly real (*satyam iva*)'. Cf. also ĀPS 70a: *evaṃ prakṛtiṃ puruṣaṃ vijñāya [...]*, 'Thus having recognized *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* as distinct [...]'; and ĀPS 75: *buddhvā vibhaktāṃ prakṛtiṃ puruṣaḥ [...]*, 'When the *puruṣa* has understood *prakṛti* as different [from himself ...]'.

[289]The analogy is a variant of the topos according to which the goose (*haṃsa*) is said to be capable of separating the milk from a mixture of milk and water; cf. TĀ IV 134–136, especially TĀ IV 136b: *tat punaḥ pibati prītyā haṃso 'haṃ sa iti sphuran//*, 'The resplendent goose drinks all that again [viz., he reabsorbs the universe] with pleasure [JR: *prītiḥ ānandaḥ svātantriyaṃ*], saying to himself: "*'haṃ saḥ*, viz., I am that." ' The subject, once aware of his identity with the universe, becomes the supreme subject — the *haṃsa* serving as an image of the *jīvanmukta*. TĀV ad loc. glosses *ahaṃ saḥ* as: *ahaṃ parapramātṛrūpo 'pi saviśvasphāraḥ saviśvasphāro 'pi vā aham eva/ iti akṛtrimeṇa sṛṣṭisamhārakāriṇā svabhāvabhūtena vimarśena sātatyena pravṛttatvād avicchinnatayā prasphuran*, 'The "I", though the transcendental cognizer, bursts forth in the form of the universe, or, though bursting forth in the form of the universe, is the "I" alone; resplendent, undivided [lit., 'in its lack of internal differentiation'], due to its constant activization through [viz., realized in the form of] reflective awareness, its very essence — reflective awareness [that is, the corresponding activization] that is the non-adventitious cause of creation and reabsorption'; also TĀV ad loc.: *haṃsaḥ [...] parapramātā; punaḥ sṛṣṭyādyuttarakālam.*

secret (*guhya*), that is, he is possessed of secret [wisdom] (*sarahasya*), **due to** [his experiencing] **the ever new** (*abhinava*), supramundane,[290] sudden burst (*sphāra*) of the state of wonder (*camatkāra*) that is consciousness.[291]

Thus have been expounded the objective of the text, its title, subject matter, and the mutual relation [of the subject matter to the means of making it known], etc.,[292] but they are not elaborated here for fear of making the text overly prolix.

Now how is the disciple described?

The master replies: **'[Wandering at a loss in the cycle of suffering that starts with our] residence in the womb'.**

Wandering, that is, at a loss, **in the cycle** (*cakra*) **that consists of suffering and ends with dying** — a 'cycle' so-called because it is like a wheel (*cakram iva*),[293] whose [revolutions are the] existences[294] shaped by successive appearances and disappearances [of the disciple, viz., his births and deaths].

One may see as its felly the six 'modifications of becoming'[295] [which any limited soul undergoes when passing] through the variety of states consequent upon residence in the womb, namely, birth, existence, growth, change, decay and death.[296]

By this description is suggested that the disciple's awakening is becoming evident, which implies remembrance of his previous births.[297] Otherwise, how can the curiosity that prompts him to pursue acquisition of the supreme benefit be explained?[298]

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[290] *alaukika*.

[291] Numerous are the esoteric etymologies of the name Abhinavagupta, some given in his own works, some in their commentaries. See PS 104 and its gloss.

[292] See n. 278.

[293] Cf. ĀPS 54b: *janmajarāmaraṇamaye cakra iva bhrāmyate jantuḥ*.

[294] *saṃsaraṇa*.

[295] *bhāvavikāra* — Renou (BSBh: 12) translates *bhāvavikāra* as 'modifications du devenir' ('modifications of becoming', Sarup *Nirukta*), whereas Thibaut (*Vedāntasūtra*: 16) renders it as 'forms of existence' or 'stages of existence'. Renou (BSBh: 12, n. 7) adds that, according to Vārṣyāyaṇi (on *Nirukta* I 2), the theory of the six *bhāvavikāras* is given in order to defend the thesis that the verb has as its fundamental idea 'to become', whereas the noun has for its fundamental idea 'to be (such and such)' ['Le verbe a pour notion fondamentale le devenir (le nom ayant pour notion fondamentale l'être)']. Moreover, as does YR here, the *Nirukta* expresses those 'modifications' as verbal forms, with a slight alteration in the order of enumeration. See also *Vākyapadīya* [VP] I 3 and III 33ff.; Ś ad BhG [BhGBh] II 20 (verse quoted in YR ad 7); see Ruegg 1959: 24–25, on the difficulty raised by the inclusion of *asti*, 'to be', in the list of modifications of action.

[296] ĀPS 3a enumerates four of these *bhāvavikāras* as consequent upon dwelling in the womb (*garbhagṛhavāsa*): *saṃbhava, janman, jarā, maraṇa*; ĀPS 54, three: *janman, jarā, maraṇa*.

[297] Had he not remembered his previous births, he would not have been aware of this unending cycle, which he can no longer bear. It is this awareness that serves as his awakening, and prompts the enquiry addressed to his guru.

[298] Lit., 'how can the curiosity [that prompts him] to pose questions as to acquisition of the supreme benefit [...]'.

And [it is also here suggested that] he is a worthy receptacle for the teacher's instruction in whom dispassion has developed, whose heart is pierced by the energy of the Supreme Lord's favor (*anugrahaśakti*), and by whom correct knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) has been acquired; thus, it is such a one alone who desires knowledge of ultimate nonduality, having approached a suitable teacher, an incarnation of the Supreme Lord.

And this has already been said elsewhere:

> O Goddess, he is led toward the true teacher by the Lord's grace.[299]

This will be stated later in this treatise.

Kārikā 4

The master has thus established a basis [for the text] by [expounding] the process of its origin. Now, he starts the text [proper] by stating, as regards this world, marvelous with the diversity of everything in it, that it is the supreme freedom of the Supreme Lord alone that constitutes the source of agency (*kartṛtva*),[300] [made manifest in] conjoining or disjoining [the host of his energies, bringing about, on the one hand, the dissolution, on the other, the creation of the universe][301] — thus making known that

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[299]The exact source of this quotation has not been found. Compare, however, TĀ XIII 249b: *rudraśaktisamāviṣṭo nīyate sadgurum prati//*, and TĀV XIII 248b–249a, which quotes: *rudraśaktisamāviṣṭaḥ sa śivecchayā/ bhuktimuktiprasiddhyartham nīyate sadgurum prati//*, a text very similar to TĀ IV 35: *śrīpūrvaśāstre tenoktaṃ sa yiyāsuḥ śivecchayā/ bhuktimuktiprasiddhyartham nīyate sadgurum prati*, 'It is said in the Ancient Treatise [viz., the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*]: "He who, thanks to Śiva's will, wishes to go to the true teacher, is led to him so that he may obtain enjoyment and liberation." ' The question of the intensity of *śaktipāta* will be taken up in kā. 9 (and YR ad loc.), YR ad 18, kā. 96–97 (and YR ad loc.). The KSTS includes a second line of quotation which we have chosen to omit: see our 'List of variants' in 'On the Sanskrit text'.

[300]Note the difference between *kartṛ* and *hetu* — doubtless based on the usage of the grammarians (cf. P. I 4, 54–55), who, among other things, thus distinguish the 'agent' of the causative verb from the 'agent' of its embedded base verb.

[301]We have interpreted *saṃyojana* and *viyojana* as the conjunction and the disjunction of the Lord's *śaktis*, taking into consideration the lines of the avat. as well as the kārikā itself. Moreover, this interpretation is supported by Kṣemarāja's commentary on SpK I 1 (p. 6): *yasyonmeṣanimeṣābhyāṃ jagataḥ pralayodayau/ taṃ śakticakravibhavaprabhavaṃ śaṅkaraṃ stumaḥ//*, 'We laud that Śaṅkara by the opening and shutting of whose eye-lids the world appears and dissolves, and who is the source of the glorious display of the Wheel of energies (*śakticakravibhava*)'. As does here the avat., SpN I 1 explains *śakticakravibhava* in terms of the *saṃyojanā* and *viyojanā* of the Lord's *śaktis*: *tasya śakticakrasyābhāsaparamārthasya viśvasya yo vibhavaḥ parasparasaṃyojanāviyojanāvaicitryam anantaprakāraṃ tasya prabhavaṃ kāraṇam/ sa eva hi bhagavān vijñānadehātmakān svātmaikātmyena sthitān viśvān ābhāsān anyonyaṃ nānāvaicitryeṇa saṃyojayan viyojayaṃś ca viśvodayapralayahetuḥ/*, ' "Glorious display" (*vibhava*) means the infinite variety of the conjunction and disjunction of the Lord's energies vis-à-vis each other, which thus appear as a wheel [lit., 'the conjunction and

this universe is nothing but the blossoming of his energies (*śaktivikāsa*) through the intermediary of the four [concentric] spheres (*aṇḍa*):[302]

4. Displaying the glorious superabundance[303] of his own energies, the Lord has brought forth this tetrad of spheres.[304] As divided one from another, they are named Energy, Illusion, Nature and Earth.[305]

By the Lord — Lord Maheśvara, who is free [from any constraint], a uniform mass of blissful consciousness —

this tetrad of spheres, consisting of the aggregate of [all] entities

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disjunction with each other of the Wheel of energies']; a Wheel of energies whose ultimate meaning is the manifestation, viz., the universe. [The Lord] is the source (*prabhava*) [of this glorious display], its cause. Thus, the Lord mutually joins and disjoins, in an infinity of ways, all objective phenomena (*ābhāsa*) [lit., 'appearances', 'manifestations'], which are [in reality] of the nature of consciousness and exist within him as identical with him [for they are nothing but his *śaktis*]. He is [in that way] the cause of the manifestation and dissolution of the universe'. According to this interpretation, the conjunction, or fusion, of the Lord's energies — of phenomena — amounts to the dissolution of the world, whereas their disjunction, or diffusion, amounts to the creation of the world in all its wonderful diversity. Such is also the explanation of Rāmakaṇṭha: according to the SpV (p. 3) on the same SpK I 1, the manifestation (*udaya*) and the reabsorption (*pralaya*) of the world take place, respectively, through the extension (*prasara*) and the reabsorption (*pralaya*) of the Lord's energies. In keeping with one of the traditional exegeses of SpK I 1, Rāmakaṇṭha demonstrates that the members of the two compounds *unmeṣanimeṣābhyām* and *pralayodayau* are organized as a chiasmus, with *unmeṣa* related to *udaya* and *nimeṣa* to *pralaya*: *yasyonmeṣanimeṣābhyāṃ śaktiprasarapralayābhyāṃ jagato viśvasya pralayodayau vināśaprādur bhāvau/ atra yathāsaṃkhyaṃ na vivakṣitam iti vakṣyāmaḥ*, 'The reabsorption and the manifestation, that is, the end and the generation, of the world take place through the opening and shutting of his eye-lids, i.e., by the expansion and reabsorption (°*prasarapralaya*) of his energies. The meaning intended here involves a reversal in the order of words'. Note that the term *yathāsaṃkhyam* designates a principle of ordering two parallel lists in such a way that the terms of the second list mimic in order those in the first: ABCD abcd (see P. I 3, 10). Rāmakaṇṭha, here, observes that this principle is not observed in the present case. Moreover, YR commenting upon *nijaśaktivaibhavabharāt* uses the same terminology, *vaibhava* explained as *vicitraḥ prasaraḥ*. On the Wheel of energies whose circumference is the universe and the hub the divine Heart, see Kṣemarāja (*Spandasaṃdoha* [SpS] ad SpK I 1), and AG's *Dehasthadevatācakrastotra*, along with its extensive commentary by Silburn (pp. 89–97). See also PS 65 and YR ad loc.

[302] The multiplicity of spheres poses the problem of their relashionship. Śaiva doctrine assumes them to be concentric, that is to say, the inner contained within the outer.

[303] Lit., 'By the superabundance of the glorious display [...]'. Our translation of °*vaibhava* is borrowed from Silburn's 'glorieux déploiement' in her translation of SpK I 1 (Silburn SpK: 61).

[304] Cf. ŚS III 30 [in the textual organisation of the ŚS]: *svaśaktipracayo 'sya viśvam*.

[305] As regards AG's rewriting or adaptation of ĀPS, it may be observed that the term *aṇḍa* is found in ĀPS 10, although in its usual sense of cosmic 'egg', and not as a notion specific to the Śaivism of Kashmir. Creation, viewed as a tetrad of spheres, is a novel idea proper to Āgamas such as MVT. Although this concept of *aṇḍacatuṣṭaya* may be seen as implicit in Sāṃkhya, insofar as it is related to the doctrine of the *tattvas* that Sāṃkhya does develop, it occurs here in an altogether different context, with an altogether different import: the tetrad of spheres is an ontological requirement of the system (see Appendix 5, p. 323).

(*vastupiṇḍa*), is so called inasmuch as it covers[306] the universe as does a sheath (*kośa*). As has been said:

> [...] the aggregate of entities is called an 'egg' (*aṇḍa*).[307]

[This tetrad] **has been brought forth**, that is, has been made manifest, or rather made effective, by [his own free] agency of becoming (*bhavanakartṛtā*).[308]

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[306] *ācchādaka*.

[307] Segment of TĀ VIII 169b, which is a quote from the *Rauravāgama*. TĀV ad loc. (vol. IV: 1474, in Dwivedi, Rastogi TĀ; all references to TĀ and TĀV will be made to this ed.) explains *vastupiṇḍa* as a *samudāya*, 'aggregate', of 'entities', namely, 'bodies, faculties, etc.' (*aṇḍo hi nāma vastūnāṃ tanvakṣādīnāṃ piṇḍaḥ samudāya ucyate, tad asya lakṣaṇam ity arthaḥ*). The term *vastu* is further explained in TĀ itself (VIII 176b–177a): *[...] vastuśabdena tanvakṣa-bhuvanātmakam// rūpam uktaṃ yatas tena tatsamūho 'ṇḍa ucyate/*, 'The word "entity" (*vastu*) refers to a form (*rūpa*) of bodies, faculties, or worlds. Thus, by this term, their assemblage is referred to, called *aṇḍa*, "envelope" [lit., "egg"]'. Thus, here, YR quotes a part of the much longer definition that TĀ VIII 169–170 borrows from the *Raurava[āgama]*. This cryptic quote is further glossed by TĀ XI 171–172, which provides the key for understanding the concept: *vastupiṇḍa iti proktaṃ śivaśaktisamūhabhāk/ aṇḍaḥ syād iti tadvyaktau saṃmukhībhāva ucyate// tathāpi śivamagnānāṃ śaktīnām aṇḍatā bhavet/ tadarthaṃ vākyam aparaṃ tā hi na cyutaśaktitaḥ//*, 'Since this *aṇḍa*, which is [essentially] an assemblage of Śiva's energies, has been described as "aggregate of entities", it is spoken of as their [energies'] objectification, in the process of manifestation. Even so [one may object], the condition of being *aṇḍa* could be predicated of the energies that are immersed in [i.e., that are one with] Śiva. For that reason [i.e., in order to avoid the fault of a too wide definition], another syntagm [qualifying *aṇḍa*, has been given, namely, *pracyutaḥ śaktirūpataḥ*, from which it may be inferred that] those [energies] have not deviated from their nature as energies [viz., being one with Śiva]'. It results from such a definition that the *aṇḍa*, assuming the form of an 'aggregate of entities', namely, bodies, faculties, and worlds, is the first externalization, or objectification, of the host of Śiva's *śaktis*. Furthermore, as the concretization of the Lord's *śaktis*, the *aṇḍa* is seen as a form given to the formless, hence as a cover, veiling the pure Light of the Self/consciousness, and further covering the world that it encompasses. Thus, the other aspect of the definition of *aṇḍa* consists in its being a cover (*ācchādaka*), a sheath (*kośa*), as explained here by YR. Therefore, the definition given by YR synthesizes the two main features of *aṇḍa*: it represents a constriction permitting concretization of the Lord's *śaktis*; see Appendix 5, p. 323.

[308] *bhavanakartṛtā*, '[the Lord's free] agency of becoming' [lit., 'faculty of exerting his power of becoming'], is the key word here, expressing the paradox of an Absolute (Paramaśiva, pure Being, perfect plenitude) who coexists with his own creation, necessarily external to him. The concept of an active being is thus adumbrated, suitable for an Absolute that is both consciousness (*prakāśa*) and self-consciousness (*vimarśa*), self-consciousness seen as *spanda*, 'vibration, pulsation'. The term occurs in ĪPvṛ I 5, 14 defining *citi*, 'consciousness', or 'principle of consciousness': *sattā bhavattā bhavanakartṛtā [...]*, 'It [viz., consciousness, *citi*] is being, becoming, and agency of becoming' (compare Torella ĪPK: 122: 'It is existing, being, the subject of the action of being'). We prefer to translate *bhavanakartṛtā* as '[the Lord's free] agency of becoming', in the light of ĪPV I 5, 14 (vol. I: 258–259): *sattā ca bhavanakartṛtā sarvakriyāsu svātantryam*, '*sattā*, "Being" [or rather, "state of being"], means *bhavanakartṛtā*, "agency of becoming", [which is but] freedom in all actions'; on *citi*, see n. 238 and n. 1049. *bhavanakartṛtā* designates the Lord's faculty of exerting his power of becoming — that is, of manifesting himself as the universe, eternally and permanently present in him. Being free, Parameśvara decides to embody reality, in other words, to become "real". See again ĪPV

How? The master says: **'By display of the glorious superabundance of his own energies'.**

[That is, the Lord has brought forth this all] by and through the **abundance**,[309] the profusion, of **the glorious displays**, the wonderfully variegated outflows,[310] of his **innate**, inherent, unique **host of energies**, such as Will, etc.

Thus the confection of the world is indeed but the sudden bursting into bloom of the Lord's own energies.[311]

As it has been said in the *Sarvamaṅgalāśāstra*:

> Energy (*śakti*) and the Possessor of energy[ies] (*śaktimat*) are said to be the [only] two entities. His energies constitute the entire world, but the Possessor of energies is the Great Lord.[312]

Of what does this tetrad of spheres[313] consist?

The master replies: **'Energy, Illusion, Nature, Earth'.**

IV 1, 6 (vol. II: 289): *sattā bhavanakartṛtā sphurattārūpā*, 'His state of being, i.e., his [own free] agency of becoming (*bhavanakartṛtā*), is but [lit., 'takes the form of'] his manifestation [lit., 'flashing forth']'. From both passages (ĪPvṛ I 5, 14 and ĪPV IV 1, 6), it appears that *bhavanakartṛtā* stands as a synonym for *sattā* and *sphurattā*, the latter very closely related to *spanda*. As such it designates the highest *śakti* of the Lord, for *sphurattā* and *spanda* consist of nearly imperceptible, or extremely subtle, movement: *kiṃciccalana*. The '*kiṃcit*' tells us rather that the 'movement' at issue is not otherwise distinguished, which implies that it would be ascertainable only with difficulty, for to perceive it would be to impute to it some characteristics, a direction, an intensity, etc. — thus justifying the translation generally adopted, 'imperceptible' or 'subtle' (movement). On the notion of *spanda*, see Appendix 6, p. 327.

[309] *bhara* — lit., 'burden'.

[310] *prasara*.

[311] *bhagavataḥ kila svaśaktivikāsasphāra eva jagannirmāṇam.* Nearly the same formulation in ĪPvṛ IV 5: *vastutaḥ śaktivikāso viśvam*, 'In reality, the universe is the blossoming of the [Lord's] energies', a statement which, according to ĪPVV (vol. III: 363), finds its source in 'an Āgama such as the *Śrīmaṅgalāśāstra*' (thus certainly referring to the famous verse: *śaktayo 'sya jagat sarvam* which YR quotes here). Nevertheless, as emphasized by *Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti* [ŚDvṛ] III 20b, such statements are valid only from a *vyāvahārika* point of view. Note YR's usage of *śaktivikasvaratā* (and its synonyms) in the context of liberation (ad PS 56, 60 and 61).

[312] *śaktiś ca śaktimāṃś caiva padārthadvayam ucyate/ śaktayo 'sya jagat sarvaṃ śaktimāṃs tu maheśvaraḥ//.* See Appendix 4, p. 322.

[313] As underlined by *Pūrṇatāpratyabhijñā* [PP] (*prakriyāvimarśa* [= II], 169, p. 21), which reformulates TĀ XI 12b–13a, the concept of *aṇḍa* is meant to emphasize diversity: *aṇḍaś ca bhuvanānāṃ hi vibhāgasthitisādhakam/ tad evāvaraṇaṃ prāhuḥ śaktyantaṃ tac ca saṃbhavet//*, 'It is said that *aṇḍa* is responsible for the differentiation of the *bhuvanas*, that it is an envelope [sequestering all the principles (*tattva*)] up to [but not including] *śakti*'. From *śaktyaṇḍa* to *pṛthvyaṇḍa*, the four *aṇḍas* may be seen as concentric spheres encompassing the entire creation, itself understood as the triad of experiencer, experience and object of experience. When, at the outset, the text has recourse to the concept of the four *aṇḍas*, diversity is not yet apprehended dynamically, in the course of its progressive manifestation via the thirty-six *tattvas*, which will be expounded at length in kā. 14–22, but statically, as a fixed object or entity composed of those thirty-six principles, grouped into four spheres according to increasing constrictions put upon the Lord's absolute freedom. For a detailed exposition of the notion of *aṇḍa* and an attempt at their interpretation, see Appendix 5, p. 323.

This **energy**, which pertains to the Supreme Lord, belongs to the universe formed of cognizers and objects of cognition (*pramātṛprameya*), even though it is in essence nothing but the marvel of supreme ipseity. It takes the form of an activity of negation (*niṣedhavyāpāra*) based on the failure to discern the Self (*ātmākhyāti*), and is effected by denying (*apohana*) one's own nature.[314]

This energy is called *śaktyaṇḍa*, the 'sphere of Energy', in virtue of its veiling function, and its role in effecting bondage (*bandha*).[315]

[This sphere] consisting of that part [of the thirty-six principles] beginning with Sadāśiva and Īśvara and ending with *śuddhavidyā*, fully holds in itself the triad of the [remaining] spheres, which have yet to be explained.

Thus it is that the [supreme] energy [of the Lord] has been so designated [i.e., *śaktyaṇḍa*], inasmuch as it takes the form of a cover. In this sphere,[316] Sadāśiva and Īśvara are the presiding deities.

And another sphere is called *māyā[aṇḍa]*, the '[sphere of] Illusion', whose essence is the triad of impurities (*malatraya*).[317] It is composed of

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[314]By denying, negating the plenitude of the Self, *apohanaśakti* gives rise to difference, but this difference exists only on the level of pure subjectivity. This is why *śaktyaṇḍa* is related to the three *tattvas* — Sadāśiva, Īśvara and *śuddhavidyā* — ordered below Śiva/Śakti, and above *māyā.´ śaktyaṇḍa* represents the state of consciousness in which difference appears as a very dim presence, a first outline of what will actually take place in *māyā*. On *apohanaśakti*, see the exposition of PP II 155b–157, which sounds like a gloss on this very passage of YR's commentary: *mātṛmeyātmaviśvasya svātmarūpasya sarvadā// parāhantācamatkārasārabhūtatayā sataḥ/ svarūpāpohanātmeyam akhyātir yāsti tanmayī// nañarthābhāvarūpātmaniṣedhavyāpṛtiś ca yā/ sā śaktiḥ parameśasya śaktyaṇḍam iti procyate//*, 'The Supreme Lord is that absolute reality, eternally remaining as the essence of the marvel of supreme ipseity, whose form as the universe of cognizers and objects of cognition is [ultimately] that of the [unitary] Self. This energy (*śakti*) called "*śaktyaṇḍa*" — assuming a form of non-existence [lit., 'absence'] as denoted by the particle "*na*" — operates to negate the Self, for it consists in the failure to discriminate, the setting aside (*apohana*), of the nature of that Self [now seen as "I" and "this"]'. While explaining this notion to K. D. Tripathi orally, Rāmeśvara Jhā used to add that this negation (*niṣedha*) was a 'pure negation' (*śuddhanañartha*), for, at this stage, negation does not require any opposing reference (*pratiyogin*): there is nothing else than the Self to be negated. See also YR ad 10–11.

[315]The form of experience that takes place at the junction of the *śaktitattva* and the *sadāśivatattva* is named Anāśritaśiva, 'Śiva unrelated [to the universe]'; see Appendix 7, p. 327.

[316]*aṇḍa* is not merely the 'envelope', which, limiting the ultimate reality, determines different levels of experience; it is also seen as a fullyfledged *loka*, a 'sphere', as it is often translated (Silburn PS), inhabited by a multitude of beings and things, under the control of presiding deities, and related to the hierarchy of the *tattvas*. This will be even more obvious with the three other *aṇḍas*.

[317]The first occurrence, in our commentary, of this key concept. The three impurities (*malatraya*) are the *āṇavamala*, the impurity of [deeming oneself] finite, the *māyīyamala*, the impurity of [regarding the world as] objective, and the *kārmamala*, the impurity of [supposing oneself the agent of] actions; on those notions, see YR ad 17–18, 24, 37, 57. Once *māyāśakti*, the power of differentiation, begins to operate, engendering the saṃsāric world, the five *kañcukas* constitute the subjectivity of an individual soul (*aṇu*) and affect it with the three impurities. Might it be possible to see in these three terms, displaced to a more concrete level, references to the three forms of being noticed above (viz., *sattā*, *bhavattā*,

delusion (*moha*); its form is the bondage that affects all varieties of cognizers in virtue solely of its propensity to occasion difference. It consists of that part [of the thirty-six principles beginning with *māyā* and] ending with *puruṣa*.

That [sphere] incorporates within itself the two spheres yet to be explained.

Here the presiding deity is the Rudra named Gahana — the 'Abyss'.[318]

Similarly, **Nature** (*prakṛti*), whose constituents are *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* [originally in equilibrium], once it is transformed [viz., once this equilibrium is lost] into [internal and external] faculties, and as well into effects [namely, the objects of those faculties] — which become objects of enjoyment (*bhogya*) for fettered subjects, binding those subjects in their guises of pleasure, pain and delusion — is called *prakṛtyaṇḍa* — the 'sphere of Nature'.[319]

In this [sphere] also, there is a presiding deity, Lord Viṣṇu, who is endowed with great glory[320] and who emphasizes difference [or, who presumes difference (in order to function)].

Similarly, **earth** (*pṛthvī*) is termed *pṛthvyaṇḍa*, the 'Terrestrial sphere' — the Terrestrial sphere, consisting of the gross [corporeal] sheath (*kañcuka*), for it provides an outer enclosure[321] to all the subjects, from man to stationary beings, and is [hence also a] binding factor.

This sphere also has its presiding deity, Lord Brahmā, who occupies the pre-eminent place in the fourteenfold creation of beings.[322]

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bhavanakartṛtā; see n. 308)? The *āṇava* "defect" relates, in effect, to the individual subject; the *māyīya* to the objective universe; and the *kārma* to the cycle of existences, which, by the intermediary of the notion of the act, explains the fashion in which the two other modes of being enter into contact, entwine.

[318]Or 'the Impenetrable'. On *gahana* and the threefold *māyā*, see n. 246. On Gahana, as the *adhipati*, the intendant deity, of the *māyāṇḍa*, see Appendix 8, p. 328

[319]Cf. ĪPK IV 4–6, which states that the Lord's energies — *jñāna*, *kriyā* and *māyā* — correspond, in the fettered subject (*paśu*), to *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, respectively, and explains how those *guṇas*, transformed into *karaṇas* and *kāryas*, can no longer be termed 'energies' or 'powers' (*śakti*).

[320]*mahāvibhūti*.

[321]*pratiprākāra* — the term is attested, according to Böhtlingk, Roth *Sanskrit Wörterbuch* [B&R] (confirmed by Edgerton's BHSD), only in the Tibetan canon, viz., in the *Mahāvyutpatti*, in the sense of 'outer wall'. Same term in YR ad 12–13 (*prākāra*) and ad 23 (*pratiprākāra*).

[322]See MVT V 7–9, where the fourteen categories of beings inhabiting the fourteen worlds (*loka* or *bhuvana*) in *brahmāṇḍa* are given in the context of the 'purification of the paths' (*adhvaśuddhi*), itself a part of the *dīkṣā*: *caturdaśavidho yatra bhūtagrāmaḥ pravartate/ sthāvaraḥ sarpajātiś ca pakṣijātis tathāparā// mṛgasaṃjñaś ca paśvākhyaḥ pañcamo 'nyaś ca manuṣaḥ/ paiśāco rākṣaso yākṣo gāndharvaś caindra eva ca// saumyaś ca prājāpatyaś ca brāhmaś cātra caturdaśa/ sarvasyaivasya saṃśuddhir brāhme saṃśodhite sati//*, '[Such are the fourteen *lokas*] where dwells the fourteenfold host of beings: stationary beings and reptiles, birds being another variety, and those termed wild animals; those termed domestic constituting a fifth variety, another being man. And Piśācas, Rakṣas, Yakṣas, Gandharvas, Indra, Soma, Prajāpati, Brahmā. Thus they are fourteen. Once this *brahma[aṇḍa]* has been purified, the

Thus does this tetrad of spheres, which is but the expansion [323] [i.e., the emanation] of the Supreme Lord, become apparent [to us] (*parisphurati*) — made manifest (*prakāśita*) in this way by the Sovereign [who remains immanent in it]. [324].

Kārikā 5

Having thus explained the tetrad of spheres, the master utters the [following] verse in order to portray the nature of the universe, with a view to explaining it in terms of the relation of enjoyer to object of enjoyment:

5. There, within those spheres lies this universe, as an uninterrupted continuum of wonderfully varied bodies, faculties, and worlds. And, therein, the enjoyer, endowed with a body, is Śiva himself, who assumes the condition of a fettered soul. [325]

There, in those four spheres well known to the Āgamas, [326]

purification of all this [fourteenfold host of beings] is achieved'. First seen as triple (see SK 53: *ayaṃ tridhā sargaḥ*) — viz., man, 'animals', gods — creation is further seen as fourteenfold, distributed into one variety of man, eight varieties of gods and five varieties of 'animals', including 'stationary' beings: *aṣṭavikalpo daivas tairyagyonaś ca pañcadhā bhavati mānuṣaś caikavidhaḥ. Yuktidīpikā* ad loc. gives a list of the eight kinds of divine beings that is slightly different from that of MVT: Brahmā, Prajāpati, Indra, Pitṛs, Gandharvas, Nāgas, Rakṣas, Piśācas. The five kinds of 'animals' are the domestic (*paśu*), the wild (*mṛga*), birds, or winged animals in general (*pakṣin*), reptiles (*sarīsarpa*) and stationary beings (*sthāvara*), such as plants, etc., that are considered to be living beings, but at the lowest level, the *tairyagyona* (see PS 6, where '*pādapa*' of the kārikā is glossed by *sthāvara*); R ad ĀPS 27a names *jāti*, 'genus', those categories of beings. As for man, it is stated that 'human creation is of one sort, for no other category (*jāti*) [lit., 'birth', or 'class'] can be suitably alleged' (*manuṣyaś caikavidhaḥ jātyantarānupapatteḥ*). Note that the acceptation of the term *bhuvana* as a metonym for the number 'fourteen' testifies to the regular association of that notion with that number — compare, for instance, the terms *akṣiṇī* or *nayane*, 'eyes' [dual], which sometimes are taken to mean 'two', by a similar metonymy.

[323] *vijṛmbhita*.

[324] Parameśvara is the transcendent form of the Lord as creator, on the cosmic level, whereas Bhagavat is the form he assumes on the level of immanence; when no longer the creator, he is seen as the knower of creation. In the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* of Yāmunācārya, *bhagavat* is defined as follows (1976: 26): *jñānam apratighaṃ tasya vairāgyaṃ ca jagatpateḥ/ aiśvaryaṃ caiva dharmaś ca sahasiddhaṃ catuṣṭayam//*, 'There is a tetrad [of] innate [attributes] belonging to the Lord of the world [that is, the tetrad 'appears along (with him)' (*sahasiddha*), as soon as he manifests himself] [or, less probably, the members of the tetrad 'appear together' (*sahasiddha*), not in sequence]: invincible knowledge, dispassion, sovereignty, and righteousness'. This is further commented upon: *jagatkartur bhagavato niratiśayaśaktimatvādinirūpaṇam*, 'It is described how the Lord, creator of the world, is endowed with unsurpassed energy, etc.'

[325] Cf. SpK II 3–4, quoted n. 452.

[326] The doctrine of the *aṇḍa* is expounded in MVT II 49 (quoted in TĀV XI 8) and MVT IV 24–25 and in the *Rauravāgama*, as clearly stated by TĀ (VIII 168b) itself: *aṇḍasvarūpaṃ gurubhiś coktaṃ śrīrauravādiṣu*, 'The nature of the *aṇḍa* has been said by the gurus in the *Raurava [āgama]*'. The two following ślokas (TĀ VIII 169–170), defining *aṇḍa*, are a quotation

within those spheres lies this universe; that is, it dwells in the midst of them.

What sort of universe? The master answers: **'[a continuum of] wonderfully varied [bodies, faculties, and worlds]'.**

By **bodies**, he means shapes characterized by various arrangements of face, hands, feet, etc., and differing [from each other] according to the [infinite] varieties of [beings, from] Rudras to ordinary souls,[327] all of which are made wonderful by the manner of their differentiated conditions.[328]

Similarly, **faculties**, such as eyes, have [degrees of] excellence due to the difference from one to another [being].

For instance, endowed as they are with a host of attributes,[329] such as omniscience, the faculties of cognizers on the order of Rudras (*rudrapramātṛ*) are unsurpassed. This universe is indeed instantly and simultaneously known and created by such faculties.

On the contrary, this universe is neither known nor made by the [corresponding] faculties of ordinary souls which are capable only of knowing and making objects such as jars, for they are restricted [in their function] by the power of [causal] constraint [that is, the constraint imposed by causal consecution, the sequence of cause and effect] (*niyatiśakti*)[330] belonging to the Supreme Lord.

And even there [viz., among ordinary souls], ascetics (*yogin*) are seen

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from the *Rauravāgama* (or from its commentary by Sadyojyotis, as proposed by Gnoli TĀ: 183, n. 4), as is made clear by the commentary. Then comes AG's own explanation, in TĀ VIII 171–174.

[327]See Appendix 1, p. 317. Both categories are 'embodied' (*dehin*) subjects, yet the difference between them is established on the basis of the hierarchy of the faculties and knowledge. Being omniscient (*sarvajña*), Rudras will not be reborn after dissolution, unlike *kṣetrajñas*, whose limited Knowledge (they take the body to be the Self) destines them to be reborn. Rudra [or the Rudras], as a type of being, signifies those who have reached, after the model of Rudra, a level of experience where one is able to reabsorb within himself all cognizable reality. Hence they will be described in the following lines of the commentary as possessed of unsurpassed knowledge and powers (see, n. 324, the definition of *bhagavat*), whereas the knowledge and the faculties of the *kṣetrajña* are limited. Nevertheless, the yogin possesses relatively more powers. The same may be said, to some extent, of beasts, for they may be more powerful physically than men, even if their knowledge is not superior. PS 49 develops the theme of the variety of bodies.

[328]*saṃsthāna*.

[329]*guṇa*.

[330]The Self, within the realm of *māyā*, is enclosed by five *kañcukas*, among which is *niyati*, the restriction of the freedom of the Lord: the One beyond causal relationship is now limited by the law of causality, which is 'at the root of the law of karman' (*niyatir yataḥ karmaṇo mūlabhūmiḥ*) (ĪPVV III 2, 3, vol. III: 312). Cf. ĪPvṛ III 2, 2: *māyīyaḥ [...] pramātā niyatyā karmādhīnaḥ saṃsārī*, 'The māyic cognizer [...] depending on the *karma* because of the law of necessity is in the power of the *saṃsāra* [...]' (tr. Torella ĪPK: 197). Hence the translations of *niyati* as 'determinism' (Miśra 1993: 175), 'causal restriction' (Silburn PS: index), 'necessity' (Torella ĪPK: 197). Yet, one can see, even so, a difference between *niyati* and *niyatiśakti*: inasmuch as everything arises from the Lord, *niyati* as a category is called '*tattva*', whereas *niyatiśakti* is a potentiality of the Lord. See also YR ad 9 and 17.

to possess faculties above the norm: even that which is distant [yet still visible], or is screened from view, or is entirely out of sight[331] may be discerned by them, and even the pleasure and pain experienced by other cognizers, for such ascetics have transcended the power of causal constraint.

And likewise, there are animals who have faculties excelling even those of men,[332] although [in general] they are restricted (*saṃkucita*) by *niyatiśakti*.

For instance, cows are able to see their homes even if they are screened from view; horses discern their way even at night; vultures descry meat even if it lies hundreds of *yojanas* away; [winged creatures, from] birds to flies and mosquitoes, are capable of flying in the sky; reptiles move on paths on their chest and hear sounds by the power of sight, and camels pull a serpent out of its hole, even at distance, merely by breathing. Thus one may infer that there is everywhere a wonderful variety of faculties.

Similarly, there are **worlds** (*bhuvana*), well known to the Āgamas, that are distinguished [from the norm] by their circular, triangular, quadrangular, semilunar and parasol-like shapes.[333]

Thus the universe is such that within it is contained an **uninterrupted continuum**, an unobstructed flowing stream,[334] **of bodies, faculties and worlds** — [bodies, faculties and worlds that are] **wonderfully varied**, or of a marvelous nature, due to their varied extraordinary qualities.

Here, in such a universe, whose nature it is to be enjoyed, an enjoyer must be presumed. Therefore, the master says: **'And, therein, the enjoyer, endowed with a body [is Śiva himself]'.**

Being the abode wherein are enjoyed [the results of past actions], the body belonging to the finite soul (*aṇu*)[335] is affected by the three impu-

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[331]Cf. SK 7, which enumerates eight causes making perception impossible, among which are *atidūratva*, 'excessive distance', and *vyavadhāna*, 'interposition [of an object between an organ and the object to be perceived]'. This question will be taken up again by YR ad 17, in the course of explaining *vidyātattva*. *viprakṛṣṭa* is opposed to *saṃnikṛṣṭa*, whose philosophical implication is the proximity of an organ of sense to its object.

[332]For an elaborate discussion of this point, see SpP 39 [= ad III 7, in the textual organization of SpN].

[333]See SvT X 99a: *chatrākārāṇi sarvāṇi teṣāṃ vai bhuvanāni tu*. On the various descriptions of and ways of counting *bhuvanas* in the Āgamas, see Appendix 5, p. 323, and YR ad 78.

[334]However, the four spheres themselves, within which the entirety of the various worlds, along with their specific bodies and organs, is created and dissolved, remain immovable.

[335]First occurrence of this concept in the commentary. The use of 'aṇu' here recalls the term's usage in Vaiśeṣika, where it designates the ultimate and individible constituents of all "things" — *ipso facto* therefrom composed. By extension, it designates also the 'atomic' soul (or rather "souls"), indivisible and reproducible infinitely, the constituents of the psychic universe. If our present authors are using the term in cognizance of its Vaiśeṣika origins, it would indicate then consciousness that is not omniscient, which functions in the inadequacy of always partial awareness — not only limited but also incompetent. According to Gonda (1960–1964, vol. II: 235ff.), the notion of the 'aṇu' — which is common to all the versions of

rities. That [finite soul is thus said to be] **embodied** (*dehin*), that is, is endowed with a body (*śarīrin*), [336] whose nature consists in the experience of pleasure and pain, etc.

In this universe consisting of pleasure and pain, etc., that [embodied soul] is also called the **'enjoyer'** (*bhoktṛ*), that is, who experiences (*anubhavitṛ*) [337] pleasure and pain, etc. — the fettered subject (*paśupramātṛ*).

Now, one may object: — inasmuch as there is [according to you] no difference attaching even to that which appears infinitesimal — as far as the transcendental cognizer (*parapramātṛ*) is concerned) — [338] how indeed can this worthless thing we call 'embodied' be different from him? For, as has been said:

> Even a part represents the universality of *brahman* [viz., its capacity to assume all forms]. Neither has it been exceeded, nor can it be diminished. [339]

Śaivism — is not so much understood as a concrete existent, as it may well have been in the Vaiśeṣika, as a designation of a principle in terms of which is explained an aspect — in any case illegitimate — of the soul's existence: the soul, which is in reality unlimited, identical with *brahman*, sees itself as detached therefrom, enclosed in a body. It is that very soul, seen in this way as 'aṇu', 'atomic', that constitutes the *āṇavamala*.

[336] A traditional etymology derives *śarīra*, 'body', from *śṝ*: *śīryata iti śarīraḥ*, 'That which decays, is the body'.

[337] Derived from *bhuj*, 'to enjoy, possess, eat, consume', the term *bhoktṛ* designates the 'enjoyer' of an object, its possessor, whether it be internal (as pleasure and pain) or external (as the color blue). Thus he is the subject of sense experiences, bound to experience those objects, whether agreeable or not. In general usage, *anubhava* is also conceived of as an empirical experience, even though, when contrasted with *bhoga*, it signifies an experience more receptive than acquisitive, in which the ego does not assume the dominant role, or, at least, in which personal interest is not primary. Nevertheless, such an experience is considered "mine", that is, does not exceed the ambit of the finite subject. The Trika system appears to invest the notion with a meaning different from ordinary usage, to the extent that it associates *anubhava* with the ultimate principle, which has the result of dissociating this type of experience from corporeal enjoyments, in principle at least. Hence the recurring contrast between *bhoga* and *anubhava*, between *bhoktṛ* and *anubhavitṛ*: the *anubhavitṛ* is also an experiencer, but of ideal objects only — his "use" of them is ideational, rather than corporeal. This is confirmed by SpN I 3 (quoted n. 253), where *anubhavitṛ* glosses *upalabdhṛ*, whose meaning, in the context of SpK I 3, is that of 'pure agent of experience'; cf. SpV I 5, p. 30: *grāhako 'pi māyīyaḥ pramātā atra vivakṣito na tāttvika upalabdhṛmātrasvarūpaḥ*, 'By "subject" (*grāhaka*), what is meant here is the empirical subject (*māyīyaḥ pramātā*), not the real one, who is the pure agent of experience'.

[338] That is, given that the Lord is [according to you] absolutely undifferentiated, how would [in that case] one be able to conceive even the atom as differing from him? By the same token as applying to "Paramaśiva" or "*parabrahman*", the term *parapramātṛ* is also hyperbolic, for, at this ultimate level, there is no other "*pramātṛ*" possible. However, given the origins of the term and its cognates in discussions elsewhere of concrete and therefore limited experience, the term *parapramātṛ* does have the flavor here of an oxymoron, plainly accepted in the Kashmiri schools in order to distinguish Śiva's unlimited cognition from that of ordinary knowers — in reference to whom the term "*pramātṛ*" may be understood literally — albeit that the limitations on their "knowledge", being self-imposed, are on no wise inherent.

[339] *avikalpya* — lit., 'dichotomized, subject to alternativity'. This is a topos: if *brahman* is

Likewise, according to [your own] maxim:

> Even each and every principle has got the form of the thirty-six principles,[340]

the same supreme sovereign cognizer, who, endowed with his own energies and formed of great Light (*mahāprakāśavapus*) is one only, radiates [within everything] (*avabhāsate*), utterly undifferentiated in every respect.

Now, even if one postulates the existence of an embodied soul [viz., an individual consciousness] lacking illumination (*aprakāśamāna*) and who is different from him [viz., the supreme cognizer], that existence cannot even be ascertained, since it [viz., the embodied soul] has been denied [or, has been postulated as lacking] the quality of 'illumination' (*prakāśamānatva*) [— and asserting this would involve you in a contradiction, for you have

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really the all, it cannot be surpassed or diminished. In our interpretation of the verse, we differ from Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 148: 'Le propre du brahman, c'est de prendre toutes les formes, d'être insurpassable et sans qualités' [— 'What is proper to *brahman* is to assume all the forms, to be unsurpassable and devoid of qualities']. Formulated in the manner of a sūtra, this verse (of uncertain provenance) has been variously cited and interpreted. The logic that seems to underlie it is that the 'part' in truth does not exist, for all 'parts' are already the Lord; each 'part' then, being incipiently the 'all' may accept qualifications normally reserved to the 'all', such as *avikalpya* 'not subject to mental constructs, or to alternativity'. Some citations of the verse (AG's, in his commentary ad BhG XV 7, in particular) do not include *avikalpya*, but end with *anatikrāntaḥ*, which suggests that the participle may have been understood in active voice (with *sārvarūpyam* as its direct object); cited however in conjunction with *avikalpya* (so YR), the passive construction appears more likely. YR cites again the same verse in his gloss ad 43. This verse occurs, shortened and slightly altered, in PTV 5–8, where it is followed by the same maxim as is here quoted by the fancied objector: *pradeśamātram api brahmaṇaḥ sarvarūpam/ekaikatrāpi ca tattve ṣaṭtriṃśattattvamayatvaṃ śāstreṣu nirūpitam/*, 'Even a part of *brahman* is endowed with all forms [here we differ from Singh who translates: 'Even a limited space contains the entire form of the Brahman']. The śāstras have stated that each *tattva* has the characteristics of all thirty-six *tattvas*'. AG quotes it again (*pradeśo 'pi brahmaṇaḥ sārvarūpyam anatikrāntaḥ*) in his gloss ad BhG XV 7, explaining that references to a 'part' (*aṃśa*, in v. 7) of the partless *brahman* are intended for heuristic purposes only. In the form in which it appears in YR's commentary, the statement is more than once referred to by TĀV I 165, III 45–46, IV 98, XII 5, XXVIII 375 (in the context of aesthetic experience). In TĀV III 45–46, in the course of expounding the *pratibimbavāda*, it is referred to in the way it is found here, in YR's commentary, that is, immediately followed by the second maxim (with variant: *ekaikasyāpi tattvasya* [...]). We surmise that the statement might derive from the Kashmirian nondualist Śaiva tradition, since TĀV IV 98, while explaining the PTV's reference to 'śāstras', introduces it as follows: *yad vā parādvayadarśane*, 'Or, as is said in the doctrine of transcendent nonduality [...]'. However, AG, in his gloss ad BhG XV 7, introduces it as belonging to *śruti*.

[340] For other citations of the text, see previous note, and PM 25 which attributes it to TĀ. According to one etymology, each and every *tattva* is the 'extension' (*tanana* < *tan*) of Śiva (see YR ad 10–11 and n. 433). Therefore, from Śiva to earth, every *tattva* has the form of the thirty-six *tattvas*. The theory of causality espoused here is the *satkāryavāda*, developed at length in PTV 5–8 (Singh: 45–48 [Skt. text], 113–118 [transl.]), according to which the effect preexists potentially in the cause. Therefore, every *tattva* is present in the others, either as potency (*pṛthivī*, the final *tattva*, is latent in Śiva, the first one) or as manifestation (when manifested, *pṛthivī* is nothing but Śiva). Cf. TĀ IX 49b–52a, quoted n. 485.

elsewhere maintained that nothing exists that is bereft of illumination — or, that is not manifest]. If, on the other hand, [you assert the existence of an embodied soul that] *is* possessed of illumination (*prakāśate*), then in that entity, which [according to you] has for its essence the transcendental *brahman*, there is just one cognizer, [for such a cognizer can] not be distinguished from 'illumination' (*prakāśa*) itself, [or from *brahman*, for that matter, which has been defined as *prakāśa* 'illumination' — and this is plainly contradicted by the plethora of subjects attested in sense-experience itself].[341]

Then, on what basis[342] do you affirm the existence of difference [viz., this universe] characterized as it is by [the opposition between] object of enjoyment and enjoyer?

In answer to all this the master says: **'Śiva himself assumes the condition of a fettered soul'.**

Thus, that Lord who has been described above as a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, and whose nature is freedom, **Śiva** himself, whose essence[343] is now the veiling of his own true nature, takes on the role (*bhūmikā*) of a cognizer endowed with a body (*dehapramātṛ*), according to his own will, as though he were an actor (*naṭa*), and, since he is [henceforth] to be maintained and treated as a domestic animal [that is, as a tethered beast], he is now distinguished by his existence as a fettered subject (*paśu*).[344] In reference to the objects of his enjoyment which he has himself created, pleasure and pain, etc., he, now the embodied soul, is called their enjoyer. There is, in consequence, nothing to which language can refer[345] that is other than Śiva.[346]

Moreover, it is the Lord himself, it is Śiva, who makes manifest the pair of cognizer and object of cognition [again] characterized as enjoyer and object of enjoyment, in his freedom, as if they were toys for playing (*krīḍanaka*).

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[341] Example of *reductio ad absurdum.*

[342] *kiṃparatvena.*

[343] *satattva.* The *Bālabodhinī* of Vamanacharya Ramabhatta Jhalakikar, a modern commentary on *Kāvyaprakāśa*, states (sub IV 23 [1965: 91]) that the *satattva* of Mammaṭa's text may be understood as synonymous with *tattva* in the sense of *svarūpa*, 'nature', as is the case with the terms *gotra* and *sagotra*: *satattvena tatsvarūpeṇa/ tattvasatattvaśabdau paryāyau/ gotrasagotraśabdavat.* Note that Mammaṭa is a Kashmirian author of the late 11th cent., contemporaneous, more or less, with YR. Cf. MW s.v. (*sa-tattva*): 'natural property, nature (-tas, ind. "really, in reality")', attested in BhP, Vedāntasāra); also YR ad 105, who glosses °*sāra*, in *śāstrasāra*, 'the core of the teaching', with *satattva*. Same analogy of Śiva compared with an actor in YR ad 1 and 26. See also SpN I 1, quoted in Appendix 10, p. 330.

[344] According to Mayrhofer EWA, s.v., *paśu* is related to Lat. *pecus*, '(domesticated) animal'; the word has nothing to do, historically, with *pāśa* 'snare' (cf. Gk. πήσσω 'assemble') — contrary to etymologies in vogue in India (as here). *paśu* in the sense of 'bound soul', 'fettered subject', is, in any case, a metaphoric usage. Similar explanation of *paśu* in YR ad 16.

[345] *padārtha.*

[346] Cf. SpK II 4, quoted n. 452.

It is in relation to this pair that all these worldly pursuits based on difference take place.

Therefore, the very freedom of the Supreme Lord is unsurpassed: even though he abandons his own nature of plenitude (*pūrṇasvarūpa*) and assumes the condition of a fettered soul which consists of the dichotomy of enjoyer and object of enjoyment, he remains Śiva himself, a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, who ever manifests himself (*prasphuran*) as the pure agent of experience present in the Self of all cognizers.

Kārikā 6

[Let us admit that] the cognizer, whose nature is consciousness, is one. Even so, if he is designated as 'many' because of the diversity implied by the marvelous variegation of knowers and things known, created by *māyā*, etc., how can he be referred to any longer in terms of a oneness already contradicted [by diversity]? If he is one, how can he be many? [347] Inasmuch as this is a case of contradiction (*virodha*), like that of sunlight and shadow, it entails the attribution (*adhyāsa*) of contradictory properties (*viruddhadharma*) [to one and the same thing]; [348] and it is not the case that a thing can be at the same time one and many, [349] as has been stated:

> The attribution of contradictory properties [to one and the same thing], [or] difference in the causes, this [pair] only constitutes difference, or the cause of difference between things [respectively]. [350]

[Alleging this,] the author resolves the objection by proposing an example taken from ordinary life, in regard to the matter to be illustrated

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[347] Cf. ĪPV II 1, 1: *yata iyati pūrvapakṣe iyad eva jīvitam ekam anekasvabhāvaṃ kathaṃ syād iti.*

[348] Cf. ĪPK II 2, 1 (Torella ĪPK: 157, n. 3), ĪPK II 4, 19, and ĪPV ad loc.: *na tu sa eva svabhāvo bhinnaś cābhinnaś ca bhavitum arhati vidhiniṣedhayor ekatraikadā virodhāt.*

[349] The usual response of the Bhedābhedavādins to such an objection is situated in the realm of experience — whatever pure logic may tell us, ordinary experience offers us countless examples of the essential coexistence of the 'one' and the 'many' (in Plato's terms) — for example, any set of "parts" that make a "whole", an "organic" whole — as opposed to an unrelated assemblage of disparate entities. The Trika's answer involves the doctrine of the two truths — for, on the cosmic level, the "one" and the "many" indeed coexist, but on different levels of being: *saṃvṛtisatya*, variously translated as 'vérité d'enveloppement', 'surface-level truth', 'relative truth', or 'truth of empirical order', and *paramārthasatya*, 'deep-level truth' (see kā. 27) — or, in Plato's terms, the 'merely apparent' and the 'truly real'.

[350] *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* [PV*svavṛtti*] ad *Svārthānumānapariccheda* 33a. We are indebted to Prof. E. Steinkellner for the identification of the quote. In the view of the MSS evidence and the citation in TĀ, the KSTS's reading has been kept; see our 'List of variants' in 'On the Sanskrit text'. The sentence is to be construed *yathāsaṃkhyam.* Also quoted in TĀV XI, avat. to 98, also in the context of a controversy as to the ability of an undivided consciousness to assume entirely the form of diversity, i.e., to manifest itself as many.

[viz., his own position]:

6. As the clear crystal assumes the shades[351] **of varied colors, so the Lord himself**[352] **contains the kaleidoscope**[353] **of forms of gods, men, animals**[354] **and plants.**

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:][355]

Although uniform, **the [clear] crystal**[356] sustains within itself a marvelous diversity by virtue of [its association with] innumerable and varied contingent attributes (*upādhi*)[357] such as red or blue, and thus itself becomes wonderfully diverse. Yet, for all that, it [the crystal] is never devoid of crystal-ness.[358] What alone [determines] the crystal-ness[359] of the crystal is this: although the [crystal] is permeated[360] by various characteristics, the understanding [viz., 'this is a crystal'] remains ever unobstructed to all [who perceive it].

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[351]Lit., 'aspect'. Silburn (p. 64) translates *rūpa* by 'apparence' ('appearance'). Barnett translates *rūpa* and *rūpatva* by 'semblance'.

[352][...] although being fundamentally one.

[353]Lit., 'the fact of being forms', 'formness'. The idiom 'the kaleidoscope of forms' is an attempt to render the abstract noun *rūpatva*, in the sense that a kaleidoscope represents a capacity holding within it an infinity of discrete forms.

[354]*paśu*, 'domestic animal', stands in the kārikā, by synecdoche, for four of the five varieties of 'animals' enumerated in MVT V 7–9 and SK 53, namely, *paśu*, *pakṣin*, *sarpa*, *mṛga*, whereas *pādapa*, 'plant', usually termed *sthāvara*, 'stationary', is given a fifth and separate entry. See n. 322.

[355]In fact the commentary starts with *yathā*, 'just as', citing the *yathā* of the kārikā. The correlative adverb, *tathaiva*, 'likewise', equivalent to the *tadvat* of the kārikā, comes later in the commentary. In order to make the translation lighter, we have separated the two clauses.

[356]*sphaṭikamaṇi* — lit., 'crystal-jewel'.

[357]*upādhi* is generally translated as 'contingent condition' or 'contingent attribute', according to context. The bird is an *upādhi* of the branch — that is, a 'contingent attribute' of the branch — insofar as it serves to distinguish that branch from others, just as "wet fuel" is an *upādhi* of the fire — that is, a 'contingent condition' of the fire — insofar as it serves to correct the overextension of the proposition 'where there's fire there's smoke' ("fuel" may be a necessary condition of fire, but its "wetness" is an *upādhi*). YR's usage seems consistent with this general principle inasmuch as, here, the very multiplicity of the attested world (including all substances, attributes, and actions) is viewed as freely (but not necessarily) 'conditioned' on the Lord's will. In the case of the color 'red', which at first sight appears to belong to the crystal, but of which it is nothing but an *upādhi* — discovered at that moment when one realizes that the color belongs in fact to the flower — the term '*upādhi*' finally acquires the valence of 'false attribute'. From this standpoint it is but a short step to the cosmic usages we see in texts of monistic persuasion, like the *Paramārthasāra*; on *upādhi*, see also n. 1278.

[358]*sphaṭikatā*.

[359]*maṇitva* — lit., 'jewel-ness'.

[360]*ācchurita* — same term in ĪPvṛ I 7, 1; Torella (ĪPK: 136) translates *ācchurita* by 'variegated by'. Cf. also avat. ad 85–86, p. 167, and ŚSV III 1, defining *citta*, 'empirical experience, or consciousness', as *viṣayavāsanācchurita*, 'colored by [or saturated by] the dispositions deposited by the objects of senses'.

In ordinary parlance [or, in everyday practice],[361] we say only that these colors, red, etc., appear (*sphuranti*) here [viz., in the crystal], not that the contingent attribute 'red[ness]', etc., qualifies the crystal, as it does a cloth, such that an alteration[362] of its true nature ensues [if the color is modified].[363]

Therefore the purity of the gem consists precisely in assuming various hues,[364] which have the form of contingent attributes, while at the same time persevering (*prathate*) in its very essence [viz., as crystal].

Likewise, as the crystal-gem may contain a variety of colors, so the Lord, free, solely formed of consciousness (*cidekaghana*),[365] contains, though uniform, in the clear mirror of his Self,[366] **the kaleidoscope of forms** of those particular [entities] he has himself created, which are not different from him — though they now have the form of entities such as Rudras or ordinary souls, who [may be classified as] gods, men, and others, from domestic animals and winged creatures to stationary beings [viz., plants].[367]

Nevertheless, transcending all of them, he is ever aware of his non-dual Self — although it has assumed innumerable forms — invigorated[368] by the state of unfragmented wonder that is [pure] 'I'[-ness] (*aham*).[369] Although [the Lord] is as he has been described [i.e., one, yet assuming innumerable forms], neither 'space' nor 'time' may be [posited as] different from him, in such manner as to negate[370] his oneness, and in reference to which one might raise the objection that [in asserting that he is both one and many] contradictory properties, etc., have been attributed to [one

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361 *vyavahr̥yate*.

362 *vipralopa* — lit., 'loss'.

363 If the red color were really present in the crystal, it would no longer be crystal, for its nature, which is to be transparent to any color, would have changed.

364 *ākāra* — lit., 'forms', 'aspects', 'shapes'.

365 Lit., 'a mass solely consisting of consciousness', which we have translated somewhat more freely to avoid burdening the reader with too many "massive" constructions.

366 First occurrence of the mirror metaphor.

367 Creation taking place in *pr̥thvyaṇḍa* is referred to here.

368 *upabr̥ṃhita*.

369 First occurrence of the 'I' notion, in reference to the specific concept of *ahantācamatkāra*. YR will take it up again, with the notion of *ahaṃpratīti*, while commenting on PS 8. 'aham' as a full-fledged notion is to be found in YR ad 30 and in kā. 47–50. Cf. ĪPK I 5, 11, according to which the difference between consciousness and the crystal is that the latter, unlike the former, being lifeless (*jaḍa*), cannot be aware of the reflections of which it is the substratum. Same reasoning in the *Saṃvitprakāśa* quoted in SpP 4 [= ad I 4] (Dyczkowski SpP: 18): *[...] naitāvatā 'sau sphaṭikaḥ pr̥thaṅ nāsty eva rañjakāt/ bhāvarūpaparityaktā tava vā nirmalā tanuḥ//*, '[...] the crystal can never be free of the color [imparted to it by other objects] whereas Your pure form [O Lord] is always free of phenomena' (tr. Dyczkowski *Saṃvitprakāśa*: 149). As observed by Dyczkowski (SpK: 369, n. 95), the verse is not found in the available MSS of the *Saṃvitprakāśa*, but is also quoted in the *Lakṣmītantra* [LT] (XIV 8a) in the same form, and as a paraphrase in TĀ V 154b–155a.

370 Time and space are deemed *upādhis*. Note the pun on *khaṇḍanā*, 'dividing' and 'refuting'.

and] the [same] Great Lord that is one's own Self (*svātmamaheśvara*).

And even others [viz., Buddhists] acknowledge that a cognition [whose content is] variable, although it is [thus] modified by a variety of distinct [factors], is, quâ immediacy [of perception — *sākṣāt*], one only. [371]

For instance, as in the *Pramāṇavārttika*:

> The color blue, etc., is a contingent attribute of cognition as regards the cognition (*vijñāna*) [whose content is always] variable (*citra*); [as such,] it does not partake of anything else [viz., it is itself, and not the color yellow, for instance]; it cannot be perceived [differently, viz., as the color yellow]. For [even] when [conceptually] separating this [blue from yellow], [the cognizer] refers [only] to the thing [i.e., to the concrete unit that underlies what he sees in his perception, namely, the color blue]. [372]

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[371] Buddhist logical theory is invoked here, once again represented by Dharmakīrti (*Pramāṇavārttika* [PV], *Pratyakṣapariccheda* 220), this time explicitly. Similar reasoning is at work in TĀ I 197 and TĀV ad loc. (tr. Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 115): 'De même que pour un objet donné, une cruche ou autre chose, la perception globale de l'objet lui-même, avec toutes ses caractéristiques, résulte de l'ensemble, de la réunion de toutes les perceptions séparées de chacune de ses qualités — une couleur rouge, par exemple, etc. — de même, ici, c'est à partir de la manifestation partielle des éléments grossiers, etc., [formant la manifestation] qu'apparaît dans sa totalité l'énergie de Rudra' [— 'In the same way as, for a given object, a jar, etc., the global perception of the object itself along with all its characteristics, results from the whole, from the combination of all the perceptions parted from each of their qualities — the red color for instance — similarly, here, it is from the partial perception of the gross elements, etc., [constitutive of the manifestation] that appears the energy of Rudra in its totality'].

[372] *Pramāṇavārttika, Pratyakṣapariccheda* 220. Again, we are indebted to Prof. E. Steinkellner for the identification of the quote. The verse here cited is to be taken with the following verse (PV III 221): *yad yathā bhāsate jñānaṃ tat tathaivānubhūyate/ iti nāmaikabhāvaḥ syāc citrākārasya cetasaḥ//*. This pair of verses has been variously interpreted by Buddhist commentators themselves: among them, Manorathanandin (whom we have followed in our translation) and Prajñākaragupta, followed by Masahiro Inami, in an article entitled 'Non-dual Cognition' to appear in *Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference* (Vienna, forthcoming), which has been brought to our attention by Prof. Eli Franco, one of the editors. Inami translates the verses as follows (cited with the author's permission): 'In a variegated cognition, a color such as blue, which is a qualifier of the cognition, cannot be known to be unaccompanied by other [colors]. One who distinguishes it [from other colors] is focusing on the [external] objects [not on the cognition] [III 220]. The cognition is experienced exactly in the manner in which it appears. Therefore, the variegated image in cognition should be singular [or, as suggested by Eli Franco: 'the cognition which has a variegated form is singular (viz., it is the cognition which is said to be singular, not the form)'] [III 221]'. The major difference of interpretation relates to the term *ananyabhāk*, which Inami subordinates in idea to the following compound, *aśakyadarśanaḥ*, understanding it (as it were) as expressing the content of that 'cognition' that is impossible — 'cannot be known [*dṛś-* here understood as *jñā-*] to be unaccompanied by other [colors]' — whereas we have related it to the verse's subject, *jñānopādhiḥ*, as, apparently, does Manoratha also. However that may be, the understandings of verse 220 are not that different as to the point that YR wants to make: even the most notorious partisans of multiplicity — the Buddhists —

Moreover, space and time are [here] postulated [by the objector] as diversifying the free, all-encompassing Knower (*jñātṛ*), whose nature is only consciousness (*cidekavapus*). How could they serve to delimit [viz., serve as a qualification of] [373] such a Lord, persisting as they do [within him] only as aspects of his playful effulgence (*samullāsaka*) that results in the variety of his forms and actions? [374]

Here it should be kept in mind that, had space and time ever existed as different from [i.e., independent of] consciousness, only then, would [your objection] have been valid: [viz., that our assertion, namely, that the Lord is one and many, entails] the attribution of contradictory properties [to one and the same object] — an attribution which is itself a creation of that consciousness.

[Rather,] since their own existence [viz., the existence of space and time] is established only by the Light of consciousness (*saṃvitprakāśa*), it is thereby established that the [Lord], although having a multiple nature, is the same unique Great Lord, whose form is consciousness (*cinmūrti*). [375]

Had difference [viz., manifoldness] been a [real] property, [376] it would have been difficult to refute [the objection of] the attribution of contradictory properties [to one and the same object].

Kārikā 7

But, [objects the *pūrvapakṣin*,] the notion has been admitted [by you] that there is but one cognizer, whose essence is consciousness, and also that [such a subject], having now assumed [the shape of] bodies, faculties and worlds, becomes multiple. If that is indeed the case, then, that one cognizer should perish once his body, etc., is destroyed, and he should originate once his body, etc., comes into being.

Similarly, that [universal subject] is variously delimited with respect to each and every cognizer in accordance with the six 'modifications of becoming' — birth, existence, etc. And it is that [universal subject, in the form of the] Lord who enjoys heaven and hell, according to the variety of his actions, whether meritorious or unmeritorious. All this being so, how

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accept that what appears to the mind, inevitably, as multiple must be cognized, insofar as it is cognized, in a cognition that is in some sense one, momentary though it may be. Whether that 'unity' be predicated of the cognition itself (as per Prajñākaragupta), or of the 'object' of cognition — viz., the color blue, that cannot be anything but itself, insofar as it is understood as a component of that object — (as per Manorathanandin), the principle is established that the 'one' and the 'many' may, or do, coexist. On the context of such a statement in this work of Buddhist logic, see also Vetter 1964: 66–71.

[373] *vyavacchedaka*.

[374] Cf. again ĪPK II 1, 4–5.

[375] Silburn translates *cinmūrti* as 'pure spiritualité' ('pure spirituality').

[376] *bhedadharme*, scil. *sati*.

can it be said that Śiva has an absolute nature (*svasvarūpa*)? The master responds to these objections by means of an example:

7. As when the water moves, the moon [reflected there] seems to move, and when the water is still, seems to be still, so it is with this Self, the Great Lord, [when reflected] in the host of bodies, faculties and worlds. [377]

Just as, where a course of water is moving, the **'cool-rayed orb'**, that is, the physical moon, which, in reality, is situated in the sky and of itself does not move, but has even so descended [in appearance] onto the flowing water, **moves**, goes forth, **as it were**, so too, at the same moment, elsewhere, where the pond of water is motionless, that very **'cool-rayed orb' becomes still**, as it were [i.e., there reflected, appears to be still].

Thus the moon is imagined in both ways [as both moving and still] by all cognizers, though it cannot in fact be so [that is, the moon neither moves nor is still: such predicates belong to the water only].

Nor is it the case that time and space, which pertain properly to the water, affect (*parāmṛś*) the nature of the moon, that is, its remaining in the sky, as differentiating factors; only water as such is so [affected by the differentiation brought about by time and space].

Moreover, since difference — as exemplified by the mobility or immobility that affect the orb of the moon but properly belong to the water in which the moon is reflected (*pratibimbita*) — is merely phenomenal, [378] to that extent, the moon suffers no harm at all in its essential nature, whether it be reflected in the water of the Ganges or whether it descends onto [viz., is reflected on the surface of] slime.

So it is with this Self that has the nature of consciousness, [though it appears] to be born or to perish when are born or perish **the host of bodies, faculties and worlds** it has itself created. But this is only the

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[377] Cf. ĀPS 17, evidently followed here by our author — although its first hemistich is slightly different, as the sun is there mentioned rather than the moon. As the moon does not depend for its existence upon the water in which it is reflected, so the Lord does not depend upon the play of differentiation. It is diversity that fluctuates, not the Lord. Silburn translates *bimba* by 'reflet' ('reflection'), and omits *iva*. Our translation is based on the commentary, which develops the meaning of *iva*, and clearly distinguishes *bimba* from *pratibimba* 'reflection'. In fact, the logic of the complete simile requires to understand *himakarabimbam* as the 'orb of the moon', instead of the 'reflection of the moon', as does Silburn, for what has to be demonstrated is the absolute, eternal, nature of the Lord, or Self. Thus the complete simile is to be understood as follows: the moon stands for the Lord, or the Absolute, its reflection for the limited Self, water for the phenomenal world. Cf. SpP 3 (p. 13), in the context of the discussion on *avasthās*: *vellatsu pratibimbeṣu jalaspandānuvartiṣu/ yathendor na kriyāveśas tathā 'tra paramātmanaḥ//*, 'Although its moving reflections dance in consonance with the vibrations of water, the moon does not indulge in any action. Likewise, here, the supreme Self [remains constant in the midst of change]'.

[378] *vyavahṛyate* — or 'is merely a convention of language' — i.e., we say 'the moon shimmers [on the water]', but this is just a way of talking.

practice [i.e., the understanding] of those who are deluded (*vyāmohita*) by *māyā* in this phenomenal world,[379] just as happens when the moon [is reflected] in water. For it is not possible that the Self be born or that it die.

As it has been said in the revered *Gītā*:

> He is not born, nor does he ever die;/ Nor, having come to be, will he ever more come not to be./[380] Unborn, eternal, everlasting, this ancient one/ Is not slain when the body is slain.[381]

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[379] *vyavahāra* — see n. 659. Note that BhGBh II 20 (BhG II 20 being quoted subsequently in YR's commentary) refers to this conventional but erroneous understanding of things: *ity ucyate loke* (see note below).

[380] The phrase *nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ* has been variously interpreted. See, among others, Lévi, Stickney BhG (borrowed by Silburn PS: 65): 'n'ayant jamais été et n'allant être encore' [— 'neither having ever been, nor being about to be again'], and Edgerton BhG: 'Nor, having come to be, will he ever more come not to be', who translate the sentence as it is, in a linear way. Ś's commentary reads (with the ambiguity on *bhavitā/abhavitā* allowed by *sandhi*): *nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā* [and *'bhavitā*] *vā na bhūyaḥ*, glossed as follows, in terms of a complex analysis of the syntax: *na ayaṃ bhūtvā abhavitā bhūyaḥ, na vā na bhūtvā bhavitā bhūyaḥ*, 'It is not that, having been, [the Self] will cease to be thereafter [viz., the ordinary definition of death], nor that, not having been, will it be thereafter [viz., the ordinary definition of birth]'. Thus *nāyaṃ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhuyaḥ* is a way of emphasizing and unpacking the first statement — *na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit* — by making it clear that this Self is beyond temporality, i.e., beyond the sequentiality hinted at here by the double use of the absolutive and of the periphrastic future — although one has to be suspicious of this interpretation, for *abhavitā* cannot be a periphrastic future, according to Pāṇinean grammar. The negative form of such a future would be *na bhavitā* (see Renou 1968: §134, for some exceptions). For this reason, Edgerton finds Ś's explanation implausible. Ś's commentary is the following: *yasmād ayam ātmā bhūtvā bhavakriyām anubhūya paścād abhavitā 'bhāvaṃ gantā na bhūyaḥ punas tasmān na mriyate/ yo hi bhūtvā na bhavitā sa mriyate ity ucyate loke*, 'Since it is not that this Self, after having come into being, i.e., after having experienced the process of existence, will thereafter cease to be, i.e., will thereafter (*bhūyaḥ* = *punaḥ*) become non-existent, therefore it does not die. [For] in common parlance, the one who ceases to be after coming into being is said to die'. *vāśabdān naśabdāc cāyam ātmābhūtvā vā bhavitā dehavan na bhūyaḥ punas tasmān na jāyate/ yo hy abhūtvā bhavitā sa jāyata ity ucyate/ naivam ātmā/ ato na jāyate*, 'Or, from the use of the words *vā* and *na*, [it is to be understood that] unlike the body, this Self does not again come into existence after having been non-existent [thus, on this second level of the meaning, the second *na* negates *bhūtvā* with the sense of *abhūtvā*]. Therefore it is not born. [For] the one who comes into existence, after having been non-existent, is said to be born. The Self is not like this; therefore it is not born'. Cf. AG's commentary on the same passage, where the exegete proves to be a more scrupulous grammarian than Ś, although he offers essentially the same explanation: *na jāyate mriyate vā kadācit/ etad eva sphuṭayati — nāyaṃ bhūtveti/ ayam ātmā na na bhūtvā bhavitāpi tu bhūtvaiva/ ato na jāyate na ca mriyate / yato bhūtvā na na bhavitāpi tu bhavitaiva/*, ' "Neither is this [Self] ever born nor does it ever die". He explains this by the words "*nāyaṃ bhūtvā* [etc.]". This Self, not having not become, will exist — in other words, it has ever been; thus it neither is born nor does it die; (*mutatis mutandis*) since it has become, it will not not be — in other words, it will ever be'.

[381] BhG II 20 (tr. Edgerton — as are all translations from BhG cited here, unless otherwise specified). Ś comments upon these attributes: since birth is denied, the Self is unborn (*aja*); since perishability, i.e., death, is denied, it is eternal (*nitya*); since change in the form of

Therefore this Self, **the Great Lord**, free [ever autonomous], whose nature is the awareness (*pratyavamarśa*) that all the universe is his own Self, ever persistent [382] as the principle of experience itself [at the heart] of all cognizers is in fact nothing but his own absolute nature, whatever [limiting] condition [383] may appear or disappear.

It is precisely the universal mastery (*maheśānatva*) of the conscious principle (*saṃvittattva*) that enables accomplishment of [what is otherwise] difficult to construe (*durghaṭakārin*); for, although [, in conformity with this principle, the Lord] enjoys in innumerable ways all the goods of heaven and all the evils of hell, having accepted [freely] the condition of fettered subject, at the same time, he remains identical with his essence [384] which is consciousness, because he is the principle of experience itself in each and every [percipient subject] (*sarvānubhavitṛtā*) [that is, that makes possible the experience of anything at all].

Or rather, if the state of being fettered — determined by its condition of bondage, and exemplified when we experience merit and demerit, heaven and hell, hunger and thirst, etc. — is illumined (*prakāśita*) by the self-illuminating (*svātmaprakāśa*) Lord and recognized (*parāmṛṣṭa*) [by him], only then does it attain its being [viz., exist] in [the Lord's] own Self, as stated above. [385] Otherwise this state of being fettered simply doesn't exist. [386]

How then can it be said that the Great Lord that is one's own Self suffers loss of his true nature? [387]

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decay is denied, it is everlasting (*śāśvata*); since change in the form of growth (opposed to decay) is denied, it is said to be 'ancient' (*purāṇa*), and as such evernew, everfresh, free from any accretion. Let us recall the traditional etymology of *purāṇa*: *purā navaṃ bhavati iti purāṇam*, 'what formerly was new, is ancient' and: *purā adhunā ca navam eva*, '*purāṇa* is that which formerly was new and is new to-day' (see YR ad 1, who comments upon *anādi* by *purāṇa*). Finally, in the last statement: 'this Self is not destroyed [or 'killed' (*hanyate*), 'slained', as Edgerton translates], when the body is destroyed', *hanyate* is to be understood as 'transformed', in order to avoid a tautology with *mriyate* in the first line. Thus this last statement works as a conclusion: in this verse, all six kinds of transformation seen in the world are denied with respect to the Self.

[382] *prathamāna* — lit., 'expanding'.

[383] *avasthā* — those states and processes which differentiate him as a limited soul: birth, existence, etc., and being gods, men, animals, etc.

[384] Lit., 'is not other than his essence'.

[385] Cf. YR ad 1, 5 and 6.

[386] *niḥsvabhāva eva* — lit., 'is simply devoid of any proper nature'. The rationale here is that of the *ābhāsavāda*, and is characteristic of the Śaiva system: only that exists which shines, i.e., only that exists which is known to us (see n. 265). Likewise, the condition of fettered subject does not exist independently of consciousness: it exists only when apprehended as such.

[387] *svarūpavipralopa* — same term in YR ad 6. The same rationale again is developed as in YR ad 6: how can that which is itself dependent alter the nature of that on which it depends? Hence bondage itself does not provide a valid argument for the *pūrvapakṣin* whose position is that Śiva, as *paśu* in bondage, cannot be of an absolute nature. Whatever is bondage is known to be bondage, its existence depends upon the Self as knower. Therefore, whatever

In every wise, only the thing, such as the body, that has been created [by the Lord] can be subject to destruction or generation; never can creation or destruction be attributed to the eternal Lord who is consciousness.

Thus, the unitary Self, being at the heart of the multiplicity of forms thanks to the distinction [freely projected by the Self] between what is to be known and him who knows, is at the same time what there persists, as the principle of unity [that obligatorily subtends that very multiplicity], inasmuch as it is the principle of experience itself that is at the heart of every percipient subject [that is, that makes possible the experience of anything at all].

Therefore, the nondualistic doctrine (*advayavāda*) remains intact.[388]

Kārikā 8

Even so, [the following objection has been raised:] — if indeed, as you have proclaimed — in keeping with both reasoning and traditional scripture — this Self of all things, on whose nature depends the phenomenal display of the universe, is ultimately nothing but universal consciousness (*saṃvit*) and if it manifests (*avabhāsa*) all things in consequence of the fact that consciousness is everywhere,[389] why then is [that universal consciousness] not observed even in the lump of clay, for [, according to you, the lump] is not therefrom to be differentiated, as far as its essence is concerned?

And if you accept [even the nonsensical view that it is present even in a lump of clay], then the [conventional] repartition [of entities][390] according to sentiency and insentience, which is so evident, cannot be explained, inasmuch as worldly practice is based on the distinction between sentient and insentient. How can that [difficulty] be [overcome]?

Answering that objection, the master says:

8. Just as Rāhu, although invisible, becomes manifest when interposed upon the orb of the moon,[391] so too this Self, although [invisibly] present in all things, becomes manifest in the mirror of

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depends upon the Self, that cannot delimit the Lord as supreme Knower, or foundational consciousness, which is essentially one.

[388]The absoluteness of the universal Self cannot be denied. The infinite variety of limited selves is but its reflection in the water — flowing or still — of the phenomenal world.

[389]See PS 44 and 49, and YR ad 58.

[390]*vyavasthā*.

[391]According to the tenets of Indian astronomy, Rāhu, the so-called planet (*graha*) causing lunar eclipses, is visible only when he crosses the moon; otherwise, he is invisible. To become visible, Rāhu, like consciousness, requires then a concrete substratum. Since eclipses are harmful, Rāhu is considered a demon, thus completing the image.

the intellect, [392] **by securing [similarly] a basis in external objects.** [393]

Although wandering everywhere in the sky, [394] [the demon of the eclipse] **Rāhu** is not perceived. Nevertheless, at the time of a [lunar] eclipse, he is clearly visible, appearing to us as if situated upon the form [viz., the orb] of the moon, [such that people say:] 'This is Rāhu'.

Otherwise, although present [in the sky], it is as if [Rāhu] were not present among the host of planets.

Likewise [i.e., as in the example], here also [i.e., in the thesis to be exemplified], **this Self**, although intrinsically persisting as the inmost core of all beings, is not observed as such by anyone, for what is apprehended is apprehended only in immediate perception, where it takes a form indistinguishable from one's own experience. [395]

Moreover, when [this Self] becomes a matter of awareness [396] in the [cognitive] experience of the 'first person' (*ahaṃpratīti*), namely, [in the 'I' that subtends the predicate in expressions] such as 'I hear [sounds]' [397] — an experience that occurs to every cognizer endowed with a subtle

[392] *dhīmukura* is glossed as *buddhidarpaṇa*, which itself is glossed as *pratibhāmukura*; same term in YR ad 77. The visible 'reflection' of the universal consciousness in the 'mirror of the intellect' is commonly considered by all the Vedāntas to be the 'I-notion' or personified 'ego' (*ahaṅkāra*); on *pratibhā*, see n. 557.

[393] *viṣayāśrayaṇena* is glossed by *śabdādiviṣayasvīkāreṇa*, 'by apprehending objects of sense such as sound'. The Self is apprehended only in course of the cognitive process, that is, when it is reflected in the mirror of the intellect, for, in statements such as 'I hear a sound', 'I' stands for the Self/consciousness, even though this 'I' represents but the limited self. This amounts to saying that universal consciousness, although all-pervasive, becomes manifest in the *puryaṣṭakapramātṛ* only, i.e., in the finite being endowed with subtle body, as will be further explained by YR. This *puryaṣṭaka* is the aggregate of the five *tanmātras*, here termed *viṣayas*, and the three constituents of the *antaḥkaraṇa* (*buddhi, manas, ahaṅkāra*) — thus meriting its name, 'octad in the fortress', viz., the eightfold, or eight-factored, subtle body within the gross body, itself seen as the 'fortress' of the *puruṣa*. The list of eight constituents of the *puryaṣṭaka* differs from text to text, cf. B&R, s.v. (which quotes a medical text): *bhūtêndriya/mano/buddhi/vāsanā/karma/vāyu*, and, as the eighth, *avidyā*; see also Torella ĪPK: 204–205. The *puryaṣṭaka* is responsible for the *paśu*'s experience, or cognition, formed of the complex of objects (*viṣaya*) and their corresponding faculties of cognition (*jñānendriya*), through which the limited cognizer comes to know himself as 'I' in virtue of the experience: 'I hear a sound'. On *tanmātras* and *jñānendriyas*, see n. 399; on *puryaṣṭaka*, see PS 92–93 and n. 1316; also SpK III 17–18, and Kṣemarāja ad loc., who explains the process of transmigration whose main impetus are the *saṃskāras* deposited in the *puryaṣṭaka*.

[394] *ākāśadeśa*.

[395] YR perhaps wishes us to understand here that the Self is not apprehended (though present) because it has clothed itself in the multiple forms of common experience; it is indeed the Self that one apprehends (what else could one apprehend!), but one is unaware that this is the case inasmuch as mundane consciousness has rendered the Self "invisible" behind the multiplicity that characterizes every act of ordinary awareness.

[396] *viṣayo bhavati*.

[397] Second occurrence of the 'I'-notion in YR's commentary.

body (*puryaṣṭakapramātṛ*)[398] whenever objects of sense such as sound,[399] viewed as[400] objects to be known[401] are apprehended in the mirror of intellect (*buddhidarpaṇa*), or, in the mirror of intuition (*pratibhāmukura*) — then, that same Self, its form now fully manifest,[402] is apprehended also in [the object before us] the lump of clay, etc., as that whose nature it is to apprehend [that lump]: there also the inherent Self **becomes manifest** (*prakāśate*), that is, is perceived by all as one and the same as their own particular experience.

[Nevertheless,] even though [consciousness] is there in the lump of clay, etc., it is widely taken (*prathate*) as not being there, in virtue of [the clay's] abounding in *tamas*, just like Rāhu in the sky.[403]

Thus, among the host of entities that are nothing but semblances of himself[404] [viz., aspects of universal consciousness], the Lord, by his power of differentiation (*māyāśakti*),[405] turns some into cognizers, who, anointed with the unction of conditional [or temporary] ipseity (*ahantā*),[406] take on the form of subtle bodies though they are [to him] but

[398]This is a definition of the *paśupramātṛ*, since it is the *puryaṣṭaka*, or 'subtle body', that carries the Self or the Soul from one birth to another, that is, from one body to another. As such it is also called *ātivāhika*; see n. 738.

[399]In Sāṃkhya as well as in the Śaivism of Kashmir, the five *tanmātras* (defined in PS 21) — sound, etc. — are the subtle objects (*viṣaya*) of the five *jñānendriyas* respectively — hearing, etc. — (PS 20). Both the *jñānendriyas* and the *tanmātras* proceed from the *antaḥkaraṇa*, and especially from the *ahaṅkāra*, for the *jñānendriyas*, realized in the form 'I hear', necessarily refer to an 'I' (YR ad 20). The *tanmātras* do the same 'due to the inevitable interrelation of the object with the subject' (YR ad 21).

[400]*vyavasthā* — see n. 406.

[401]Starting with the conjunction of objects and sense-organs, this process of cognition aims at establishing a determinate cognition (*niścaya*) — which is the function of *buddhi* (PS 19) — which leads one to become aware of one's self as the subject of the experience: objectivity becomes the pretext for an awareness of one's own subjectivity, although it is yet but limited, deserving to be termed egotistical 'conceit' (*abhimāna*), an adulteration of essential I-ness, or ipseity (*ahantā*). On speculations about this process, and the functions which it implies, see PS 19; also YR ad 94–95, which, through a striking description of the dysfunction of *antaḥkaraṇa* and *bāhyakaraṇas* at the moment of death, is very useful for understanding their role in the cognitive process.

[402]*sthitaḥ san sphuṭarūpaḥ*.

[403]*tamas* is darkness, lethargy, as well as metaphorical darkness, ignorance. Clay is not a cognizer, in the absence of a subtle body. Consciousness may be there, but is not experienced, and therefore not experienced by others, except by a *jñānin*, one enlightened.

[404]*svātmakalpa*.

[405]First occurrence of this notion, as such (and not as *tattva*, or as *aṇḍa*), that is, as the power of the Lord to manifest himself as the entirety of diversity.

[406]*ahantāvyavasthārasābhiṣikta*. For *vyavasthā* as a technical term in traditional usage, see Renou 1942, s.v. The term is used in relation to certain rules whose "optionality" is not general, but is rather determined by accompanying circumstance (cf. P. I 1, 34). For instance, the difference between 'one may substitute saccharine for sugar at any time' and 'when taking coffee, you may use sugar; otherwise, saccharine'. In our present usage, the term perhaps signifies that what is at issue is conditioned — by "facts", by ordinary usage — and is in no wise predetermined; as such, it is subject to the complex of spatio-temporal con-

elements to be known.

And [*mutatis mutandis*] he turns some into objects fit to be cognized — in reference to which, the well-established practice of differentiation [407] whereby, on the one hand, sentient entities are stipulated and, on the other, insentient, is quite well founded.

Thus, because it is a mere object of cognition, the lump of clay, etc., is insentient, whereas the cognizer endowed with a subtle body, because he is a cognizer, is sentient.

But, ultimately, from the point of view of the Supreme Lord, no usage distinguishes the sentient from the insentient. [408]

Kārikā 9

Now, one may object: — if in the intellect (*buddhi*) of all cognizers there exists this vibration (*prasphuraṇa*) of their proper Self without any distinction, then why may not all of them become knowers of their proper Selves (*svātmavid*)? Or let us suppose them not endowed with such knowledge [viz., that of the Self], there being no basis for any distinction [among knowers]. [409]

Yet, even at the level of phenomenal existence, there are some who, having attained the knowledge of their proper Self (*svātmajñāna*) are liberated while still living [in a physical body] (*jīvanmukta*), and are endowed with omniscience and omnipotence; [410] and there are some who are worthy of attaining the knowledge of their proper Self and are desirous of making the ascent, [411] whereas others, lacking the knowledge of their own

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ditions. The same image of royal consecration — lit., an 'aspersion', a 'sprinkling' (*abhiṣeka*) of water mixed with a few ingredients — occurs in YR ad 31. Consecration (*abhiṣeka*), thus used analogically, is a topos; cf. SpN I 8, in the context of a discussion on the sense-organs: *ahantārasavipruṅabhiṣekād acetano 'pi cetanatām āsādayatyeva*, 'The insentient [group of the senses] itself may acquire sentiency provided it is consecrated by the drops of the unction of ipseity'. And ŚSV II 8: *sarvair yat pramātṛtvenābhiṣiktaṃ sthūlasūkṣmādisvarūpaṃ śarīraṃ tat [...] haviḥ*, 'The body, whether gross or subtle, etc., that all beings consecrate (*abhiṣikta*) "Subject", is the oblation [...]'.

[407] *bhedavyavahāra*.

[408] The passage concerns two issues: it justifies ordinary usage (*vyavahāra*), which goes against that of the doctrine, and sets it aside, for, as it is the case with the other Advaitas, ordinary usage cannot apply to the Absolute.

[409] The two branches of the dilemma are: since the Self/consciousness is all-pervasive, either every *pramātṛ* must immediately know that Self, or no *pramātṛ* can possibly exist, for no distinction can be imagined that would distinguish that *pramātṛ* from any other. All are *jñānins*, or none are. How then can one justify a hierarchy of *pramātṛ*s?

[410] See PS 96.

[411] *āruruksu* — see PS 97–102.

Self, are tightly fettered by the chains[412] of actions good and evil that occasion merit and demerit, and are bound to transmigrate. How can this be consistent?

So, keeping all these objections in mind, the master explains in response that the grace (*śaktipāta*)[413] of the Supreme Lord is without restriction[414] [that is, is not bestowed in virtue of any qualification, moral or immoral, on the part of the donee]:

9. As a face is reflected clearly in a mirror free of dirt, so does this [Self] become manifest, being nothing but radiance, in the 'intellect-principle', made pure by Śiva's grace.

[The comparison may be developed through the following example:]

In a mirror free of dirt, a face appears[415] [clearly], is endowed with its various qualities of form, etc., that are not different [from those of the face itself], for there is no area [of the face] that the mirror free of dirt doesn't capture.[416] On the contrary, in a dirty mirror, the face, even though it may have an extraordinary excellence, appears (*prakāśate*) altered due to the tarnishing force [of the mirror].

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[412]The term *nigaḍa* refers to the heel chains of an elephant or to a noose that snares the feet of an animal, throwing him down. The *paśu*, or fettered soul, is, analogically, such an animal.

[413]Lit., 'the "fall", that is, the conveyance [from above] of energy, its descent'; first occurrence of the notion in the kārikās; see YR ad 18, PS 64–66, and 96. Śiva is seen as *pañcakr̥tyavidhāyin* (cf. PH *maṅgalācaraṇa*), endowed with five cosmic functions (*kr̥tya*): creation (*sr̥ṣṭi*), sustenance (*sthiti*), dissolution (*saṃhr̥ti*, or *dhvaṃsa*) — three functions accepted by all Indian philosophical systems that postulate the world as created — as well as obscuration (*tirodhāna*, or *nigraha*), and grace (*anugraha*, or *śaktipāta*) — two additional functions that are postulated by Advaita systems in general. These two functions, or energies/powers (spoken of as *tirodhānaśakti* and *anugrahaśakti*) respectively explain bondage — the manifestation of Śiva as the host of the sentient limited souls and the insentient objects of the world — and liberation. Cf. TĀ XIV 24, where the *pañcakr̥tyas* are enumerated.

[414]*viśr̥ṅkhala* — see YR ad 96. Note the play on the words: *nigaḍa/viśr̥ṅkhala*. *viśr̥ṅkhala*, whose literal meaning is 'lacking a chain', viz., 'unfettered', 'unbound', 'unrestrained', has here the derived meaning of 'unconditioned' (see, infra, the second quotation in YR ad loc.). The question will be taken up again in kā. 82, where the notion of ritual *adhikāra* is questioned, as well as in kārikās 96–102. Analogous formulation in TĀ I 185: *nairmalyaṃ saṃvidaś cedaṃ pūrvābhyāsavaśād atho/ aniyantreśvarecchāta ity etac carcayiṣyate//*, 'Consciousness' absence of defect is due either to prior practice [in former lives, adds JR], or to the unrestrained will of the Lord; this will be examined [in the thirteenth chapter, adds JR]'. Whereas the *jīvanmukta* is described in kā. 96, kā. 97 evokes the *videhamukta* who is liberated immediately after the existence in which he has striven for liberation. The different types of the *yogabhraṣṭa*, those 'fallen from the path of yoga' (or 'from discipline') are also described: one who will strive for liberation within the span of two births, separated by a stay in 'worlds of enjoyment' (kā. 98–99); and one whose liberation will take place also after two births, but after a much longer stay in divine worlds (kā. 100–102).

[415]*cakāsti* glosses *vibhāti* in the kārikā; cf. KāU II 2, 14–15, quoted n. 265, which contrasts *vibhāti* and *bhāti*, *vibhāti* meaning 'to shine in reflection'.

[416]*svīkr̥* — lit., 'make its own', 'appropriate'.

Moreover, the dirty mirror is not able to capture those qualities, such as they are. Rather, the man whose face is reflected there feels ashamed of himself while contemplating his altered face, affected as it is by the tarnishing force [of the mirror], etc., and he thinks: 'my face is deformed'.

In the same way, the Self of some few cognizers whose present birth is the last is reflected (*avabhāsate*, lit., 'is resplendent') in the mirror of intuition, in proportion to the sum of attributes, such as omniscience, with which it is endowed — for that mirror has been cleansed by Śiva's grace — [Śiva being none other than] one's own Self, **for that** [Self] **is radiance** (*bhārūpaḥ*) — whose **very form** is **radiance**, namely, Light itself.

['Cleansed' means] made clear by the complete removal of the latent dispositions (*vāsanā*) left by the impurities of deeming oneself finite (*āṇavamala*), of regarding the world as objective (*māyīyamala*), of supposing oneself the agent of actions (*kārmamala*).[417]

By the term **descent** (°*pāta*) is here evoked the effulgence of the rays of the **energy** (*śakti*°), [also] termed 'favor' (*anugraha*), that emanate from **Śiva** himself.[418]

These few alone, though descended into the world of transmigration, are, for all intents and purposes, liberated (*muktakalpa*), for their own nature has become co-extensive with their proper [or 'universal'] Self.[419] They are thus possessed of excellence.

The Self of some others, though endowed with radiance, that is, though [in reality] illumined (*bhāta*), remains, for all intents and purposes, as if unillumined (*abhāta*), due to its impurity, inasmuch as the intellect-principle (*buddhitattva*) has been veiled by the impurities of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing oneself the agent of actions deriving from the Supreme Lord's energy of obscuration (*tirodhānaśakti*). On this account, these [others] are called 'tethered' [animals, *paśu*] and 'bound to transmigrate' (*sāṃsārika*).

And still others are cognizers desirous of ascending, because of the conjunction of both energies [that of obscuration and that of grace, bestowed on them by the Lord].

Thus, in all such cases, the variation in [the Lord's] grace may be pre-

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[417]The translation reflects, for these three notions, the same point of view, which is that of the fettered subject; the three 'stains' are certainly erroneous but at the same time are voluntary, imposed on ourselves by ourselves, and by no other, of whatever sort; see n. 317, an hypothesis on the correspondence of the three *malas* with three forms of being: *sattā*, *bhavattā*, *bhavanakartṛtā*. See PS 24 for a complete exposition of the *malas*.

[418]Cf. another definition of *śaktipāta* in YR ad 96.

[419]Lit., 'due to the extension of their own nature into their proper Self' (*svātmasvarūpaprathanāt*). These are the *jīvanmuktas* further described in PS 96 and YR ad loc. Same statement, but in negative form, at the end of the passage, which deals with the opposite figure of the *paśu*: 'on account of this [power], they wander (*saṃsaranti*) through this [cycle] again and again, engaged in good and bad actions, enjoying pleasure and pain, etc., for their own nature has not become co-extensive with their [universal] Self (*svasvarūpāprathanāt*)'.

sumed as one of the following types: sometimes intense (*tīvra*), sometimes feeble (*manda*), sometimes even more feeble (*mandamandatara*), etc. [420]

Accordingly, there is no action — whether it be meditation (*dhyāna*), silent (or whispered) recitation (*japa*), etc., or sacrifices such as horse sacrifice, or anything else, all of which arise from the power of causal constraint [of the Lord] that is included in his power of differentiation — which may cause the liberation (*mocana*) of the Self. For nothing that is based on difference is suited to serve as means to that [liberation, viz., identity with the Self], since the Self has passed beyond *māyā*. [421]

As it has been sung:

> Not by the Vedas, nor by austerity,/ Nor by gifts or acts of worship,/ Can I [be seen in such a guise,/ As thou hast seen Me]. [422]

Therefore, accordingly, the favor of the Supreme Lord is the only genuine (*akṛtrima*) cause [of liberation for] those whose intellects are worthy

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[420]'Variation in [the Lord's] grace' here refers, not to to differing intensities of the Lord's grace, but to the levels of receptivity of the adept. Similarly, the same fire will have quite different effects on dry and wet paper. We have here, admittedly, an explanation of the inexplicable: on one hand, divine grace is the same for all, unconditioned (*viśṛṅkhala*); on the other, nevertheless, is observed in the "real" world a hierarchy of subjects, which is a function of each subject's degree of aptitude in receiving that grace. Thus YR distinguishes three large categories: on one extreme, the *jīvanmukta*, on the other, the *paśu* or *saṃsārin*, whose submission to worldly concerns makes him insensible to the actions of grace, and between these two extremes, the *ārurukṣu* (or *mumukṣu*), whose efforts toward delivrance open him up to the Lord's grace, but whom diverse factors — his native intelligence, or chance interruptions in his practice (see kā. 98–102) — deter from an efficacious and immediate reception of grace. We have here another version of the "two truths": the *paramārthasatya* and the *saṃvṛtisatya*, transcendent truth, and empirical truth. The distinction between the subject destined to liberation and the subject condemned to be reborn is not a function of the intention of the god — so says the text cited below by YR himself: 'As far as the Lord's grace is concerned, his intention (*dhī*) requires nothing [as a precondition], for it proclaims his independence (*svatantratā*) [...]'. There remains the question of the distinction between *anugrahaśakti* and *tirodhānaśakti*. The former is manifested in the form of the 'descent of energy' (*śaktipāta*). The second is instrumental in effectuating *māyā*, which is responsible for the finitude of the *saṃsārin*. But the principle underlying the exercise of either *śakti* is the sovereign liberty of the Lord. Similarly, the term *viśṛṅkhala*, applied to *śaktipāta* in the avat., may also be understood in this sense: the grace dispensed by the Lord is 'free', not merely in that it is unconditioned, but also in that it has no other cause than the sovereign liberty of the divinity. An explanation that may well be opened to the objection that it explains nothing, but to which one might respond that the dogma of the Lord's liberty is at the very heart of Trika doctrine. The same debate, expressed in almost the same terms, occurs in the commentary on kā. 96–102; see, esp., the avat. to 96 and 97.

[421]Cf. YR ad 18 and 96: 'the acquisition of the knowledge of one's own Self has for its unique means the favor of the Supreme Lord'.

[422]BhG XI 53. Devotion (*bhakti*) is the unique means, as taught in the following verse: *bhaktyā tv ananyayā śakya aham evaṃvidho 'rjuna/ jñātuṃ draṣṭuṃ ca tattvena praveṣṭuṃ ca paraṃtapa//*, 'But by unswerving devotion can/ I in such a guise, Arjuna,/ Be known and seen in very truth,/ And entered into, scorcher of the foe' (BhG XI 54). There is no direct commentary of AG on this verse of the *Gītā*.

of it.

As has been said:

> As far as the Lord's grace is concerned, his intention requires nothing [as a precondition], for it proclaims his independence; it is not affected by a trace of cause[423] [associated with it — that is, it cannot be construed as the effect of any cause, such as the behavior of the worshiper].[424]

On the other hand, the Supreme Lord's energy of obscuration is the very cause of fettered subjects' wandering from birth to birth: on account of this energy, they wander through this [cycle] again and again, engaged in good and bad actions, enjoying pleasure and pain, etc., for their own nature has not become co-extensive with their [universal] Self.

Therefore, although the [absolute] Self is common to all cognizers, there are nevertheless two energies, that of favor and that of obscuration, of the nature of Light and of non-Light (*aprakāśa*) [respectively], that are causes of the dichotomy between liberation (*mokṣa*) and bondage.

As has been said [by Avadhūtasiddha]:

> The unobstructed energy [of obscuration] of the one endowed with infinite energies binds the ordinary being with the net of fetters that is this empirical world. And his other [energy, that of grace], after it has severed all [three] strands with the sword of knowledge,[425] leads man face to face [with Śiva] so that he reaches the state of liberation (*vimukti*).[426]

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[423] Read *kāraṇakalā-aghrātā*.

[424] The source of the quotation has not been found. The doctrine of the Lord's 'unconditioned' will suits very well other ideas concerning the dispensing of grace in the Śaivism of Kashmir.

[425] The 'sword of knowledge' is a common image. Cf. MBh X 47, 12–15, quoted in BhGBh XV 1: *etac chittvā ca bhittvā ca jñānena paramāsinā/ tataś cātmaratiṃ prāpya tasmān nāvartate punaḥ//*, 'Having felled and split this [Tree of material existence] with the great sword of knowledge, and thus attaining the bliss of the Self, one does not return from that [bliss]'. 'Axe of knowledge' (*jñānakuṭhāra*) is a variant; cf. YR ad 87–88.

[426] *Bhagavadbhaktistotra* 17. The verse is also quoted in Śrīkumāra's commentary on the *Tattvaprakāśa* (I 15) of Bhoja. As observed by Gnoli (ibid.: 215), 'this *stotra*, as is shown by the relatively numerous quotations, must have enjoyed at other times a certain reputation', especially in Kashmirian Śaiva circles. In effect Abhinavagupta quotes it (v. 29) in the *Bṛhadvimarśinī* and the *Laghuvimarśinī*, and YR, once more, cites it (v. 21) when commenting on PS 27 (see Gnoli, ibid.). According to Gnoli, Avadhūtasiddha might have been a native of Kashmir, and, having become an authority among Śaivas as early as AG's time, might have lived there in the 10th or even in the 9th cent.

Kārikās 10–11

Having thus accounted for this entirety (*idaṃ sarvam*) [viz., the universe in general], in accordance with scripture, experience and reasoning,[427] the master next takes up the world (*jagat*) that is internal to the tetrad of the spheres of Energy, etc., earlier propounded, which has as its basis the thirty-six principles [that will be explained] in the order of their arising.[428] But, in anticipation of that, in two kārikās, he propounds the cause of the cause, namely, the Supreme Śiva (Paramaśiva), suspended from whom that world appears:[429]

10–11. This world of thirty-six principles is reflected within the ultimate principle,[430] which, formed of light, is complete, and is supremely blissful on account of reposing in itself; it is suffused with the energies of Will, Knowledge and Action,[431] and replete with an infinity of [other] energies; it is devoid of all mental constructs, de-

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[427]That the doctrine can be justified logically is a claim made by all the exponents of non-dual Śaivism of Kashmir; see, for instance, the first and last kārikās of the ĪPK, viz., ĪPK I 1, 1: *tat pratyabhijñām upapādayāmi*, 'I will make suitable [to my audience by my exposition] [viz., make a suitable exposition of] the [doctrine of] recognition', and ĪPK IV 18: *īśvarapratyabhijñeyam utpalenopapāditā*, 'This [doctrine of] the Lord's recognition has been made suitable [to the student] [viz., explained suitably] by Utpala', as well as ĪPvṛ IV 16: *mayā yuktinibandhanena hṛdayaṃgamīkṛtaḥ*, '[This new path taught by Somānanda] I have made it attractive [lit., 'I have caused it to enter the hearts'] by affixing it with arguments (*yukti*)'. Also third *maṅgala* verse of the SpN: *samyaksūtrasamanvayaṃ [...] tīkṣṇāṃ yuktikathām [...] jñātuṃ vāñchatha cet [...]*, 'If you want to know the exact inter-connexion of the sūtras [...], accurate exposition of the reasoning [at work, there], etc.'. Recurrently, in all the texts of the Trika, argument by reasoning is contrasted with justification by Āgamas or appeal to personal experience (*anubhava*), often in the form of the triad: *yuktyanubhavāgamasiddhena, yuktyanubhavāgamayuktam*, or other variant; see, for instance, YR ad 8 (which omits *anubhava*); avat. ad 104; YR ad 79–80, which adds a fourth term (*pariśīlana*, 'sustained concentration'), as required by context: *yuktyāgamānubhavapariśīlanena*. Even more explicitly, Kṣemarāja's general avat. ad SpK presents the work as 'showing the agreement of Āgamas, experience and reasoning': *āgamānubhavopapattaikīkāraṃ pradarśayan*.

[428]Cf. YR ad 1, 14 (avat.), 22, 46 (avat.). Note that the word 'jagat' (by most accounts, derived from the intensive form of *gam*) suggests the 'world' unceasingly moving, finite, and full of contrast, as apprehended by our sense-organs; therefore, the "real" world, contrasting with the "virtual" world previously described; see n. 465.

[429]Same phraseology and same context in ĪPV I 7, 1: *api tu saṃvedanam eva tat tathā cakāsti māṃ prati bhāti iti pramātṛlagnatvāt*, 'Moreover, that [object] is consciousness itself, for that [object] is inseparable from (*lagna*, lit., 'attached to', 'hung upon', 'suspended from') the experiencing subject [whose experience has always the form]: "thus it appears before me." ' Here, *pramātṛ* represents the subject par excellence, as does Paramaśiva in YR's commentary.

[430]A similar attempt is made in kā. 43 and 64–66 to understand Paramaśiva (or, what amounts to the same thing, *brahman*), through the enumeration of his qualifications. Note that the image of the city in the mirror developed in 12–13 is already present here: *yat paratattvaṃ tasmin vibhāti [...] jagat*, 'This world appears in the ultimate principle'.

[431]Silburn translates literally: 'abondamment pourvu de volonté (*icchā*), de Conscience (*saṃvit*) et d'instrument (*karaṇa*)'.

void of dissolution and creation, is pure and is at peace. [432]

The universe, which will be described as starting from Śiva [the first among the thirty-six principles] and ending with earth [the last], appears (*prakāśate*) as reposing in him — that is, in him whose nature is such as has been described — the **ultimate**, all-encompassing, Śiva-principle (*śivatattva*). That is to say, though manifesting itself (*cakāsat*), it is shown by reasoning not to be different from that [principle]. Now, as to this view, [the following objection may be raised:]

— [The word *tattva* is thus derived:] 'that where the whole (*sarva*) consisting of bodies, etc. [scil., faculties and worlds], is spread out (*tanyate*) [is called "*tattva*"]'; [433] alternatively, because of its 'extension' (*tananāt*), it is what 'extends' (*tat*) up until [the world's] dissolution; "*tat-tva*" is then 'the state or condition of that [extended thing, viz., the ultimate principle]'. [434]

In either case, the word *tattva* conveys something insentient. [435] How,

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[432] Compare PS 11 with ĀPS 25: *sarvavikalpanahīnaḥ śuddho buddho 'jarāmaraḥ śāntaḥ/ amalaḥ sakṛd vibhātaś cetana ātmā khavad vyāpī//.*

[433] Both derivations of the word *tattva* referred to here by the *pūrvapakṣin* are from the root *tan*, 'to spread, extend, expand'. The first, in passive voice, makes *tattva* an object, an effect of the Lord's activity. However, the word does not designate concrete diversity *per se*, but rather 'where the entire manifestation is extended' — the categories whereby the infinite varieties of phenomena are ordered; *tattva* is thus a factor of classification (*vargīkaraṇanimitta*), an element unifying a collection of distinct entities, as stated in ĪPV III 1, 2, vol. II: 219: *yathā girivṛkṣapuraprabhṛtīnāṃ nadīsaraḥsāgarādīnāṃ ca pṛthivīrūpatvam abrūpatvaṃ ceti*, 'For instance, mountain, tree, city, etc., are earth by essence, whereas river, lake, ocean, etc., are water by essence'.

[434] Kṣemarāja's definition of *tattva* in his *Svacchandatantroddyota* [SvTU] ad SvT IV 241–242 (vol. II: 74) — the terminology is almost the same — makes YR's commentary more intelligible by adopting the exegetic method associated with *nirukti*: *tasya bhāvas tananāt tattvam iti vyutpattyā niruktyā ca*, '*tattva* is so called for it is "extension" (*tanana*), according to etymology (*niruktyā*); and from the point of view of morphological derivation (*vyutpattyā*), it means the state or condition of that [which "extends" (*tat*)]' — that is, *tattva* is derived from the root *tan*. It is (barely) possible that this *tat* could have been understood as the root noun of the root *tan* (*tanoti*), in weak grade (and so shorn of its nasal, cf. *ga-ta*), with *tugāgama* (that is — the stem-extension *t*[*uk*]), as would be normal after a short vowel (cf. *viśva-kṛ-t*). See also TĀV IX 1, vol. IV: 1637: *tanoti sarvam iti tat paraṃ rūpaṃ tasya bhāvas tattvam ity arthaḥ*, '[The term] *tattva* is thus explained: [the element] *tat* means 'that which extends to everything', [namely] the ultimate form [of the universe]; [by affixing thereto the abstract suffix *-tva*, one obtains the sense:] 'the state (or condition) of that [extended entity (or supreme form) — that is, the principle of expansion itself]'. Thus, *tattva* refers either to classified objectivity, or to transcendental subjectivity, although, ultimately, all *tattvas* are absorbed into that wherefrom they proceed, the Supreme Lord, or ultimate principle (*paratattva*), defined as 'that which expands'. See also n. 506. Historical linguistics of the modern sort of course does not approve such etymologies, preferring the straightforward derivation *tat-tva* 'this-ness'.

[435] Whether phenomenal category or ultimate principle, *tattva* is always understood as existing in space and time (as *paratattva*, it 'expands till dissolution'). As demonstrated elsewhere (YR ad 6 and 10–11), spatiality and temporality are insentient, unless taken as the very powers of the Lord. So grounded is the objection of the *pūrvapakṣin*. This 'extending' mani-

therefore, can it be applied to the Lord, to the Supreme Śiva, whose form is consciousness (*cidrūpa*)?

To this objection it may be said in response: — The word *tattva*, 'principle', is employed [by us] only to the extent that a verbal exposition is required, for those who need instruction,[436] but truly this word does not apply to [the Supreme Śiva].

Of what sort is this ultimate principle (*paratattva*) then? It is that **whose form**, whose proper nature, is **radiance**, is Light: of it the form is that of great Light: that is the meaning.

And, it is **complete** [or **all-encompassing**] (*paripūrṇa*), that is, it wants nothing [to complete itself, is free of dependency] (*nirākāṅkṣa*).[437] [In this respect, it might be alleged:] — but also are free of dependency such things as crystal-gems, mirrors, etc., which are insentient.

Therefore, the master says: '**supremely blissful** (*mahānanda*) **on account of reposing in itself**', that is, it is endowed with great bliss, with supreme felicity,[438] due to the fact that it reposes in its own true nature, [informed by] the delight (*rasa*) that arises from the state of unfragmented wonder that is [supreme] ipseity (*akhaṇḍāhantācamatkāra*).[439]

Thus, because its essence is supreme, beatific splendor (*sphurattā*), [which needs no other source of light], its difference is [sufficiently] stated in respect of inanimate entities such as crystal, which must be illumined [from without].

Therefore the master says further: '**suffused with the [energies of] Will, Knowledge and Action**'.

The energies of Will, Knowledge, and Action[440] constitute its nature;

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festation, being nothing but phenomenal plurality, implies that the Lord has abandoned his own essential nature, pure consciousness. In this way, plurality implies insentience.

[436]Same term and discussion in YR ad 14.

[437]Barnett and Silburn translate *paripūrṇa* as 'perfect'. But 'complete' appears more appropriate here, in the light of the commentary which explains it as *nirākāṅkṣa*, 'desireless, wanting nothing [to fill it up, viz., complete]'. The term *ākāṅkṣā*, 'expectation', borrowed from grammar, designates that which — like a transitive verb — "expects" a complement — its "direct object" — and is therefore in itself incomplete. Commenting upon both *icchāsaṃvitkaraṇair nirbharitam* and *anantaśaktiparipūrṇam*, YR again understands the term to mean 'completely filled with innumerable energies'. Same sequence in YR ad 65.

[438]His freedom from dependency is not just a negative condition. He is also characterized as supreme bliss itself; see Intr., p. 29, and p. 46.

[439]Similarly ĪPK I 5, 11 makes reflective awareness (*vimarśa/pratyavamarśa*), experienced as wonder (*camatkāra*), the factor distinguishing the Lord or universal consciousness from insentient objects such as crystal. Although the latter are colored by objects just as consciousness is, they are not aware of it.

[440]Paramaśiva is inseparable from his supreme energy (*parāśakti*), which is also named *svātantryaśakti*, energy of absolute freedom. Since this *svātantryaśakti* transforms itself into *icchāśakti*, *jñānaśakti* and *kriyāśakti*, in succession, Paramaśiva may be said to be 'of the nature of the energies of Will (*icchā*), Knowledge (*jñāna*), and Action (*kriyā*)'. SpN III 13 and ŚSV III 19, both quoting MVT III 5–13, describe in detail the entire process (see Appendix 9, p. 329).

it is not the case that it is devoid of energy, and is, as it were, insentient, as is maintained by the Śāntabrahmavādins.

Moreover, it is **replete with an infinity of [other] energies** (*anantaśakti*);[441]

replete with (*paripūrṇa*) — **entirely**, completely, **filled with** (*pūrṇa*), or permeated by (*vyāpta*)— **infinite**, uncountable, **energies**, as manifested in [the infinity of] forms that have names, such as 'jar', 'cloth', etc. And these energies take the form of Brāhmī, etc.,[442] as offshoots of the energies of Will, Knowledge and Action,[443] and [as denotation] arise from the mass [or totality] of sounds (*śabdarāśi*).[444] These energies beam forth (*ullasat*)

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[441]Note that *anantaśakti* was the term used by Avadhūtasiddha in the passage quoted at the end of the commentary on PS 9. Cf. also SpK I 1, quoted n. 301, in which Śiva is celebrated as the master of the Wheel of energies. These 'innumerable (*ananta* or *aśeṣa*) energies' are also termed the 'Wheel of energies' (*śakticakra*), which SpN III 13, while defining *parāvāc*, describes as 'composed of enlargements of the "six paths" — [enlarged] by means of innumerable words and objects to which they refer [appearing and disappearing to the rhythm] of uninterrupted series of manifestation and dissolution [...]' (*[...] svīkṛtānantavācyavācakarūpaṣaḍadhvasphāramayāśeṣaśakticakrakroḍīkārāntaḥkṛtaniḥśeṣasargapralayādiparamparā[...]*). See also PS 47 (and YR ad loc.) and the image of the water-wheel.

[442]MVT III 14 mentions eight goddesses, or divinized energies (*śakti*), presiding over the eight groups of phonemes (*varga*): Māheśī (= Māheśvarī), Brāhmaṇī (= Brāhmī), Kaumārī, Vaiṣṇavī, Aindrī, Yāmyā, Cāmuṇḍā and Yogīśī; on the *mātṛkās*, see also SpP 1 (pp. 11–12). But the lists differ according to different texts (see Padoux 1992: 155). SpK III 13 emphasizes, as explained by the *Nirṇaya*, the deluding power of those verbal *śaktis*, responsible for the servitude of the *paśu*, 'deprived of his might by limited words and ideas' (*saṃkucitaiḥ śabdair jñānaiś ca viluptavibhavaḥ*). Cf. ŚSV III 19: *[...] prāptatattvo 'pi pramādyan māheśyādibhiḥ paśujanādhiṣṭhātṛbhūtābhir api śabdānuvedhadvāreṇa mohyate*, 'Even he who has attained [supreme] reality, if inattentive, is confounded (*mohyate*) by Māheśī and all the other presiding deities of fettered subjects, through the medium of words that confound [lit., 'pierce' (scil. 'destroy'), *anuvyadh*]'.

[443]YR's exposition refers here to the doctrine of phonemic emanation, as developed by ŚSV III 19. The Lord's *svātantryaśakti*, seen as *parāvāc*, supreme Speech, having divided itself into the three energies of Will, Knowledge and Action, assumes the forms of vowels and consonants. Thus it becomes Mātṛkā, the 'Mother' of phonemes, whether uttered or not, and presides over the deities, such as Māheśvarī, etc., who reign over the eight groups of phonemes, also called *mātṛkās*. The name *mātṛkā*, whether applied to a single entity or to many, connotes not only the 'mother' of the words, but also of the worlds, inasmuch as the multitude of words entails the multitude of objects by them denoted. As shown by MVT III 5–13 (see Appendix 9, p. 329), Brāhmī, etc., seen as energies, spring forth from the triad of *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*. Similar development in YR ad 64–66; also ŚSV III 19, TĀ III 198–200a.

[444]ŚSV II 13 defines the Lord as '*śabdarāśi*, mass [lit., 'heap', implying an undifferentiated totality] of sounds, whose essence consists of a pulsating radiance, the nature of which is the reflective awareness of the fullness of the [absolute] "I", inseparable from the totality of the universe' (*bhagavān śabdarāśiḥ tasya yā sattā aśeṣaviśvābhedamayapūrṇāhaṃvimarśanātmā sphurattā*); tr. Padoux 1992: 307. See also YR ad 64–66, using a similar phraseology. SpV IV 21 [= ad III 19, in the textual organization of SpN] (p. 160) makes explicit the relationship between the Wheel of energies and *śabdarāśi*: *satyātmasvarūpapratyabhijñālakṣaṇād hetoḥ cakreśvaro bhavet cakrasya prākpratipāditasthityā carācarabhāvaparyantena prapañcena prasṛtasya śabdarāśisamutthasya svaśaktisamūhasya īśvaro 'dhiṣṭhātā*, 'By recognising his true essential nature, "He becomes the Lord of the Wheel", that is, the Lord Who presides over the

from it [the ultimate principle], and also achieve rest in it.[445]

And, thus, it might also be said that, in the Lord, [his energy of absolute] freedom takes the form of supreme Speech (*parāvāc*).[446]

Here, someone may object: — If the ultimate principle [or entity] is of the nature of Speech (*vāc*), then, it is constructed mentally inasmuch as it is differentiated by means of sounds [or phonemes] [which are voluntary]. How can a mental construct (*kalpanā*) be attributed to him who is pure Light?

With the intention of answering this objection, the master says: **'devoid of all mental constructs'.**

[That is,] although of the nature of Speech, the wondrous experience, in the supreme cognizer, of supreme ipseity is free from mental constructs (*nirvikalpa*).

For a mental construct (*vikalpa*) is characterized by the differentiation (*apoha*) [of a 'this'] from an 'other' [viz., a 'non-this'] — that is, by the postulation of a duality — the jar and the non-jar — which determines the jar as distinguished from all that is non-jar.[447]

But nothing other than Light, which would [necessarily] have the form of non-Light, is attested that could serve as a counter-reality[448] to that Light — whose very essence is the marvel of supreme ipseity — such that, by distinguishing [Light] from that [other entity], its status as a mental construct [— as having an alternative[449]—] would be established.[450]

Wheel or group of His own powers born of the "Mass of sounds" (*śabdarāśi*) and which, in the manner previously described, unfolds through the extending sequence of manifestation (*prapañca*) all the way down to the level of animate and inanimate beings' (tr. Dyczkowski ĪPK: 134); also SpK III 13, which again establishes the *śabdarāśi* as the source of the group (or Wheel) of energies: *śabdarāśisamutthasya śaktivargasya bhogyatām/ [...] gataḥ san [...]*, but from the viewpoint of the *paśu* and not that of the *pati*, as does SpV IV 21 [= III 19] quoted above.

[445]Cf. SpN III 13 quoted n. 441.

[446]*parāvāc*, supreme Speech, is the first flutter of consciousness: I am, and I know that I am. On the levels of Speech, or of the Word (*vāc*), see Padoux 1992: 166–222.

[447]Cf. ĪPK I 6, 3, which defines *vikalpa* in almost the same terms: *[...] atadvyapohanāt/ tanniścayanam ukto hi vikalpo ghaṭa ity ayam*, 'For we call *vikalpa* the ascertainment of a certain thing (*tanniścayanam*) [e.g.] "jar" arrived at through the exclusion of its opposite (*atadvyapohanāt*) [...]' (tr. Torella ĪPK: 131).

[448]*pratipakṣatayā*.

[449]*vikalpa*, here, is used almost punningly: not only 'mental construct', but also 'alternative' (as employed by grammarians and some others).

[450]Had there been something like non-Light (*aprakāśa*), Light (*prakāśa*) would have been a mental construct. But *aprakāśa* becomes *prakāśa* as soon as one supposes it to be *aprakāśa*. All is Light, and this Light is ultimately pure ipseity, as such free of all mental constructs. This discussion echoes, in nearly the same terms, that of ĪPK I 6 and its *vṛtti* concerning *vikalpa*, while examining *ahaṃpratyavamarśa*, the reflective awareness 'I'. See particularly ĪPK I 6, 2: *bhinnayor avabhāso hi syād ghaṭāghaṭayor dvayoḥ/ prakāśasyeva nānyasya bhedinas tv avabhāsanam//*, 'In fact, the manifestation of two things as different would [be limited to, for example,] the case of the "jar" (*ghaṭa*) and the "non-jar" (*aghaṭa*). There is, however, no manifestation, as if it were light, of something other [than light]'; and its *vṛtti*: *prakāśād dvitīyasya*

If [you, the *pūrvapakṣin*, further allege that] there is an object to be distinguished [from Light] that is of the essence of non-Light, and which does appear before him whose form is Light itself [— namely, the content or object of that Light/consciousness —], then, we reply: how could that object serve to delimit[451] that Light, which is [also] that object's own essential nature, inasmuch as that object must have [by your hypothesis] the nature of Light [in order that it may be 'seen']? Only in terms of such [alternativity] could the status [of Light] as a 'mental construct' be brought out!

For there is the maxim:

> [...] since [the embodied soul] perceives his identity [with all entities] through his awareness (*saṃveda*) of them, [there is no state, as regards words, meanings or thoughts, which is not Śiva].[452]

And, since nothing appears as contrary [to Light], how then might it

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bhinnasya pratiyogino 'prakāśasaṃjñasya anavabhāsane prakāśetaratvaṃ na syāt/ tasya anavābhāse vyapohanāyogād vikalpatāhāniḥ//, 'Otherness with respect to light (*prakāśetaratva*) is not possible, since an opposite reality (*pratiyogin*), second to and distinct from light, called non-light, is not manifested. There being no possibility of exclusion (*vyapohanāyogāt*), since such an opposite reality does not exist, one cannot, therefore, speak of mental construct (*vikalpatā*) [with reference to *ahaṃpratyavamarśa*]' (tr. Torella ĪPK: 129–131). Note that the notion of *pratiyogin* is based on a technical usage of the Nyāya — where it signifies the term to be presumed as the other pole in defining a given relation. For instance, 'father' is the *pratiyogin* of 'son', in the relation *pitṛputrabhāva*, as the meaning of this latter term (already implicitly relational) presumes reference to a parent, in this case, his 'father'.

[451] *vyavacchedaka* — lit., 'serve as a qualification of'. The meaning of the term *vyavacchedaka* is best grasped in the context of the notion of the *pratiyogin* — for it too is a relational term, whose *pratiyogin* is the *vyavacchedya*. The relation is that of 'qualification to thing qualified', understood in a way such that the existence of the one is somehow determined or limited by the existence of the other — for example, the 'Indian cow' and the 'dewlap' (whose relationship appears to be without exception, and therefore may serve in a definition), or the 'bird' and the 'branch' (on which it perches, which relationship is merely occasional, and therefore serves only to distinguish the bird from other birds). The relation is thus (as are all relations) shared by the two relata, and belongs to neither one exclusively, whatever be the manner of their coexistence. In the present context, this language is used to emphasize that "light" (*prakāśa*) can have no *pratiyogin*, and is therefore "unqualified" absolute. Cf. Vāmana, quoted in SpN II 3–4 (see n. 902).

[452] SpK II 3b. The entire text is as follows: *yasmāt sarvamayo jīvaḥ sarvabhāvasamudbhavāt/ tatsaṃvedanarūpeṇa tādātmyapratipattitaḥ//* (II 3) *tasmāc chabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ/ bhoktaiva bhogyabhāvena sadā sarvatra saṃsthitaḥ//* (II 4), 'The limited individual Self/embodied soul (*jīva*) is identical with the whole universe, inasmuch as all entities arise from him, and he perceives his identity (*tādātmya*) [with all entities] insofar as he is aware (*saṃveda*) of them. Therefore, there is no state, as regards words, meanings or thoughts, that is not Śiva. It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment (*bhogya*)'. Thus the experienced object has an identity of essence with the experiencer. From the PM 60, it may be inferred that the famous hemistich (SpK II 4a): *tasmāc chabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ*, is borrowed from some older texts (*anekāmnāya*); see n. 1028. Cf. TĀ IV 275a: *sarvaṃ śivamayam*, and avat. ad PS 46.

be possible even to ascertain[453] that there *is* an object here which, not subject to illumination (*aprakāśamāna*), has the form of its opposite [that is, which is different from Light] — whatever that object might be?

Therefore, the ultimate principle is of an undelimited nature (*aparicchinnasvabhāva*), inasmuch as it is **free of all mental constructs**, which are themselves delimiting factors.

Therefore, the master says: 'it is **pure**', free of stain, due to the absence of the soot-like impurity found in thought-construct.

Similarly, [the master says: that the ultimate principle is] **serene** (*śānta*), reposing [ever] in its absolute nature, in unison (*sāmarasya*)[454] with its Śakti, for there is no disturbance (*kṣobha*) arising from the dichotomy between the knower and the known. Yet, it does not at all resemble a piece of stone [as does the *śāntabrahman* of the Advaitins].

Moreover, it [the ultimate principle] is **devoid of dissolution and creation**. According to the maxim:

> Once this Self has appeared [, its possibility of not appearing
> is nowhere (— is not possible —), for it is complete],[455]

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[453]Cf. ĪPV I 3, 7 (vol. I: 143): *yata eṣa eva paritaś chedanāt pariccheda ucyate, tad avabhāsanasāmarthyam apohanaśaktiḥ*, 'Differentiation (*pariccheda*) is so called because it cuts [the differentiated] off on all sides [from the rest]. Hence, what is responsible for the manifestation [of one object as distinct from the rest] is *apohanaśakti* [the power of differentiating "I" from "this", i.e., the power of negating the Lord's essential plenitude]' (our translation borrows from Pandey ĪPK: 38). On *apohanaśakti*, see n. 314; also GAS XV 15: *ayaṃ ghaṭa eva iti sarvātmakabhāvakhaṇḍanāsāraṃ vikalpajñānātmakam apohanaṃ pāśavasṛṣṭirūpamāyāmayapramātrucitam*, 'Distinctive apprehension (*apohana*), such as "this is nothing but a jar" (or "this is a jar [and nothing else]") is essentially that knowledge consisting of mental constructs, the source of [*sāra* — "from which flows" ...] the disintegration of the notion that all things have the same essence, which is suitable to the [limited] knower who is himself a consequence of those illusory powers (*māyā*) that have shaped themselves into a creation affected to souls in bondage'.

[454]*sāmarasya* — lit., 'the condition of [those things] that have one and the same savor or essence', 'sameness of savor'; first occurrence of this key notion. Same term in ŚDvṛ I 48, glossing *sarvapadārthānāṃ samaiva śivatā sthitā: paramaśivātprabhṛti ghaṭādyantānām api padārthānāṃ samaiva [...] śivatā... niyatā sarveṣāṃ tathā sāmarasyāsādanāt kāpi sthitiḥ syād ity arthaḥ/ evaṃ ca sarvasya śivarūpasāmarasyāt tadakhyātimayaśuddhyaśuddhirūpaparāparādibhedo bhāvānām uktaḥ*, '["Śivahood is the same for all entities" — This means:] from Paramaśiva [on high, down] to jars, and so forth, Śivahood [...] is established ... as the same for all entities. So, since they have acquired such unity of essence, their status would be a matter of indifference. Since everything has identity of essence (*sāmarasya*) with Śiva, the difference between pure and impure, between the transcendent and the immanent (*parāpara*), and so forth, can be attributed to entities only insofar as that [identity] is misconstrued/not recognized (*akhyāti*), for this is the source [of such difference] (°*maya*°)'. In the Kashmirian tradition, the word *rasa* lies at the heart of another unity, that of poetics and metaphysics. In an aesthetic context, the *rasa* expresses also a unity of sentiment in which private distinctions and emotional involvements are cast off. It is the cornerstone of the doctrine. On the notion, see Rastogi 1987: 35–36; Bansat-Boudon 1992; Pollock 2006.

[455]The complete text of the quotation is given by AG in ĪPVV II 1, 6–7 (vol. III: 23), while commenting on *na kvāpy aprakāśaḥ* of the *vivṛti* ad II 1, 7, attributing it to the Śaiva

[the Self] is eternal. Therefore time, past, future, and present, makes no alteration[456] in it, for from it time itself emerges (*samullāsa*).

Thus, once it is admitted that the ultimate principle is free of generation and decay, the entirety of the whole may be logically established. And this is what has been propounded here.

Kārikās 12–13

But, interrupts an objector, if the ultimate principle is such as you say [and you also] affirm that the world appears [within it], then how can this be — inasmuch as nothing, in respect of that ultimate principle, would dare to 'appear' therefrom different?

[You are caught in the following dilemma:] If you say that the universe is different from it [viz., the ultimate principle] and so appears [within it], this would be tantamount to denying the nondualistic doctrine. But if you

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Sārasvatasaṃgraha: *sakṛd vibhāto 'yam ātmā pūrṇasyāsya na kvāpy aprakāśanasaṃbhavaḥ*; it is found also in the SpS [p. 25], where it is attributed to the *Śivasūtra* (probably a part of the ŚS which is lost; see Silburn ŚS: 2); note that the SpS reading differs slightly: *pūrṇo 'sya, aprakāśasaṃbhavaḥ*. The statement can also be reminiscent of ChU VIII 4, 1–2: *atha ya ātmā sa setur [...] tasmād vā etaṃ setuṃ tīrtvāpi naktam ahar evābhiniṣpadyate/ sakṛdvibhāto hy evaiṣa brahmalokaḥ*. It may be worth noting that ĀPS 25 also defines the *ātman* as *sakṛd vibhātaḥ*, a point of convergence with AG's PS 93; R ad loc. quotes MuU II 2, 11 (see p. 14). The compound *sakṛdvibhāta* appears twice in Gauḍapāda's ĀŚ III 36 and IV 81, in the context of defining *brahman* as *ātman* (or *citta*). The term is glossed by Ś ad loc.: *sadaiva vibhāta ity etat*, and, as he notes, is further explained in ĀŚ IV 81b itself: *sakṛdvibhāto hy evaiṣa dharmo dhātuḥ svabhāvataḥ* (as Bouy reads); the same term qualifies *brahman* in *Upadeśasāhasrī* X 1: *dṛśisvarūpaṃ gaganopamaṃ paraṃ sakṛdvibhātaṃ [...]*. In its abridged form (viz., *sakṛd vibhāto 'yam ātmā*, or even *sakṛd vibhātaḥ*), this passage is quoted in a number of Śaiva texts, among which we are able to cite, besides ĪPVV and SpS, ĪPV II 1, 6–7 (vol II: 22), TĀV I 125–126, IV 179, VIII 169a, 174 and XXIX 80, and, here, YR ad 10–11. It is also found, in the context of aesthetics, in ABh ad NŚ VI, *śāntarasaprakaraṇa*, after kā. 82 (vol. I: 335). In all probability, this list is not exhaustive and many other occurrences might be discovered. In any case, it should be emphasized that its frequent occurrence makes *sakṛd vibhāto 'yam ātmā* a key formula of nondual Śaivism of Kashmir. Note that YR quotes it here in the same context as does ĪPK II 1, 6–7, that of the eternity of the supreme Subject, or consciousness, whose background is the debate on Light and its contrary. In fact, YR seems here to refer, indirectly, to the literal form of ĪPK II 1, 6, whose final *sakṛt* is given a special treatment: *sarvatrābhāsabhedo 'pi bhavet kālakramākaraḥ/ vicchinnabhāsaḥ śūnyāder mātur bhātasya no sakṛt//*, 'In all things the diversity of the manifestations is the source of temporal succession for the knowing subjects, such as [those who are conscious of] the void (*śūnya*) [viz., the *śūnyapramātṛ*], etc., whose light is discontinuous, but not for the knowing subject who shines once and for ever' (tr. Torella ĪPK: 155, modified). See also PS 93 and notes thereon. It is noteworthy that SpS quotes *sakṛd vibhāto 'yam ātmā*, etc., immediately after referring to SpK II 4a: *śabdārthacintāsu na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ/*, 'There is no state, as regards words, meanings or thoughts, that is not Śiva'. The same textual organization is observed, here, in YR's commentary, where the previous quotation is from SpK II 3b. Such echoes from text to text show the persistent interreferentiality of the Trika system.

[456] *na kramate* — see YR ad 6.

say that it is not different, what sense then can be attributed to this verbal construction of yours,[457] [which appears to say] that the universe appears [within it] [as something else again]?

[In response to this], illustrating through an example the principle at issue, viz., [the relation termed] 'difference-and-non-difference' (*bhedābheda*), the master says, in order to substantiate [the aforesaid principle]:

12–13. As, in the orb of a mirror, objects such as cities or villages, themselves various though not different [from the mirror],[458] appear both as different from each other and from the mirror itself, so appears this world [in the mirror of the Lord's consciousness], differentiated both internally[459] and vis-à-vis that consciousness, although it is not different from consciousness most pure, the supreme Bhairava.[460]

[The comparison may be developed through the following example:] In the depths of a clear mirror, the world[461] appears (*bhāsate*) as reflec-

[457] *vācoyukti.*

[458] That is, as reflections, having no substratum apart from the mirror itself.

[459] Lit., 'mutually'.

[460] The translation differs somewhat from that of Silburn: 'Tout comme des villes et des villages variés qui se reflètent dans le disque d'un miroir sont dépourvus de distinctions, bien qu'ils semblent doués de distinctions mutuelles et séparés du miroir également, de même, procédant de l'Intelligence absolument immaculée du suprême Bhairava, cet univers tout en étant lui aussi dénué de toute distinction, apparaît comme fait de parties mutuellement distinctes et distinct également de cette (Intelligence)' [— 'In the same way as varied cities and villages reflecting in the orb of a mirror are devoid of distinctions, although they appear as endowed with mutual distinctions and separated also from the mirror, so, originating from the altogether immaculate Intelligence of the supreme Bhairava, this universe, although also devoid of any distinction, appears as made of parts mutually distinct as well as distinct from that [Intelligence]']. Here, *vimalatamaparamabhairavabodhāt* is not taken as a complement of *vibhāgaśūnyam,* as does the commentary, but rather as a causal complement of the principal verb *ābhāti* (which creates a difficulty, for, then, *vibhāgaśūnyam* is left without complement), and *bhairavabodha* is understood as 'the Intelligence of Bhairava'. Note that these kārikās seem to echo TĀ III 1–4 and TĀV ad loc.: *ata eva cānena viśvasya citpratibimbatvam/ [...] yathā hi darpaṇādau parasparavyāvṛttātmānaḥ pratibimbitā ākāraviśeṣāḥ tato 'natiriktatve 'pi atiriktā iva bhāsante tadvad ihāpīti,* 'Le monde, ainsi, est un reflet dans la conscience [...] Il en est du cosmos comme des formes reflétées dans un miroir ou autre [surface réfléchissante], formes distinctes les unes des autres et qui, quoique nullement séparées [du miroir qui les reflète], apparaissent cependant comme différentes de lui' (tr. Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 141); the *pratibimbavāda* is developped at length in TĀ III 1–65, whose commentary ends with the same verse as that which is quoted at the end of YR's commentary ad 12–13. Since the exposition of the *pratibimbavāda* is dealt with in the TĀ in the context of the exposition of the *śāṃbhāvopāya,* and is placed there under the aegis of Bhairava, it may be inferred that PS 12–13 amounts to a cryptic exposition of the *śāṃbhāvopāya* — in order to be liberated in the 'way of Śaṃbhu', one must realize mystically that the universe has no nature apart from being a reflection in the divine consciousness. He who acquires in this way an experience, in his own consciousness, of the appearance and disappearance of the universe, and can affirm: 'I am Śiva' [*śivo 'ham*], is liberated (TĀ III 268–293). See also, AG's *stotra, Paramārthacarcā,* vv. 4–5.

[461] *sarva* — in order to appreciate the force of the analogy, it seems important to understand

tion (*pratibimba*) **variously** — whether a city, village, fortress, enclosure, market-place, river, stream, fire, a tree, mountain, animal, bird, a man or a woman — that is, as having various forms, each differentiated by means of its own characteristics (*svālakṣaṇyena*), but also that [differentiated world] appears (*bhāti*) as **undifferentiated**, that is, as not different from the mirror itself, assuming a form within the mirror that is in no way different from that mirror.

And although it appears there [in the mirror] as undifferentiated from the mirror itself, [that world] **appears** (*bhāti*), or presents itself [to the senses] (*sphurati*) **in relations of mutual disjunction**,[462] that is, appears as differentiable[463] [internally], in the sense that the cloth is different from the jar and the jar from the cloth inasmuch as each presents characteristics of its own.

Only as reflected in that mirror are objects perceived (*parāmṛśyante*) as distinct from each other; and once they quit the mirror, nothing of them [remains behind to be] apprehended separately [that is, only the mirror remains]. Rather, though remaining consubstantial with the mirror[464] [i.e., although being one with it, as reflection], the world[465] is perceived as different in every respect.[466]

Now, if it be objected that, in that case, the mirror would itself be hidden by the reflection of the jar, etc., the master replies, saying: 'no, **[the reflections are different] from the mirror itself as well**'.

It is not merely in and of themselves[467] that the objects, even though

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sarvam 'the whole' (= the world) in its distributive aspect, rather than in its comprehensive aspect: *sarvam* here implies 'everything that exists, or can exist, whatever it may be'; "differentiation" is thus implied by the notion of "totality" itself.

[462] *vibhāgenaiva ca parasparam*.

[463] *vibhaktatayā* — cf. PS 48 and YR ad loc.

[464] *darpaṇasāmarasyena sthitam api* — the term *sāmarasya*, 'unison', is intended to evoke the nature of the relation between the image and the mirror: fundamental identity, superficial (or apparent) difference.

[465] *jagat* — although there are still differences of opinion, the word *jagat* is commonly derived from the root *gā* (*jigāti*), understood as a present participle with "corrected" reduplication. The Indian tradition more or less agrees, beginning from the root *gam-* ('*kvip, dvitvam, tuk ca*' — *Vācaspatya*), which explanation Renou also favors (1952a: §248). On the other hand, one of the glosses of the word given the same dictionaries is *jaṅgama*, which suggests that a sentiment of intensification has also been associated with *jagat*. Thus the word suggests, even more strongly than *sarva*, that the "world" is here to be understood distributively, as the 'incessant going and coming' of differentiated being; see its frequent occurrence in the phrase: *ṣaṭtriṃśatattvātmakaṃ jagat*, for instance in avat. ad 14, YR ad 1 and 46 (avat.).

[466] It is only in the mirror that the appearance of multiplicity is possible; without the mirror, there would be no presentation of multiplicity. In order for the comparison to support the thesis here propounded, and in order to understand the verse above, one must forget that a "real" mirror implies objects beyond or outside it. In this mirror reflections alone are at issue, and, quâ reflections, their sole support is the mirror itself; see TĀ III 21b: *[...] vastu bhavati tato 'py anyatra nāpy alam//*, '[the reflected image] is a [real] thing, which does not exist apart from that [mirror]'.

[467] *svayam*.

reflected in the mirror, appear as different [from each other], inasmuch as they are also different from the mirror.[468]

For, although the mirror is composed of those various reflections, it appears (*cakāsti*) as [different] from those reflections, for its own nature transcends them. And it is not understood as composed of them in such a way as to convey the idea that no mirror exists.

Everyone has an unsublated perception that 'this is a mirror', even as he apprehends the various objects therein reflected. Nor is it the case that the [image of the] jar, etc., qualifies the mirror in such fashion that the essential nature [of the mirror] would be abrogated [— as it would if one were to say]: 'this mirror is suitable for [reflecting] a jar' [scil., '... and not a cloth'], and 'this mirror is suitable for [reflecting] a cloth' ['... and not a jar']. The difference consequent upon time and space ['causes' of the variability of the reflections] does not thus eventuate in the loss of the [mirror's] essential nature.[469] Therefore, being tolerant of those reflections, the mirror remains nothing but a mirror, as regards itself.[470] There is thus no defect attaching to the doctrine of reflection [viz., of the reflected image] (*pratibimbavāda*).

Now, it might be said that this reflection is nothing but an error (*bhrānti*). Indeed, when an elephant is perceived in the mirror, it is not that an elephant is found *in* the mirror [rather, there is something like an elephant, in the form of its reflection], for, since no consequence which is fruitful[471] [can be attributed to the elephant in the mirror] such as would in fact [pertain to an actual elephant], the conclusion (*niścaya*) [that 'this is an elephant'] would be simply an error.

[Let it be said here only that] the example is valid to the extent that the doctrine of reflection is valid. As far as error is concerned, its nature will be propounded later in the text.[472]

Likewise, in exactly the same way, namely, in complete accordance with the example of the reflection of a city, etc., in a mirror,[473]

[we assert that] **the world** (*jagat*), this universe (*viśva*), **although not different from consciousness most pure, the supreme Bhairava**, that is, although not separated from Light itself, which abounds in unfrag-

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[468]The differences between objects do not suffice to explain all difference. The issue is important for Abhinavagupta for it entails that the world be understood also in its relation to the Absolute, rather than merely in and of itself, independently. Thus the illustration is complete — the reflections of objects, however numerous they are, also need the mirror.

[469]Were it necessary to employ a special mirror to reflect each different object, then, of course, it would have been legitimate to say that its 'nature' had indeed been affected by the nature of the object.

[470]*svātmani* — or '... its nature'.

[471]*arthakriyā*.

[472]It will be explained later what is an error, and how reflection is not an error.

[473]The example (*dṛṣṭānta*) has been explained. The author now takes up to the *dārṣṭāntika*, the term to be explained through the example.

mented bliss and is utterly free of impurity,

[... that the world] is displayed as differentiated [internally], like the image in the mirror — that is, as having various forms, each [determined as different] from the other, in virtue of the dichotomy of knower and known ...

... **and [differentiated] from that as well**, that is, from that consciousness as well, **appears** (*ābhāti*) [the world] as if emerging from it, whereby consciousness, though displaying itself in the form of that [world], displays itself also as transcending it, in the way the mirror transcends the reflections.

And so, Light/consciousness, tolerant of the reflections of all the objects of the universe and yet transcending all those objects, displays itself according to its own inherent nature as the principle of experience itself in each and every [percipient subject].

And even the difference of time, of place, or of kind, which pertains to the [external] object, just appears there [but not really], as if in a mirror. Yet, it is not the case that they serve to differentiate the very nature [of consciousness]. Therefore, consciousness, although appearing both one and multiple, is one only, just as variegated cognitions are grasped by [one] consciousness.[474]

Nevertheless, between the Light of consciousness (*citprakāśa*) — endowed as it is with the state of wonder [that is supreme ipseity][475] — and the light of the mirror, there is the following difference — viz., the city, etc., that is judged to be different [from the mirror] as a reflection, appears in the perfectly pure mirror only as external to it, but is in no way created by the mirror. Thus the conclusion that 'this is an elephant' [as applying to what is seen] in the mirror would be erroneous.[476]

On the other hand, Light [viz., consciousness], whose essence is the marvelous experience of itself, makes manifest (*ābhāsayati*) on its own surface (*svātmabhitti*), and out of its own free will, the universe, whose material cause is that same consciousness, by considering (*parāmṛśat*) that

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[474]All variety — the city itself — is comprehended in and by consciousness, single and unique, which serves as the basis of that variety. Compare the elegant argument on this issue developed by Śaṅkara in his *Upadeśasāhasrī*.

[475]I.e., endowed with *vimarśa*, or *spanda*. Consciousness, or Light, vibrates, realizing itself as consciousness, whereas the insentient mirror is neither aware of itself nor of the reflections it receives from outside.

[476]This remark follows from the discussion of *arthakriyā*, above. The "image" (usually designated by the term *ākāra*) of the elephant, whether that of the mirror or a picture, represents only its exterior form (and to that extent is shared with the "real" elephant), but lacks all other qualities (which we may call "real") of the animal: one cannot travel on the back of a picture (for example). Here, this difference is exploited in order to emphasize that the "reality" of the elephant is elsewhere, and does not derive from the mirror, which is not true of "objects" created by Śiva. The metaphor can, in other words, only be carried so far.

[the universe] is not different [from that consciousness].[477] The Lord's creativity (*nirmātṛtva*) is nothing but that manifestation (*ābhāsana*) of the universe. Therefore, self-awareness (*parāmarśa*) is the main aspect of that Light, making it possible to distinguish it from the light of the insentient mirror, etc.[478] This is what the author has stated in his *Vivṛtivimarśinī*:

> As the variegated construction [of the universe] appears within the mirror, so does the entire universe, here, within the Self [consciousness]. Nevertheless, consciousness knows the universe by means of its own essential power of awareness (*vimarśa*), whereas the mirror doesn't know it in that way.[479]

Thus, from the point of view of the Supreme Lord, since the host of objects[480] has been created within his own body, there is no illusion of difference (*bhedabhrānti*) at all [that is, we cannot logically consider the Lord as different from the universe].

However, from the point of view of the cognizer under the dominion of *māyā* (*māyāpramātṛ*), the appearance of difference [or, difference which itself is but an appearance] (*bhedāvabhāsa*) is nothing but a confusion on his part that consists in his failing to recognize his plenitude (*pūrṇatvākhyāti*).[481]

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[477] In the example (*dṛṣṭānta*), the substratum is the mirror. In the *dārṣṭāntika*, the substratum is consciousness. There is a unique difference between the *dṛṣṭānta* and the *dārṣṭāntika*. In the *dṛṣṭānta*, there is something present as an archetype that is reflected in the substratum, whereas, in the *dārṣṭāntika*, it is consciousness that appears both as substratum and archetype (as the manifold world), for the archetype is but the creation of the substratum. The world thus created is consciousness, he who manifests it is consciousness, and the surface, or screen (*bhitti*), on which it is manifested, or projected, is also consciousness. This is the source of wonder. For a similar formulation, see TĀV III 1–4 (vol. II: 354): *svabhittāv eva svecchayā sarvaṃ prakāśayati*, and vol. II: 355–56: *parameśvaro hy anargalatvalakṣaṇasvasvātantryamāhātmyāt svātmabhittāv eva anatiriktam apy atiriktāyamānam iyad viśvavaicitryaṃ pradarśayati iti*, 'The Supreme Lord, by the power of his own freedom which cannot be hindered, makes manifest on his own surface the wonderful diversity of the universe as different from him, although it is non-different from him'.

[478] 'Etc.' means insentient matter, in general.

[479] TS III (p. 19), quoted by AG in ĪPVV I 5, 14 (vol. II: 203): 'I have said this in the *Tantrasāra*, etc.'. Note that TĀV III 65 quotes the same verse, with a variant: *nijavimarśanasāravṛttyā*, instead of *nijavimarśanasārayuktyā*.

[480] *bhāvarāśi*.

[481] *akhyāti*, *avidyā*: these two terms, which often seem to be used interchangeably, may nevertheless be distinguished in terms of their origins. In principle, *akhyāti* is employed more or less at the psychological or individual level, to designate one type of misapprehension or misunderstanding, and to characterize a certain theory of validity formulated in terms of that notion. The term is particularly associated with the Mīmāṃsā of Prabhākara, who denies any positive participation of the apprehending subject in the formulation of the error to which he is subject. *avidyā*, in contrast, is a term particularly associated with Advaita in its various forms, which designates a form of error at the cosmological level. For Śaṅkara, *avidyā* is the product of *māyā*, creative power par excellence, to which all men are subject at every moment. Our authors, it seems, utilize these terms in full cognizance of their

Failure to discern (*akhyāna*) means here 'absence of display' [or 'non-persistence' (in our consciousness)] (*aprathā*) of the all-encompassing, that is, the nondual nature [of the Lord].

To say it in another way: plenitude does not appear [to the limited cognizer], but rather non-plenitude alone, which has duality as its form [viz., the duality of knower and known]; thus it is that only difference is by him perceived.

Therefore, this doctrine of reflection is free from flaw.

Kārikā 14

Thus, the master having stipulated[482] that the world consisting of thirty-six principles [is to be understood] as undifferentiated from Light [viz., consciousness] [kārikās 12–13] — this in consequence of his having stated the true nature of the ultimate principle [kārikās 10–11] — he goes on now, in the [following] kārikās [viz., kārikās 14–22], to explain, in the order of their arising, the proper form of each principle:[483]

14. He [the Supreme Śiva] makes manifest the [conditional] state of the [unique] principle[484] [just mentioned] by realizing differences among the five energies — which realizations are Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, and Īśvara and *vidyā*.[485]

original acceptations, although, case by case, their domains may very well overlap. This is unsurprising, in a monism of this sort — it is *avidyā* that is responsible for the fact that we confuse what is not our body with our body, which confusion in turn is fundamental in the various particular errors that govern our daily lives as enchained beings. We have generally translated *akhyāti*, when otherwise undetermined, as 'failure to recognize [one's own Self]' or, with contextual variants, 'failure to recognize [one's identity with the Self]' or 'failure to recognize [the Self as such]' — or, in those cases where *akhyāti* impinges on the domain of *avidyā*, quite simply, by 'nescience', keeping in mind, of course, the complex of ideas out of which it emerges.

[482] *sthitiṃ vidhāya.*

[483] Cf. the condensed exposition of the thirty-six *tattvas* in ŚD I 29b–33.

[484] *tattvadaśā.*

[485] The uniform energy (of the unique Lord) is contextualized (or hypostatized; hence the term *daśā*) by dividing itself into five energies. Silburn translates: 'Il manifeste les catégories: Śiva, Énergie, éternel Śiva, et celle du Seigneur et du pur Savoir, en se servant des caractères propres aux cinq énergies' [— 'He manifests the categories: Śiva, Energy, Eternal Śiva, as well as those of the Lord and of pure Knowledge, by making use of qualities specific to the five energies']. TĀV IX 50 (vol. IV: 1683) quotes this kārikā. PS 46 will deal again with the manifestation of the five *śaktis* as the first five *tattvas*. Emphasizing the ontological question of the division into five *tattvas* of the Supreme Lord who is one, YR follows the argument of TĀ IX 49b–52a: *śivaḥ svatantradṛgrūpaḥ pañcaśaktisunirbharaḥ// svātantryabhāsitabhidā pañcadhā pravibhajyate/ cidānandeśaṇājñānakriyāṇāṃ susphuṭatvataḥ// śivaśaktisadeśānavidyākhyaṃ tattvapañcakam/ ekaikatrāpi tattve 'smin sarvaśaktisunirbhare// tattatprādhānyayogena sa sa bhedo nirūpyate/*, 'Śiva, who is by essence free vision and is endowed with five *śaktis*, first divides himself into five [*tattvas*], by differentiation born of freedom itself — [and this is done] for clarification of [the pentad of *śaktis*] Consciousness, Bliss, Will, and Action. [Thus] comes to be the pentad of *tattvas* — termed Śiva, Śakti, Sadā[śiva], Īśāna and *[śuddha]vidyā*. [And] although each one of the *tattvas* is filled with all the *śaktis*, yet every distinct entity [i.e.,

[The verse is to be construed as follows:]

He, that is, the Supreme Śiva, whose essential nature has just been propounded by describing [him as] the ultimate principle [kārikās 10–11], **makes manifest** (*bhāsayati*) **the [conditional] state of the [unique] principle** [now] as qualified in five ways, by realizing differences among **the five energies**,[486] that is to say, by discriminating each from what it is not[487] — **the energies** that are five in number, Consciousness, Bliss,[488] Will, Knowledge and Action, [each of them] the cause of innumerable [subsidiary] energies, and that [together] constitute the [Lord's] own real nature; that is to say, he makes evident each in and through its proper characteristics. This is the purport.

How described is that [conditional state of the unique principle]?

The master says: **'Śiva, etc.'** [— i.e., he speaks the verse in an effort to explain that condition].

[In this verse, the term *tattvadaśā*, 'conditional state of the (unique) principle', is qualified as *śivaśaktisadāśivatām* in which the abstract suffix *-tā*] evokes that general condition of which the three terms 'Śiva', 'Śakti' and 'Sadāśiva' [appear as instances].

Similarly, ['conditional state of the (unique) principle' is qualified as *īśvaravidyāmayīm* in which the suffix *-mayī*] evokes that state whose [dual] form consists of **Īśvara and *vidyā*** [i.e., evokes that state which is made of Īśvara and *vidyā* as a pair].[489]

Now, the nature of each principle is explained.

To explain in detail, *śivatattva* — that is, 'the principle that is termed Śiva' — is nothing other than consciousness, whose material form is great Light, which transcends all the [other] principles, and consists of the state of wonder that is perfect ipseity (*pūrṇāhantācamatkāra*) within all cognizers. Here, the exposition [of the Lord] as principle is done with reference to people who require instruction.[490]

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tattva] is characterized by the predominance of such or such [*śakti*]'. See MM 13–15 and PM ad loc., which deal with the manifestation of the Lord's energies as the first five *tattvas*.

[486] Lit., 'through the division of the five energies'.

[487] *atadvyāvṛttyā* — the term means 'by excluding what is not that [namely, what is not itself]', which both glosses and emphasizes *bhinnatvena* — Īśvara, for instance, being absolutely different from that which is not Īśvara. For a similar usage of *vyāvṛtti*, see Gauḍapāda ad SK 28: *mātraśabdo viśeṣārtho 'viśeṣavyāvṛttyarthaḥ/ yathā bhikṣāmātraṃ labhyate nānyo viśeṣa iti/*, 'The word "only" (*-mātra*) is meant to specify, to exclude what is not [properly] a specification. If it is said: "alms only are received", it means that [what is received] has no other specification'. See n. 574 on *viśeṣe*.

[488] *nirvṛti*.

[489] Lit., 'Similarly [the compound ending with *-mayīm* is to be understood as expressing the idea that such "condition" (°*daśā*) is] that in which Īśvara and *vidyā* constitute the "substantial nature" (*prakṛti*)'. This passage is cast as a grammatical exegesis of the verse, especially of the suffixes *-tām* (at the end of the first compound) and *-mayīm* (at the end of the second compound) of the first hemistich.

[490] Such divisions and distinctions are but provisional modalities that are bound to disappear

[Universal] consciousness consists in the Lord's becoming [potentially] all things, as when he knows (*parāmṛśat*): 'I become all'.[491] It takes the form of the Bliss that is proper to the Lord who is [pure] consciousness; it is slightly swollen (*kiṃciducchūnatārūpa*), being at this stage the seed of all things.[492] This [condition of consciousness] is called the 'state of Śakti' (*śaktyavasthā*).

It is she [viz., Śakti] who is celebrated in all the esoteric doctrines (*rahasyanaya*) as one only,[493] although sometimes in complete and some-

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at the moment one dissolves in the Absolute.

[491] *viśvaṃ bhavāmi.*

[492] The reasoning, terminology and image appear to be borrowed from ŚD I 16–17 defining *aunmukhya* (lit., 'direction toward', 'orientation'), the desire of creating which begins to deploy within blissful consciousness itself: *kiṃciducchūnatā saiva mahadbhiḥ kaiścid ucyate*, 'Some philosophers name this desire [of creation] *kiṃciducchūnatā*, i.e., "slight swelling" '. According to Utpaladeva (p. 16), it is Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna who has recourse, in his *Tattvagarbhastotra*, to this image of the slightly swollen seed, which is about to eject the shoot it contains as a germ, in attempting to explain the moment when, as stated in MM 14, the Lord is 'ready to desire, know and create the universe'; the PM ad loc. makes use of the same image: *tasyaiva kiṃciducchūnatāvasthāyāṃ śaktiśabdavyapadeṣa ity arthaḥ*. As Silburn puts it (MM: 100), before quoting ŚSĀ XIII 15: 'L'énergie constitue la prise de conscience que Śiva a de soi en tant que Béatitude quand il tend à s'enfler ou à se dilater au sortir de la plénitude indivise et qu'il se met à vibrer spontanément en vue de s'exprimer' [— 'The energy constitutes Śiva's awareness of himself as Bliss, when he intends to swell or dilate at the moment he comes out of undivided plenitude and starts to spontaneously vibrate so as he expresses himself']. It is worth noting that Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, who forged the image of the slightly swollen seed that is used here in order to define the state of Śakti, was a śaivite Śākta (on Bhaṭṭa Pradyumna, see Dyczkowski SpK: 291).

[493] Cf. PHvṛ 8 [Singh: 70]: *[...] iyaṃ turīyā saṃvidbhaṭṭārikā tattatsṛṣṭyādibhedān udvamantī saṃharantī ca sadā pūrṇā ca kṛśā ca ubhayarūpā ca anubhayātmā ca akramam eva sphurantī sthitā/ uktaṃ ca śrīpratyabhijñāṭīkāyām 'tāvad arthāvalehena uttiṣṭhati pūrṇā ca bhavati' iti/*, 'This venerable *turīyā* consciousness flashes forth ceaselessly, now creating multifarious emanations, etc., now withdrawing them, [thus] always full (*pūrṇa*) [since it is able to project things out of itself] and yet always emaciated (*kṛśa*) [and therefore bound to reabsorb what departed from it in order to make up its loss], of both forms, and assuming none of them. It has been stated in the *Pratyabhijñāṭīkā*: "When licking [i.e., reabsorbing] (*avaleha*) the objects, she [Śakti] rises [in her own nature], and so she is full" '; also ŚSV I 6, which deals with the incomprehensible nature of supreme energy in the context of the *śakticakra*: *[...] atiriktāriktatadubhayātmatayāpy abhidhīyamānāpy anetadrūpā anuttarā parā svātantryaśaktiḥ kāpy asti*, 'There exists an energy of freedom (*svātantryaśakti*), unexcelled (*anuttarā*), transcendent (*parā*), not having any form [lit., 'not having the form of that', *anetadrūpā*], although it has been described as "being in excess" (*atirikta*) or "in no wise deficient" (*arikta*), or as manifesting both [viz., "excess" and "deficiency"]'. Singh and Silburn, supported also by Apte's dictionary, understand *atirikta* as 'beyond empty', that is 'extremely empty, quite empty' [cf. Singh ŚS: "greatly empty"; Silburn: "elle a beau être pleine, vide, à la fois pleine et vide, ou ni vide ni pleine"], thus apprehending here a *catuṣkoṭi* of the Madhyamaka sort. YR in his commentary appears to follow this line as well. However, neither B&R nor MW list such a meaning for *atirikta*, which they take in the usual sense of 'excessive', 'de trop', and so on — which meaning, if retained here, would vitiate the *catuṣkoṭi*. The *Vācaspatya* has perhaps the key to this puzzle: '*atirikta*: "*atiśayite, śreṣṭhe, bhinne, śūnye ca*" — and, to justify this last meaning, 'empty': '*yasya yāvatpramāṇaṃ yuktaṃ tato 'dhikatve: "hīnāṅgīm atiriktāṅgīm" iti smṛtiḥ*', namely, 'she who is "missing a limb" has gone beyond the norm established as

times in emaciated form, the two serving as metaphors of world creation and world dissolution.

Further, at this [stage, viz., that of Śakti, which is] the seminal level[494] of the universe's generation and which is termed [therefore] the 'great Void beyond the Void' (*mahāśūnyātiśūnya*),[495] the condition of Sadāśiva is reached, namely, the state of wonder that is perfect ipseity,[496] a state proper to the Great Lord (Maheśa), who realizes: 'I am this',[497] without differentiating [one from the other], for [at this level] the segment of [the energy of] Action [implied by the 'this', viz., the Lord's creation] still reposes in ipseity (*ahantāviśrānti*) [i.e., is still latent in the 'I'], because [the energy of] Knowledge is yet predominant.[498]

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proper [in the śāstras that govern such niceties], and so, in the words of a Smṛti, may be said to "have a limb in excess" [viz., to have gone beyond the norm in the matter of limbs]'. By this tortuous argument, 'excess of limbs' becomes 'deficiency of limbs'! But, of course, this would not be the first case of an opportune remorphemicization in the interests of "clarity"; see, for instance, *sura* issued from *asura* understood as *a-sura*.

[494] *bījabhūmi*.

[495] Probably a Krama technical term, which implicitly refers to the Goddess Vyomavāmeśvarī ('She who Vomits the [Five] Voids'), worshiped in the first phase of the pentadic cycle of the Five Voids, who represents 'the initial and eternal vibration of thoughtless consciousness' (Sanderson 1988: 696–697). Thus is Vyomavāmeśvarī at the level of Śakti. See the Krama text, the *Mahānayaprakāśa* (39b–40a) of Arṇasiṃha, which describes Vyomavāmeśvarī: *mahāśūnyātiśūnyatvāt samyakśāntatarāpi yā// sarvavyomāni vāmantī vyomavāmeśvarī tu sā/*, 'She who, though extremely at peace for she is "great Void beyond the Void" (*mahāśūnyātiśūnya*), vomits all Voids is Vyomavāmeśvarī' (manuscript transcribed by Marc Dyczkowski, made available by the Muktabodha Indological Research Institute). The term *mahāśūnya* appears in SvTU II 154 (which cites VBh 149 and *Kubjikāmatatantra* [KMT] VI 23), SvTU IV 209, and IV 369; since SvTU IV 209 relates *mahāśūnya* with the *śāntātītakalā*, which corresponds to the level of Śiva/Śakti, the notion might be equated with that of *mahāśūnyātiśūnya*. It is to be distinguished from the notion of *śūnyātiśūnya*, the 'Void beyond the Void', which, according to SvT X 707, corresponds to the *śakti* named *mahāmāyā* (see SvTU VII 6 (two times), X 707, X 1213, X 1278, XI 16; TĀV VI 10, XI 20, NT VII 21, XXI 61 (two times), XXII 43, XXII 44); nevertheless PHvṛ 4 [Singh: 55] offers a different correspondence, which makes *śūnyātiśūnya* a synonym for Anāśritaśiva — a level of experience at the junction of Śakti and Sadāśiva, i.e., at the junction of the one and the many (*°anāśritaśivaparyāyaśūnyātiśūnya°*) — inasmuch as such 'experience' (if it can be called that) precedes all concrete or material creation (on these notions, see Appendix 7, p. 327).

[496] *pūrṇāhantāmayo yaḥ camatkāraḥ*.

[497] *aham idam*.

[498] Trika texts develop a sort of norm which correlates *icchāśakti* with Sadāśiva, *jñānaśakti* with Īśvara and *kriyāśakti* with *śuddhavidyā* (see PS 14, TĀ IX 50b–51a, ĪPV III 1, 7 (avat.) and Torella ĪPK: 193, n. 13). Nevertheless, as emphasized by TĀ IX 51b–52a (quoted n. 485), it is more a question of the predominance of one specific *śakti* in a specific *tattva* than a regular correspondence, the other *śaktis* being also present in every *tattva*, even though in a subordinated way. This principle suffices to explain the relative discrepancies between the texts. In effect, according to some, it is *jñānaśakti* that operates in Sadāśiva, and *kriyāśakti* in Īśvara, whereas a residual trace of *kriyāśakti* is in action in *śuddhavidyā*, *icchāśakti* being correlated with Śakti; see ŚD I 29b–31, TĀ VI 43–44, and the rather enigmatic statement of the ĪPK III 1, 2, thus explained by the *Vimarśinī*: *āntarī jñānarūpā yā daśā tasyā udrekābhāsane sādākhyam [...] bahirbhāvasya kriyāśaktimayasya [...] udrekābhāse sati [...] īśvaratattvam,*

Here reside the class of cognizers called the Mantramaheśvaras, the 'Great Lords of Mantras'.[499]

Likewise, it is at this very stage [i.e., on the level of the *tattva* Sadāśiva], thanks to the absence of difference expressed in the judgment 'I am this',[500] that the condition termed 'Īśvara' is reached, consisting in the marvelous experience of one's own Self,[501] for now the two moments of ip-

'When the preponderance (*udreka*) of the internal condition characterized as "knowledge" (*jñāna*) becomes evident, there arises the *tattva* Sādākhya. [...] And when the preponderance of the external state, which consists of the energy of Action (*kriyāśakti*), becomes evident, there comes into being the *īśvaratattva*' (on the etymology of Sādākhya and Sadāśiva, see n. 906); see also ŚD II 1, and PTV 1 (p. 3 [Skt. text]): *tatra ubhayatra jñānakriyāśaktimaye rūpe sadāśiveśvarasāre [...]*. Here, YR's commentary appears to accord with such conceptions.

[499] On the hierarchy of the seven types of subject (*saptapramātṛ*) — Śiva, Mantramaheśvaras, Mantreśvaras, Mantras (including Vidyeśvaras), Vijñānākalas, Pralayākalas and Sakalas — see Appendix 10, p. 330. Those categories, to whom YR will refer in commenting on this kārikā and kārikā 23, represent different levels, or modes, of consciousness.

[500] *aham idam.*

[501] Here, YR does not relate the *īśvaratattva* to a specific *śakti*, be it *jñānaśakti*, as is generally the case, or *kriyāśakti* (see n. 498). Moreover his exposition of the *īśvaratattva* differs from what appears to be the norm. Most Trika texts establish symmetry between the Sadāśiva and the Īśvara states, to the extent that they even explain them through the contrastive metaphor of shutting and opening the eyes (*nimeṣa/unmeṣa*), as in ĪPK III 1, 3. In both *tattvas*, it is the experience of *aham idam*, 'I am this', with a difference of emphasis: on 'I' (or internality), in Sadāśiva; on 'this' (or externality), in Īśvara. In Sadāśiva, 'I' overcomes 'this', since consciousness equates the universe with itself, in the movement of *nimeṣa*, while closing, as it were, its eyes. According to ĪPVV, vol. III: 264, the word itself — Sadāśiva, 'Eternal Śiva' — means that Śiva remains Śiva, i.e., consciousness, even if the object begins to emerge within him. Symmetrically, in Īśvara, 'this' overcomes 'I', since now consciousness equates itself with the universe, thus making differentiation more evident, as the universe is, in effect, its own negation. On these reasonings, see ĪPV III 1, 2–3: *[...] yadā aham ity asya yadadhikaraṇaṃ cinmātrarūpaṃ tatraivedaṃ samullāsayati tadā tasyāsphuṭatvāt sadāśivatā aham idam iti/ idam aham iti tu idamityaṃśe sphuṭībhūte 'dhikaraṇe yadāhamaṃśavimarśaṃ niṣiñcati tadeśvaratā — iti vibhāgaḥ*, 'When the substratum of the "I", namely, pure consciousness, makes appear in that ["I"] a "that", then such [conscious] state is called "Sadāśiva", because the "that" [though appearing] is not there manifested clearly [i.e., as other than the "I"], viz., "I am this"; on the other hand, when, as [captioned in the phrase] "this is I", the "that"-aspect has achieved clarification as the substratum, then such [conscious] state is called "Īśvara", for in such [awareness] [the "that"] is anointed with an awareness of the "I"-aspect [that is, the "object" is endowed with the grace of consciousness] — such is the difference [between the two stages]'. See ĪPK III 1, 2–3; also ĪPK III 1, 5 and *vṛtti* ad loc., wherein is coined the concept of 'perfect-imperfect state' (*parāparadaśā*; *parāparāvasthā*) in order to account for these two ambiguous *tattvas*, whose perfection of consciousness (that of the 'I') is slightly altered by the mere presence of a 'this': *atredantāmater aparatvam ahantayā sarvasya vedyasyācchādanāt parateti parāparāvasthaiṣā*, 'Here there is imperfection because there is the notion of 'this', perfection because all the cognizable is veiled by the 'I'; this is therefore the perfect-imperfect condition' (tr. Torella); cf. PHvṛ 3, where the concept of a *parāpara* condition is applied to the *sadāśivatattva*. On the other hand, YR, though admitting the simultaneous presence of ipseity and objectivity at the level of Īśvara, chooses to emphasize the perfection of the experience in which there is no sense of alterity. Kṣemarāja's exposition, in PHvṛ 3, accords with that interpretation: *īśvaratattve sphuṭedantāhantāsāmānādhikaraṇyāṃ yādṛk viśvaṃ grāhyam, tādṛk [...]*, 'The universe, in the *īśvaratattva*, grasped as that kind [of entity] in which the co-referentiality of the "I" and the "that" has become manifest, is such [...]'. Note

seity and ecceity (*idantā*) are held in perfect equilibrium, according to the "rule of the balance"[502] [— which does not allow 'this', viz., the 'other', to present itself as differentiated].

Here reside the class of cognizers called the Mantreśvaras, the 'Lords of Mantras'.

At this point, thanks to the subordination of ipseity and the predominance of ecceity [that thereupon ensues], the state of wonderment consisting in the realization: 'I am I', [and] 'this is this',[503] is attained; [the predicates in these judgments] may be indicated [only] with a finger [for their content is as yet indistinguishable from their subject], just as is the head of the new-born child.[504] This is indeed the [condition] of the Lord [and is called] the principle of pure Knowledge (*śuddhavidyā*),[505] because [this realization is] the very essence of knowledge (*bodhasāra*).[506]

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that the grammatical concept of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* is applied to *śuddhavidyā* in ĪPK III 1, 3.

[502]*samadhṛtatulāpuṭanyāyena* — same phrase in ĪPV III 1, 3, which is there applied to *īśvaratattva* alone, even though the *Vimarśinī* seems to understand the image in relation both to Sadāśiva and to Īśvara: *[...] aham idam iti samadhṛtatulāpuṭanyāyena yo vimarśo sa sadāśivanātha īśvarabhaṭṭarake ca.* Yet, as the *Bhāskarī* explains, it is so formulated for fear of prolixity (*vistarabhiyā*), but in reality apart from this passage, the pre-eminence of the 'I-principle' is associated only with the *sadāśivatattva* (*nanu tarhi sadāśivatattve samadhṛtatulāpuṭanyāyo na yuktaḥ, satyaṃ, vistarabhiyā atraivam uktam anyathā tu sadāśivatattve ahaṃbhāvasya prādhānyam eva vartate ity alam*).

[503]*aham aham/idam idam* — some texts formulate the experience as '*ahaṃ ca idaṃ ca*' or '*aham idaṃ ca*'.

[504]The illustration is most likely intended to reflect the infant's "point of view" — which, *mutatis mutandis*, is that of the Lord: the infant confounds the external world with himself (or his own body), and is unable to designate it other than by pointing to his own head.

[505]In *śuddhavidyā*, the 'this', although now clearly apparent, still remains within the fold of the 'I', inasmuch as it is but the projection of the 'I' within itself. Thus, although at this stage some duality appears, that duality does not present itself in the form of alterity, to be subject to which is the destiny of the finite beings (Pralayākalas and Sakalas) living in the world of mutually exclusive subjects and objects. In the *śuddhavidyā*, even though the subject regards now the object as other, he does not deviate for all that from his perfect mergence with pure consciousness. Though apprehended, objects are known as they are in essence: as nothing but consciousness (*cinmātrasāra*, in ĪPvṛ III 1, 4 = *bodhasāra* in YR ad 14). This is where the 'purity' of 'pure' Knowledge resides, as explained in ĪPvṛ III 1, 4. At this stage, the 'this' appears as "distinct" from the 'I', but not "different" from it, inasmuch as it is just an aspect of the 'I'. It is noteworthy that YR uses the same term *camatkāra*, 'wonder', in describing each of the three levels of experience corresponding, respectively, to Sadāśiva, Īśvara and *śuddhavidyā*. On *śuddhavidyā* and its relation to the concept of *śakticakramaheśvaratva*, see n. 942.

[506]The sequentiality implied in the ordering of the *śuddhatattvas* is intended to clarify the process of creation, first as an immaterial extroversion of vibrating consciousness, then, from *māyā* onwards, as a material one. In this 'pure path' (*śuddhādhvan*), consciousness is the only reality; creation takes place within consciousness: it is in fact a projection of consciousness. In this sense, it is right to apply the term *tattva* to the five stages of consciousness, which are 'principles' or 'reality-levels', rather than 'facts' — and this usage is equally justified even if the term be understood in the etymological sense of 'extension', 'projection', as Indian commentators are wont to do (see YR ad 10–11, n. 433 and 434). They are states of consciousness in which the multiplicity of the world is at first submerged, then gradually revealed, though

Here, out of inherent benevolence, seventy million Mantras, replete with signification (*vācakatā*), attend, along with the Vidyeśvaras, upon the Mantramaheśvaras, the 'Great Lords of Mantras' and upon the Mantreśvaras, the 'Lords of Mantras', in order to free (*uddhartum*) the bound souls that are thereby signified (*vācya*).[507]

Here, although the category of [*śuddha*]*vidyā* is not distinguishable from the state of [pure] consciousness belonging to those cognizers called Vidyeśvaras, the display of difference (*bhedaprathā*) [that is here observed in the opposition *vācaka/vācya*] is brought about by the energy of *māyā*.[508]

Therefore, it has been sung in the Āgamas:

> There is *mahāmāyā* above *māyā* [...][509]

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still in immaterial form.

[507]The Mantras, all varieties included, are *vācakas*, 'expressors', and the bound souls are *vācyas*, what is 'expressed' through them. So formulated is the distinction between signifier and signified: 'to what object do those mantras pertain, etc.?'

[508]This is a paraphrase of ĪPK III 1, 6: *bhedadhīr eva bhāveṣu kartur bodhātmano 'pi yā/ māyāśaktyeva sā vidyety anye vidyeśvarā yathā//*, 'According to others, [*śuddha*]*vidyā* is nothing but the notion of "difference" — similar to that which results from *māyāśakti* — that affects an agent endowed with consciousness in regard to entities [that he perceives] — such as is exemplified by the Vidyeśvaras'; a view that is not shared by Utpaladeva, who presents it as that of 'others', and which the ĪPV ad loc. attributes to the *Rauravāgama*, introducing in the same passage the additional *tattva* of *mahāmāyā*. At the level of *śuddhavidyā*, comments AG in his avat. ad ĪPK III 1, 6, the manifestation of difference cannot be explained without the intervention of *māyā*. Yet, difference is still 'known' — an aspect of 'knowledge' (*vidyā*). Therefore the *māyā* that operates there is, however, 'not fully developed' (*aprarūḍhā*) *māyā*, feeble ('śithilā', so glossed by the *Bhāskarī*) — an attenuated form of *māyā*, called *mahāmāyā* in the *Raurava*: *tata evāprarūḍhamāyākalpatvān mahāmāyeyaṃ śrīrauravādigurubhir upadiṣṭā*. YR's manner of exposition implies that the incomplete quote that follows (*māyopari mahāmāyā*) is likely borrowed from the *Raurava*; see n. below. Anyhow, it is in this sense, because the Mantras and the Vidyeśvaras are 'permeated' (as stated here by YR) by the *mahāmāyā*, that is, are contaminated by its vicinity, that they are affected by the *māyīyamala*; but it does not mean that they are located in the *mahāmāyā*; rather, it is the next level of subjectivity, that of the Vijñānākalas, which resides in the *mahāmāyā*. Moreover, it should be noted that YR's differs here from Utpaladeva's view, as formulated in ĪPK III 1, 3, that 'I' and 'this' are, in the *śuddhavidyā*, in a relation of co-referentiality (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*).

[509]*māyopari mahāmāyā [...]*. Cf. *Rauravāgama, Vidyāpāda*, IV 28b: *māyopari mahāmāyā sarvakāraṇakāraṇam*. It must be noted that the *Vidyāpāda* part of the printed *Rauravāgama* [RĀ] is in fact part of the *Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha* [RSS], which probably dates from a much earlier period than the printed *Kriyāpāda* of the *Rauravāgama*. The printed *Kriyāpāda* belongs to a different stratum of composition and was transmitted exclusively in South India (moreover, there is no *Vidyāpāda* at all in the South Indian RĀ). In the RSS, citations from the old *Raurava* are found, among them: *māyopari mahāmāyā*. For more information and a discussion of the dating and the relation of the two texts, see Goodall (*Kiraṇavṛtti*: xl, n. 92, and xlviii-xlix). A similar line is cited by AG in his PTV 5–8 with attribution to the *Kubjikāmata*, but the verse is not found in the transmission of the *Kubjikāmata* (see Sanderson 2002: 2): *māyopari mahāmāyā trikoṇānandarūpiṇī*, 'Above *māyā* is *mahāmāyā*, the embodiement of the bliss of the triangle' (Singh PTV [Skt. text: 64; transl.: 176]; Gnoli PTV: 249); compare YR's quote with that of PTV 5–9 (PTV [Skt. text: 40; transl.: 101]) and TĀV IX 91a: *māyordhve śuddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ*, 'Above *māyā* and below *śuddhavidyā* are the Vijñānakevalas' (see

Hence [it is only in that limited sense that] the Mantras residing there are said to be finite souls, for they are penetrated by *mahāmāyā*.[510]

Above the *māyā*-principle and below the *śuddhavidyā* are the cognizers termed Vijñānākalas,[511] who retain the impurity of deeming oneself finite

n. 511). Also TĀ VIII 337b: *mahāmāyordhvataḥ śuddhā mahāvidyātha mātṛkā// vāgīśvarī [...]*, 'Above *mahāmāyā*, there is the pure great Knowledge (= *śuddhavidyā*), the Mātṛkā, the goddess of Speech [...]', and TĀV ad loc. according to which *śuddhavidyā* is termed *mahāvidyā*, on account of its purity (*śuddhatvād eva cāsyā mahattvam ity uktam mahāvidyā iti*); the term appears (as *mahāmāyāśakti*) in ŚSV I 2, quoted n. 226. At this stage, YR's exegesis introduces the concept of *mahāmāyā*. The issue is that of explaining the paradox of a subjectivity unmodified by objectivity; such "objectivity" as there is remains under the dominion of the "subject"; it cannot be the product of *māyā*, but rather of this quasi-*māyā*. The paradox is brought out in the characterization of the Mantras and the Vidyeśvaras, who, though belonging to the *śuddhādhvan*, are nonetheless subject to the *māyīyamala* (see Appendix 10, p. 332). On *mahāmāyā*, see also n. 495 and Vasudeva MVT: 170.

[510]The implication being that they are considered as finite souls (*aṇu*) inasmuch as they are subject to the *māyīyamala*. YR refers here implicitly to ĪPvṛ III 2, 9, which states, as regards the Vidyeśvaras:*[...] eṣām aṇutvam api syāt*. Another characteristic of the Mantras and Vidyeśvaras (which distinguishes them from the Vijñānākalas) is that they are endowed with agency (*kartṛtva*; ĪPK III 2, 9) — a feature which is only alluded to in YR's exegesis, when he presents that category of subjects as 'signifiers' (*vācaka*), that is, 'agents of signification', who are able 'to free the bound souls'. As for the Vidyeśvaras, they are also agents, inasmuch as several Āgamas present them as instigators of the cosmic functions, later termed *pañcakṛtya*, the 'five functions', but here restricted to four. Scriptures differ as to the act they are exempted from; see *Vimalāvatī* I 1a, *Parākhyatantra* II 96b, RSS I 15b, and MVT I 20b–21: *etān aṣṭau sthitidhvaṃsarakṣānugrahakariṇaḥ// mantramantreśvare śuddhe saṃniyojya tataḥ punaḥ/ mantrāṇām asṛjat tadvat saptakoṭīḥ samaṇḍalāḥ//*, 'Having accorded [the status of] pure Mantramantreśvaras to these eight [Vidyeśvaras] in charge of preservation/creation (*sthiti*), destruction (*dhvaṃsa*), obscuration/protection (*rakṣā*) and grace (*anugraha*), he then created in the same way seventy million Mantras with their respective spheres of influence/*maṇḍalas*' (tr. Vasudeva, modified; see Vasudeva MVT: 158–161, for an interpretation of the passage). Thus, as observes ĪPvṛ III 1, 9, the Vidyeśvaras are endowed with a partial agency, such that they are 'different from the Lord and from one another', and as such 'they too must be considered as "aṇu" ' — which is just another way of formulating the reason justifying the *aṇutva* of this category of subjects, the *māyīyamala* being the cause of their partial agency. One observes here YR's emphasis on the level of subjectivity represented by the Mantras and the Vidyeśvaras, who reside in *śuddhavidyā*. By underlining the Mantras' role as *vācakas* and the liberating vocation of both the Mantras and the Vidyeśvaras, YR anticipates the account of mantric practice he will give in kā. 41–46, where those *pramātṛs* named Mantras are also the personifications of the mantras of the tantric practice.

[511]This sentence is to be read as a paraphrase of the quote (probably an Āgama, although given without explicit attribution): *māyordhve śuddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ*, which completes the argument of PTV 5–9 (and in TĀV IX 90b–92a; see below). The entire passage (Singh [Skt. text: 40; transl.: 101]) is as follows: *māyātattvasyopari vidyātattvādhaś cāvaśyaṃ tattvāntareṇa bhavitavyaṃ yatra vijñānākalānāṃ sthitiḥ/ yathoktaṃ māyordhve śuddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ iti tathā hi mahāmāyābhāve māyāpade pralayakevalānām avasthitiḥ vidyāpade ca vidyeśvarādīnām iti kim iva tad vijñānakevalāspadaṃ syāt/*, 'There must exist necessarily another principle above the *māyā*-principle and below the *[śuddha]vidyā*-principle where abide the Vijñānākalas. As has been said: "Above *māyā* and below *śuddhavidyā*, are the Vijñānakevalas". Therefore, if *mahāmāyā* is not [accepted as a category], then, since the abode of the Pralayakevalas is in the domain of *māyā*, and that of the Vidyeśvaras, etc., is in the domain of *[śuddha]vidyā*, in which domain would abide the Vijñānakevalas?' By allud-

[after shaking off the two other impurities].[512]

This form of Śiva, who is [in essence] one only, is yet spoken of in terms of a pentad of principles, i.e., as the Fourth state (*turya*), although he transcends the Fourth state (*turyātīta*).[513]

Hence this independent agent (*kartṛ*) manifests himself as one only. Therefore, this [Śiva], unique and autonomous, appears (*prakāśate*) as the agent [of creation], the Light [viz., consciousness] of whom, at the level of Sadāśiva and Īśvara, consists in the thought: 'I am this'.[514] It

ing here to the PTV, YR refers implicitly to the notion of *mahāmāyā* he has just dealt with, thus completing its definition. This additional level, which has no name of its own in the quoted text, is to be identified as *mahāmāyā* and interpreted, spatially, as a full-fledged *tattva*. This is another argument in favor of the introduction of *mahāmāyā* in the general scheme of *tattvas* and *pramātṛs*: an additional *tattva* has to be postulated in order to make room for the Vijñānākalas. TĀ IX 90b–92a confirms that line of reasoning, providing it with an ontological foundation: the Vijñānākala is stationed mid-way between the pure and impure paths, for, being affected by *āṇavamala*, he cannot ascend, while, being free both from *kārmamala*, inasmuch as he is exempt from action (*niṣkarma*, v. 90b), and from *māyīyamala*, inasmuch as he 'resides only in pure consciousness' (*śuddhacinmātrasaṃsthita*, v. 92a), he cannot descend. As TĀV ad loc. says: *[...] asau 'māyordhve śuddhavidyādhaḥ santi vijñānakevalāḥ' ityādyuktayuktyā śuddhāśuddhādhvamadhyavartī śuddhabodhaikasvabhāvo 'pi svātantryahāneḥ — āṇavamalāṃśakṛtasya svarūpasaṃkocasya saṃbhavāt [...]*, '[...] that one, according to the reasoning at work in the statement: "Above *māyā* and below *śuddhavidyā*, are the Vijñānakevalas", abides between the pure and impure paths, although he is essentially pure knowledge — [a paradox] due to the loss of freedom, that is, due to the presence of the contraction of his own essential nature brought about by a trace of the *āṇavamala*'. On such grounds, the apparently contradictory statements of Vasudeva (MVT: 170), namely, 'Abhinavagupta locates the Vijñānākalas in Mahāmāyātattva [...] but he is unable or unwilling to cite an authoritative scriptural passage substantiating this', and 'an unidentified Śaiva scripture quoted by Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha also places the Vijñānākalas in the interstice between the pure and impure universes', may be reconciled. For further details on the Vijñānākalas, see Appendix 10, p. 330.

[512]Here YR briefly evokes the Vijñānākalas, who do not belong to the *śuddhādhvan*, the subject of the kārikā. Yet, he must refer to them at this point of his exposition, because of their intermediate status and location between *śuddhādhvan* and *aśuddhādhvan*. Thus, YR, following AG, reorganizes the various arrangements observed in previous texts of the Śaiva tradition. He locates here three categories of subjects unambiguously on the scale of the *tattvas*: the Mantras (along with the Vidyeśvaras), the Vijñānākalas and the Pralayākalas being respectively assigned to *śuddhavidyā*, *mahāmāyā* and *māyā*. He will take up the description of the last two categories of subjects, the Pralayākalas and the Sakalas, in his gloss on PS 23.

[513]The 'Fourth state' (*turya*) is Śiva's experience of perfect, blissful, consciousness, transcending waking (*jāgrat*), dream (*svapna*) and deep sleep (*suṣupti*); cf. PS 35 and YR ad loc.; *turyātīta*, the 'one transcending the Fourth', is a still higher state, for *turya* is not completely free from contingent conditions (*upādhi*) such as the body or breath. Here the question of the existence of a thirty-seventh *tattva* is implicitly referred to by YR in agreement with ĪPK III and Bhāskara's commentary. According to Bhāskara, though Śiva and Paramaśiva are not different in essence, Śiva is meant to refer to his specific nature (*svarūpanirdeśa*) while Paramaśiva is the all-inclusive form, which implies his pervading (*vyāpaka*) the whole scale of the *tattvas*. However, Paramaśiva is not to be considered a thirty-seventh *tattva*: he who pervades (*vyāpaka*) cannot be located in the same series as those pervaded (*vyāpya*). See Torella ĪPK: 189–190, n. 2.

[514]*aham idam*.

is this thought that, composed of pure knowing, is the instrument [of creation].[515] The effect [thus produced][516] is the ensemble of [concrete] principles beginning with *māyā* and ending with earth that are yet to be explained.

Thus that unique transcendental cognizer (*paramapramātr̥*) named Maheśvara, the Great Lord who is the Self, expands himself[517] as agent, instrument and action.[518]

Kārikā 15

The master next explains what the proper form[519] of the *māyātattva* is:

15. The supreme freedom of the Great Lord, which accomplishes what is difficult to construe,[520] is indeed nothing but the covering of

[515]This celebration of Śiva's supreme agency echoes ĪPvr̥ III 2, 5: *ahetūnām api karmaṇāṃ janmādihetubhāvaviṣayaviparyāsād abodhātmakakartr̥gataṃ kārmam*, 'The impurity of [supposing oneself the agent of] actions, which pertains to the agent devoid of the Light of consciousness, arises from erroneously considering actions to be the cause of births, etc., whereas they are not causes [for the sole, real, cause is the supreme agent, the Lord himself]'. Actions, being insentient, cannot be the cause of anything. The only cause is the sole agent, the Lord.

[516]Cf. ŚDvr̥ (p. 27), according to which the Lord 'assumes the form of the thirty-six *tattvas*, all understood as "effects" (*kārya*)' of that sole cause that is the supreme agent (*[...] tattvarūpaṃ ṣaṭtriṃśatsaṃkhyaṃ kāryaṃ rūpeṇa bibharti*).

[517]*vijr̥mbhate* — see the conclusion of YR's commentary ad kā. 35. With this verb YR anticipates the next definition (kā. 15), for ĪPV III 1, 8 (pp. 234–235) states: *atiduṣkaravastusaṃpādanāpratīghātarūpā parameśvarasya māyāśaktiḥ/ ity etad vijr̥mbhate ityanena darśitam*, 'Thus, the power of the Supreme Lord that is *māyā* (*māyāśakti*) is characterized by freedom to accomplish the most difficult things. This is the idea conveyed by the word *vijr̥mbhate*' (tr. Pandey 1986: 197, slightly modified).

[518]By this statement YR defines 'the absolute autonomy of a non-individual consciousness which alone exists containing the whole of reality within the bliss of a dynamic 'I'-nature, projecting space, time and the interrelating fluxes of subjective and objective phenomena as its content and form, manifesting itself in this spontaneous extroversion through precognitive impulse (*icchā*), cognition (*jñānam*) and action (*kriyā*) as the three radical modes of an infinite power' (Sanderson 1986: 170).

[519]*svarūpa* — viz., 'nature', 'essence'.

[520]*durghaṭasaṃpādana* — that is, the internal division of the single principle into innumerable subjects and objects. The compound can be understood as a *karmadhāraya* [KD], a *tatpuruṣa* [TP] or a *bahuvrīhi* [BV]. It amounts to five possible interpretations, among which the main difference is whether *durghaṭa* qualifies as an adjective the process of manifesting objectivity, or designates objectivity itself ('that which is difficult to construe'); 1) as a KD — 'which is a difficult accomplishing', as an apposition to *svātantryam*; 2) as a TP — 'which is the accomplishing of what is difficult to construe'; 3) as a TP understanding *saṃpādana* in the sense of *saṃpādaka* (see YR: *prāptiprapākam*, and Renou 1968: §§ 168, 180) — 'which accomplishes what is difficult to construe'; 4) as a BV based on a KD (see 1) — 'whose accomplishing [as the dichotomy of subjects and objects] is difficult'; 5) as a BV, based on a TP (see 2) — 'which accomplishes what is difficult to construe'. The translation follows YR's interpretation.

Śiva's own Self, [in which phase he appears as] the Goddess Māyā-śakti — the energy of delusive construction. [521]

By **supreme** is meant 'requiring nothing else'; [522] by **freedom** of the Supreme Lord (*parameśitṛ*), is meant 'the fact that he creates everything'; such freedom is realized in the **energy**, termed ***māyā***, of him [the Lord] who possesses it). [523]

māyā is so called because by it is distributed (*mīyate*), that is, delimited (*paricchidyate*), the phenomenal display of knowers and knowns, culminating in earth; or *māyā* is so called in terms of its capacity to delude everyone [and everything]. [524]

Keeping in mind that she is associated with the god of playful nature (*krīḍāśīla*), [*māyā*] is [also] called the **'goddess'** (*devī*), [525] and it is not

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[521] Cf. TĀ VIII 332: *ataḥ paraṃ sthitā māyā devī jantuvimohinī/ devadevasya sā śaktir atidurghaṭakāritā//*. PS 15 and 16a are quoted in TĀV I 37; PS 16b and 17 in TĀV I 39–40.

[522] *ananyāpekṣa*.

[523] It is noteworthy that, in defining *māyā*, which is responsible for empirical bondage, the emphasis is laid on freedom. The theme of the divine play (*līlā*, in Advaita and Vaiṣṇava traditions, *krīḍā*, in Trika) culminates in the somewhat paradoxical notion that the freedom of the Lord is not complete unless he is able to obscure and delimit himself (cf. Hulin 1978: 306). In ŚSV I 2, the Lord's freedom is defined as *jñānakriyāsvātantrya*, freedom to know and to do everything. Here, the *kriyā* aspect of the Lord's freedom is referred to, since the exposition now takes up the *aśuddhādhvan*, the 'impure path', namely, actual (as opposed to virtual) creation.

[524] YR gives here two traditional etymological explanations of the term *māyā*, both of which seem to presume the root *mā* (passive *mīyate*) 'measure out': *māyā* is, on the one hand, the capacity to 'produce' forms, images, objects, and on the other, to 'deceive' thereby. For a summary of recent discussions of the problem, see Mayrhofer (EWA II: 349–350), who takes it as 'wahrscheinlich' that the term derives from the root *mā* 'construct', *contra*, *inter alia*, Thieme (ZDMG 95: 112ff., Anm. 1), who would derive it from the root *mī* 'alter'. As Mayrhofer points out (see also KEWA II:625; III: 777), recourse to the root *mī* does not appear at all necessary, inasmuch as the sense 'capacity to deceive' (*mohakatā*) can easily be deduced as an extension of 'the capacity to measure', that is, to construct forms that are in the last analysis illusory. Such acceptations are in evidence in the earliest period, as *índro māyā́bhiḥ pururū́pa īyate*, 'Indra assumes many forms through his powers [of representation] (*māyābhiḥ*)' (ṚS VI 47, 18; ŚB XIV 5, 5, 19; BĀU II 5, 19; JUB I 44, 1, 4), quoted by R ad ĀPS 1 (while commenting on *niviṣṭaṃ bahudhā guhāsu*), by Bhāskara in his gloss ad ĪPV, *maṅgalācaraṇa* 2, p. 13, and by ĀŚ III 24a (through its *pratīka*), in order to demonstrate that creation takes place in an illusory fashion; see also n. 528, the quotation in ĪPV II 3, 17 (vol. II: 141): *māyā vimohinī nāma*, and TĀ VIII 332, quoted n. 521: *jantuvimohinī*. See also the phrase *mohanīṃ māyām* [...], in kārikā 51 and n. 969.

[525] Similar passage in TĀV VIII 333: *devīti devābhinnatvāt*. Cf. PTV (Skt. text: p. 3), which enumerates the meanings of the root *div*: *divu krīḍāvijigīṣāvyavahāradyutistutigatiṣu*, 'The root *div* is used in the senses "play", "desire to conquer", "worldly pursuits", "splendor", "adoration", "movement" '. *Dhātupāṭha* IV 1 gives some more meanings: *divu krīḍā-vijigīṣā-vyavahāra-dyuti-stuti-**moda-māda-svapna-kānti**-gatiṣu*. Here, *māyā* is *devī* in a limited sense, as playful (*krīḍāśīla*), and she is playful because, as one of God's energies/powers, she belongs to him, who is himself playful, according to one etymology of the name *deva*. See also TĀ I 101–103 (where the list of the divine qualities is slightly different): *heyopādeyakathāvirahe svānandaghanatayocchalanaṃ krīḍā*, '[Il est dieu, *deva*, parce qu'Il joue] sans se soucier de ce qui est à rechercher et à rejeter. [Son] jeu est jaillissement en tant que masse indivise de sa

appropriate to state, as do the Brahmavādins,[526] that there is a *māyā* who is distinct.

What sort of freedom is it? The master answers: **'which accomplishes what is difficult to construe'.**

[By '**difficult to construe**'] he means 'able to be effected [only] with difficulty';[527] [through this freedom takes place] **the accomplishing** (*saṃpādana*) **of that difficult** (*durghaṭa*) result, consisting in [the totality of relations between] cognizers and objects of cognition — that is, such freedom effects the attestation of [such a universe].[528]

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propre félicité' (tr. Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 97 — '[He is God, *deva*, because he plays] without caring for what has to be sought and what has to be rejected. His play is springing up as an undivided mass of his own bliss').

[526]The Brahmavādins referred to here are those who hold that *brahman*, understood as free of all activity (*śānta/niḥkriya*), is the only reality. For Śaṅkara, the very language of 'cause' and 'effect' is soiled by *māyā*. Therefore, the relation between the level of *māyā* and that of *brahman* is 'difficult to be expressed' (*anirvacanīya*). Furthermore, since the 'world' is not a 'result' of *brahman*, it cannot be anything other than an 'appearance', like that of a rose in a mirror. Therefore, the Śaiva exposition given here of the Advaita doctrine should be treated with circumspection: according to Advaita, there is nothing "different" from *brahman*; at the same time, what appears as "different" is such only as erroneous 'manifestation' (as "different", it is not *brahman* — and therefore does not exist). *māyā* is thus a principle both independent and false, which cannot belong to *brahman* as such. Nevertheless, it should be observed that for the "Idealists" of the Śaṅkara school of Vedānta, the cause of error has retroverted to *brahman* itself, from considerations of logical consistency: for the *jīva* cannot be, as Maṇḍana maintains, both the result and the source of illusion. ĀPSV 56, p. 29, explains *māyā* as a transformation of the Lord who produces it, 'just as snow, foam, etc., are produced from water only as its transformations' (*yathā jalāddhimaphenādayas tathā tathā pariṇamanasvabhāvatvād eva jāyante*). However, the *māyā* that is thus produced is 'not meant for any purpose, because the Lord cannot desire anything, having already all his desires satisfied' (*na kim api prayojanam uddiśya, tasyāptakāmatvena kasmiṃś cid icchāsambhavād ity arthaḥ*). In contrast, the Trika considers *māyā* a power (*śakti*) of the Lord partaking of his essence, and defines it as the Lord's desire (*icchā*) of diversity. YR will take up again this criticism of the Brahmavāda in his commentary ad 27, emphasizing that this system does not take into consideration the sovereign freedom of the Lord, which is itself responsible for duality.

[527]See TĀ XV 272b: *atidurghaṭaghaṭāsvatantrecchāvaśād ayam*, 'This is due to the force of the free desire [of the Lord] to construe what is difficult to construe', and TĀV ad loc., which explains *ghaṭā* as *ghaṭanam*, and refers to P. III 3, 104 (*ṣidbhidādibhyo 'ṅ*): *ghaṭanaṃ ghaṭeti bhidāditvādaṅ*.

[528]*prāptiprāpaka* — lit.,'brings it to discernibility'. In this context, it is inviting to understand *prāpti* in its 'grammatical' or '(psycho)logical' sense of 'the given' — what is presented to the observer as he contemplates his next step, whether it be the provisional stage of a word's derivation as it awaits the application of the following rule, or that which presents itself to the organs of sense as their immediate content, suitable or unsuitable. The two possibilities amount to the same thing here, for all intents and purposes, for it is the creative power of the Lord that 'causes to appear' (*prāpaka*) before our eyes that which 'appears' there as unconditioned (*prāpti*). YR implies here that the internal division of the single principle into innumerable subjects and objects is the problem — either that such a division is difficult to justify reasonably, or that the result is difficult to effect within the unity. The notion of *durghaṭasaṃpādanam* is a leitmotif in Trika literature, as shown by parallel passages in which appear such terms as *durghaṭakārin* (TĀV V 123), *atidurghaṭakārin* (TĀ I 92, TĀV IV 173a,

This *māyā* is **the covering of Śiva's own Self** — when, out of his free will, he assumes the state of a bound soul. ['Covering'] here refers to the triad of impurities — impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc. — and is termed 'concealement of his proper form'.[529]

Kārikā 16

Inasmuch as the various objects of experience, which are derived from primordial matter and appear to us in the form of the pleasurable, etc., are about to be explained, the master [first] speaks of the principle of

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pp. 814–815), *durghaṭakāritā* (TĀ VIII 333), *durghaṭakāritva* (TĀ IV 10–11), *atidurghaṭakāritva* (TĀV I 330, TĀ VIII 333), *atidurghaṭakāritā* (TĀV VIII 333, XVII 20), *atiduṣkara* (ĪPV II 3, 17), *durghaṭā [śaktiḥ]* (TĀ V 123), *atidurghaṭaghaṭā°* (TĀ XV 272b); see ĪPV II 3, 17 (vol. II: 141): *itaś ca kim atiduṣkaraṃ bhaviṣyati yat prakāśātmany akhaṇḍitatadrūpya eva prakāśamāne prakāśananiṣedhāvabhāsaḥ prakāśamānaḥ/ tasmāt parameśvarasyedaṃ tat paraṃ svātantryaṃ yat tathāvabhāsanaṃ paśurūpatāvabhāsanaṃ nāma grāhakāṃśasamutthāpanaṃ taddvāreṇa ca grāhyollāsanam api/ saiva bhagavato māyāśaktir ucyate/ yathoktaṃ māyā vimohinī nāma [...] iti*, 'What is more difficult to accomplish than this: to manifest, within the One who is Light itself, the negation of Light, at the very time when his luminous essence shines forth undivided? Therefore, it is the supreme freedom of the Supreme Lord thus to manifest himself as the bound soul, causing that part [of the phenomenal world] that is the experiencer to arise, and, through that [experiencer], manifesting the objects of experience. This is called the power of *māyā* of the Lord, according to what has been stated: "*māyā* is that which deludes" '; also TĀ IV 10–11, which places on the same level 'play' (*krīḍā*), 'Illusion' (*māyā*), and 'the accomplishing of what is difficult [to construe]' (*durghaṭakāritva*): *kiṃ tu durghaṭakāritvāt svācchandyān nirmalād asau/ svātmapracchādanakrīḍāpaṇḍitaḥ parameśvaraḥ// anāvṛtte svarūpe 'pi yad ātmācchādanaṃ vibhoḥ/ saiva māyā yato bheda etāvān viśvavṛttikaḥ//*, 'But, in virtue of his capacity of accomplishing, out of his pure freedom (*svācchandya*), what is difficult [to construe], the Supreme Lord skillfully plays at hiding his own Self. Although his essence is in no way veiled, this hiding of the Self by the Omnipresent is but *māyā*, from which proceeds the difference [that is seen] to this extent at work in all activities'; see also TĀV IV 10: *grāhyagrāhakādyullāsāt tathātvenābhāsanaṃ saiva krīḍā*, 'This play is manifestation as such, due to the surging forth of subject, object, etc.'; also TĀ V 123: the *śakti* 'which accomplishes what is difficult' (*durghaṭā śaktiḥ*, in the verse) is named *svātantrya*; it accomplishes the paradoxical exploit of expanding itself as the universe, while articulating itself as endless cycles of emanation and resorption. YR ad 7 has used the same formulation in a similar context.

[529]Cf. YR ad 9. Such is the *tirodhānaśakti*. On the 'concealment of his proper form' (*svarūpagopana*), see PP II 9, p. 3: *guruśaktir jayaty ekā madrūpapravikasikā/ svarūpagopanavyagrā śivaśaktir jitā yayā//*, 'Hail to this unique power of the guru which enables the blossoming of my own nature. Thanks to it, the energy of Śiva which is intent on concealing his own nature is overcome'. See also ĪPvṛ II 2, 5: *tanmalatrayanirmāṇe prabhor icchā māyāśaktir ucyate*, '*māyāśakti* is the Lord's will to create the three impurities'. Although *māyāśakti* is a *śakti*, its status is different from that of the triad of Will, Knowledge and Action, since *māyāśakti* is connected with differentiation.

individuation (*puṃstattva*)[530] as such,[531] which is manifested in the form of the enjoyer of experiences:

16. Under the influence of all-encompassing *māyā*, consciousness is defiled, becoming the individual soul, the fettered being, and is bound, thanks to [the limiting factors of] Time, Agency, Necessity, Passion and Ignorance.[532]

Consciousness,[533] although omniscient and omnipotent, assumes the impurity of deeming itself finite on account of its loss of freedom (*pāratantrya*), brought about by ***māyā***'s taking control [or possession]. This impurity is nothing but the failure to recognize [the Self as such] (*akhyāti*),[534] as when one sets aside those qualities of omniscience, etc.

Wherefore, that [consciousness], [now] limited, having cut itself off from the infinite[535] space of consciousness, just as the space confined in the jar (*ghaṭākāśa*) [is cut off from infinite space], is called *puṃstattva*, the 'person'.

Therefore, both maintained (*pālya*) and bound (*pāśya*) by *māyā*, it is called ***paśu***, [the 'domesticated animal' or, figuratively, the 'fettered subject'],[536] being the locus of those very fetters (*pāśa*) which are the impurities of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of

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[530] *puṃstattva* here stands for *pumān*, 'person', and is thus synonymous with *puruṣatattva*. As shown by YR at the end of his commentary, *puṃstattva* is the condition of the fettered individual subject, delimited by *māyā* and the five *kañcukas*. *puṃstattva* thus represents the infusion of supreme ipseity into individual souls (now 'atomic', *aṇu*), who are themselves further affected by the three *malas*. Cf. ĪPvṛ III 2, 3, where the term *puṃstva* is found in the same sense. The term 'individuation' should not be understood in any sociological (or even psychological) sense, implying what has come to be designated as the "individual" of modern societies — it has rather to do here with the idea of the *aṇu*, or the *āṇavamala*, the wholly deceitful 'atomization' of universal consciousness. Among the many discussions of the Indian "individual" — or whether such a term is at all appropriate in characterizing the pre-modern "person" — is Louis Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus*, q.v.

[531] Lit., 'in its proper form'.

[532] The usual denomination of this *tattva* is *vidyā*, meaning '[limited] Knowledge'. The first hemistich is quoted, along with kā. 15, in TĀV I 37–38. The second is quoted immediately thereafter, along with PS 17, in TĀV I 39–40. The term *kalā*, here translated '[limited] Agency', expresses more literally this sense of limitation, its primary meaning being 'segment, phase (of the moon), etc.'.

[533] *bodha* is the universal divine consciousness, whose characteristics, according to PTLvṛ (p. 2), are *avikalpatvam*, 'not subject to thought-constructs', and *pūrṇatvam*, 'completeness', 'lack of internal division or external condition'. By contrast, *abodha* is empirical consciousness, characterized by *vikalpa* and *apūrṇatva*.

[534] Cf. ĪPV II 3, 17 (vol. II: 141): *yā mūḍhatā [...] pūrṇatvasya [...] svātantryasya [...] nityatādharmasya ca prakāśamānasyāpi yad aprakāśamānatayā abhimananam*, 'That confusion consists in wrongly considering perfection, freedom and eternality as not shining, although they are shining [within one's self]'.

[535] *pūrṇasvarūpa* — lit., 'perfect', 'full'.

[536] For a similar definition of *paśu*, see YR ad 5.

supposing oneself the agent of actions.[537]

Moreover [by saying: 'bound (*saṃbaddha*)] **by Time, Agency, etc.'**, the master indicates that [consciousness] is **bound** (*baddha*) completely (*samyak*), that is to say, is tied down, due to its being permeated[538] **by Time, etc.**, whose proper form will be expounded next.

Thus the *puṃstattva* consists in being enveloped by the hexad of principles [namely, *māyā* and the five *kañcukas*].[539]

Kārikā 17

The master now propounds the proper nature of these principles, Time, etc., in the order of their enveloping that [embodied consciousness]:

17. I know[540] just this thing, at this very moment only, to some extent only, by focusing my entire self on it.[541] In this way, the hexad of sheaths, *māyā* being the sixth,[542] is said to be [existentially] included[543] in the finite soul ...[544]

Thus, just as consciousness, though free, assumes the condition of a finite soul through its own *māyā*, so also its energies of Knowledge and

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[537] See YR ad 9.

[538] *otaprotatā* — lit., 'interwoven with'. Cf. YR ad 18, where *ūta* is mentioned, and ĪPV III 1, 9 (vol. II: 238, quoted n. 546), where we find *otaprota* mentioned in a context similar to this one, viz., while are being defined the five *kañcukas*.

[539] For *māyā* is a veil (*āvaraṇa*, lit., a 'covering'), and the *kañcukas* are 'sheaths'. The literal meaning of the latter, 'armor', 'cloak', is found in the name of a traditional character in the Indian drama: the *kañcukin*, or chamberlain, so termed because of his close-fitting garment.

[540] The grammatical remark in the commentary indicates that YR is privileging, among the various 'powers', that indicated by the verb *jñā*, 'know'; even though the other 'powers' are implied, they are easily supplied, and it is not necessary to cite them each time their "leader" is mentioned; cf. the symmetric statement in ĪPV III 1, 9, vol. II: 238 (see n. 546).

[541] Note that the Sanskrit order of the sentence — *adhunā, kiṃcit, idam, sarvātmanā, jānāmi*, viz., *kāla, kalā, niyati, rāga, vidyā* — corresponds to the order of kārikā 16, which in turn reproduces the order according to which these *kañcukas* envelop the *paśu*, as taught by YR's avat. ad 17. Thus there is logic in the 'genesis of bondage'. Yet, one may find other orders of enunciation in other texts, for instance: *kāla, niyati, rāga, vidyā, kalā* in ĪPvṛ III 1, 9. The VIIIth chapter of TS (p. 84) solves the difficulty, giving the order of enumeration as a convention differing from one text to another: *atra caiṣāṃ vāstavena pathā kramavandhyaiva sṛṣṭir ity uktaṃ kramāvabhāso 'pi cāstīty api uktam eva/ kramaś ca vidyārāgādīnāṃ vicitro 'pi dṛṣṭaḥ kaścid rajyan vetti ko 'pi vidan rajyate ityādi/ tena bhinnakramanirūpaṇam api rauravādiṣu śāstreṣu aviruddhaṃ mantavyam*, 'In this regard, as a matter of fact, of those [sheaths] it has been stated that the origination is free of sequence; but it has also been said that an appearance of sequence is there. [In ordinary life] one can see that *vidyā*, *rāga*, etc., appear in a different order. For instance, one knows when he loves, whereas another loves when he knows, etc. Therefore, one should know that there is no contradiction in expounding a different order [of the *kañcukas*] as happens in śāstras as the *Raurava*'.

[542] Lit., 'associated with *māyā*'.

[543] *antaraṅga* — see n. 549.

[544] The two kārikās 17 and 18 are to be read as a syntactic unit.

Action, when restricted, are said to become respectively the [limited] Knowledge (*vidyā*) and [limited] Agency (*kalā*) of the bound soul.[545]

Just as by the king a small quantity of money is given, out of compassion, to him whose wealth has just been appropriated, so that he may survive, likewise, to consciousness which has assumed the condition of a finite soul, its omniscience, etc., having been put aside, the ability to know [something] is conferred [by the Supreme Lord], with the ultimate aim of permitting limited Agency [and result].[546]

Because the power of knowing is thus predominant, the syntax of the sentence shows [the other sheaths, *kāla*, etc. (of kārikā 16)] as subordinated to the verb *jñā*.

This hexad of sheaths, associated with *māyā* as described above, veils[547] the proper form **of the finite soul** (*aṇu*), that is, of the particular soul (*puṃs*), whose omniscience, etc., has been removed due to the impurity of deeming itself finite.[548]

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[545]And he exercises his limited powers of Knowledge and Agency through cognitive organs (*jñānendriya*, or *buddhīndriya*), and organs of action (*karmendriya*) as stated by the *Tantrasadbhāva*, quoted in ŚSV III 3: *kalodvalitacaitanyo vidyādarśitagocaraḥ/ rāgeṇa rañjitātmāsau buddhyādikaraṇair yutaḥ//*, 'Consciousness [of the finite subject] is reduced to [limited activity] by *kalā*, the objects of sense (*gocara*) are shown to him by *vidyā*, he is emotionally affected by *rāga*, endowed as he is with organs of cognition, etc.'. See also ĪPV III 1, 10–11, vol. II: 242, quoted in Appendix 13, p. 337, and PHvṛ 9 (pp. 71–72), quoted n. 561, which develops this process in the course of explaining how the three *śaktis* of the Lord, *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*, transform themselves respectively into *āṇava*, *māyīya* and *kārma malas*. On *jñānendriya* and *karmendriya*, see PS 20.

[546]Doing and Knowing are associated with Willing (*icchā*), and Willing is rooted in Bliss (*ānanda*). This is a positive way of seeing the *kañcukas*. They are not only corsets constraining free, infinite subjectivity, transforming it into a fettered individuality; they are also gifts conferred by the Lord as compensation for this ontological damage, as a partial return of its former powers. ĪPV III 1, 9, vol. II: 238, synthesizes the entire process: *evaṃ kalāvidyākālarāganiyatibhir otaproto māyayāpahṛtaiśvaryasarvasvaḥ san punar api prativitīrṇatatsarvasvarāśimadhyagatabhāgamātra evaṃbhūto 'yaṃ mitaḥ pramātā bhāti/ idānīm idaṃ kiṃcij jānānaḥ idaṃ kurvāṇo 'tra rakto 'traiva ca yaḥ so 'ham iti*, 'Thus, the subject, being permeated (*otaprota*) with limited Agency, limited Knowledge, Time, Passion and Necessity, and being deprived of all sovereignty by *māyā*, manifests himself as limited, with a part of the whole sovereignty that is given back to him (*prativitīrṇa*), [when considering]: "The one who knows and now does something, this much, and is attached to this, and to this only, that one is me." ' Hence, concludes ĪPV, 'these [*kāla*, etc.] manifest themselves only as associated with the [limited] subject and, therefore, constitute his [limited] powers' (*ete ca pramātṛlagnatayaiva bhānti, iti tasyaiva śaktirūpāḥ*). Therefore, in this world of difference inhabited by individuals, 'they differ in the case of each subject' (*pratipramātṛbhinnā eva*). This is how the formulations: 'his Time', 'his Necessity', etc., which are seen frequently in YR's gloss, are also to be understood — in which the genitive refers to the aforementioned 'aṇu'. On the *kañcukas* considered as the degradation of the attributes of the Lord — omnipotence, etc. — see MM 18.

[547]*ācchādaka*.

[548]The function common to the five *kañcukas* is that of delimiting, particularizing, the universal experience characteristic of the *śuddhādhvan*. And this delimitation cannot arise without replacing the free vision (*svatantradṛś*) characteristic of completeness with the clouded vision brought about by *māyā*, the power of differentiation; cf. TĀ IX 49b–52a (quoted n. 485)

[In this sense, the hexad of sheaths] is said to be **'[existentially] included'**, that is, is innate [in the finite soul], just as the flaw is innate in the gold.[549]

What does the hexad consist of? The master replies: **'[just] now, etc.'**.

I know at this very moment only[550] signifies that this finite soul delimits itself in terms of present time [i.e., qualifies itself as present only, as expressed through the verbal endings of the present tense — as such excluding past and future]; [and *mutatis mutandis*, in terms of past or future time, as when it says:] 'I knew it previously, I know, I will know'; similarly [for the verb 'do':] 'I did, I do, I will do'.[551]

In so doing,[552] [the finite soul] delimits even its modes of being in accordance with the proper nature of knowledge and action. Thus does Time (*kāla*), so [delimited], [become a fetter] of the finite soul.

And **[I know] to some extent only**,[553] that is, [one knows and] one accomplishes delimited things only,[554] for one is not capable of accomplishing everything. [The potter] undertakes to make a jar only, not a piece of cloth, etc.

Such is the limited Agency of the finite soul.[555]

[I know] just this,[556] i.e., that one expects a determinate effect to

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where Śiva is said to be *svatantradṛgrūpaḥ*. Therefore, in order to give a full account of the process, *māyā* is to be added to the pentad of the *kañcukas*.

[549]Gold, like the soul, is in essence free from flaw. In the world of nature, however, gold, like the soul, is associated with flaws that, however, can be removed — the gold by fire (the technique consisted in melting the gold so that any impurities, always lighter than gold, might float to the surface), the soul by the realization that I am Śiva. Such flaws are '*antaraṅga*' — a term used here with overtones of its grammatical meaning — in the sense that they find their 'existential' occasions before another 'rule' is applied or whose causes are found within the domain of another rule — for instance, the rule here promulgated, thanks to which we may be liberated from such flaws. The grammatical *antaraṅgatva* has to do with priority of application founded on the principle that rules whose domain is included take precedence over those of the including domain — which is consistent with the present non-grammatical application, inasmuch as the inherent "part" of the rice grain is *antaraṅga* with respect to the grain as a natural whole, or the flaw with respect to the nugget. Note that the literal sense of *antaraṅga* is 'inner element' or 'element within'. Same image of the flaw within the gold in YR ad 24 and 87–88. In kārikā 18, we will meet another image: that of the *kambuka*, the 'bran'.

[550]Lit., 'I know now only' (*adhunaiva jānāmi*).

[551]The action expressed by the finite verb is always delimited by a temporal suffix, so that the tenses appear as exclusive alternatives; one cannot express the three tenses simultaneously. Thus is the soul 'qualified' by the verbal cum temporal context.

[552]*tathā kalayan* — on root *kal*, see n. 623.

[553]Lit., 'just something' (*kiṃcid eva*).

[554]Cf. ĪPV III 1, 9, vol. II: 238 quoted n. 546: *idaṃ kiṃcij jānāna idaṃ kurvāṇaḥ [...]*.

[555]Implied here is not so much that our talents are limited to one or another métier, but that, at any given time, we are restricted as to what we do, by what we do. And the same goes for 'knowing'. Only the Lord is '*sarvakartṛ*', that is, can do or know everything at once — the universe that we experience only in limited ways.

[556]Lit., 'this alone' (*idam eva*).

follow from a determinate cause — such as smoke from fire, or enjoyment of heaven, etc., from performance of sacrifices like the horse sacrifice, etc.; one does not expect [the result] to arise from any [cause] whatsoever.[557]

Thus the *niyatitattva* of the [limited self] is that [*tattva*] according to which the self [during the course of its life] is necessarily determined[558] by the merits and demerits arising from the host of actions done by reason of its own resolution.[559]

And [finally, **I know] by focusing my entire self on it**[560] means that the bound soul is grounded in *rāgatattva*, the principle of passion, which is a deeming of oneself as incomplete, as when one thinks: 'all such things are of use to me', or 'I would be [such and such; for instance: rich]', or 'may I never cease to be'.[561]

[557]For the Śaivas, the yogin and the poet represent, in this world, the omnipotence of the free Lord, who creates whatever he desires without reference to any material cause; cf. ĪPK I 5, 7 (quoted n. 666) and ĪPvr̥ as well as SpN I 2, quoted n. 265. Similarly, Mammaṭa says in the *maṅgalācaraṇa* of his *Kāvyaprakāśa*: *niyatikr̥taniyamarahitāṃ hlādaikamayīm ananyaparatantrām/ navarasarūcirāṃ nirmitim ādadhati bhāratī kaver jayati//*, 'Victory to the poet's Speech, which projects a creation, free from the laws of Necessity (*niyati*), constituted by pure delight, independent of anything else, and charming on account of nine (or novel) sentiments (or flavours: *rasa*)' (tr. Dwivedi *Kāvyaprakāśa*: 3, modified). The commentary *Saṃpradāyaprakāśinī* by Śrīvidyācakravartin contrasts this creation of the poet with that of the Creator (*brahman*), attributing to the former an eminence comparable to the latter's: *niyatiśaktyā niyatarūpā sukhaduḥkhamohasvabhāvā paramāṇvādyupādānakarmādisahakārikāraṇaparatantrā ṣaḍrasā na ca hr̥dyaiva taiḥ tādr̥śī brahmaṇo nirmitir nirmāṇam*, 'Formed into a definite shape by the power of *niyati*, characterized by pleasure, pain and delusion, dependent on material causes such as atoms and auxiliary causes such as action (*karman*), possessed of [only] six flavours and not invariably pleasant by these — such is the creation or production of the Creator' (tr. Dwivedi *Kāvyaprakāśa*: 3). According to AG's *maṅgalācaraṇa* to the *Locana*, the poet — the metaphor of the Supreme Lord — can create anything he wishes, such as a celestial flower, without abiding by the ordinary law of causality, i.e., without requiring any other cause than his own genius (*pratibhā*), which may be seen as the totality of the causes: *apūrvaṃ yad vastu prathayati vinā kāraṇakalām [...]*, '[The poet] manifests entirely new objects without requiring the least cause [...]'. Which affords yet another example in Kashmirian Śaiva thought of the close parallel between the Lord's powers and the poet's — and indeed between *mokṣaśāstra* and *kāvyaśāstra*. Note that, in the Trika, *pratibhā*, often translated as 'genius' in a poetic context, is both self-luminous consciousness (*svaprakāśa*) and self-consciousness (*vimarśa*).

[558]*niyamena* [...] *niyamyate* — for a similar usage, also in a context of physical determinism, namely, the successive rising and setting of the moon and sun, suggestive of human destinies, see *Śakuntalā*, IV, st. 2.

[559]*saṃkalpa* — the law of karman is one aspect of this general law of causation. Sanderson (1986: 179) translates *niyati* as 'causality of *karma*'.

[560]*sarvātmanā*.

[561]I.e., 'let me not lose the capacity of being an enjoyer'. The feeling that my possessions are not yet complete and a desire for continued existence constitute the principle of desire [or Passion]. The finite subject, forgetting his universal nature, identifies himself with something or someone else. In this sense, *rāga* is the degradation of plenitude (*pūrṇatva*). This regular correspondence between the Lord's *śaktis* — omnipotence, omniscience, plenitude, eternity, and inclusivity [lit., 'pervasion'] — and the five *kañcukas* is laid down in PHvr̥ 9, pp. 72–73: *tathā sarvakartr̥tvasarvajñatvapūrṇatvanityatvavyāpakatvaśaktayaḥ saṃkocaṃ gr̥h-*

[Contextualized] passion (*rāga*) is an attribute of the intellect.[562] It is nothing but ['corporeal'] attachment as when one thinks: 'here is my passion', having set aside all else for the sake of the thing designated as 'beloved', [now located] in one place, wherever it may be — and it is not the case that the [word *rāga* is] coextensive with[563] the [general] principle of passion (*rāgatattva*) which governs any expectation at all [for instance, the hope of final release, which illustrates rather the *kañcuka* itself].[564]

ṇānā yathākramaṃ kalāvidyārāgakālaniyatirūpatayā bhānti, 'Thus, by accepting limitation, the [Lord's] energies — omnipotence, omniscience, plenitude, eternity, and inclusivity — appear respectively as *kalā*, *vidyā*, *rāga*, *kāla* and *niyati*'. The logical cum causal nuance of these terms should be kept in mind: the fifth fetter to which the subject is prone is here termed *niyati*; the unfettered Lord vis-à-vis the subject so fettered is described as *vyāpaka*. The term *niyati* here intends specifically the type of connection that is called "causal": from "smoke" we are obliged to conclude "fire", and the reason for this is that the domain of "smoky things" is without exception included (*vyāpya*) in the domain of "fiery things" (*vyāpaka*); such relation of inclusion is termed *vyāpti*, often translated as 'pervasion'. Here the Lord is the ultimate *vyāpaka*, for he includes everything possible, and therefore everything can indifferently be termed a *vyāpya*. The relation of *vyāpti* is therefore "truistical" for the Lord, and no *niyati* can be said to characterize his relation to any effect — which relation does most definitely apply to his "fettered" subjects. Cf. also Kṣemarāja's *Parāprāveśikā* (p. 8): *asya sarvakartṛtvaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ pūrṇatvaṃ nityatvaṃ vyāpakatvaṃ ca śaktayo 'saṃkucitā api saṃkocagrahaṇena kalāvidyārāgakālaniyatirūpatayā bhavanti*, 'Omnipotence, omniscience, plenitude, eternity, and inclusivity: those powers of him, although not contracted, become *kalā*, *vidyā*, *rāga*, *kāla* and *niyati* respectively, when they assume contraction'.

[562]There are eight *buddhidharmas*: righteousness (*dharma*), gnosis/knowledge (*jñāna*), detachment/dispassion (*vairāgya*), sovereignty (*aiśvarya*) and their opposites (cf. SK 23, and GBh). Cf. ĪPV III 1, 9 (vol. II: 238): *ca na tad buddhigatam avairāgyam eva, taddhi [avairāgyaṃ] sthūlaṃ vṛddhasya pramadāyāṃ na bhaved api, rāgas tu bhavaty eva*, 'That [*rāgatattva*] is not simply the [specific] attachment [or passion] (*avairāgya*) that is associated with the intellect/volition (*buddhi*) [that is, it is not to be understood as the Sāṃkhya notion of *avairāgya*, that belongs to the category of *buddhidharma*], [for] [that specific attachment], in its gross form, is not observed in an old man in regards to a young woman, whereas the [principle of] passion (*rāga* = *rāgatattva*) [itself, or 'in its general form'] very much is!' Cf. Rāmakaṇṭha ad *Kiraṇatantra* I 16c–17 (Goodall *Kiraṇavṛtti*: 201–208).

[563]*samāna* — that is, 'expressive of'.

[564]At issue are two forms of 'attachment', one (*rāga* or *avairāgya*, as it is referred to in ĪPV III 1, 9, quoted n. 562) specific, exclusive, contextualized; the other (*rāgatattva*) general, inherent in the human condition, which diffusely establishes any object as 'not mine'. Note also that the term *avairāgya* involves a double negation: 'absence of dis-passion': our author may be profiting here from that resonance as well, for a 'contextualized' passion is nothing more than the lack of a certain kind of discipline, itself associated with those objects of sense one wishes to abjure. The lyrical cry of Cherubino [Chérubin], in *The Marriage of Figaro* [*Le Mariage de Figaro*] by Beaumarchais (I, 7), may illustrate this concept of *rāgatattva*, craving for all objects of enjoyment: '[...] le besoin de dire à quelqu'un *je vous aime*, est devenu pour moi si pressant, que je le dis tout seul, en courant dans le parc, à ta maîtresse, à toi, aux arbres, aux nuages, au vent qui les emporte avec mes paroles perdues. – Hier, je rencontrai Marceline ...' [— '[...] the need to say to someone "I love you" has become so compelling that I say it to myself when I run across the park, I say it to our lady and to you, to the clouds and the wind that carries them away along with my useless words. Yesterday, I ran into Marceline ...']. The same distinction is made in Sanskrit aesthetics between the aesthetic feeling that is the *rasa*, *śṛṅgāra* for example, and the empirical affect (*sthāyibhāva*) that is its corresponding *kāma*; the former experienced by the audience at large, as a disembodied

Moreover, **I know** means that I know something that is before my eyes, such as this jar, etc., but not that distant object screened from view: [565] such is the principle of *vidyā* (*vidyātattva*), or limited Knowledge.

In [the previous] kārikā [16], the term *avidyā*, 'absence of knowledge', 'nescience', has been used with a view to [distinguishing this limited *vidyā* from] perfect Knowledge (*śuddhavidyā*), and not because [it implies a complete] absence of knowledge; [566]

associated with *māyā* [that is, *māyā* being the sixth] means that the hexad of sheaths is, for the bound soul, conjoined with the display of difference [brought about by *māyā*].

Kārikā 18

How is this hexad of sheaths existentially included in the finite soul? The master says:

18. ... Just as the bran [567] is tightly attached to the grain of rice, in a relation of non-separability, although it is different from it. [568] Nevertheless, it is open to purification through the discipline of ardent engagement in the path of Śiva. [569]

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:] In practical terms, [570] **the bran, though different, is attached to the rice-grain in a relation of non-separability**, to the point of appearing (*bhāsate*) interwoven with the grain of rice, with no difference [in evidence between them], such that it is removed [571] even by the skilled [only] with much effort; being exis-

or "generalized" passion, the latter experienced by the person only on condition that the affect ceases to be generalized and is embodied elsewhere than in the imagination. On the association of *rāga* and *niyati*, cf. TĀ IV 17–18a, 28; XIII 28.

[565] For the same terminology and issue, see YR ad 5.

[566] In spite of the etymology, *avidyā* should not be taken as complete absence of knowledge (*vedanābhāva*), but rather as imperfect knowledge, whether taken in the general sense of 'nescience', or as referring to a specific *kañcuka*. Indeed, the usual name of the *kañcuka* is *vidyā*, for although imperfect, it is yet knowledge.

[567] *kambuka* — first occurrence of the term, usually attested as *kambūka*. Kārikā 23 contrasts the term with *tuṣa*, 'husk'. According to Mayrhofer, *kambūka* is Dravidian in origin, whereas *tuṣa* is Indo-aryan [or Indic].

[568] The stress is laid on the inseparability of the bran/sheaths and the rice-grain/finite soul, which inseparability is apparent only, as YR emphasizes, while commenting on 'tu'. Relying on the commentary, we differ from L. Silburn, who understands *kambuka* as synonymous with *tuṣa*, 'husk' (Fr. 'balle'): 'La balle fixée au grain de riz (semble) inséparable de lui, bien (qu'en réalité) elle en soit distincte. Mais cela est parfaitement purifié lorsqu'on se tourne ardemment vers la voie de Śiva'. As well, the full sense of 'yoga' is not hinted at.

[569] Thus a soteriological parenthesis is formulated in the exposition of the *tattvas*, factors of finitude.

[570] *vāstavena vṛttena*.

[571] *prakṣipyamāṇa* — lit., 'thrown away'.

tentially included in the grain of rice, it does not present itself separately [to the person polishing].

In similar fashion, the [sixfold] sheath of *māyā*, etc. [i.e., of *māyā* together with the five *kañcukas*], which is figuratively represented by the bran [in the illustration above], though [really] separate from the finite soul, which is figuratively represented by the rice-grain, appears as if inseparable from that soul, due to its being existentially included in it, thus concealing the unfragmented essence of consciousness. This much is to be supplied.[572]

If this be so, how does that sheath, so difficult to detach, disappear? The master says: **'it is open to** [purification], **etc.'**.[573]

The particle 'tu', **'nevertheless'**, is here used in the sense of specification [i.e., restriction][574] for no other means is available in this case.

[There now follows a word-by-word exegesis of the second half of the verse:]

of Śiva, that is, of the Great Lord that is one's own Self;

the path, that is, the method whereby one arrives at[575] the awareness that one's own essence is resplendence (*vibhūti*), which takes the form: 'I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, supreme and nondual',[576] or 'this entire universe is mine alone — is nothing but the expansion of my own energy';[577]

... **ardent engagement in that [path]** (*aunmukhya*), that is, directing oneself with perseverance toward meditation on that [method];

such [meditation] is **discipline** (*yoga*), that is, a grounding[578] of the finite soul in its own Self seen as constituting its essential nature, that is, seen as plenitude.

In this way, **it**, that is, the [sixfold] sheath, whose essence has been explained, **is open to purification**, and this in an exemplary fashion,[579] that is, attends spontaneously upon its own dissolution without remainder.

And this should be said as well: when the bound soul becomes of purified heart, due to the Supreme Lord's grace, then the veil (*āvaraṇa*) of sheaths that afflict us with finitude spontaneously disappears, on account of the coming into being of the knowledge of one's own Self consisting in the insight: 'I am myself the Great Lord'.[580]

And, apart from such knowledge of the Self [won through this arduous

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[572]Same reasoning in YR ad 24.

[573]*bhajate* — lit., 'shares, partakes of'.

[574]*viśeṣe* — see n. 487.

[575]Lit., 'whose form is'.

[576]*paramādvayacidānandaikaghano 'smi.*

[577]*mamaiva idaṃ viśvaṃ svaśaktivijṛmbhaṇamātram.*

[578]*saṃbandha* — lit., 'connection with'.

[579]*viśeṣena* = *vi* in the 'viśuddhi' of the kārikā.

[580]*aham eva maheśvaraḥ.*

method], no mere act grounded on worldly causalities[581] and belonging to the realm of *māyā* would have the slightest chance of succeeding.[582]

Kārikā 19

For such a finite soul, which is, as well, an enjoyer, an object of enjoyment must be posited.[583] This being the case, the master next expounds the principles that have originated from primal matter [— that is, from *pradhāna*, or *prakṛti*]:[584]

19. Pleasure, pain and delusion: these alone constitute primal matter. Next comes the inner organ differentiating itself, in order, into volition, mind and ego, in accordance with [the functions of] decision, ratiocination and conceit of self [that each, respectively, assumes].[585]

That state of indifferentiation[586] — referred to here as **consisting of pleasure, pain and delusion** — of [the three 'qualities'] *sattva*, *rajas* and

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[581] Lit., 'arising through the power of causal constraint (*niyatiśakti*)'.

[582] Lit., 'would dare present itself [so as to effect such a reversal, that is, the dissolution of the *kañcukas*]'. Cf. a parallel statement in the commentary ad 9. Not only are rituals hinted at here, but also any action presuming to effect a result.

[583] *evaṃvidhasyāṇor bhoktuś ca bhogyena bhāvyam* — the statement is symmetrical with YR ad 5: *evaṃvidhe cātra bhogyasvabhāve viśvasmin bhoktrā bhāvyam*.

[584] After the exposition of *pradhāna*, or *prakṛti*, begins that of *meya*, cognizable reality, which is defined as follows (ĪPK III 1, 10–11): *trayoviṃśatidhā meyaṃ yat kāryakaraṇātmakam/ tasyāvibhāgarūpy ekaṃ pradhānaṃ mūlakāraṇam// trayodaśavidhā cātra bāhyāntaḥkaraṇāvalī/ kāryavargaś ca daśadhā sthūlasūkṣmatvabhedaḥ//*, 'Made of twenty-three categories, cognizable reality consists of effects and instruments. As an undivided [category] (*eka*), *pradhāna* is that state in which [all cognizable reality] is unified (*avibhāgarūpin*). It is the primal cause [i.e., the material cause] (*mūlakāraṇa*). The series of external and internal instruments has thirteen aspects and the effects are of ten kinds, being divided into gross and subtle' (on *avibhāgarūpin*, cf. Pandey, ĪPK, vol. III: 199). The exposition of the *meya* ends with kā. 22.

[585] Cf. SK 33. 'antaḥkaraṇa' is a term found also in Advaita, where it represents the 'subjective' side of the provisionally real, corresponding to the 'objective' *māyā*. Under its aegis are grouped together, as in Sāṃkhya, the intellective functions of *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, and *manas*. The sequence found in the kārikā does not imply that the Trika presumes for the "organs" an order of evolution different from that of the Sāṃkhya. By it is merely signified that the three "organs" correspond to and are explained by the three functions: *niścaya*, *saṃkalpa*, *abhimāna*. The translation differs somewhat from L. Silburn's interpretation: 'Ainsi la nature consistant uniquement en plaisir, en souffrance et en égarement constitue l'organe interne fait de décision, de volition et de présomption qui appartiennent dans l'ordre à l'intellect, au sens interne et à l'agent d'individuation'.

[586] *sāmānyaṃ rūpam* — the same notion is conveyed by *sāmyāvasthā* in GBh 16: *tat kiṃ uktaṃ bhavati sattvarajastamasāṃ sāmyāvasthā pradhānam*, and GBh 23: *iyaṃ prakṛtiḥ sattvarajastamasāṃ sāmyāvasthā*. According to the Sāṃkhya, when the equilibrium of the *guṇas* — by which equilibrium *prakṛti* as such is defined — is disturbed by the mere proximity of *puruṣa*, the process of creation takes place. However, the Trika develops its own notions on the sequence of *tattvas* that starts from *prakṛti*, postulating, notably, an additional principle, the *guṇatattva*; see Appendix 11, p. 334.

tamas where no dominance or dependence[587] [of any of the three] is apprehended, is termed ***prakṛti***, the primal cause (*mūlakāraṇa*).[588]

The master says, beginning with the words **'decision, etc.'**,[589] that from *prakṛti* proceeds the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) — which has the form of its [viz., of *prakṛti*] effect.

By **decision** (*niścaya*)[590] the master means the notion that 'this is such and such'.[591]

By **ratiocination** (*saṃkalpana*)[592] he means 'organizational thinking' (*manana*).[593]

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[587] *aṅgāṅgibhāva*.

[588] This notion of *mūlakāraṇa* is common to both Sāṃkhya (SK 3) and Trika (see n. 584). However, in the Trika, *prakṛti* is *mūlakāraṇa* in a secondary sense, for *prakṛti* is not the supreme principle, as it is in the Sāṃkhya, but a manifestation of the Lord's supreme energy.

[589] Here begins the definition of the several 'functions' (*vṛtti*) of *buddhi, manas* and *ahaṅkāra*. Cf. GBh 27: *tatra manasaḥ kā vṛttir iti/ saṃkalpo vṛttiḥ*. ŚSV III 1 uses also the term *vyāpāra*, 'activity': *[...] adhyavasāyādivyāpārabuddhyahaṅkṛnmanorūpaṃ cittam*, '*citta* consists of *buddhi, manas* and *ahaṅkāra*; its activity consists in ascertaining, etc.'.

[590] Cf. the Sāṃkhya definition (SK 23), where *adhyavasāya* is a synonym of *niścaya* (see also ŚSV III 1, quoted n. 589). On *adhyavasāya/niścaya* as the function of the *buddhi*, see n. 401, n. 591, and p. 294; also, TĀ I 38b–40 and TĀV ad loc. (p. 76): *adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ*; TĀ I 215, IX 238. However, there is a definition of *buddhi* specific to the Trika, which is expounded in TS VIII, pp. 85–86: *tato guṇatattvād buddhitattvaṃ yatra puṃprakāśo viṣayaś ca pratibimbam arpayataḥ*, 'Thereafter, from *guṇatattva, buddhitattva* emerges, in which the light of *puruṣa* [i.e., consciousness] reflects itself, as well as objects'. On *niścaya*, see also YR ad 32 and 63.

[591] That is, it is 'just this' and not 'something else'. It is the faculty of distinguishing between objects and ascertaining their specific nature. The *buddhi* evaluates as well as discerns; it reacts in relation to the 'I': why indeed discriminate objects? The *buddhi* comes into play when a response of the subject is called for. Note that the *buddhi* is the initial evolute of *prakṛti*, where the notion of 'activity' is lodged. Thus the *buddhi* is not solely an intellective function, but also a volition, a desire to act, be it simply the 'act' of preferring one object to another. GBh 23 gives an example similar to that of YR: *ayaṃ ghato 'yaṃ paṭa ity evaṃ sati yā sā buddhir iti lakṣyate*, 'When one says: "This is a jar, this is a piece of cloth", this is what is defined as volition (*buddhi*)'. In the Sāṃkhya, it is to the *manas* that is given the task of representing to us the world of the senses, which appears both as external and internal, providing thus the groundwork for involving the individual (the '*aham*') in actions. Thus is explained the characteristic function of the *buddhi, adhyavasāya*, that is, choosing, even willing (cf. the notion of *aiśvarya*, 'sovereignty, power', as a property of *buddhi* — *buddhidharma* — in SK 23 and Vācaspati's TK thereon, even though the word has acquired a supra-human reference), on the basis of the data that are given to it by the *manas*. The *buddhi* makes its own the content delivered to it by the *manas*, thus anticipating the individuations represented by the *ahaṅkāra* and the host of the sense-organs, and to which the latter are instrumental; cf. TK 23: *sarvo vyavahartālocya matvā 'ham atrādhikṛta ity abhimatya kartavyam etan mayety adhyavasyati ataś ca pravartata iti lokasiddham*, 'It is well known that a man who is to act, considers [the situation], ponders over it, agrees that he is entitled to do it, determines that he should do it and then does it'.

[592] Or 'projection' — of an entity where there exist only the disjointed data of the five senses. Cf. SK 27, where *manas* is defined as *saṃkalpaka*.

[593] As is obvious, AG follows here *verbatim* the "evolution" of the categories as expounded in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya; there, the function of *manas* is clearly that of collecting the senses' data — scattered as such under the five domains of the individual organs — so that unique

By **conceit of self** [or **self-referentiality**] (*abhimāna*) the master means 'possessive behavior' (*mamatā*).[594]

"objects" appear clearly before us, each of them endowed with the properties of the five senses — length, odor, color, etc. Thus is *manas* the common "theater" where all the five gather — much akin to the "common sense" of the English philosophers, which itself has antecedents in Aristotle's κοινὴ αἴσθησις. Advaitins, on the other hand, use the term *manana* in another sense. Here, as well, it belongs to a triad, *śravaṇa*, *manana*, *nididhyāsana*, which evoke the way one appropriates the truths of the system — first, they are 'heard' under the guidance of an enlightened teacher; then, one strives to convince oneself of their validity by efficient 'arguments', thus setting aside opposing theses as well as doubts originating in the "real" world; finally, they are incorporated in a new apprehension of the "real", which is now intuitive. Note that *manana* plays here as well the part of an intermediary between "external" and "internal" thought. TS VIII (p. 87) explains how *manas* proceeds from the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra*, along with the *buddhīndriyas* and *karmendriyas*: *tatra sāttviko yasmād manaś ca buddhīndriyapañcakaṃ ca*, 'From the *sāttvika* [*ahaṅkāra*] *manas* and the pentad of the *buddhīndriyas* proceed', and (p. 88): *sāttvikād eva ahaṅkārāt karmendriyapañcakam*. Nevertheless, TS VIII (p. 89) mentions other views: according to some, *manas* proceeds from the *rājasāhaṅkāra* (*anye tu rājasān mana ity āhuḥ*); according to others, *manas* proceeds from the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra*, whereas *indriyas* proceed from the *rājasāhaṅkāra* (*anye tu sāttvikād mano rājasāc ca indriyāṇīti*); see n. 605 and 613. In a similar fashion, Vācaspati considers the *buddhi* to be polyvalent — in some, it is *sāttvikapradhāna*, in others, *tāmasapradhāna* (TK 23).

[594]Lit., 'the idea that "all this is mine, or for me." ' Similar definition in YR ad 70. Cf. TK 24: *abhimāno 'haṅkāraḥ/ yat khalv ālocitaṃ mataṃ ca tatra 'aham adhikr̥taḥ', 'śaktaḥ khalv aham atra', 'madarthā evam amī viṣayāḥ', 'matto nānyo 'trādhikr̥taḥ kaścid asti', 'ato 'ham asmi' iti yo 'bhimānaḥ so 'sādhāraṇavyāpāratvād ahaṅkāraḥ/ tam upajīvya hi buddhir adhyavasyati 'kartavyam etan mayā' iti niścayaṃ karoti*, ' "The I-principle (*ahaṅkāra*) is egotism (*abhimāna*)" and this "I-principle" is perceptible in such ideas as — "To what I have observed and thought of I am entitled" — "I am able to do this" — "all these things are for my use" — "there is no one else entitled to it" — "hence I am" — the egotism involved in all such notions forms the characteristic function of the "I-principle" — it is through this principle that the Will (= *buddhi*) performs its determinative function appearing in such decisions as "this is to be done by me." ' (tr. G. Jha). The notion of *abhimāna* implies 'conceit of self', 'pride', 'egotism' (see G. Jha), in sum, 'presumption' — bearing in mind that it is the 'I' itself that is chiefly 'presumed' (as well as the entirety of the ego's relations to its surroundings) — or, in some contexts as TK 30, quoted next note, 'self-referentiality'. TS VIII (p. 86) gives a definition of *ahaṅkāra* and emphasizes the way in which the Trika distinguishes itself from the Sāṃkhya: *buddhitattvād ahaṅkāro yena buddhipratibimbite vedyasaṃparke kaluṣe puṃprakāśe 'nātmany atmābhimānaḥ śuktau rajatābhimānavat/ ata eva kāra ity anena kr̥takatvam asya uktaṃ sāṃkhyasya tu tad na yujyate sa hi nātmano 'haṃvimarśamayatām icchati vayaṃ tu kartr̥tvam api tasyecchāmaḥ/ tac ca śuddhaṃ vimarśa evāpratiyogisvātmacamatkārarūpo 'ham iti*, 'From *buddhitattva* emerges the ego (*ahaṅkāra*). It is responsible for mistakenly presuming the non-Self [i.e., the body, the intellect, the faculties, etc.] to be the Self, as happens when silver is mistakenly seen in the conch shell [in lieu of mother-of-pearl]. This [experience] takes place when the light of the *puruṣa* [viz., consciousness] is tarnished by its connexion with the object reflected in the intellect/volition (*buddhi*). Therefore, °*kāra* [in *ahaṅkāra*] denotes the factitious character (*kr̥takatva*) [of the ego]. This position is not that of the follower of the Sāṃkhya, who does not admit that the Self is endowed with the awareness of itself as an "I" [— inasmuch as, according to him, the conscious principle (the *puruṣa*) is inactive, and cannot therefore refer to itself; such self-reference will not obtain until the *ahaṅkāra* makes its appearance, vis-à-vis the *buddhi*, 'pure or active consciousness'], whereas we admit also the agency [of this "I"]. And that [agency] is pure, for [according to us] the "I" (*aham*)— being nothing but self-awareness — has the form of the marvel[ous experience] of one's own Self (*svātmacamatkāra*), in reference to which there is no possible alternative (*apratiyogin*)'. Note, however,

In the order thus described, [have been enumerated] the triad of **volition, mind and ego** (*buddhiḥ mano 'haṅkāraḥ*), termed [collectively] the **inner organ**,[595] which appears as an effect of the qualities, [inasmuch as their equilibrium has been disturbed by notions of] dominance and dependence.[596] And it appears also as a cause, with regard to the gross elements (*bhūta*), the [external] organs (*indriya*), etc.[597]

Kārikā 20

The master now speaks of the external organs:[598]

20. The ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose[599] are the cognitive organs[600] in respect of sound, etc.[601] And voice, hand, foot, anus and

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that this *-kāra* is often explained today by equating it with the *-kāra* of the grammarians: as in *śakāra*, the 'vocable' *śa*. Thus, *ahaṅkāra*, viz., the 'vocable' *aham*, would represent the irruption of reflexivity within consciousness, in the form of '*aham*' (see van Buitenen 1957: 17ff.). Cf. also Kṣemarāja's *Parāprāveśikā* (p. 10): *ahaṅkāro nāma mamedaṃ na mamedam ity abhimānasādhanam*, 'By *ahaṅkāra* we mean that [locus] wherein is realized the conceit [of egoism] (*abhimāna*), as instanced by the assertions, "this is mine", "this is not mine." '

[595]On the functioning of those three *tattvas*, see the example given in TK 30: *yadā mandāloke prathaman tāvad vastumātraṃ sammugdham ālocayati atha praṇihitamanāḥ karṇāntākṛṣṭasaśarasiñjiṇīmaṇḍalīkṛtakodaṇḍaḥ pracaṇḍataraḥ pāṭaccaro 'yam iti niścinoti atha ca māṃ pratyetīty abhimanyate, athādhyavasyaty apasarāmītaḥ sthānād iti*, 'In dim-light, a person has at first only a vague perception of a certain object; then, fixing his mind intently, he observes that it is a robber with his drawn bow and arrow leveled at him; then follows the self-consciousness that "the robber is advancing against me"; and lastly follows the determination to run away from the place' (tr. G. Jha).

[596]According to TS VIII, one should understand that the inner organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is an effect of the *guṇatattva*, the additional *tattva* postulated by the Trika between *prakṛti* and *buddhi* in order to explain why actual creation takes place, i.e., in what manner the equilibrium of the three *guṇas* has been disrupted. See, in Appendix 11, p. 334, the development on *kṣobha*.

[597]The Sāṃkhya and the Trika differ regarding the manner in which the evolution of the phenomenal world is to be conceived; see Appendix 12, p. 335.

[598]The *jñānendriyas* and the *karmendriyas* are collectively termed *bāhyakaraṇas*. See ĪPV III 1, 11 (vol. II: 241), which emphasizes the instrumental character of the threefold *antaḥkaraṇa* and the ten *bāhyakaraṇas*: *eṣāṃ ca kāryatve 'py asādhāraṇena karaṇatvena vyapadeśaḥ*, 'Though they are the effects [*buddhi* proceeding from *guṇatattva*, *ahaṅkāra* from *buddhi*, the ten *indriyas* and *manas* from *ahaṅkāra*], yet, instrumentality being their peculiarity, they are spoken of as such [i.e., as instruments]' (see also YR ad 94–95).

[599]Note that the SK distinguishes clearly between the organ (*indriya*, e.g., the ear) and the 'faculty' (*vṛtti*), which is nothing but the organ's manner of functioning; see Vācaspati ad loc.: *tatra rūpagrahaṇaliṅgaṃ cakṣuḥ*, etc., 'The eye is the organ for perceiving color' (tr. G. Jha), etc. In truth, the 'function' or 'faculty' enters into consideration only as a secondary phenomenon, but it is already implied by the strict relation that exists between the organ — the ear — and its 'subtle' object, that is, the *tanmātra* that is proper to it — in this case, sound. See also ĪPV III 1, 11, quoted note below.

[600]*buddhīndriya* or *jñānendriya*; G. Jha (TK 26) translates: 'organs of sensation', 'sensory organs'. ĪPV III 1, 11 (vol. II: 241) defines them as 'useful in acquiring the determinate cognition of sound, etc., within *buddhi*' (*buddhau śabdādyadhyavasāyarūpāyām upayogīni*).

[601]Here the five *tanmātras* are referred to; see kā. 21.

genitals are the organs of action. [602]

In respect of sound, etc., that is, in respect of the domain [wherein each operates] that is to be described [in kārikā 21], there are five organs (*indriya*), the **ear, etc.**, which are predominantly cognitive [hence they are termed *buddhīndriyas*, or *jñānendriyas*]. And the five organs that are predominantly active [hence they are termed *karmendriyas*] are the **voice, etc.** The domains [603] [wherein operate] the organs of action (*karmendriya*) are speaking, grasping, moving, excreting and bliss. [604]

And in both cases, since both are accompanied by the ego in expressions such as 'I hear ...' [viz., *buddhīndriya*] or 'I tell ...' [viz., *karmendriya*], both are taken to be effects of the ego. [605]

Kārikā 21

Now, the master describes the proper form of the domains of those organs: sound, etc.:

[602] Cf. GBh 26: *karma kurvantīti karmendriyāṇi/ tatra vāg vadati [...]*, 'They are called organs of action because they perform actions. Thus, the voice speaks [...]'. Cf. ĪPV III 1, 11 (vol. II: 241): *tyāgo grahaṇam iti dvayam — bahirviṣayaṃ yat tatra pāṇiḥ pāyuḥ pādaḥ — iti karaṇāni/ etad evāntaḥ prāṇe yena kriyate tad vāg indriyam/ tat prakṣobhapraśāntyā viśrāntikriyopayogy upasthaḥ*, '[Action] is of two types: giving up and grasping. In [actions related to] external objects, hand, anus and foot are the instruments (*karaṇa*). Being in relation to vital air, which is internal, voice is the organ (*indriya*) that is able to perform the two kinds of action [viz., giving up and grasping, in the sense of exhaling and inhaling]. Hence [according to this logic], the genitals are that which is useful in the act of resting (*viśrānti*) which follows the cessation of the agitation [of vital breath]' (tr. Pandey, modified) — an assertion that functions as an explanation for the *viṣaya* assigned to *upastha*, that is, *ānanda*, 'bliss', *ānanda* being nothing but 'the act of resting (*viśrānti*) which follows the cessation of the agitation of vital breath'. And the text concludes: *sarvadehavyāpakāni ca karmendriyāṇy ahaṅkāraviśeṣātmakāni/ tena cchinnahasto bāhubhyām ādadanaḥ pāṇinaivādatta evam anyat/ kevalaṃ tattatsphuṭapūrṇavṛttilābhasthānatvāt pañcāṅgulirūpam adhiṣṭhānam asyocyate*, 'The organs of action pervade the whole body and are particular forms of the ego. Therefore, the person whose hands have been cut off and who receives [alms, etc.] by means of his arms really receives by means of his hands. The same may be said of other [organs] also. [The hand,] with its five fingers, is spoken of as the 'abode' [of the function] only because it is the seat wherein is manifested most clearly the full and complete function (*vṛtti*), viewed in relation to various [uses]' (tr. Pandey, modified).

[603] What is termed here 'object' [or 'field', or 'domain'] (*viṣaya*) of the *karmendriya* is termed its 'function' (*vṛtti*) in Sāṃkhya. Cf. SK 28 and GBh ad loc.

[604] *ānanda* — G. Jha translates: 'gratification'. On *ānanda*, object of the *upastha*, see n. 616; cf. BĀU II 4, 11: *[...] evaṃ sarveṣām ānandānām upastha ekāyanam [...]*, '[...] as the organ of generation is the one goal of all kinds of enjoyment [...]'.

[605] Cf. TS VIII (p. 87), with correction of *bhautikam* in *bhautikatvam*: *bhautikatvam api na yuktam ahaṃ śṛṇomy ityādy anugamāc ca sphuṭam āhaṅkārikatvam, karaṇatvena cāvaśyaṃ kartraṃśasparśitvam*, 'It is not proper to consider them [viz., the organs] as material. Rather, since they are accompanied [by the ego] in [such statements as] "I hear", it is obvious that they proceed from the *ahaṅkāra*. Since they are organs (*karaṇa*), they are necessarily "touched" by the agentive part [of the *ahaṅkāra*]'.

21. The subtle domain, devoid of [internal] differentiation, which the [cognitive organs] are [severally] to apprehend consists of the pentad of abstract entities (*tanmātra*):[606] sound, touch, [form as] light,[607] savor and odor.

As regards the domain, that is, the field, **to be grasped by** [each of] **these** organs as something to be known or done,[608] the master asks: — 'What kind of thing is it?' [First of all,] it is **devoid of [internal] differentiation**: its essence is the universal from which the particular has been expelled;[609] it is [therefore] **subtle**. Such an entity is the ***tanmātra* — sound [as such], etc.**, [grasped in its] universal form. Sound in its universal [form] (*śabdasāmānya*) is thus called *śabdatanmātra*, 'sound as such' [that is, devoid of reference to the other *tanmātras*, and therefore, as well, to particular sounds]. And as for the others [namely, the *karmendriyas*, their domains have been already dealt with (ad 20)].[610]

Due to the reciprocal implication[611] of [cognitive] field and [cogni-

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[606]Or 'unmixed entities'. Judging by the term *tanmātra* 'just that', we should conceive of these 'entities' not only as 'archetypal' or 'generic' (Torella ĪPK; see the term *sāmānya* in TS VIII, quoted n. 613), but also as 'pure', considered in and of themselves, without admixture of the other four, that together make up the complex that constitute the normal condition of perception — an 'intellective' object, but an 'object' nonetheless. The *tanmātra* is then the obverse or the ground of the "real", required by the very hypothesis that postulates in the gross elements various degrees of elemental "mixture". This view, which seems originally to have been developed in the Vaiśeṣika (Frauwallner 1973: 280), is not, of course, universally accepted (see n. 616).

[607]Here, light (*mahas*) replaces the usual *rūpa*, probably in order to emphasize the relationship, which will be set forth in the following kārikā, between *rūpa* as *tanmātra*, and *tejas* as *mahābhūta*.

[608]See YR ad 79–80.

[609]SK 38 defines the *tanmātras* as *aviśeṣa*, 'non-specific', contrasting them with the *bhūtas* defined as *viśeṣa*, 'specific': *tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣās tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ/ ete smṛtā viśeṣāḥ śāntā ghorāś ca mūḍhāś ca//*, 'The Rudimentary Elements are "non-specific". From these five proceed the five gross elements; these latter are said to be "specific", because they are calm, turbulent and deluding' (tr. G. Jha). According to Vācaspati ad loc. (*tanmātrāṇi tv asmadādibhiḥ parasparavyāvṛttāni nānubhūyante ity aviśeṣāḥ sūkṣmā iti cocyante*) the criterion for distinguishing the *bhūtas* from the *tanmātras* is the capacity of each of the former to set aside instances of the others (*parasparavyāvṛttyā*) — whereas, evidently, 'sound as such' (*śabdatanmātra*) cannot set aside or cancel 'form as such' (*rūpatanmātra*). The *bhūtas* are capable of entering into the field of our experience as distinct from one another, inasmuch as 'they are calm, turbulent and deluding', that is, inasmuch as they abound in various degrees of *sattva* or *rajas* or *tamas*. They are therefore considered as both 'specific' (*viśeṣa*) and 'gross' (*sthūla*). That is not to say that one cannot experience the 'subtle' object — for if one did not, one would not experience anything at all; all that can be said is that the 'subtle' objects (*tanmātra*) are not experienced in their 'pure' state — except perhaps by yogins — but only when they are exemplified through the 'gross' elements (*mahābhūta*). As such, the *tanmātras* are said to be non-specific (*aviśeṣa*) and subtle (*sūkṣma*).

[610]The terms '*jñeya-kāryatayā*' and '*evam anyāni*' suggest that the commentary intends here the domains both of the *buddhīndriyas* and the *karmendriyas*, although the emphasis is put on the *tanmātras*, the domain proper to the *buddhīndriyas*.

[611]*parasparāpekṣitva* — lit., 'mutual expectancy'.

tive] witness,[612] **the pentad of abstract entities** derives, as do the organs [of cognition and action], from the [principle of] ego.[613]

Kārikā 22

Earth, etc., are the result arrived at by a mutual commingling of those [sensible] domains [viz., the *tanmātras*]. This the master says:

22. The domain [thus described], now gross[614] due to the mingling of the [subtle *tanmātras*], manifests itself as the pentad of gross elements (*bhūta*):[615] ether, air, fire, water and earth.

It is the particular, that is, the [now] **gross domain** that acquires the form of a concrete element, **due to the mingling of those** [subtle 'fields as such' (*tanmātra*)], that is, due to their ability to come into contact with each other.[616]

For instance, from 'sound as such' (*śabdatanmātra*) proceeds 'particular sound' (*śabdaviśeṣa*), namely, [the gross element] ether [in the sense that ether is the locus of tonal variety, as well as of 'sound' as distinguished from other 'objects']. From sound and touch proceeds air; from those two combined with form proceeds fire; from those [three] combined with savor proceeds water; and from those [four] to which odor has been added

[612] *viṣayaviṣayin*.

[613] Cf. SK 25, which distinguishes the *indriyas* that presume (along with the *manas*) a *sāttvika*, or 'luminous', form of the ego from the *tanmātras*, that presume a *tāmasa*, or 'dark', form of the ego, with the result that *manas* and the *indriyas* are 'apt to fulfil their specific function' (*svaviṣayasamartha*). Moreover, according to GBh 25, the ego 'is said to be *tāmasa* to the extent that it is the origin also of the *bhūtas*, which abound in *tamas*' (*bhūtānām ādibhūtas tamobahulas tenoktaḥ sa tāmasa iti*). In fact the ego is the 'origin of the *bhūtas* abounding in *tamas*' only in an indirect way: in the Sāṃkhya doctrine of evolution, the *bhūtas* proceed from the *tanmātras*, which are the evolutes of the *tāmasa* ego. Cf. TS VIII (pp. 89–90): *śabdaviśeṣāṇāṃ hi kṣobhātmanāṃ yad ekam akṣobhātmakaṃ prāgbhāvi sāmānyam aviśeṣātmakaṃ tat śabdatanmātram/ evaṃ gandhānte 'pi vācyam*, 'That which is the undisturbed, unique, [principle] of specific sounds whose nature has been disturbed, such a universal (*sāmānya*) of a non-specific nature, which is prior to them, is called *śabdatanmātra*, "sound as such". This may be said also of the other *tanmātras* down to odor'.

[614] Cf. SK 38 quoted n. 609.

[615] *bhūtas*, or *mahābhūtas* — lit., 'great (or gross) entities/beings'.

[616] According to GBh 38, one *bhūta* proceeds from one *tanmātra*: ether from sound, air from touch, water from savor, fire from form, earth from odor. However, this does not contradict the definition of PS 22, which agrees, as does the theoretical section (*vidyāpāda*) of the Āgamas (e.g. *Kālottara*, *Pauṣkara*, etc.), with the classical Sāṃkhya thesis (see *Yuktidīpikā* ad SK 38) of the *tanmātras*' progressive accumulation, that is, that the physical elements are categorized by the adjunction one-by-one of sensible qualities, for it remains the case that each *bhūta* has one *tanmātra* as its primary quality (see Torella ĪPK: 196); see Appendix 13, p. 337.

proceeds earth.[617] Such are the five 'great' [that is, gross, physical] elements (*mahābhūta*).[618]

In consideration of the maxim, 'the effect has the qualities of the cause',[619] [it follows that the *mahābhūtas*] have qualities that increase [in complexity] one-by-one [— each more complex element, in other words, has one more quality than the preceding simpler element].

Thus is *prakṛti*, whose nature is that of cause and effect,[620] transformed into something that can be enjoyed by the mundane man (*puruṣa*), through the Will of the Supreme Lord. And so has this world of thirty-six principles been described, *tattva* by *tattva*, by distinguishing [each principle from the rest].[621]

Kārikā 23

As the master explained previously how *māyā* functioned as sheath (*māyākañcuka*) [kārikās 15–18], so [now] he explains how *prakṛti* serves as sheath with respect to the mundane man:

23. As the husk envelops the rice-grain, so does this creation, beginning with *prakṛti* and ending with earth, envelop consciousness in the manner of a body.

As **the husk**, the skin of the grain, **envelops**, or veils, **the rice-grain**, so does **this creation** too, starting with *pradhāna* and ending with earth,

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[617]From clay to man, all earthly elements are fragrant.

[618]On the relationship of the *tanmātras* and the *bhūtas*, see Frauwallner 1973: 279ff.

[619]The statement quoted here is an adaptation of SK 14, expounding the theory of *satkāryavāda*: *kāraṇaguṇātmakatvāt kāryasya [...]*, 'Because the effect has as its essence the qualities of the cause', commented upon by Gauḍapāda as: *loke yadātmakaṃ kāraṇaṃ tadātmakaṃ kāryam api/ tathā kṛṣṇebhyas tantubhyaḥ kṛṣṇa eva paṭo bhavati*, 'In mundane matters, of whatever nature is the cause, of the same nature is the effect. For instance, from black threads only a black piece of cloth comes into being'. The same logic underlies the theory of the progressive accumulation of *tanmātras* within the *bhūtas* as they increase in grossness (see ĪPV III 1, 10–11, in Appendix 13, p. 337).

[620]See Frauwallner 1973: 304ff. From the Trika point of view, *prakṛti* is also an effect, inasmuch as its proceeds from *māyā*, which is, in turn, nothing but the Lord's energy of freedom.

[621]Here ends the description of the thirty-six *tattvas*. On the last twenty-three, which, from *buddhi* onward, constitute cognizable reality (*meya*), see ĪPK I 1, 10–11, and *Vṛtti* (Torella ĪPK: 195–196). This portrayal of the process of manifestation is ultimately meant to show the way the process may be reversed progressively and the world "reabsorbed", as one strives for liberation; see PTLvṛ 21–24 (which echoes ChU VI 1, 4ff.): *yathā ghaṭaśarāvaprabhṛtiprapañcavarjane mṛnmātram eva satyaṃ mṛdrūpātmakaprapañcavarjane 'pi gandha ity eva satyaṃ gandharūpatāviśeṣāparamarśe 'ham ity eva satyaṃ tathā*, 'As, when the phenomena that are the jar, the dish, etc., are set aside, what remains truly is clay itself, and as, when the phenomenon of clay is set aside, what remains truly is odor itself, and as, when one is no longer aware of any specific odor, what remains truly is the [absolute] 'I' (*aham*) itself, likewise [...]' (our translation).

envelop once again **consciousness** — [already] enveloped by the sheath of *māyā*, figuratively represented by the bran — **in the manner of a body**, figuratively represented by the husk, that is, it veils [consciousness] as its outer enclosure.

Here [, at this level], are called Sakalas[622] those cognizers who are of a bodily nature because of the factors of fragmentation (*kalā*),[623] beginning with the organs in their "pure" state [that is, without adjunction of an object][624] and ending with particular [objects] [i.e., with the *mahābhūtas*].

And those who are freed from the particular [that is, from gross materiality] and from the body are Pralayākalas [as happens, for instance, in deep sleep].[625]

Such is this world: governed by the Rudras and by ordinary souls,[626] in the company of the seven categories of subjects (*pramātṛsaptaka*), from Śiva to the Sakalas.

622The Sakalas, lit., 'those endowed with *kalā*', are affected by the three impurities, and their condition is that of life in this world. They are therefore also called *māyāpramātṛs*, inasmuch as they are deceived by *māyā* from which the dichotomy of subject and object begins. On Sakalas, see Appendix 10, p. 330.

623Commenting on *kalāviluptavibhavaḥ [...] sa paśuḥ*, 'the fettered subject, deprived of his might by *kalā*', SpN III 13 sets forth the meanings of *kalā*: *kalayati bahiḥ kṣipati pārimityena paricchinattīti kalā māyāśaktiḥ [...] atha ca kalayā kiñcitkartṛtvopodbalanātmanā śaktyā tadupalakṣitena kalāvidyākālaniyatirāgātmanā kañcukena viluptavibhavaḥ sthagitapūrṇatvakartṛtvādidharmaḥ/ [...] kalayā akhyātyātmanāṃśena viluptavibhavaḥ saṃkucita iva*, 'The term *kalā* [lit., '(the verb) *kalayati*'] designates that which, projecting outside, cuts off and delimits, namely, the energy of delusion (*māyāśakti*) [...]. According to another interpretation, *kalā* means the energy/power (*śakti*) giving strength to limited agency (*kiñcitkartṛtva*). [This power named *kalā*] implies the [quintuple] sheath (*kañcuka*) of *kalā*, *vidyā*, *kāla*, *niyati* and *rāgā*. Therefore, "the fettered subject deprived of his might by *kalā*" designates the one whose attributes of perfection, [unrestrained] agency, etc., are veiled by that [quintuple sheath]. [...] [And *kalā* may be taken in the sense of a part (*aṃśa*). Therefore,] being deprived of his glory by a part, i.e., by the part[ial knowledge] that is *akhyāti* [the metaphysical ignorance of his own plenary nature], he is contracted [i.e., limited] as it were'. Cf. ĪPV III 2, 13 (vol. II: 263), defining *buddhīndriyas* and *karmendriyas* as the expansion (*prapañca*) of *vidyā* and *kalā*, viz., of limited Knowledge and limited Agency (*vidyākalayoḥ prapañcabhūtau yau krameṇa buddhīndriyakarmendriyavargau*). Also ĪPV III 2, 8 (vol. II: 252), quoted n. 625.

624*indriyamātra* — implied here is the Indian notion according to which the organs, far from being mere receptors, play an active part in the act of perception. In this vein, the term *grāha* is to be taken literally.

625ĪPV III 2, 8 (vol. II: 252) defines the Pralayākalas as follows: *[...] kṛtā akalāḥ kalātattvopalakṣitakaraṇakāryarahitā*, 'They have been made "without activity (*kalā*)" (*akala*), i.e., devoid of the *karaṇas* [the internal and external organs] and *kāryas* [the objects of those organs] which are implied by *kalātattva* [limited Agency]'. This is why the term Pralayākala has to be understood as 'Inert in Dissolution' [lit., 'those devoid of limited Agency (*akala*), because of dissolution (*pralaya*)'] — a condition experienced, for instance, in deep sleep, when one reaches that state of total absorption (signified by the word 'dissolution') where neither sense-organs, nor objects of sense appear to be in play. It is thus a degree of consciousness higher than that of the Sakalas. Rudra is the model for such subjects. See Appendix 1, p. 317 and Appendix 10, p. 330.

626YR thus intends to place the Rudras and the 'fettered souls' on the same level of responsibility (or of deficiency).

Kārikā 24

The master now explains the triad of sheaths — the supreme, the subtle, and the gross:

24. In this world, the supreme covering is the impurity [also termed *āṇavamala*]; the subtle one consists of the [sixfold] sheath, beginning with *māyā*[627] [thus constituting the *māyīyamala*]; the gross covering is external, and has the form of the body [thus constituting the *kārmamala*]. Indeed the Self is enwrapped in a triad of coverings.

Inmost **impurity**, the *āṇava[mala]* [viz., the impurity of deeming oneself finite],[628] means here the [*paśu*'s] failure to recognize that he is consciousness — which failure, in turn, consists essentially in casting aside one's own real nature.

By **supreme** is meant 'existentially included [in the finite soul]' for it remains as coexistent [with consciousness][629] in the manner of the flaw within the gold.[630]

By **covering** (*āvaraṇa*) is meant 'veil' (*chādana*).

The sixfold **sheath beginning with *māyā***, and ending with limited Knowledge, constitutes **the subtle** covering of the Self.

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[627]... and ending with *vidyā*.

[628]The *āṇavamala* is the fundamental, ontological impurity, that 'concerning the *aṇu*' (cf. the 'atom' of the Vaiśeṣika — the smallest particle found in "nature"). It represents the reduction of infinite free consciousness to a minimal, 'atomic', state. In the realm of experience, as stated in ŚSV I 4, the *āṇavamala* is the 'presumption (or intuition) of limitedness' (*apūrṇammanyatā*), which makes the limited soul think: *apūrṇo 'smi*, 'I am not full [viz., 'I am imperfect']' (ibid.). Same definition in PHvṛ 9 (p. 72). Note that *mala* often signifies, by synecdoche, *āṇavamala*, particularly in Siddhānta.

[629]The term *tādātmya* is used by Advaitins as a way of rationalizing their inability to describe in conventional terms the relationship between *brahman* and *māyā* — neither identity, nor difference, nor both (viz., the notion of *bhedābheda*, dear to the *pariṇāmavāda*, but abjured by Advaita). It might be said that the Advaitin speaks of *tādātmya* in a way resembling Nāgārjuna's use of the *catuṣkoṭi* — viz., in order to assert that the Absolute is ineffable. In the same fashion, here, even though it cannot be said why the flaw is within the gold, its presence therein is both irrefutable and "given" (*nija*). Here, *tādātmyena* glosses the epithet *antaraṅga*, glossed previously as *nija*, 'innate' (YR ad 17).

[630]One might allege here a certain inconsistency in YR's use of metaphors. In AG's text, in effect, the analogy of the inedible bran (*kambuka*) of the grain is affected to the *māyīyamala* (kā. 17–18). Yet, commenting (ad kā. 17) on the 'antaraṅgatva' of the hexad of sheaths that constitutes the *māyīyamala*, YR introduces the analogy of the flaw within the gold (*kālikā*) — an analogy which, in his commentary ad 24, is affected to the *āṇavamala*, whereas that of the bran is affected to the *māyīyamala*. The following interpretation may solve the difficulty: in YR ad 17, the analogy of the flaw within the gold is affected to the *māyīyamala* only secondarily, inasmuch as the *māyīyamala* presupposes the *āṇavamala*, which is indeed implied by the term 'aṇu', in the genitive: *māyāsahitaṃ kañcukaṣaṭkam aṇor antaraṅgam idam uktam* (17b); see YR *ad loc.* In YR ad 87–88, the analogy of the flaw within the gold is again affected to the *āṇavamala*.

Such a cover pertains to [the soul/consciousness] in such a way that it leans back against it,[631] as does the bran with respect to the rice-grain — thanks to which the display of the [limited] ability to know, act, etc., constitutive of difference,[632] displays itself [before us — in reference to the "world" extending before us in apparent multiplicity]. It constitutes the impurity of regarding the world as objective.[633]

External, with respect to it, is the covering — figuratively represented by the husk — which is characterized as embodied existence (*śarīrasattā*) derived from *pradhāna*, and which is **gross**, for it consists of skin, flesh, etc.

This is the third impurity [namely, the impurity of supposing oneself the agent] of actions, due to which the subject becomes a receptacle for the accumulation of good and bad [results of] actions.[634]

Thus **the Self**, although fully open (*vikasvara*) becomes contracted (*saṃkucitīkṛta*) [i.e., is reduced to finitude],[635] like space by the jar, and **is enwrapped in this triad of coverings** — the supreme, the subtle and the gross.[636] In this condition, it is deemed 'atomic' (*aṇu*, viz., finite soul), and it is termed the fettered soul (*paśu*).

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[631] Viz., that it is tightly attached to it.

[632] Here, the five *kañcukas* are referred to, as defined in kā. 17.

[633] ŚSV I 4 defines the *māyīyamala* as the 'display of differentiated objectivity' (*bhinnavedyaprathā*), which makes the limited soul consider his body as if it were his Self, such that he thinks: *kṣāmaḥ sthūlo vāsmi*, 'I am slim or fat' (ibid.). Same definition in PHvṛ 9. See also YR ad 31.

[634] ŚSV I 4 defines the *kārmamala* as the 'impregnating [of consciousness] with the dispositions that result from one's good and bad [actions]' (*śubhāśubhavāsanā*), which makes the limited soul think: *agniṣṭomayājy asmi*, 'I am a performer of the *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice' (ibid.). Similar definition in PHvṛ 9.

[635] The contrast *saṃkocavikāsa* is specific to Trika, evoking the closing and opening of a flower. *saṃkoca* is a metaphor of finitude, *vikāsa* of liberation. The image will be taken up again in YR ad 56, 60, 61, in the course of discussing *mokṣa*.

[636] Kṣemarāja, commenting on his PH 9 (pp. 71–72), goes even further, presenting the three *malas* as limitations (*saṃkoca*, or *parimitatā*) of the *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kriyā śaktis*, respectively: *icchāśaktiḥ saṃkucitā satī apūrṇaṃmanyatārūpam āṇavaṃ malam; jñānaśaktiḥ […] antaḥkaraṇabuddhīndriyatāpattipūrvam atyantaṃ saṃkocagrahaṇena bhinnavedyaprathārūpaṃ māyīyam malam; kriyāśaktiḥ […] karmendriyarūpasaṃkocagrahaṇapūrvam atyantaṃ parimitatāṃ prāptā śubhāśubhānuṣṭhānamayaṃ kārmaṃ malam/*, '*icchāśakti*, once contracted, becomes *āṇavamala*, which consists in considering oneself imperfect; *jñānaśakti*, assuming the extreme contraction that begins with the acquisition of the inner organ and cognitive organs, becomes *māyīyamala*, which consists of the apprehension of objects as different [from one another and from the Self]; *kriyāśakti*, once contracted in the form of organs of action, becomes extremely limited, assuming the form of *kārmamala*, which consists in doing good and evil'.

Kārikā 25

Due to its relationship with those [three coverings, or impurities], [the Self] is harmed,[637] as it were. The master says:

25. Due to the darkness of ignorance [which is akin to the disease of double-vision],[638] the [Self][639] conceives its own essential nature[640] as a multifarious diversity of objects and subjects, whereas it is one and nondual.

The [aforementioned] Self, bound up with the triad of coverings, because it has been brought into contact with the darkness that is the failure to discern the Self,[641] knows

its own — that is, its inherent, viz., not borrowed from another —

essential nature (*ātmasvabhāvam* = ***svabhāvam ātmānam***) — namely, consciousness, that essence whose distinguishing mark is the [pure] presence of the Self —

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[637]*upahata* — 'harmed' means here 'forgotten'. Same image in YR ad 31: *yad [anātmany api] ... ātmamānitvam ... etad ativaiśasam.*

[638]*ajñānatimira* — the term *timira* is here used both in its general sense ('darkness') and in a specialized medical sense, designating a certain disease of the eye (see also the gloss, here, of *ajñānatimira* by '*ātmākhyātyandhakāra*' as well as kā. 31 and YR ad loc.). What is at stake here is the specific ocular disorder that causes double-vision, which may be translated by the technical term 'diplopia'. This diplopia, and its effect, the apprehension of a double moon, serves as a classic example of erroneous perception (*bhrānti*) and of metaphysical ignorance, or nescience (*akhyāti*), since by this defect of vision one perceives duality where there is only unity. The motif of diplopia is recurrent in Trika literature; see, for instance, TĀ I 331, ĪPvṛ III 2, 17 (*dvicandrādibhrāntiḥ*), ĪPvṛ II 3, 13; also *Stavacintāmaṇi* 24: *ajñānatimirasyaikam auṣadhaṃ saṃsmṛtis tava/*, 'Your constant memory is the only remedy for the darkness of ignorance', and Kṣemarāja ad loc.: *timiraṃ pratibhācakṣurāvārakatvena dvaitapradarśako doṣaḥ*, '*timira*, which is an imperfection [of vision] due to which one sees [real objects as] double, is [to be understood] as what obstructs the vision of the supreme consciousness (*pratibhā*)'. Rāmānuja's *Śrībhāṣya* I 1, 1 (pp. 99–100) explains the apprehension of a double moon by the split of the visual rays that is produced either through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to *timira*, understood in the technical sense of an 'ocular disorder': *dvicandrajñānādāv apy aṅgulyavaṣṭambhatimirādibhir nāyanatejogatibhedena sāmagrībhedāt sāmagrīdvayam anyonyanirapekṣaṃ candragrahaṇadvayahetur bhavati*, 'Similar is the case of the double moon. Here, either through pressure of the finger upon the eye, or owing to some abnormal affection of the eye, the visual rays are divided (split), and the double, mutually independent apparatus of vision thus originating, becomes the cause of a double apprehension of the moon' (tr. Thibaut, *Vedāntasūtra*: 123). The term *rekhātimira* is in itself a technical description of the trouble, since it means the '*timira* consisting in [confusing the] lines (*rekhā*)'. See YR ad 31.

[639]Despite the separate avat. ad 25, kārikās 24 and 25 make one grammatical unit, whose subject is the *ātman* (occurring at the very end of kā. 24) and whose predicate is the verb *avabudhyeta*.

[640]*svaṃ svabhāvam ātmānam* — agreeing with Barnett, Silburn translates: 'alors qu'il est [...] identique à soi' [— 'whereas it is self-identical'], which appears to render *svaṃ svabhāvam*. See YR's commentary on *svaṃ svabhāvam ātmānam*, rephrased as *svaṃ ātmasvabhāvam*.

[641]*ātmākhātyandhakāra* — cf. the definition of the *āṇavamala* as *caitanyasya ... akhyāti*, in YR ad 24.

although one — that is, although of a nondual nature — [only] in terms of the phenomenal display — a display that consists of multifarious constructs [or (artificial) arrangements, dispositions], such as knower, means of knowledge and known;

or, in other words, it thinks of itself in terms of difference, the obverse of [original] non-difference.

For instance, the person afflicted with the [ocular disorder called] *rekhātimira*, though he is looking at just one moon, asserts that there are two moons in the sky and even points them out to people, saying: 'Look at the two moons!' Inasmuch as the moon is really single, it is due to his diplopia (*timira*) that it so appears. And thus, the person afflicted with diplopia experiences a practical result, be it anxiety or delight.[642]

Similarly, he takes as his goal the fruits of actions, as different [from himself], treating everything as different though it is not different from his own self — he by whom the display of difference has been taken for granted thanks to the darkness of ignorance [viz., of non-recognition of the Self].[643]

And thus he becomes again and again the enjoyer of heaven and hell [as a result of his actions].

In this way, diplopia is to be taken here as a metaphor[644] for ignorance (*ajñāna*),[645] for thereby things appear contrary [to reality].

Kārikā 26

The master shows the nonduality of the Self through an illustration:[646]

26. Just as juice, skimmed froth, granular sugar, brown sugar, candy, etc., are in essence nothing but sugar cane,[647] so are all forms

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[642] *arthakriyām prāpnoti* — lit., 'He acquires [viz., reaps the benefit of] its causal efficiency which produces either anxiety or delight'. Seeing those two moons, he watches them or shows them to others, deriving either anxiety or delight from this experience, or wishing others to experience the same feelings.

[643] Thus are referred to, respectively, the *āṇavamala* (the darkness of ignorance), the *māyīyamala* (the display of difference), and the *kārmamala* (the acting in the world of differentiation).

[644] *rūpaṇā*.

[645] Same phraseology in YR ad 30, which reformulates PS 25.

[646] It should be noted that AG's PS 26–28 agrees here as to content and sequence with ĀPS 26–28.

[647] Cf. MM 25, which uses the same analogy in a different context. The PM ad loc. explains: *yadvad ikṣurasasya svapākayuktikramāt styānībhūtasya mādhuryaṃ gulapiṇḍair na parityajyate*, '[...] as sweetness is not alien to [viz., is still retained by] the lumps of *gūr* (solidified molasses), [that result] from the process of cooking the juice of the sugar cane until it becomes solidified'. Cf. ChU VI 1, 4: *yathā saumya ekena mṛtpiṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ vijñātaṃ syāt vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mṛttikety eva satyam*, 'Just as, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay becomes known, the modification being only a name arising

only different states of the supreme Self, Śaṃbhu.[648]

As one and the same essence of sugar cane (*ikṣurasa*) is [revealed in] the different forms taken on by the sugar cane, such as **juice** (*rasa*), **etc.**, on account of the [same] ultimate sweetness found in all of them, so, likewise, **all** particulars that appear within phenomenal display through the relation of object to subject are — [like] waking, etc. — merely **different states of the supreme Self** (*paramātman*), one's own essential nature, [which we term] **Śaṃbhu**, the Great Lord, consciousness itself.

For it is that very Lord, the inner self (*svātmabhūta*) of each and every one, who assumes those different roles[649] out of his own freedom, and thus displays himself as characterized by the states of object and subject, etc., in the same way as does the juice of the sugar cane [assume various forms].[650] Moreover, it is not that there is anything different from that Self. Therefore, it is one and nondual, for consciousness pervades all the states.

Thus, visualizing everywhere the unity [of the Self], the cognizer becomes the knower of all.[651]

As the revered Śaṃbhu[nātha] has stated:[652]

> One object has the nature of all objects. All objects have the nature of one object. Therefore, he who has seen one object in its essence has seen all objects in their essence.

And in *Bhagavadgītā*:

> Whereby in all beings one/ Unchanging[653] condition men

from speech while the truth is that it is just clay'.

[648]Verse quoted in PM 25.

[649]*bhūmikā* — same image in YR ad 1 and 5. Compare YR ad 5: *na punaḥ śivavyatiriktaṃ kiṃcit padārthajātam asti*, 'There is, in consequence, nothing to which language can refer that is other than Śiva'. and what is formulated here: *na punaḥ svātmanaḥ tasmād bhinnaṃ kiṃcid asti*, 'Moreover, it is not that there is anything different from that Self'. On *bhūmikā* in the sense of 'level [of subjectivity]', see YR ad 41–46 (general avat.) and 45.

[650]The use of the word *rasa* here in its two senses (lit., 'juice' and fig. 'essence') confirms the word's etymology. The connection of the two is so close that it may be doubted whether even a pun is intended.

[651]*sarvadṛśvan*.

[652]One of the teachers of AG who deserves specific mention in TĀ (I 12–13, I 16), Śaṃbhunātha (celebrated as Bhaṭṭanātha, 'revered teacher', in śl. 16) probably initiated AG in Kaula tantric practices.

[653]Our text agrees with the KSTS in reading *akṣaya* 'imperishable' here. However, the received text of this line of the *Gītā* reads *avyaya* 'changeless', which is followed by Śaṅkara (who glosses it with *kūṭastha*) as well as by other commentators (when this can be ascertained); and this reading was also adopted in the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata* (VI 40, 20) and in Edgerton's translation. For the reasons why we have retained the KSTS's variant, see our 'List of variants' in 'On the Sanskrit text'.

perceive,/ Unmanifold in the manifold,/ Know that that knowledge is of goodness.[654]

Kārikā 27

Though the variety [of reasonings][655] formulated by the other schools is accepted by us for purposes of provisional discussion,[656] that variety is not becomingly employed[657] in the arena of [those reasonings that have to do with] the truth.

The master now says:

27. [The many differing conceptions of the Ultimate — that it is] Consciousness, or the Inner Controller, or Breath, or the Sovereign Body,[658] or the Genus, or, finally, that it is the Particular — all these are for purposes of disputation only;[659] in ultimate terms, none of

[654]BhG XVIII 20. This verse contrasts the knowledge proceeding from *sattva* with that based on *rajas* (śl. 21) and *tamas* (śl. 22). This *sāttvika* knowledge consists in realizing the Self (here *bhāva*, 'Entity/Reality') as nondual, however multifarious empirical diversity may be. BhGBh XVIII, 20 concludes: *tadātmavastu vyomavan nirantaram ity arthaḥ*, 'That Reality which is the Self remains, like space, undivided — this is the purport'. And Ś adds in his avat. to 21: *yāni dvaitadarśanāni tāni asamyagbhūtāni rājasāni tāmasāni ceti na sākṣāt saṃsārocchittaye bhavanti*, 'Being based on *rajas* and *tamas*, those doctrines that are dualistic are incomplete; therefore, they are not by themselves adequate for the eradication of [the pains of] worldly existence'.

[655]Note that *bhedaḥ* is rephrased as *ete bhedāḥ* (plural) at the end of the same commentary.

[656]*saṃvṛtyartham* — 'for purposes of provisional [discussion]' is a contextually determined "translation" of *saṃvṛtyartham*, here apparently understood by YR as a synonym of the kārikā's *vyavahāramātram*. In any case *saṃvṛti* appears to be used here in a way consistent with its Buddhist sense; YR himself, while commenting on this very kārikā, uses the term *saṃvṛtisatya*, variously translated as 'vérité d'enveloppement', 'surface-level truth', 'relative truth', or 'truth of empirical order', and contrasted with *paramārthasatya*, 'deep-level truth'. On this opposition, see, *inter alia*, Edgerton BSHD, s.v., who translates 'common-sense truth'; Sprung 1973: 40–53; Bareau 1966, vol. III: 179, 184, 196. Cf. *Bhāmatī* on *satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya* (BSBh I 1, 1, *Adhyāsaprakaraṇa*: 17): *na ca saṃvṛtiparamārthasatoḥ pāramārthikaṃ mithunam astīty abhūtatadbhāvārthasya cveḥ prayogaḥ*.

[657]*avakalpate*.

[658]*virāḍdeha* — the cosmic Man whose body is the entire cosmos. Silburn distinguishes between *virāj*, translated as 'corps cosmique' ['cosmic body'], and *deha*, translated as 'corps ordinaire' ['ordinary body']. So does Pandit PS: 37. We have followed YR's gloss, which takes *virāḍdeha* as a unit. Note that R ad ĀPS 27 interprets also *virāḍdeha* as a single syntagm, and understands it as 'the Brahmā Egg, stretching for 500 million *yojanas*' (*pañcāśatkoṭiyojanavistīrṇaṃ brahmāṇḍam*). Cf. BĀUBh I 4, 1, who identifies the *ātman* with Virāj or Hiraṇyagarbha.

[659]Whatever translation we adopt, *vyavahāra* (in *vyavahāramātram etat*) should be taken as referring to this world of practical and provisional truths. Cf. also YR ad 37: 'Moreover, in none of the other schools of philosophy do the terms *jīva*, *puruṣa*, *ātman*, *aṇu*, apply (*vyavahriyate*) to the Supreme Lord, a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness'. Cf. also MāU 7 and 12, in which 'the ineffable final fourth part of the human self and the soundless fourth part of *oṃ* [...] are described as *avyavahāra*, "not susceptible of being dealt with, in language or otherwise." ' (Hacker 1972: 120). According to ĀŚ II 17–19 and Ś

them[660] exist [as characterizations of the Ultimate].[661]

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ad loc. (on the authorship of the *Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*, or *Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa* [ĀŚV], and its traditional ascription to Ś, see notably Bouy ĀŚ: 31–33, and n. 140), *prāṇa*, etc., are among the innumerable objects (*bhāva*) imagined (*vikalpita*) as the *ātman*. And those objects are endowed with *saṃsāradharmas*, 'phenomenal attributes' (ĀŚV II 17–18), or *saṃsāralakṣaṇas*, 'phenomenal characteristics' (ĀŚV II 19), such as cause and effect, exteriority, interiority, decay, death, etc., from which, as established by scripture (*sarvopaniṣad*, in ĀŚV II 17; *śāstra*, in ĀŚV II 18) through the *via negationis*, the *ātman* is altogether distinct (ĀŚV II 17 is quoted n. 667).

[660] And, *ipso facto*, the doctrines that expound them.

[661] This enumeration of different conceptions of the Real is rather unusual in Trika literature. The canonical scheme appears to be that of PS 32, which enumerates *deha*, body, *prāṇa*, breath, *buddhi*, intellect or volition, and *nabhas* (or *śūnya*), the Void. A list that matches that of ĪPK I 6, 4, and of ŚSV I 1, which, commenting on *caitanyam ātmā*, explicitly attributes these different conceptions of the Real to their respective exponents or schools of thought: *atha cātmā ka iti jijñāsūn upadeśyān prati bodhayituṃ na śarīraprāṇabuddhiśūnyāni laukikacārvākavaidikayogācāramādhyamikādyabhyupagatāny ātmāpi tu yathoktaṃ caitanyam eva*, 'And so, in order to explain to inquisitive disciples what the Self is, the author says: "It is not the body, as maintained by the Materialists (*laukikacārvāka*), not Breath (*prāṇa*), as maintained by the followers of the Vedas, not the intellect (*buddhi*), as maintained by the Yogācāras, nor the Void (*śūnya*), as maintained by the Mādhyamikas, but, as already said, it is pure consciousness (*caitanya*)' (tr. Singh, modified). For parallel passages, see Appendix 14, p. 338. The enumeration of kā. 27a may have been occasioned by ĀPS 27a, first hemistich, of which it is an exact borrowing. However, the perspectives of the two texts are altogether different. On the basis of their common terminology and approach, it appears that, as a Vedāntin, Ādiśeṣa agrees with Bhartṛprapañca's conception of *brahman*, or *paramātman*, passing through different states, or stages (*avasthā*), in the process of evolution, the ultimate reality becoming differentiated into the manifold objects of experience that are both identical to and different from it. These stages, or modes, of the *saprapañcabrahman*, to which the infinite variety of the universe is reduced, are eight in number, according to Bhartṛprapañca. In descending order, the hypostases, or 'transformations' (*pariṇāma*) of *brahman*, are (see Hiriyanna 1924: 79–80): 1) *antaryāmin*; 2) *sākṣin*; 3) *avyākṛta*; 4) *sūtra*; 5) *virāj*; 6) *daiva*; 7) *jāti*; 8) *piṇḍa*. Thus, as Hiriyanna concludes (p. 80): 'the whole *brahman* may be said to evolve in two distinct lines — one (1–2) the spiritual, and the other (3–8) the material, which constitutes either the adjunct or the environment of the spiritual'. In ĀPS 27a, those *avasthās* are said to be five, if one relies on R, who takes *jātipiṇḍa* as a unit, glossing it "*vyaṣṭidehāḥ*", doubtless to be taken in its Sāṃkhya acceptation, which designates the particular 'body' only insofar as it constitutes a part of a larger whole. Thus Ādiśeṣa enumerates *vijñāna*, *antaryāmin*, *prāṇa*, *virāḍdeha*, and *jātipiṇḍa*, even though those states imputed to the Self are in truth unreal, for it is only one, as established by ChU VI 2, 1 quoted by R ad ĀPS 27. Despite the similarity of their first hemistichs, verses 26 and 27 differ as to their purport in the two *Paramārthasāra*. In ĀPS, kā. 26 and 27 form a pair expounding the view common to Bhartṛprapañca and Ādiśeṣa of the evolutionary relationship between *paramātman* (or *saprapañcabrahman*) and the modes in which the universe appears: *rasaphāṇitaśarkarikāguḍakhaṇḍā vikṛtayo yathaivekṣoḥ/ tadvad avasthābhedāḥ paramātmany eva bahurūpāḥ// vijñānāntaryāmiprāṇavirāḍdehajātipiṇḍāntāḥ/ vyavahārās tasyātmany ete 'vasthāviśeṣāḥ syuḥ//*. On the contrary, AG's PS distinguishes 26 from 27, which contrast is signaled also by the supplementary *-ādyāḥ*. Verse 26 is indeed an adaptation of ĀPS 26 (besides the adjunction of *-ādi*, note the suppression of *vikṛti* in a; the greater alteration of b). Verse 27 then becomes the doctrinal exposition of different conceptions of the Self, at the cost of making a few alterations in the half verse: *vijñānāntaryāmiprāṇavirāḍdehajātipiṇḍāntāḥ/ vyavahāramātram etat paramārthena tu na santy eva//*. According to YR's interpretation, the names given to the Self or Ultimate do not denote the different states through which it passes, but the different conceptions of the Ultimate that

By **consciousness** (*vijñāna*)[662] is meant 'nothing but consciousness' (*bodhamātra*), in isolation (*kevala*), devoid of limiting attributes.[663] Although devoid of name and form,[664] [consciousness] appears variously, adopting the mode of externality, in shapes such as "blue" and "pleasure", etc.,[665] — thanks to the power of beginningless latent dispositions [constantly] reawakened (*vāsanāprabodha*)[666] and infinitely various. Thus say

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the different schools of philosophy attempt to establish. Thus, verse 27 aims to refute such doctrines in order to establish the Trika as the highest and only true view. From the Trika perspective, if there is an evolution, it is not of the Self, which is beyond evolution, but of speculations about the Self. And Trika represents the accomplishment of this long speculative process (see n. 689 and 946). Cf. ĀŚ II 19–28, which enumerates thirty-five conceptions of the Self or Ultimate, falsely represented as so many phenomena. ĀŚ II 30 concludes that the *ātman*, which assumes the form of the innumerable phenomena it itself creates, is in reality absolute and free from all ideation. Such phenomena do not exist independently of the *ātman*, which is their substratum, as shown by Ś ad loc., who quotes BĀU II 4, 6 [= IV 5, 7]: *idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā*. Also, BSBh I 1. A separate monograph will be devoted to a detailed interpretation of this kārikā and its commentary.

[662]The question of how to translate the term is taken up in May 1971: 305. The term (one of whose synonyms is *citta*) is understood contextually as 'cognition', 'pensée' ('thought'), or 'conscience' ('consciousness'); May translates *cittamātravāda*, one of the appelations given to the Vijñānavāda, as 'doctrine du rien-que-pensée', 'doctrine de la pensée sans plus' (EPU II, s.v. *citta*). Cf. ĀŚ II 25b and BSBh II 2, 28.

[663]*anupādhi*.

[664]From BĀU I 6, 3, the syntagm 'name and form' signifies phenomenal reality as veiling the immortal *ātman*, equated with *prāṇa*. Therefore, it designates the objective aspect of consciousness. "Name" refers to the "designating" subject, "form" to the "signified" object; in their opposition, they refer to a world conceived of as a totality half-objective and half-subjective.

[665]*nīla*, 'blue' [or yellow (*pīta*), etc.], is the standard example of the external form grasped by the sense-organs, whereas *sukha*, 'pleasure', is that of the internal, grasped by the *antaḥkaraṇa* (see YR ad 30). Therefore, the syntagm *nīlasukhādi* represents the 'knowable' (*vedya*), or 'objectivity' insofar as it is an object of consciousness, whether external or internal. Such reasonings are common to Buddhist idealists and to the Trika, even though the latter (see SpK I 4) reaches the opposite conclusion: the existence of a permanent Subject, a substratum for the impermanent, incidental experiences of pleasure and pain, etc. On the Vijñānavāda, see Bouy ĀŚ: 229–235, 261–263 (who refers to Lévi 1911, Bareau 1966, Bugault 1968, Yamada 1977, Dasgupta 1969, Mahadevan 1975); see also May 1971: 265–323.

[666]YR reproduces here the very terms of ĪPK I 5, 5, which formulates the Vijñānavāda doctrine through its refutation — to which Trika adheres — by the Bāhyārthānumeyavādins: *na vāsanāprabodho 'tra vicitro hetutām iyāt/ tasyāpi tatprabodhasya vaicitrye kiṃ nibandhanam//*, 'Not [even] a varied reawakening of the dispositions can be taken to be the cause here [viz., of the multiform world of phenomena], for in such case, what would be the cause of the variety of their reawakening [if not the existence of material entities outside the plane of thought]?' (tr. Torella, modified); ĪPV I 5, 5 (vol. I: 212ff.), refutes the Vijñānavāda with two arguments: 1) *vāsanās* are able to cause remembrance only: *vijñānavādinā yo hetur vaicitrye vāsanāprabodhalakṣaṇa uktaḥ sa na upapadyate/ 'smṛtijanakaḥ saṃskāro vāsanā' iti tāvat prasiddham*, 'What the Vijñānavādin holds, namely, that the cause of phenomenal diversity consists in the [re]awakening of the *vāsanās* (*vāsanāprabodha*), cannot be accepted, for it is well known that "the *vāsanā* is the residual trace (*saṃskāra*) responsible for remembrance (*smṛti*) [and nothing else]" '; 2) ultimately, the Vijñānavādins' position is but 'a kind of *bāhyārthavāda* under the guise of different words' (*tad ayaṃ śabdāntarapracchanno bāhyārthavādaprakāra eva*); ĪPK I 5, 6–7 give the Trika position, which agrees with the Vijñānavāda in denying

the Vijñānavādins.[667]

The Brahmavādins,[668] citing the texts:

All this [universe] is verily Puruṣa,[669]

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the independent existence of the material world, but disagrees with it inasmuch as it replaces inert thought (*citta*) by free, divine and omnipotent consciousness, as the source of the phenomenal world: *cidātmaiva hi devo 'ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ/ yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet//*, 'Indeed, the Lord, who is consciousness, manifests externally the multitude of the objects that reside within him, without having recourse to material causes, through his sole will, as does a yogin' (ĪPK I 5, 7); see also BSBh II 2, 28, p. 395, which reproduces the debate between a Buddhist Bāhyārthavādin, who holds that the external object is the cause of perceptive cognition (*prajñapti*), and the Vijñānavādin, for whom it is thought or consciousness that transforms itself into objects. To the objection of the Bāhyārthavādin: *kathaṃ punar asati bāhyārthe pratyayavaicitryam upapadyate*, 'How does one explain the variety of sense experience if the external object does not exist?' the Vijñānavādin thus answers: *vāsanāvaicitryād iti*, 'due to the variety of the [inherited, immemorial] dispositions'. See also YR's commentary ad 91, which uses the same terms: *vāsanāprabodha*.

[667]Cf. ĀPS 26–27, which expounds an early vedāntic doctrine that agrees essentially with the teachings of the upaniṣads, on the states or modalities of the *saprapañcabrahman* in the course of its transformation, namely, according to Ādiśeṣa: *vijñāna, antaryāmin, prāṇa, virāḍdeha* and *jātipiṇḍa*. Hence, R ad ĀPS 26–27 quotes, in order to explain *vijñāna*, BĀU III 9, 28: *vijñānam ānandaṃ brahma*, '*brahman* is knowledge and bliss'. Cf. also ĀŚV II 17, where the *ātman* is defined as pure consciousness and nothing else (*viśuddhavijñaptimātra*): *tadhetuphalādisaṃsāradharmānarthavilakṣaṇatayā svena viśuddhavijñaptimātrasattādvayarūpeṇāniścitatvāj jīvaprāṇādyanantabhāvabhedair ātmā vikalpita ity eṣa sarvopaniṣadāṃ siddhāntaḥ*. On the contrary, according to YR, AG's intention is to present and refute the doctrines of the Self or Ultimate held by other systems of thought, namely, at this point, the Vijñānavāda, as does SpN I 5 in dealing with the Śāntabrahmavāda. Commenting upon SpK I 5: *na cāsti mūḍhabhāvo 'pi tad asti paramārthataḥ*, 'That exists in an ultimate sense where there is no insentience', SpN explains: *mūḍhabhāva aiśvaryātmakavimarśaśūnyaprakāśamātratattvo brahmarūpo 'pi yatra nāsti yac chrutyantavidaḥ pratipannāḥ vijñānaṃ brahma iti tasyāpi svātantryātmaka spandaśaktiṃ vinā jaḍatvāt/*, 'Even where insensibility does not exist, if that [sensibility] takes the form of the *brahman* that is, although pure consciousness (*prakāśamātra*), said to be devoid of reflection (*vimarśa*), such as have held the partisans of Vedānta — who say "*brahman* is consciousness" (*vijñānaṃ brahma iti*) — even to that *brahman* insensibility [may be secondarily attributed], because [in addition to being devoid of reflection which is] the source of its sovereignty (*aiśvarya*), it lacks the power of vibration (*spanda*) which is the essence of its freedom (*svātantrya*)'. In the same way, YR (ad *vijñāna* and *antaryāmin*) treats as equivalent the Vijñānavāda and the Śāntabrahmavāda, glossing over their many similarities and differences, insofar as he emphasizes that both have erred equally in not recognizing the absolute freedom of the Lord as cause of creation. Thus perhaps YR echoes the criticism of the Vijñānavādins as formulated by the Mādhyamikas. In effect, according to the Mādhyamikas, the Vijñānavāda theory of cognition, involving the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, 'consciousness-receptacle', has surreptitiously reintroduced the germ of a substantiality which they [viz., the Mādhyamikas] denounced as a resurrection of the brahmanical *ātman* (see Bareau 1966: 196 and Bouy ĀŚ: 320) into Buddhist speculations that had been characterized by the doctrine of *anātman* [Pāli *anatta*] (viz., the non-existence of an imperishable *ātman*); see ĪPK I 5, 5, quoted n. 666.

[668]By the term 'Brahmavādin' YR may refer here to Śaṅkara's Advaita or to preśaṅkarite Vedānta, and most probably, to the *Vaiṣṇava* stream of preśaṅkarite Vedānta, as represented by Bhartṛprapañca and Ādiśeṣa — the reference made here to the *puruṣasūkta* (ṚS X 90) would corroborate such a hypothesis; on the identification of that Brahmavāda, see n. 41.

[669]ṚS X 90, 2. Same text in ŚvU III 15, quoted in SpN II 6–7, which reveals what is really

and:

> There is not the least diversity here [in *brahman*], [670]

hold that it is the transcendental *brahman* itself, which they call the '**Inner Controller** (*antaryāmin*) of all', [671] that appears as difference through the force of beginningless nescience.

[We, however, reply:] — In both these [doctrines, though the

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at stake when confronting the upaniṣadic doctrine with the Śaiva: *ātmā jñātavya iti tatredam eva sarvajñasarvakartṛsvatantraśivasvarūpatayā pratyabhijñānam ātmano jñānaṃ na tu puruṣa evedaṃ sarvam iti śrutyantaviduktam*, 'In the statement: "The Self should be known", what is meant is the recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) of the Self as Śiva, who is omniscient, omnipotent and free. Such is the knowledge of the Self. That [knowledge] is not referred to by the Vedāntins' (*śrutyantavid*) dictum, "All this [universe] is verily Puruṣa." ' Then Kṣemarāja concludes with a quotation from SvT IV 392a: *ta ātmopāsakāḥ sarve na gacchanti paraṃ padam ity āmnāyokteḥ*, '[It is not so] for, as stated by tradition [viz., SvT IV 392a]: "All those worshipers of the Self do not reach the highest state." ' As explained by Singh (SpK: 125), according to the Trika, the realization of [lit., 'mergence into'] the Self (*ātmavyāpti*) is not the highest ideal, rather it is *śivavyāpti*, the realization of both the Self and the universe as Śiva. Cf. also BĀU I 4, 1: *ātmaivedam agrāsīt puruṣavidhaḥ*, 'In the beginning, this [world] was the *ātman* alone, in the form of the *puruṣa*' (cf. Radhakrishnan: 'In the beginning this (world) was only the self in the shape of a person'), and the 'Śaiva Āgama' text quoted in PHvṛ 8: *sthitā vedavidaḥ puṃsi*, 'The knowers of the Vedas rest [content] with the Puruṣa'.

[670] BĀU IV 4, 19. It is evidently a quotation from some older text (*tad ete ślokā bhavanti*: BĀU IV 4, 8), which is followed by this conclusion: *mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyum āpnoti/ ya iha nāneva paśyati*, 'He goes from death to death, who sees in it, as it were, diversity'. Cf. also KāU IV 10b and 11b; text quoted, by means of its *pratīka*, along with the *pratīka* of BĀU II 5, 19 (= ṚS VI 47, 18: *indro māyābhiḥ*) in ĀŚ III 24a (*neha nāneti cāmnāyād [...]*), and in ĀŚV II 31. Cf. also ChU VI 2, 1 quoted n. 893. The two citations given by YR, representing Brahmavāda-Vedānta, establish the thesis that duality is unreal: the Lord whose manifestation is the differentiated universe is inwardly free from differentiation. SpP 28–9 [= ad II 3–4, p. 37] quotes the Śruti: *śrutiś ca ātmaivedaṃ jagat sarvaṃ neha nānāsti kiñcana*, 'Śruti declares: "All this universe is the Self alone, there is not the least diversity here." '

[671] R ad ĀPS 27 quotes BĀU III 7, 3: *yaḥ pṛthivyāṃ tiṣṭhan pṛthivyā antaraḥ, yaṃ pṛthivī na veda, yasya pṛthivī śarīram, yaḥ pṛthivīm antaro yamayati, eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmy amṛtaḥ*, 'He who dwells in the earth, yet is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who controls the earth from within, he is your self, the inner controller, the immortal'. BĀU III 7 (1–23) consists, in its entirety, of the definition, in the form of a litany, of the *ātman* as *antaryāmin*, 'the inner controller from within who controls this world and the next and all things' (*ya imaṃ ca lokaṃ paraṃ ca lokaṃ sarvāṇi ca bhūtāny antaro yamayati*), who is 'that thread by which this world, the other world and all beings are held together' (*tat sūtraṃ yasminn ayaṃ ca lokaḥ paraś ca lokaḥ sarvāṇi ca bhūtāni saṃdṛbdhāni bhavanti*) [BĀU III 7, 1]. The litany concludes (v. 23): *nānyo 'to 'sti draṣṭā, nānyo 'to 'sti śrotā, nānyo 'to 'sti mantā, nānyo 'to 'sti vijñātā/ eṣa ta ātmāntaryāmy amṛtaḥ*, 'There is no other seer but he, there is no other hearer but he, there is no other perceiver but he, there is no other thinker but he. He is your self [*ātman*], the inner controller, the immortal'. Cf. also MāU 6, in which *antaryāmin* defines the *prājña* (on this notion, see kā. 35 and YR ad loc.). Thus, the earliest references to the notion of *antaryāmin* are to be found in the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* and the upaniṣads, especially in the ChU and BĀU, from which is quoted 'There is not the least diversity here [in *brahman*]'. In Vaiṣṇava Vedānta, the *antaryāmin*, which occurs first in the enumeration of the states or modes of the *paramātman*, appears as a *tattva*. Different is the later vedāntic conception of the *antaryāmin*; see, for instance, *Pañcadāśī* VI 236; also BSBh I 2, 5, 18 (which discusses BĀU III 7), in which Śaṅkara holds that the *antaryāmin* is effectively the *ātman*, and is distinguished, at least provisionally, from the *jīva* (this being wholly determined by *māyā*), whereas what one has called the *antaryāmin* represents the core of what is real in the heart

conscious principle has been formulated as supreme], what has not been recognized is the freedom of that conscious principle (*vedana*), which, endowed with life,[672] becomes the efficient cause[673] of the construction of the universe.[674]

However, others, the **Prāṇa**brahmavādins [viz., the Brahmavādins who hold that *brahman* is cosmic **Breath**], maintain that the entire universe has come into being in accordance with the act of breathing (*prāṇana*), once the resolve [of creating the universe] has been formed (*āgūrya*) [or, once [the *brahman-prāṇa*] has proclaimed it].[675] And since, according to

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of the living being — impossible to slough off. Evidently, the *antaryāmin* is 'considered from the *vyāvahārika* point of view', but, at the same time, transcends that point of view — it is not the *jīva*, and to it is not attributed any 'creative' role. Similarly, Rāmānuja identifies the *antaryāmin* with Nārāyaṇa, arguing against a *pūrvapakṣa* which would have it the same as the *jīva*.

[672] *jīvitabhūta* — such terminology implicitly contests the vedāntic's view that *brahman* is *śānta*.

[673] *hetu* — efficient or 'impelling' cause (according to the grammatical acceptation of the term — specifically, the causative 'agent' as contrasted with the embedded 'agent': P. I 4, 55). Cf. Kallaṭa's *Tattvavicāra* quoted in SpP 1, p. 9: *śaktiprasarasaṅkocanibaddhāv udayavyayau/ yasyātmā sa śivo jñeyaḥ sarvabhāvapravartakaḥ//*, '[All things] arise and fall away in consonance with the extension and withdrawal of [Śiva's] power. Know that their essential nature is Śiva, Who impels all things' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 145).

[674] According to the Trika, the inadequacy of the Śāntabrahmavāda consists in its considering *brahman* as pure *prakāśa*, inherently luminous consciousness, devoid of self-awareness (*vimarśa*), or dynamic freedom (*svātantrya*); see SpN ad I 5. Same argument in YR ad 15. See also SpN I 4, quoted in Appendix 16, p. 340. It is TĀV I 33 which, in order to establish the *svātantryavāda*, develops his criticisms of the Vijñānavāda.

[675] The entire passage is quite puzzling. A number of texts refer to those named Prāṇavids, or Prāṇātmavādins. For instance, according to ŚSV I 1 (quoted n. 661), they are Vaidikas. Cf. ĀŚ II 20, dealing with the different conceptions of the *ātman*: 'Comme étant l'Énergie pneumatique [le] conçoivent ceux qui connaissent l'énergie pneumatique' (tr. Bouy — 'It is conceived as pneumatic energy (*prāṇa*) by those who know pneumatic energy'). According to Anubhūtisvarūpa, Ānandagiri and Svayaṃprakāśānanda ad loc., the Prāṇavids are the Hairaṇyagarbhas, worshipers of the Hiraṇyagarbha eulogized in ṚS X 121, who take the *prāṇa* to be the 'creator of the world' (*jagatkartṛ*), or, if *prāṇa* is taken to be Īśvara, the Lord, those who, like the Vaiśeṣikas, consider the Lord as the efficient cause (see Bouy ĀŚ: 127). Nevertheless, such an identification creates a problem: can these Hairaṇyagarbhas, whoever they may be, be understood as the *savimarśaśabdabrahmavādins* of YR's commentary? There remains the possibility that these Brahmavādins are to be identified with Bhartṛhari and his followers — the key to the puzzle being the reference here to the word *āgūr(ya)*, although the word is itself as puzzling as the entire passage. However that may be, the different usages of the term agree with the sense, well attested in the older language, of the root *gur/gūr* (related to the root *gī* or *gṝ* by the majority of philologists): at issue is the articulation of a formula with ritual function in the course of a rite of some sort. Later lexicographers add the nuance of 'proposition', inasmuch as the majority of such formulae amount to invitations or to requests for actions. It should not then be surprising that the term figures here in the dissection of theses attributed to the Prāṇabrahmavādins, who would derive the cosmos from a similar 'proposition' articulated quasi-verbally by "(Śabda)brahman". It is perhaps due to that ambiguity that our text does not specify the agent of the act of elocution, but the doctrinal context allows one to suppose that it is either *brahman* or the force of "breath" that *brahman* represents. Thus, it seems that YR expounds here the view (shared by Bhartṛhari and others) that words precede the things they name in the order of creation. Such speculations echo the śaṅkarite exegesis of ChU I 11, 4–5, whose conclusion is that '*prāṇa* is *brahman*'

them, *brahman* has no form other than Breath, *brahman* is Word [itself] (*śabdabrahman*) endowed with self-awareness (*savimarśa*).[676]

Others are agreed that the true form of *brahman* is the **Sovereign Body** (*virāḍdeha*)[677] [that is, the cosmic body (*deha*), or creation] that has assumed the shape of Virāj (*vairāja*) — in accordance with such texts as:

> The One, of whom fire is the mouth, heaven the head, sky [space] the navel, earth the feet, the sun the eye, directions the ears, homage to him who is in the form of the universe.[678]

(BSBh I 1, 9, 23). Though Bhartṛhari's philosophy does not give as much emphasis to the notion as it receives here, the view espoused is in conformity with his theory of four stages of enunciation — *paśyantī*, etc. (see, nevertheless, VP I 117: *tasya prāṇe ca yā śaktir yā ca buddhau vyavasthitā*). According to Bhartṛhari, whom YR is probably following here, *prāṇa* plays a prominent role at the fourth and third levels of linguistic activity: *vaikharī* — where takes place articulation into phonemes, as *prāṇa*, in its gross or physical form, strikes against the various organs of articulation (cf. VP I 122) — and *madhyamā* — in which intentions are formulated mentally. Consequently, *prāṇa* represents as much the differentiated world as the cosmic principle from which it proceeds (on this question, see Iyer 1992: 123ff., 143–146, 106ff.). It seems, therefore, that the views attributed by YR to the Prāṇabrahmavādins agree with Bhartṛhari's theory according to which things are produced by word: *chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ vyavartata* (VP I 120); see also Ruegg 1959: 61 (n. 2c), 76–79. Moreover, such speculations may also imply a tradition of exegesis in which vedic speech, represented by the syllable *oṃ*, is considered to be at the core of the cosmic process — a tradition going back perhaps to ṚS X 121 (Max Müller's hymn to 'Deo ignoto'), in which Hiraṇyagarbha, identified with Breath (*asu*), is said to be the effective source of creation, therefore associated (though later) with Prajāpati. In the same way, Breath is extolled as the cosmic principle in *Atharvaveda* XI 4, whose last stanza (possibly a later addition) compares it to Hiraṇyagarbha. Thus, the Prāṇabrahmavādins, in YR's commentary, are less likely to be Hairaṇyagarbhas (commonly referred to as Prāṇavids, or Prāṇātmavādins) than followers of Bhartṛhari, described in our text as identifying *prāṇa* as the source of the entire cosmos.

[676] On the notion of *śabdabrahman*, see also *Sāmbapañcāśikā* 21 (along with Kṣemarāja ad loc., in Padoux *Sāmbapañcāśikā*: 569): *yat tad vedyaṃ kim api paramaṃ śabdatattvaṃ tvam [...] tat sad vyaktiṃ jigimiṣu [...] avyaktena praṇavavapuṣā [...] sacchabdabrahmaoccarati karaṇavyañjitaṃ vācakaṃ te//*, 'Quant à Ta nature ineffable, qu'il faut connaître, c'est que Tu es la réalité intérieure suprême de la Parole (*paramaṃ śabdatattvam*) [...] voulant devenir manifeste à partir de l'essence immanifeste du *praṇava*. [...] Les organes de la parole étant [intérieurement] manifestés, le véritable Brahman-son (*śabdabrahman*), qui est ce qui t'exprime, s'énonce' [— 'As for Your ineffable nature, which is to be known, it is that You are the ultimate reality of Speech [...], desirous of becoming manifest [...] from the unmanifest essence of the *praṇava*. [...] Once the organs of Speech are [internally] manifested, the true *śabdabrahman*, which is what expresses You, enunciates itself'].

[677] The Sovereign Body (*virāḍdeha*) is the cosmic body, seen as the creation (*deha*) of Virāj, the cosmic 'Sovereign'. The *virāj* is, according to the traditional etymology, the 'all resplendent', or the 'Sovereign (*per se*)': *viśeṣena rājate iti virāj*. On *virāj*, considered both as a meter of ten syllables and as a demiurge, see ChU IV 3, 7–8. Senart observes (ChU: 49) that 'Virāj', the cosmic 'Sovereign' seems to correspond to the totality of the sensible world (n. 2), whereas the meter 'virāj' is to be considered as the expression of this world (n. 4). For a diachronic account of the notion, see Renou 1952: 141–154.

[678] *Mahābhārata* [MBh] XII 47, 44, quoted by Ś ad BS I 2, 25. Parallel statements are found in ṚS X 90, 13–14 (hymn to Puruṣa), ṚS X 81, 3 [= *Kāṭhakasaṃhitā* XVIII 2, as quoted in YR ad 35]), KāU V 9–12, MuU II 1, 4; ChU V 18, 2 gives a parallel description, applied to the *ātman vaiśvānara*, the equivalent, at the empirical level, of the divine and cosmic Virāj. On the *vaiśvānara-ātman* as a vedāntic notion, see PS 35 and YR ad loc., both texts expounding the MāU doctrine (developed by the ĀŚ and Śaṅkara's ĀŚV) according to which the four states

What the Vaiśeṣikas and others[679] call '**genus**' (*jāti*) is [for them] the ultimately real (*paramārthasat*)[680] entity, being the substratum of all qualities (*guṇa*). It is characterized [in this doctrine] by using terms such as 'universal' (*sāmānya*) and 'being as such' [or the 'universal *per se*'] (*mahāsattā*).[681]

Others maintain[682] that **particulars** (*piṇḍa* = *vyakti*)[683] are ultimately

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of consciousness coincide with the four elements or instants of the syllable *oṃ*. According to ĀŚV 3 — which establishes the correspondence between the divine Virāj and the lowest level of the *ātman*, the *vaiśvānara* — to take *brahman* to be Virāj signifies, even in a vedāntic context, that one's course has been interrupted on the way to liberation.

[679]The opposition *vyakti/ākṛti*, 'particular [thing]/common [form]' has been subjected to much scrutiny by Vaiśeṣikas, Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiyākaraṇas, as have been the related notions of *jāti*, *sāmānya*, *piṇḍa* and *dravya*. For the Mīmāṃsā, cf. *Śābarabhāṣya* I 3, 30: *kā punar ākṛtiḥ kā vyaktir iti/ dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sāmānyamātram ākṛtiḥ/ asādhāraṇaviśeṣā vyaktiḥ*, 'Qu'est-ce que l'*akṛti*? Qu'est-ce que la *vyakti*? L'*akṛti*, ce n'est rien d'autre que le trait commun — *sāmānya* — aux substances, aux qualités et aux actions. Quant à la *vyakti*, c'est la particularité individuelle — *asādhāraṇaviśeṣa*' (tr. Biardeau 1964: 167) [— 'What is *ākṛti*? What is *vyakti*? The *ākṛti* is nothing else than the feature common (*sāmānya*) to substances, qualities and actions. The *vyakti* is the uncommon particular — *asādhāraṇaviśeṣa*']; cf. also *Mahābhāṣya* I 2 6, opposing *vyaktivādin* and *ākṛtivādin*. Biardeau observes [1964: 292ff.] that Bhartṛhari, in dealing with the same notions, transforms the views of Patañjali and of the Mīmāṃsā. On these questions, see Biardeau 1964: 68–100; 155–203; 229–247; 292ff.

[680]*paramārthasat* is a term not well suited to a Vaiśeṣika context, implying as it does, degrees of "reality". 'Ultimately real' may serve as a translation if one understands 'what is real in and of itself, without qualification'. The problem of translation is essentially unresolvable because one cannot set aside the fact that here a partisan of monism is speaking of systems that are in no wise monist.

[681]YR's account partly agrees with Vaiśeṣika doctrine according to which 'being' (*sattā*), as the ultimate form of commonness (*parasāmānya*), represents the category of commonness (*sāmānya*) as such (cf. Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 104 and 175–177). See Appendix 15, p. 339.

[682]The passage seems, in quarrels with the other schools on the 'meaning of the sentence' (*śābdabodha*), to echo the position of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which has insisted that the word refers literally only to the *vyakti*, and secondarily to the *jāti*. In this sense, a Śaiva such as YR may have understood that the Vyaktivādins considered the *vyakti* an ultimate principle. See *Nyāyabhāṣya* [NBh] II 2, 58–69, in which the Vyaktivādin is perhaps a follower of Vyāḍi, an early grammarian, many of whose notions have been refuted by later Pāṇinīyas; Vyāḍi teaches that the word refers to *dravya*, the 'particular', understood as a concrete thing (see Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 101–102); on Vyāḍi, see Ruegg 1959: 32–34; Renou 1940: intr., p. 19. As well, the point of view expressed here is consonant with that of the Cārvākas, according to the few authentic records of that school — a single authentic text of that "school" is thought to survive, the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*; other references are found in always hostile compendia, such as the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* — where an attempt is made to demonstrate (ironically?) that 'perception' (*pratyakṣa*) alone, which is always restricted to particulars, guarantees any semblance of validity, and that no 'inference' can be deemed certain, inasmuch as the universal (*vyāpti*) on which it depends can never extend, given our limited purview, to all possible instances. May also be intended here (so Ruegg, private communication) the Buddhist Pramāṇavāda (Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, etc.), where the universal (*sāmānya*, *jāti*), as opposed to *svalakṣaṇa* (the term *vyakti* not being employed in this school) is not real. Favoring this interpretation is YR's usage of language akin to that of the Buddhists, such as *paramārtha(satya)/saṃvṛtisatya*, *vyavahāramātra*, *sāmānya/vyakti*.

[683]*vyakti* is a Mīmāṃsaka notion, which is taken up again, with some alterations, by the Naiyāyikas (cf. Biardeau 1964: 234–235). The notion is discussed in *Śābarabhāṣya* I 3, 10, 30–35 (cf. Biardeau 1964: 168ff.) For the discussion of *piṇḍa* — lit., 'lump', 'compact mass', or 'corporeal frame', therefore 'individu concret' ('concrete individual'), as translated by

real, and that no universal that would be one and [at the same time] the substratum of numerous qualities[684] ever appears (*prakāśate*) [to the senses]; nor may it be established by argument that such is the case. Therefore, ordinary usage, which deals exclusively with particulars (*vyakti*), is sufficient [and we need not resort to fictions such as the 'universal'].[685] What then is the use of positing a universal?

They dispute [the need to posit] such a universal by advancing speculations[686] of various sorts. They say, among other things, that 'particulars do not depend [on that universal for their existence], and that nothing else appears [in our ordinary experience] that is dependent on it'. Thus, they are agreed that 'genus (*jāti*) is not ultimately real'.

The categories [here set forth] — viz., **'[from] consciousness to particulars'** — are such as have been described. [In conclusion] we hold that **'all these are for purposes of disputation only'.** Since, in this doctrine of [Śiva's absolute] freedom (*svātantryavāda*), the self-manifesting (*prakāśamāna*) reality cannot be concealed,[687] those different categories do appear [also] as relative truths (*saṃvṛtisatya*), but, **in ultimate terms, none of them exist [as characterizations of the Ultimate],** that is, they do not exist in essence [i.e., in truth];[688] they do exist as categories postulated in other systems of thought.

Therefore, it is the one Great Lord — namely, [one's own] consciousness, the supremely real, the ultimate Light, the utterly free — who appears (*cakāste*) variously [i.e., who appears as manifold], for there is nothing other than he that is different from him, and hence lacking in illumination, that can manifest itself.[689]

Biardeau (1964: 33) — synonym of *vyakti*, see *Śābarabhāṣya* I 6, 6, 19.

[684]Cf. NBh II 2, 59ff.: *varṇaḥ śuklā gauḥ kapilā gaur iti dravyasya guṇayogo na jāter iti*, '[The explanation applies to] color: [When one says:] "a white cow", "a tawny cow", qualities (*guṇa*) are united to the individual substance (*dravya*), not to the genus (*jāti*)'.

[685]Lit., 'Therefore, ordinary usage (*vyavahāra*) suffices inasmuch as it relates to particulars'. See NBh II 2, 59ff., from which we extract the example: *vaidyāya gāṃ dadātīti dravyasya tyāgo na jāter amūrtatvāt pratikramānukramānupapatteś ca*, 'When one says: "he gives a cow to the physician", there is a gift of an individual substance (*dravya*), not of a genus (*jāti*), for the latter is devoid of material form (*amūrtatva*), and is incapable of exchange, whether receiving or giving'. Thus, YR's phrase — 'Ordinary usage (*vyavahāra*) [which deals exclusively] with particulars (*vyakti*), is sufficient' — can be seen as a résumé of NBh II 2, 59ff., which enumerates the following worldly pursuits and usages and makes the same point for each of them: group (*samūha*), gift (*tyāga*), possession (*parigraha*), number (*saṃkhyā*), increase (*vṛddhi*), diminution (*apacaya*), color (*varṇa*), compound (*samāsa*), lineage (*anubandha*); cf. Biardeau's translation of the passage (1964: 230–232).

[686]*vṛttivikalpa*.

[687]Lit., 'denied'.

[688]*satattvatayā* — cf. TĀ I 33b: *itthaṃ samāsavyāsābhyāṃ jñānaṃ muñcati tāvataḥ*, 'Whether taken collectively or separately, these forms of knowledge liberate only from the corresponding [aspect of the *saṃsāra*]'.

[689]Same phraseology in YR ad 1. The polemic auto-commentary of PH 8 gives a complete panorama, arranged in a hierarchy, of the different conceptions of the Self, in order

And it has been stated:

> After speculating,[690] those who are fond of building systems of thought out of their own wisdom go on saying that the essence (*tattva*) is such and such. That essence is nothing different from you, O Lord; it is but a dispute of scholars about the names [to be given to you].[691]

Kārikā 28

Now the master offers an illustration of error in terms of its capacity to present unreal objects:

28. There is no serpent at the place occupied by a rope, and yet that serpent causes dread that may end in death. Truly, the power of error is great and cannot be pinned down.[692]

The great power of error cannot by anyone **be pinned down**: in other words, [its true nature lies] beyond anyone's capacity of investigation — so great is its ability to make the real appear (*pratibhāsana*) other than it is,[693] which [in the present case] means failing to recognize one's own plenitude.

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to demonstrate not only that the Trika is a synthesis of all the Indian schools of thought, but also that it surpasses them. These systems are classified into ten types according to the level of reality they have been able to reach, a level again roughly related to the Śaiva scale of the *tattvas*. These levels (*sthiti*), which other systems have failed to go beyond, are to be understood as different modes of identification with the inner, ultimate reality. Moreover, in accordance with the recurrent metaphor of the Lord-actor, they are taken to be the different roles through which the divine Actor manifests his essence. As the seven categories of subjects are seen as roles (*bhūmikā*) assumed by the Lord in SpN I 1 (see Appendix 10, p. 330), so it is with the forms of the Self presumed by the different schools of thought, as stated by PHvṛ 8: *evam ekasyaiva cidātmano bhagavataḥ svātantryāvabhāsitāḥ sarvā imā bhūmikāḥ svātantryapracchādanonmīlanatāratamyabheditāḥ/ ata eka eva etāvad vyāptika ātmā*, 'Thus, the divine one, whose essence is consciousness, in his absolute freedom displays all these roles. And it is this freedom that, by opting for relative degrees of concealment or unveiling, makes these roles differ from one another [choosing in varying degrees to unveil or conceal itself]. Therefore, there is only one Self pervading all these roles'. Therefore, one has to go beyond appearances, or roles, to reach the ultimate reality, the divine Actor. Such is the eleventh and highest *sthiti*, that of the Trika philosophers who maintain that the Self is both immanent in the universe and transcendent (see n. 59). Cf. ĪPvṛ I 6, 4–5, for which the erroneous identification of the Self with various entities such as the body, etc., constitutes a *vikalpa*, a mental construct.

[690] *utprekṣya*.

[691] *Bhagavadbhaktistotra* 21. On Avadhūtasiddha's *Bhagavadbhaktistotra*, see YR ad 9 and n. 426.

[692] Same theme as ĀPS 28. The sequence of ideas is this: since the aforesaid doctrines are erroneous to some degree, being only relatively true, it is now appropriate to explain how error is possible.

[693] *atādrūpya*.

For instance, although it is a rope that in reality is seen, yet, due to the confusion (*bhrama*) caused by its long and coiled form, the witnesses (*adhyavasātṛ*) conclude: 'this is a snake' — for they apprehend (*adhyavasāya*) in the [real] object, the rope, a snake — itself an unreal object that merely appears (*pratibhāsa*) to them.

And it is precisely because [the snake] appears [to them] as a real object that [their mistake] causes a fear that death will terminate [the encounter].

This [sort of thing] is even well attested in experience: who has not undergone [a semblance of] heart-failure, thinking that a post is a living being,[694] or having become confused, after conjuring up[695] on his own some [supposedly] terrifying form?[696]

Thus it is delusion (*vibhrama*) itself [defined, in this system, as the ignorance of one's own plenitude] that is the cause of the display of finitude.[697]

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[694]We take '*iti*' as referring to '*bhūtam*' alone, not to '*sthāṇuṃ bhūtam*' as in the KSTS ed. Moreover, all the MSS show a pause after *etat* — some have a single *daṇḍa*, some a double, others a noticeable space; in all cases, the final *-t* of *etat* is signaled with a *virāma*, indicating a complete phrase. Note also that one MS gives *iva* in the place of *iti*.

[695]*samullikhya* — a sense suggested by certain figurative usages of the root *ul-likh*, among them the late figure of speech *ullekha*, signifying a rapid series of images evoking a single subject (*upameya*); see Gerow 1971, s.v.

[696]Here, *sthāṇu* and the *ākāra* are envisaged as alternatives (indicated by the *vā*). The post seen in the distance at dusk serves, particularly in vedāntic literature, as a familiar illustration of 'bhrānti' — for example, *Upadeśasāhasrī*: *avidyā nāma anyasminn anyadharmādhyāropaṇā, yathā prasiddhaṃ rajataṃ prasiddhāyāṃ śuktikāyām, yathā prasiddhaṃ puruṣaṃ sthāṇāv adhyāropayati, prasiddhaṃ vā sthāṇuṃ puruṣe...* (51–55, etc.); also BSBh I 1, 4: *yathā mandāndhakāre sthānur ayam ity agṛhyamāṇaviśeṣe puruṣaśabdapratyayau sthānuviṣayau*, 'As in light darkness, the word and the idea of man is applied to a post when it is not distinctly cognized as "This is a post." ' As well, B&R cite a passage drawn from Śaṅkara's commentary on BĀU: *kiṃsvin naro vā sthāṇur vā*: 'Might this be a man or a post?' Elsewhere, the implication is simply that, in its indistinction, the dimly seen post occasions doubt and therefore fear; see also TĀ I 250a: *sthāṇur vā puruṣo veti na mukhyo 'sty eṣa saṃśayaḥ/*.

[697]*apūrṇatva* — lit., 'incompleteness', 'absence or loss of plenitude'. In Advaita Vedānta, error is understood as a twofold process whose first stage is the veiling (*āvaraṇa*) of the real nature of the rope, and the second, the projection (*vikṣepa*), or superimposition (*adhyāsa*), of a snake on the rope itself. Thus, the delusive power of *māyā*, understood as an external force, is behind error. The epistemological viewpoint of Trika is different: if error is the product of *māyā* (which is not external, inasmuch as it is a *śakti*), and implies a superimposition of an unreal object on the real one (see YR ad 30), yet, in ultimate terms, error is to be defined as the ignorance of one's own plenitude, as imperfect knowledge, which the Lord's freedom has made possible, by means of his *māyāśakti*.

Kārikā 29

Now, the master shows the relevance [of this example] to the matter under discussion:[698]

29. Likewise, merit and demerit, heaven and hell, birth and death, pleasure and pain, as well as social class and the stage of life, etc., although [in reality] not existing in the Self, come into being through the force of delusion.

Just as a rope, really existing, but erroneously apprehended (*vimṛṣṭa*) as a snake, brings about the same [dreadful] effect as that created by a [real] snake,[699] so likewise, **do merit**, etc., **although unreal**, that is, not existing really, **take place**, that is, come into existence, in the minds of those who take the body to be the Self (*dehātmamānin*), because of the confusion: 'this [viz., the body] alone is real', which confusion comes into being **through** the force of **delusion**, that is, the illusory (*vyāmoha*) influence of *māyā*.

By **merit** is intended '[a sacrifice such as the] *aśvamedha*';
by **demerit** is intended the 'slaying of brahmins', etc.;
by **heaven** is intended 'supreme happiness';
by **hell** is intended 'torments';
by **coming into existence** is intended 'birth';
by **death** is intended 'cessation of existence [lit., 'of birth']';
by **pleasure** is intended 'delight';
by **pain** is intended the 'agitation arising from *rajas*';
and by **social class** is intended the 'belief: "I am a brahmin" ', etc.;
by **stage of life** is intended: 'I am a celibate', etc.;
the mention of the word **'etc.'** here intends penance, worship, vows, etc.

All that, whose essence is nothing but mental constructs, which emerges from the gaping [mouth of][700] delusion is deemed to be such on account of the power of differentiation, by which the Self is taken to be the body, etc. (*dehādyātmatā*).

All this proceeds from error [viz., from taking the body, etc., to be the Self], due to which fettered souls experience incessantly the bondage of heaven, hell, birth and death [viz., the inevitable results of *dharma* and *adharma*].

However, merit and demerit, etc., do not exist ultimately for the Self,

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[698] *prakṛta* — lit., 'he applies this example to the matter under discussion'.

[699] Lit., 'brings about the causal efficiency (*arthakriyā*) belonging properly to the snake [viz., terror]'.

[700] *vijṛmbhita*.

which is a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness (*anava-cchinnacidānandaikaghana*).[701]

Kārikā 30

Thus, having examined the capacity of error to make unreal objects appear, the master now explains its origin:

30. That darkness [of error] [702] **is such that this wellknown conceit develops, in regard to entities, that they are other than the Self, though [in truth] they are not separate from the Self, owing to the fact that they appear to it.**

In saying **'That darkness** (*andhakāra*) **is such ...'**, the master refers to the all-deluding (*viśvamohinī*) error that consists in our failing to recognize our own plenitude, as previously explained;

in saying **'that ... in regard to entities'**, he refers to those ubiquitous objects, whose form presumes the opposition of cognizer and object of cognition, which are the very substance of Light, **owing to the fact that they appear to it** (*prakāśamānatayā*), that is, they cannot be accounted for except in terms of their having appeared, in accordance with the maxim:

> That which is not luminous cannot manifest itself,[703]

[... and they appear such] even though not separate **from the Self**, that is, from consciousness, the Great Lord.

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[701] *anavacchinna* is here taken in its scholastic sense of 'not discriminated, unqualified' — the *avacchedaka* designating the quality or particularity that serves to distinguish one thing (or type) from another (as its dewlap distinguishes the Indian cow from other beasts). The usage of the term here indicates that the terms *cit* and *ānanda* are in this sense unqualified, inasmuch as they are universal and cannot be limited by anything whatsoever (which, if it were supposed, would contradict their comprehensiveness); see the use of the positive *avacchinna* in YR ad 58.

[702] That is, the first level of error consisting in taking the Self as non-Self; in other words, not recognizing one's own essential plenitude, giving therefore rise to the belief in otherness. Thus, kārikā 30 echoes, or reformulates, kārikā 25 — which describes *ajñānatimira*, the 'darkness of ignorance [which is akin to the disease of double-vision]', again commented upon as *ātmākhyātyandhakāra*, 'the darkness that is Self-ignorance' — as well as kārikā 28.

[703] *nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate* — lit., 'That which is not luminous cannot illumine'. Perhaps the fourth pada from Vāmanadatta's *Saṃvitprakāśa* I 12: *tvadātmakatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ vivadante na kecana/ yat prakāśyadaśayāto [v.l. prakāśyadaśāṃ yāto] nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate//*, 'No one disagrees that entities have as their essence you, in terms of their condition of needing illumination. Therefore, that which is not luminous is not manifest'. The verse is quoted in SpP 28–29 [= ad II 3–4]; cf. Dyczkowski's transl. (SpK: 162): 'None dispute that You (O Lord) are the essential nature of (all) things; it is not darkness (*aprakāśa*) that shines when (the light of consciousness) becomes the object of illumination', and his edition of the *Saṃvitprakāśa*, for variants.

Furthermore, **this conceit that [these entities] are other than the Self** (*ayam anātmābhimānaḥ*) [obliges me to think:] 'those entities are to be grasped [by me] (*grāhya*), are external to and different from me, [exist] independently [of me, as their *grāhaka*]'. All this being the case (*yat*), [such conceit is nothing but] the unreal imposition[704] of insentience on them,[705] by denying their real form, which is consciousness.

Here is the purport of what has been said:[706] as regards the appearance (*prakāśana*) of entities [viz., their manifestation as such to the subject], it is the Light of the Self that alone is independent, or, in other words,[707] that manifests itself as "blue" or "pleasure", etc. [i.e., as objects apparently external or internal][708] — for it would be unintelligible to allege as the cause [of their appearance] something other [than consciousness], such as, for example, latent dispositions, etc., considered as external [to consciousness], and having the form of non-Light.[709]

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[704] *āpādana* — Śaṅkara speaks here of *adhyāsa*.

[705] Cf. TĀ I 332, which formulates lyrically this imposition of untrue insentience on objects; see also YR ad 31.

[706] The syntagm *ayam āśayaḥ* often flags a contrasting portion of the commentary in which emphasis is placed on argumentation, rather than on syntax or vocabulary — by introducing parallel considerations, offering analogies, etc. Hence, it may be translated as: 'Now [let us turn to] the argument [of the verse]', or 'Here is the purport [of what has been said]'.

[707] *arthāt.*

[708] Cf. TĀ II 16, according to which everything is Light, Light is the sole reality: *nīlaṃ pītaṃ sukham iti prakāśaḥ kevalaḥ śivaḥ/ amuṣmin paramādvaite prakāśātmani ko 'paraḥ//*, 'Śiva is the only Light [shining] as blue, yellow and joy. In this absolute, nondual state, whose nature is that of Light, who is there other [than he]?'

[709] This extremely condensed statement includes an objection, which is not explicitly indicated as such, and its answer. The position of the Traika *siddhāntin* is that no entity can exist, absent its cognition, and that there can be no cognition without a persisting factor, which is consciousness: whatever exists, i.e., whatever is known, is nothing but Light/consciousness, or, to put it differently, Light/consciousness is the unique cause of the appearance of an entity. The *siddhāntin* answers here the objection of a *pūrvapakṣin* according to whom some other cause independent of Light/consciousness, such as the latent dispositions (*vāsanā*), may explain this shining, or cognition, whether true or erroneous. For, if we try to reconstruct the objector's argument, why does one see a snake, and not a garland, in a rope? In other words, why are things known in a particular way, sometimes differing from one individual to another? The objector would answer that one's own *vāsanās* produce the erroneous cognition as well as the fear it involves: the latent impression of a snake lies in us, along with the disposition of fear; when conditions are brought together, this latent impression makes the snake appear in our consciousness, instead of the rope, and this implies the correlated terror. The *siddhāntin*'s refutation follows the same fundamental assumption: the cognition (hence the existence) of an object necessarily depends on consciousness. In other words, consciousness is both luminous in and of itself (*svaprakāśa*) and object-illuminating (*arthaprakāśa*) (cf. ĪPV I 3, 6–7). The opponent who would have recourse to *vāsanās* (presumably removed from present sentience) as the cause of this cognition would have to admit that *vāsanās* themselves are ultimately not different from consciousness. The reference is probably to Buddhists (particularly the Vijñānavādins; see n. 666) and Vedāntins, who take beginningless *avidyā*, or, what is the same thing, beginningless dispositions, to be the cause of the illusory phenomenal world. As emphasized, here, in YR's commentary, the Trika viewpoint reflects its main postulate: the absolute freedom of the Lord. It is this divine freedom that makes all entities

Thus, it is only 'I' (*aham*) — who am essentially consciousness (*cit-svarūpa*) — who appear [in fact] through the opposition of cognizer and object of cognition;[710] but this real form [viz., the absolute 'I'] does not appear [to the bound soul]; it is merely unreal difference that displays itself.

Since [Light as] the true essence (*tāttvika*) [of things] is not thus displayed, error has here been represented through the metaphor of darkness.[711]

Kārikā 31

Once the conceit that locates the non-Self in the Self[712] has arisen, there arises the conceit that locates the Self (*ātmābhimāna*) in the non-Self.[713] In explaining this, the author affirms the doubly delusive form of error:[714]

31. It is darkness upon darkness,[715] it is a great 'pustule upon a boil',[716] to think that the Self is located in the non-Self — the body, breath, etc.[717]

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appear, i.e., that makes them known and knowable. Diversity is the expression of the Lord's freedom, and there is nothing that is not he (cf. TĀ II 16, n. 708).

[710]This is the first occurrence of the pronoun *aham* itself — a notion that is at the core of Trika speculation.

[711]Same phraseology in YR ad PS 25.

[712]That is, in terms of Śaṅkara's Advaita, the superimposition (*adhyāsa/adhyāropaṇa*) of the non-Self on the Self.

[713]Cf. YR ad 60, who develops the notion of the superimposition of the Self on the non-Self, whereas, in YR ad 61, *apūrṇatvakhyāti*, 'the [mistaken] cognition (*khyāti*) that [the Self] is incomplete' stands for *ātmany anātmābhimānaḥ*.

[714]The reasoning resembles greatly that of Śaṅkara on the notion of *adhyāsa/adhyāropaṇa* (*abhimāna* = *adhyāropaṇa*); cf. *Upadeśasāhasrī* 51: *avidyā nāma anyasminn anyadharmādhyāropaṇā*, 'Nescience is [defined as] the superimposition of the qualities of [one] thing upon another'. The *adhyāsa* involves always two aspects — *tasminn atad/atasmin tad*, 'not that in that/that in not that' — and PS 31 deals with the second aspect, which is the contrary of the first, as clearly stated by YR ad loc.: *atādrūpye tādrūpyapratipattiḥ*, 'The apprehension of a thing as having such and such a form in [reference to an object] not having such and such a form'.

[715]Silburn translates *timira* as 'troubles de la vision'. Better to reflect the coherence of the text, we take *timira* here as a synonym of *andhakāra* of the previous kārikā; see also kā. 25. It is the commentary that plays on the *double entendre* of *timira*.

[716]We borrow the idiom from Barnett.

[717]*ātmamānitva* — i.e., when that which is the non-Self (*anātman*), the body or vital breath, is taken to be the Self. Cf. YR ad PS 53 and 60. Cf. ŚSV I 2: *evam ātmany anātmatābhimānarūpākhyātilakṣaṇājñānātmakaṃ jñānaṃ na kevalaṃ bandho yāvad anātmani śarīrāv ātmatābhimānātmakam ajñānamūlaṃ jñānam api bandha eva*, 'Thus, that [limited] knowledge, which is really ignorance in the sense that one is not aware that the non-Self [has been] erroneously superimposed on the Self, is not alone bondage; [as well] that [limited] knowledge, which is rooted in the ignorance whereby the Self is superimposed erroneously on the non-Self, viz., the body, etc., is also bondage'. At this point in his demonstration, Kṣemarāja quotes

In the first place, the darkness that is nescience (*akhyātitimira*)[718] has resulted in the imposition of insentience, appearing as difference, onto entities that are in reality but one consciousness, such that those entities, which are not different from one's essential Self (*svātman*), are yet displayed as different from it. Hence nescience, which is like darkness, is called **'darkness'** (*timira*) [metaphorically].

As the one and only moon appears double due to [the disease called] 'line-darkness' (*rekhātimira*) [viz., diplopia], situated in the eye, such that one concludes: 'There are here two moons', so likewise does the double-vision that is nescience (*akhyātitimira*) make each and every object appear as if it had the form of non-Self, through [the principle of] difference, though [in truth the objective world is] one only and shares the nature of one's essential Self.[719]

In this situation, another **darkness** ensues — a delusion engendered by a delusion — [it is as though] 'a pustule grew **upon a boil**'.

Now, **as regards** (*yat*) ... **the Self [which is] thought [to be located in the non-Self]** (*ātmamānitvam*) [we say]: once the ubiquitous objects [of our normal experience] have fallen victim to insentience — their nature as consciousness (*citsvarūpa*) having been abrogated by not recognizing [their identity with the Self] — from among them, on one or another insentient [object] occupying the field of the knowable, such as **the body, or breath, etc.**, now seen as other than the Self, **is [superimposed]**, according to the principles of ordinary cognition, **the belief that this is the Self** (*ātmamānitva*) — or, [in general,] the apprehension of a thing as having such and such a form in reference to an object not having such and such a form — as, for example, when one asserts 'I am thin', 'I am stout', 'I am hungry', 'I am happy', 'I am nothing'[720] — so many assertions that [according to us] are outrageous [that is, fly in the face of common

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SpK III 14 (symmetrically, in his commentary to SpK III 14, Kṣemarāja quotes ŚS I 2), which defines the condition of the *paśu*, the fettered subject, thus explaining how the non-Self, the body, etc., is taken to be the Self: by metonymy, the body represents the innumerable ideas (*pratyaya*) of which it is the substratum, and by 'ideas' one has to understand words, as well as their corresponding objects, exclusively apprehended in their relation to the ego, as shown by the *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* XXV 15 (quoted by SpN III 14): *tāteti kiñcit tanayeti kiñcid ambeti kiñcid dayiteti kiñcit/mameti kiñcin na mameti kiñcid bhautaṃ saṃdhaṃ bahudhā mā lapethāḥ/*, 'Do not indulge ceaselessly in material associations, saying sometimes "O father", sometimes "O my child", sometimes "O mother", sometimes "O beloved", sometimes "This is mine", sometimes "This is not mine." ' As stated by the kārikā itself, it is precisely the 'rise of ideas' (*pratyayodbhavaḥ*) that makes one who is essentially pure and autonomous consciousness lose his independence (*asvatantratām eti*). Similarly ŚS II 8: *śarīraṃ haviḥ*, 'Oblation is the body', refers to the error that consists in taking the body to be the Self, and which has to be reduced to nothing in the fire of knowledge, in the way the oblation is consumed in fire; see ŚSV ad loc. Cf. BSBh I 1 and ĀŚ I 13 and 15.

[718] See kā. 25 (*ajñānatimira*) and YR ad PS 30.

[719] See PS 25 and n. 638.

[720] A reference to the Buddhist *śūnya*?

sense].[721]

Now, if it is objected that such an [experience, which is an] outrage to common sense exists [even] without postulating the conceit that locates the Self [in the non-Self], let it be so as regards such phenomena as "blue" and "pleasure".[722]

Or[723] even if we could avoid referring to it [viz., the notion of *abhimāna*] in all cases,[724] still there is, through the notion of [being associated with] a Self, the unction of ipseity sprinkled on this or that insentient object, such as the body, etc., itself nothing but a lump of clay.[725] On the other hand, in the case of phenomena such as "blue", "pleasure", and so on, the attribution to them of a lack of relation to the Self [can be understood only] through the notion that they are related to nothing but themselves.[726]

The situation [that we have just described] is nothing but the round of existences in its full and lamentable form, for what drags the fettered souls [into the round of existences] is that very injury inflicted [on the Self][727] by the dualities [of pleasure and pain, etc.], brought into play through such conceits [as have been displayed in the preceding analysis].

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[721] *ativaiśasa*. The syntax is: *yat ... ātmamānitvam ... etad ativaiśasam*.

[722] Viz., 'such an objection should also apply to the internal and external objects of experience' — an objection which we answer by saying that, on the contrary, it is difficult to do without the notion of superimposition as regards "blue" and "pleasure", because, according to you (might the objector be a Naiyāyika?), such qualities as "blue" and "pleasure" cannot exist in the absence of a substratum, which, in this case, is a Self. Perhaps implied is the Nyāya position that most cases of error such as that of the 'red crystal' may be accounted for without referring to *ātmābhimāna*, 'superimposition of the Self on the non-Self', but even the Nyāya, says YR, adopts this notion in the case of the internal and external qualities of the Self.

[723] We understand this continuation of the argument as again directed to the Naiyāyikas, whose doctrine has been reformulated in terms more congenial to the Trika (*ahantā/idantā*, *ahantārasābhiṣeka*). But, another possibility might be that the former clause is addressed to a proponent of the Sāṃkhya, whose notion of *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra* does indeed appear to conflate the conscious principle with the inert principle; the latter half might conceivably be addressed to a Buddhist, possibly a Vaibhāṣika, whose notion of *svalakṣaṇa* appears to attribute an untoward 'thatness' to fleeting and self-referential experiences.

[724] Lit., 'Or even, [let it be admitted that] there is no [such notion] in any case'. Note that, probably, the comma and the semi-colon introduced by the KSTS ed. should be interchanged: the semi-colon after *astu*, the comma after *bhūt*. Anyhow, in the corrected text presented in this volume, we have not maintained punctuation marks other than *daṇḍas*.

[725] Same image of the unction of ipseity temporarily sprinkled on an insentient object (*ahantāvyavasthārasābhiṣikta*) in YR ad 8.

[726] *idantayā* — lit., 'through the notion that they are nothing but "this" '. That is to say, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, although there is no "Self" to serve as substratum to the unending series of cognitions, each cognition is momentarily distinguished from the next, and at that moment is endowed with *idantā*, 'thatness'. Thus the Trika answers both the Sāṃkhyas ('you do nothing but reformulate our notion of *ahantā* "I-ness" ') and the Vaibhāṣikas ('you do nothing but reformulate our notion of *idantā* "thatness" ') — and the result in both cases is the same: 'this world is lamentable' (*eṣa eva saṃsāraḥ śocanīyaḥ*).

[727] *abhighātaḥ*.

As has been said by the *yoginī* Madālasā in the *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa*:

> The chariot is situated on the ground, and the body is situated on the chariot, and in the body is situated yet another spirit (*puruṣa*) [i.e., the Self]. Yet no one thinks of the earth as 'mine', as one does with his own body. Such extraordinary delusion![728]

Kārikā 32

Having established that, in this way, one binds one's [true] Self with false mental constructs by failing to recognize that Self,[729] the master now says:

32. How strange it is that one envelops one's Self with notions such as the body, or the vital breaths, or with concepts belonging rather to the intellect, or with the expanse of the Void[730] — just as does the silkworm with its cocoon![731]

[728] *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* XXV 18. This is a development of the ancient parable of the Self riding in the chariot being the chariot-driver, the mind (*manas*) the reins, the senses (*indriya*) the horses, the objects of sense (*viṣaya*) they range over; see KāU I 3, 5. Once the first level of error has taken place, that is, once the entities constitutive of phenomenal reality have been taken to be different from the Self, earth, chariot and body are but mere substrata for the Self, i.e., they are objects equally insentient. Nevertheless, in a second phase, the limited subject identifies himself with the body alone, whereas he should identify himself with all the objects of the universe, thus recognizing that there is no object of the world that is different from the supreme Self, which is both transcendent and immanent. It is noteworthy that, in the same context — the definition of the *paśu* as he who takes the body to be the Self — SpN III 14 quotes a verse borrowed from the same chapter of the *Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa* (see n. 717). See also PS 39, which explains the reverse process, in which the two errors are successively dispelled.

[729] *akhyātivaśāt* — cf. ŚS I 2: *jñānaṃ bandhaḥ*, '[Limited] knowledge is bondage'.

[730] 'Sky' (*nabhas*) here metaphorically for the usual 'Void' (*śūnya*) — see below. *prapañca* may also be somewhat ironically intended — the marvellous extent of different speculations on emptiness. This enumeration of the four main modes of conceiving the Self agrees with that of ĪPK I 6, 4, ŚSV I 1, and PHvṛ 8 (see n. 661 and Appendix 14, p. 338). As made clear by the *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā* 3, quoted in PM 19 (p. 54), those four main modes of conceiving the Self (namely, body, breath, *buddhi*, the Void) are nothing but realizations of 'egoity' (*asmitā*), as opposed to 'ipseity' (*ahantā*), which is the experience of the true Self; note that the *Virūpākṣapañcāśikā* adds to these four, objects of sense and the senses themselves: *sampanno 'smi kṛśo 'smi snihyattāro 'smi modamāno 'smi/ prāṇimi śūnyo 'smīti hi ṣaṭsu padeṣv asmitā dṛṣṭā//*.

[731] An echo of this discussion is to be found in PS 51, as shown by YR ad loc. Relying on the commentary, and thus agreeing with B. N. Pandit (PS: 39), we propose translating *jālakāra*, lit., 'net-maker', as 'silkworm', rather than as 'spider', as do Barnett and Silburn. For, not only does YR gloss *jālakāra* as *kṛmi*, whose primary meaning is 'worm', but the detailed description of the entire process better suits the silkworm. Although not suggested here by YR, the metaphoric meaning of *jāla*, 'deception', 'illusion', 'magic', could also be implicitly intended here (cf. ĀPS 30).

Once [the unity of] consciousness has been cast aside in failing to recognize the Self, each and every cognizer **envelops his Self**, though [it is in truth] pervasive, with the bindings[732] of mental constructs which arise from himself. How? The master explains this by saying: **'the body, etc.'**.

[These mental constructs are:] **notions** (*vimarśana*) **of body and vital breath** [as the one and only Self]; **concepts** (*jñāna*) **proper to the intellect**, that is, the determinate cognition [or ascertainment] [of pleasure and pain, etc.]; and **the expanse** (*prapañca*), that is, the proliferation **of** [speculations on the] **Void** (*nabhas*).

with [notions] such as ... (*yogena*) means 'by relating [his Self] to mental constructs such as the body, etc.' — for instance, saying: 'I am slim, fat, beautiful, wise'.[733] — Thus do feeble-minded persons, children, and women, and, indeed, cultivators [who are absorbed only in their physical labour] take their body to be the Self, on the strength of their own understanding,[734] and, in so doing, deem themselves discerning,[735] at least to some extent. [But, we say,] the body perishes here and now; how can it be the Self?

On the other hand, those who take the vital breath to be the Self,[736] thinking: 'It is I who am hungry and thirsty', may deem themselves a bit [but not much] more discerning!

[To which we reply:] now, both the body and the vital breaths are as insentient as is a lump of clay, etc.; how could either of them be the Self?

So, Mīmāṃsakas and others,[737] [who think that the assertions:] 'I am

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[732]*nigaḍa*.

[733]Those who say: 'I am wise' are those who take the *buddhi* to be the Self.

[734]*svavikalpena*.

[735]*vivecakaṃmanya* — Philosophically, this unsurprising position is just that adopted by the Cārvāka school of thought. Cf. ŚSV I 1, quoted n. 661, and PHvṛ 8: *caitanyaviśiṣṭaṃ śarīram ātmā iti cārvākāḥ*, 'The Cārvākas say: "The Self is identical with the body endowed with consciousness." ' On the Cārvāka doctrine, see Mahadevan 1974: 79–86: 'The Cārvāka does not deny consciousness, but only that it is real independent of the body. When the elements come together in a particular mode to form an organism, consciousness (mind or soul) appears in it. Consciousness, thus, is an epiphenomenon, an after-glow of matter; it is a function of the body. [...] when the elements combine to form an organismic pattern, consciousness emerges, even as the intoxicating quality appears in a mixture of certain ingredients, none of which, taken separately, possesses it, or as the red color is produced from the combination of betel leaf, areca nut, and lime, none of which is red. That there is no soul apart from the body is evidenced by the fact, says the Cārvāka, that consciousness perishes with the body'. Note how the objector [?] reverses the argument in YR's commentary.

[736]That is, inasmuch as vital breath is the prerequisite of all sense experience. Here YR's exposition differs from that of kā. 27: there, he was referring to a philosophical school, the Prāṇabrahmavādins, here he alludes to the ordinary, almost trivial, experience of breathing.

[737]Here, YR comments upon *dhījñāna*, lit., 'cognition of the intellect', of the kārikā. ŚSV I 1 (quoted n. 661) and SpN I 4 identify those who take the *buddhi*, or the act of cognition proper to the *buddhi*, to be the Self, respectively, as the Yogācāras, and as both the Yogācāras and the Mīmāṃsakas. According to PHvṛ 8 (quoted in Appendix 14, p. 338), which gives a more complete account of this position, they are Yogācāras, Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas,

happy', or 'I am sad', mean that it is the Self who feels pleasure and pain, show even greater discernment, for they take the subtle body to be the Self.[738]

[But, we reply,] how can affectations of the intellect,[739] such as pleasure and pain, be said to be the Self?[740]

Hence the partisans of the Void[741] assert that the Self [is rather to be found] where there is an [utter] absence (*abhāva*) of mental construct — whether it be that of body, vital breath, or intellect. Thinking that 'whatsoever appears, I am not that', they maintain that the Self is but that Void, defined as the absence of any [cognizable] content whatsoever,[742] whose essence is the negation of all [definite cognition]. [This Void] is expressed here by the term **'sky'** (*nabhas*).

But there is another 'Void' (*śūnya*) — that of the Brahmavāda[743] —

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each school developing its own views on the way *buddhi* stands for the Self. It seems likely, therefore, that here, the 'etc.' refers to Yogācāras and Naiyāyikas.

[738]The Mīmāṃsakas' purpose is to disclose the rationality inherent in the law of karman: the doer and the experiencer are one and the same person, even if the fruits of his acts are experienced after some delay, in another birth even. Therefore, they postulate a 'soul', *puryaṣṭaka*, which transmigrates from one birth to another. Thus the *puryaṣṭaka*, composed of eight elements, among which the subtlest is *buddhi*, both acts and experiences the fruits of its actions, in the form of pleasure and pain. SpN I 4 presents a similar exposition of the Mīmāṃsaka view of the Self (see n. 740). In addition, it shows that such a view, although not fully satisfactory, implies its own completion. In effect, to consider the Self as the experiencer, or the 'I', of 'I am happy', 'I am sad', is undoubtedly a progress with regard to those, Cārvākas and the untutored, who take the body to be the Self, and thus know only 'I am thin', 'I am fat'.

[739]*buddhidharma* — here, *buddhidharma* appears to be understood in the sense of *buddhyupādhi*, 'extrinsic affectation of the intellect' (and not in the sense of the eight *buddhidharmas*: *dharma, jñāna, vairāgya, aiśvarya*, and their opposites), since pleasure and pain are so characterized in Trika texts — cf. PHvṛ 8, SpN I 4, or YR ad PS 27. SpK I 4 and SpV ad loc. speak of *[buddhy]avasthā*.

[740]It may be interesting to compare this passage with Kṣemarāja's refutation — from the Trika point of view — of Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, ad SpK I 4: *ahaṃ sukhī ca duḥkhī ca raktaś ca ityādisaṃvidaḥ/ sukhādyavasthānusyūte vartante 'nyatra tāḥ sphuṭam//*, ' "I am happy, I am sad, I am devoted" — these and other cognitions have evidently their basis in some other [substratum] (*anyatra*) threaded through the states of happiness, etc., [like jewels on a necklace, or flowers on the string of a garland]'; note that SpN I 4 glosses *sukhādyavasthānusyūte* of the kā. as: *antaḥsraksūtrakalpatayā sthite*, 'which is like the cord within [and binding together] the garland of flowers'; cf. YR ad 34 and 35; on the Mīmāṃsaka position on the Self, see Appendix 16, p. 340.

[741]*śūnyābhimānin* — the same examination of the *śūnyavāda* is at issue in SpK I 12–13 and SpN ad loc., which treats the matter thoroughly. See Appendix 17, p. 341.

[742]Lit., 'as the absence of any display'.

[743]It is a second version of the *śūnyavāda* that is at issue here, namely, that of the Advaita, interpreted according to the Traikas. The difference appears to be but a question of method — Buddhists say that the Void is the Void, namely, that it is apprehended only as such, whereas Advaitins want to particularize it, as it were, by distributing it over several acts of negation, in keeping with the formula '*neti neti*'. Thus it seems that YR wants to associate the Advaitins to the *śūnyavāda* while distinguishing them from the Mādhyamikas, by taking recourse to a literal reading of '*neti neti*', which seems to pluralize the notion of Void.

whose partisans maintain that, in the process of meditation (*samādhāna*), when it is realized that 'here is another absence (*śūnya*) [that] is not myself', they then posit that other absence as the Self,[744] in accordance with the formula 'not this, not this';[745] this amounts to giving up one particular Void and grasping [in its place] another, in series, as the essence of the Void.

These [latter speculations] have been characterized as **'the expanse of the Void'**[746] in the kārikā.

Furthermore, because they have not determined the nature [of the Self] to be consciousness, those ascetics (*yogin*) who take the Void to be the Self — themselves insentient[747] and confused, immersed as they are in the cave of deep sleep — fetter the Self with insentience, the Self that is essentially consciousness.[748]

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[744]'When, at the moment [or in the process] of meditation (*samādhāna*) [...]': here, the concept of *abhāvasamādhi*, 'absorption in the Void', that the Śaivas ascribe to such 'nihilists' as the Vedāntins and the Mādhyamikas, is referred to and refuted, as is also done in SpK I 12–13, SpN and SpP ad loc. Same argument in SpN I 12–13: *tvādṛśām avijñeyā [avasthā] avijñeyatvād vaktum aśakyety ucyatāṃ śūnyeti tu kutaḥ, śūnyatāpi ca yāvad bhāvyate tāvad vikalpollikhitatvād asau vijñeyaiva* [emending *vijñaiva* to *vijñeyaiva*], 'If this state [named vacuity] is unknown to people like you, it should be said that, on account of its unknowability, it is impossible to express it. Then why call it Void? Even vacuity, as long as it is conceived, is indeed knowable, inasmuch as it is conceptually delineated'.

[745]*neti neti*. See Appendix 18, p. 342.

[746]SpN I 12–13 (Kaul Shāstrī: 28) denounces it as an 'unfathomable abyss of supreme delusion' (*agādhe mahāmohe*) into which the Śūnyavādins throw themselves and others.

[747]Cf. SpK I 13a: *atas tat kṛtrimaṃ jñeyaṃ sauṣuptapadavat [...]/*, 'Hence, that [viz., non-being (*abhāva*)] should be considered a factitious [state] similar to deep sleep'; in other words, the *abhāvasamādhi* is taken to be a state of naught and insentience only in a hyperbolic or transitory sense, as is the case with deep sleep. For when one awakes from deep sleep, one knows that he has experienced, adventitiously, that state of naught and insentience; cf. SpN I 13a: *ato mohāvasthaiva sā kalpitā tathā smaryamāṇatvāt sā cānubhūyamānatvād anubhavituḥ pramātur avasthātṛrūpasya pratyuta sattām āvedayate na tv abhāvam iti*, 'Hence, that state of insentience is but a presumption (*kalpita*), since thus it is recollected (*smaryamāṇa*). On the contrary, the fact that such a state is experienced attests to the existence (*sattā*) of the experiencer (*anubhavitṛ*), of the cognizer (*pramātṛ*), who is the substratum (*avasthātṛ*) of that experience, and not of any non-being (*abhāva*) [or Void]'.

[748]The experience of the Void remains an intelligible experience (*pratipatti*), which the yogin thus construes, after he has emerged from *samādhi*: 'I was profoundly unconscious' (*gāḍhamūḍho 'ham āsam*). Therefore the experience is not possible without an experiencer, that is to say, without consciousness itself. Insentience cannot as a consequence characterize such an experience. Thus the Trika has formulated three objections against the *śūnyavāda*: 1) Taking the Self as a Void, defining it negatively, amounts to a *regressus ad infinitum*, for this involves the aporia that the object negated has by that fact been admitted. 2) Taking the Self as a Void implies its insentience. 3) From the Trika perspective, it is impossible to conceive the all-vibrating and fulgurating Self or consciousness as inert and insentient. On this argument as to the intrinsic dynamism of the Self or consciousness and the correlative principle of its sovereign freedom, see YR ad 27: 'In both these [doctrines, though the conscious principle has been formulated as supreme], what has not been recognized is the freedom (*svātantrya*) of that conscious principle which, endowed with life, becomes the [efficient] cause of the construction of the universe'; see also Kṣemarāja's discussion on the

How strange! — that is, how astonishing this all is! Moreover, how absurd! This would never happen of its own accord![749]

And here the master gives an example: '**[...] with its cocoon, etc.**'. Just as **the silkworm**, that is, a certain kind of worm, after making its cocoon, namely, an envelope formed of its own saliva, **envelops itself** on all sides, that is, binds itself with a view to its own death — for, later on, it there dies — so likewise does one who considers the body, etc., to be the Self, bind his own Self with his own thought-constructs, that is, with thought-constructs such as 'I' or 'mine' that he himself has made.

As Buddhists say:

> Where there is Self, there is thought of an other. Attachment and hatred arise from distinguishing the Self and the other. Compounded of these two [opposed ideas], all vices arise.[750]

Kārikā 33

How is this great delusion (*mahāmoha*) then dissolved, in itself difficult to fend off,[751] which arises when the body, etc., is taken to be the cognizer? To this question, we answer: it is the freedom of the Lord only that is the cause [of such a dissolution]. The master says:

33. One should unveil[752] his proper Self by a discipline that aims at manifesting the might of Self-knowledge. Thus does the Supreme Śiva extend [within our sphere] his play made wonderful by [the alternation of] bondage and liberation.[753]

[The compound *svajñānavibhavabhāsanayogena* is analyzed as follows:]

Self-knowledge (*svajñāna*) here means the 'awareness (*avagama*) of Self's own freedom' — that Self whose distinctive feature is consciousness;

the **might** (*vibhava*) of that Self-knowledge means the 'flourishing (*sphītatva*) of [the acolyte's] own freedom', in the marvelous form of supreme ipseity, as his conscious form (*cidrūpa*) [becomes evident] as he sloughs

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same questions in SpN I 12–13.

[749]Namely, it can be explained only in terms of delusion, that is, in terms of our notion of *abhimāna*.

[750]*Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi* 219, according to Vetter's edition (= 221 in Pandeya's edition). Note the inversion of the first two words in YR, who reads *saty ātmani* instead of *ātmani sati*. The identification is due to Birgit Kellner and Seishi Karashima, whom I thank. Prof. Raffaele Torella has drawn my attention to the fact that the verse is quoted anonymously in the *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka* by Haribhadra (ed. Vaidya: 303, 545).

[751]*durnivāra* — cf. YR ad 18, where the hexad constituted of *māyā* and the five *kañcukas* is also said to be *durnivāra*; see also, at the end of the passage, the absolutive: ... *nivārya*.

[752]These two kārikās are symmetrical: *veṣṭayate*, in kā. 32; *udveṣṭayet*, in kā. 33. The second hemistich of 33 is intended as a conclusion to both 32 and 33.

[753]See PS 60, n. 1039.

off the conceit that takes the body, etc., to be the Self (*dehādyabhimāna*). Then he knows: 'I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, [hence] I am free'.[754]

The **manifestation** (*bhāsana*) of that might that is nothing but the freedom of consciousness means illumination [namely, of the acolyte who] has located in his own Self everything that had been heretofore wrongly considered as external to it, saying [as it were]: 'This might is all mine'.[755]

The **discipline** (*yoga*) aiming at this manifestation means the fixation of reflection on the Self that results from such a program of such determined practices.[756]

Thus, **by a discipline that aims at manifesting the might of Self-knowledge, one unveils**[757] **his proper Self** — that Self, whose nature is consciousness and is not subservient to anything else.[758]

[By 'one unveils' is meant that] the Lord himself unfastens him who had been made fast in the chains that consist in considering (*paramarśanā*) the body, vital breaths, subtle body or the Void [as the Self], that is, now removes what had covered him, by making him aware of the truth: 'I am consciousness, I am free'.[759]

Thus, the veiling of the Self that is the body, etc., which had come about through failing to recognize the Self as such, perishes now due to the power of recognition (*khyāti*),[760] inasmuch as the fault [viz., the wrong identification with the body, etc.] is such insofar as it is made up from one's own thought-constructs, as has been stated by the revered author of the *Tantrasāra*:

> One becomes the Lord (*pati*) instantly — his self nothing but consciousness and his body nothing but the universe — through reasoning, whereby is obtained a firm conviction wholly other

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[754] *cidānandaikaghanaḥ svatantro 'smi.*

[755] Quote from ĪPK IV 12: *sarvo mamāyaṃ vibhavaḥ*, which occurs again in YR ad 51 (avat.).

[756] *evaṃpariśīlanakrameṇa.*

[757] *udveṣṭayate — udveṣṭayet*, in the kā.

[758] This statement expands upon the preceding *nija*, 'own, proper'. Consciousness is autonomous, in the sense that it is self-caused; it is not an effect, rather, it is the only cause of whatever exists. Or, as say the Advaitins, the language of cause and effect, being *vyāvahārika*, cannot be used to describe the ultimate principle, which is 'without beginning'.

[759] *caitanyasvarūpaḥ svatantro 'smi.*

[760] Here we note the only occurrence in YR's commentary of the positive term *khyāti*, plainly and perhaps even playfully contrasted with *akhyāti*. The contrast suggests that *khyāti* is to be taken in the sense of *pratyabhijñā*, whose antonym *a-pratyabhijñā* is not attested. Cf. PHvṛ 4, where the following verse, of unknown provenance, is cited: *akhyātir yadi na khyāti khyātir evāvaśiṣyate/ khyāti cet khyātirūpatvāt khyātir evāvaśiṣyate*, 'If non-manifestation does not manifest [itself], then "manifestation" alone remains; if it does manifest [itself], then manifestation alone remains, because [the non-manifest] has the shape of the manifest'. The rhetorical model here is perhaps the upaniṣadic '*pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idam/ pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate/ pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya/ pūrnam evāvaśiṣyate* (BĀU V 1, 1)' or the ubiquitous Śaiva '*nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate*'.

> than the [false] conviction of the bound soul, [in the habit of] asserting [confidently:] 'I am inert', 'I am bound by my acts', 'I am impure', 'I am governed by another'.[761]

But why does the Lord both bind and liberate? The master says: **'Thus [does the Supreme Śiva extend his play made wonderful by (the alternation of)] bondage, etc.'.**

Thus (*iti*), i.e., through the process expounded earlier, the free Lord, **the Supreme Śiva**, whose distinguishing feature is that the uniform mass of blissful consciousness of which he is composed cannot be perfected,[762] creates bondage, establishing himself in the capacity of cognizer by means of the body, etc. — whereupon failure to recognize [one's own identity with the Self] is made to appear through his playful habit that essentially consists in concealing his own real nature, thus covering over his own nature.

Similarly, *mutatis mutandis* (*punaḥ*), having suppressed the bondage of cognizing by means of the body, etc., through the process of revealing the knowledge he has of his own Self, he liberates (*mocayati*) himself of his own free will.

Thus, in two ways, **he extends**, or he spreads [before us], **his play** (*krīḍā*), his sporting (*khelā*), **made wonderful by [the alternation of] bondage and liberation**, that is, made marvelous by bringing out the essential nature of the transmigrating world and of liberation (*apavarga*) — [all the while] thinking to himself: 'Alone, I do not rejoice'.[763] For this is the very essence of the deity that, while remaining fixed in his own nature (*svarūparūpaḥ san*), he displays himself everywhere as the principle of experience itself, whatever state [or condition] he may assume. And this is precisely his freedom.

Kārikā 34

And it is not just that [freedom or play that is the issue], inasmuch as any other particular state, to the extent that (*eva*) it reposes in its own form [i.e., appears as such], is [also] made to appear (*avabhāsyate*) by the Lord. The master says:

34. Creation, maintenance and dissolution, as well as waking, dream and deep sleep, appear against [the backdrop of] the Fourth

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[761] *Tantrasāra* IV (p. 32).

[762] *pūrṇacidānandaikaghana* — lit., 'whose uniform mass of blissful consciousness is already perfect/complete'.

[763] *ekākī na ramāmy aham* — cf. BĀU I 4, 3: *sa vai naiva reme, tasmād ekākī na ramate, sa dvitīyam aicchat.*

abode.[764] **Nevertheless, the Fourth abode does not appear as covered over by them.**[765]

Now, whether it concern creation and the rest from the cosmic point of view, or particular states, such as waking and the rest, that apply to the cognizer under the dominion of *māyā*, in either case, these states **appear** against the [backdrop of the] Lord, a mass of bliss (*ānandaghana*), that is, **against the Fourth abode** (*turīye dhāmani*), namely, the Fourth (*caturtha*) state consisting of nothing but perfect ipseity (*pūrṇāhantā*).

Reposing there as they do, such states nevertheless acquire a formal[ly independent] existence,[766] [i.e., appear to exist] as external to it, when regarded from the perspective of the [limited] cognizer, himself constructed [by the Lord's power of *māyā*].

That which does not appear (*na prakāśate*) against the backdrop of the Supreme Lord does not appear externally either. Thus [the *Śivasūtra* states]:

> Like sesame oil, the Fourth state is to be sprinkled over the three others.[767]

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[764]The kārikā establishes the correspondence between the macrocosmic (creation, etc.) and microcosmic (waking, etc.) states. Kārikās 34 and 35 of AG's PS correspond to ĀPS 31: *tribhir eva viśvataijasaprājñais tair ādimadhyanidhanākhyaiḥ/ jāgratsvapnasuṣuptair bhramabhūtaiś chāditaṃ turyam//*. As observed by Mahadevan (1975: 21), it seems that *sṛṣṭisthitisaṃhāra*, 'creation, maintenance and dissolution', are paraphrases of *ādimadhyanidhana*, 'beginning, middle and end', in apposition with *viśvataijasaprājña*, in ĀPS 31.

[765]... for it is the force behind their appearance. From the grammatical point of view, two interpretations of the last line (*tathāpi tair nāvṛtaṃ bhāti*) are possible, dependent on whether *āvṛtam* is construed with the subject phrase or as a part of the predicate (= *na bhāty āvṛttam*). Silburn adopts the first possibility: 'Pourtant (ce quatrième) ne se révèle plus lorsqu'il est recouvert par ces (diverses conditions)'. We prefer the second as does YR. The negation then includes *āvṛtam* rather than excludes it. The ambiguity of the verse is perhaps not foreign to AG's purposes, for reading it in one way expresses the standpoint of the *paśu*, and in the other that of the Lord. The latter interpretation is supported by Rāghavānanda's *Vivaraṇa* (p. 18) on the slightly different form of the kārikā in ĀPS (kā. 31, quoted above): *bhramabhūtair iti jāgradādīnāṃ mithyābhūtatvān na vastutais turyaṃ tiraskṛtaṃ rāhuṇevādityaḥ*, 'By saying [that the three anterior states] "have become illusion", it is meant that, since waking, etc., are false, the Fourth state is not in reality concealed by them — as is the sun by Rāhu'. *chāditam*, here, is to be read in relation to *bhramabhūtais*, so that *chāditam* assumes in effect the meaning of *achāditam* — if the Fourth state is concealed by something unreal, it is in fact not concealed. Cf. ĀŚ I 5, quoted n. 769, and MM 61: *yogī jāgarasvapnasauṣuptaturīyaparvaparipātīm/ citrām iva maṇimālāṃ vimarśasūtraikagumphitām udvahati*, 'The yogin wears, like a marvelous jewel-garland [that is, like a rosary], the articulated sequence of [states of consciousness]: waking, dream, profound sleep, and the Fourth — strung upon nothing but the thread of his reflective consciousness (*vimarśa*)'.

[766]*svarūpasattā*.

[767]ŚS III 20. Adopting here Kṣemarāja's explanation ad loc.: *tailavad iti, yathā tailaṃ krameṇa adhikam adhikaṃ prasarad āśrayaṃ vyāpnoti tathā āsecyam/*, ' "As sesame oil" means "as sesame oil, gradually spreading little by little, pervades its substratum", so likewise should [the Fourth state] be sprinkled over [the three others]'.

Thus, the Fourth mode is threaded[768] through all states — this is the supreme purport of the verse.

But 'can for all that his essential nature be veiled there [in that Fourth state] by those [phenomenal states], or not?' The master answers: **'Nevertheless, it** [the Fourth state] **does not appear to be covered over by them'.**

And so, though covered over for the sake of [revealing] the formal independence [of entities in this world], [that essential nature] is still manifest (*avabhāsate*) everywhere, for, being the principle of experience itself at the heart of each and every percipient subject, he [the Lord] transcends all those states. And it is not the case that, there [viz., in the Fourth state], he hides his own nature of plenitude (*pūrṇasvarūpa*) by concealing that [essential nature].

Thus is the abode that is Śiva ever replete, in all conditions whatsoever.

Kārikā 35

With language taken from vedāntic statements,[769] the master treats of the nature of the three states of waking, dream, and deep sleep; and [in so doing] he makes known the Fourth [state], which is beyond them, though infused in them:[770]

35. The waking state is this All, because difference is there. Dream is Splendor, because of the glorification there of Light. The state of [deep] sleep is that of the [pure] Knower, because it is a mass of consciousness; beyond there is the Fourth.[771]

[768] *anusyūta* — YR's commentary on the next kārikā presents the same image. The same term is found in SpK I 4; see also TĀ X 296 (also quoted in PM 61): *trayasyāsyānusaṃdhis tu yadvaśād upajāyate/ sraksūtrakalpaṃ tat turyaṃ sarvabhedeṣu gṛhyatām*, 'The Fourth is to be understood, within all the [three] different [states], as the string [holding together] the garland, through whose power comes into being the interconnection of [the elements of] the triad'. Note that MM 61 presents a somewhat different image: the string is *vimarśa*, and the Fourth is one of the pearls that are there strung.

[769] The themes developed in kā. 35 are based on MāU 2–12, and have been elaborated by preśaṅkarite vedāntic works, such as ĀPS 31 (quoted n. 764) and ĀŚ I 1–29 ad MāU 2–12. Note that, in the same context, Kṣemarāja also refers to vedāntic reasonings. In order to substantiate his gloss on ŚS I 11: *tritayabhoktā vīreśaḥ*, 'The enjoyer of the three [states] is the Lord of the heroes [i.e., of his sensorial energies] (*vīreśa*)', he quotes (without giving the source) ĀŚ I 5: *triṣu dhāmasu yad bhogyaṃ bhoktā yaś ca prakīrtitaḥ/ vedaitad ubhayaṃ yas tu sa bhuñjāno na lipyate//*, 'He who knows both what is said to be the object of experience and the subject of experience in the three states is not affected by them [i.e., by those two conditions], even while he experiences them'. On the reasoning, see SpK II 4b, quoted by YR ad 1.

[770] *anusyūta* — lit., 'threaded through them'.

[771] As to content, kārikās 34 and 35 correspond to ĀPS 31.

The waking state is **this All** (*viśva*),[772] i.e., the cosmic (*vairāja*) form of *brahman*.[773]

Why? **Because of difference**, that is, because the sense-organs — the eye, etc.[774] — of all cognizers operate within the fivefold domain [of sense objects] — sound, etc.,[775] which the Supreme Lord has created as external to himself.[776]

Hence, it is one and the same *brahman*, [diversified] as to object and subject, that subtends the marvelous display of varied sensory cognition.

Hence, it has been stated in the *Śivasūtra*:

> The waking state is [ordinary] cognition (*jñāna*).[777]

This has been proclaimed as the cosmic state (*virāḍavasthā*) of *brahman*.

As has been said in the Śruti:[778]

> He who has eyes on every side, and a face on every side, who has hands on every side, and feet on every side, he forges together with hands, with [wings] that are worthy of sacrifice, creating the heaven and the earth, sole god.[779]

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[772]*viśva*, here, corresponds to the *vaiśvānara* of MāU 3, as developed by ĀŚ I 1–5 (which employs *viśva*, instead of *vaiśvānara*). Senart (ChU: 69) translates *vaiśvānara*, in ChU V 11, 2, as: 'l'âme qui est dans tous les hommes', Minard 1949 (p. 156, § 432) as: 'Building Panthrope' (observing in the note: 'Ou Pamphyle ou Pandème, si l'on entend "appartenant à tous les clans en commun", comme le fait Ren. Anth. 15 n. 1'), Bouy (ĀŚ: 84) as: le 'Panhumain'. The first occurrence of the notion (although not yet included in the quadripartite scheme expounded in MāU) appears in ChU V, which elaborates it in seven chapters (11–18); see also ŚB X 6 1, 9; BS I 2, 24ff., and Ś ad loc.

[773]Cf. ChU V 18, 2, to be compared with MBh XII 47, 44, quoted by YR ad 27, as well as by BSBh I 2, 25.

[774]Viz., the *buddhīndriyas* (see PS 20).

[775]Viz., the *tanmātras* (see PS 21).

[776]Thus, as stated by MāU 3 and ĀŚ I 3, the waking subject is *sthūlabhuj*, 'experiences the gross aspect (of objectivity)'. ĀŚ I 4 adds that not only does the waking subject, or *viśva*, 'experience the gross', but 'the gross also satisfies him': *sthūlaṃ tarpayate viśvam*. It is the state of external cognition: *bahiṣprajñā* (MāU 3; ĀŚ I 1).

[777]ŚS I 8.

[778]And it has been said profusely in the Śruti. This text (R̥S X 81, 3) is one of the hymns to Viśvakarman. It is also found (with variants) in *Kāṭhakasaṃhitā* [KS] XVIII 2, *Vājasaneyisaṃhitā* [VS] XVII 19, *Maitrāyaṇīsaṃhitā* [MS] II 10, 2, *Atharvasaṃhitā* [AthS] XIII 2, 26, *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* IV 6, 2, 4, *Taittirīyāraṇyaka* X, ŚvU III 3. Here, the reading (*namate, saṃyajatrair*) is that of KS XVIII 2. *namate* is also supported by *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* and *Taittirīyāraṇyaka*, which read *namati*. Main variants: *dhamati* (R̥S X 81, 3; VS, MS, ŚvU), in the sense of 'to weld', 'to forge', is supported by R̥S X 72, 2, where Brahmaṇaspati 'forged together' (*samadhamat*) all things in this world; *bharati* in AthS. *saṃyajatrair* is found only in KS; elsewhere: *saṃpatatrair*, which is supported by R̥S IX 112, 2, describing the blacksmith who uses the feathers of great birds (*parṇebhiḥ śakunānām*) for fanning fire; therefore, in order to make sense with *saṃyajatrair*, 'worthy of sacrifice', we supply 'wings' as the implicit noun to be thus qualified. Note that R ad ĀPS 6 quotes the last *pada* of R̥S X 81, 3. For other texts evoking Virāj, see YR ad 27, and n. 678.

[779]R̥S X 81, 3.

[As waking is the cosmic form of *brahman*,] likewise **dream** is the state of *brahman* that is *tejas*, 'Splendor' (*tejovasthā*).[780]

Why? The master says: **'because of the glorification of Light'.**[781]

In dreams, neither do the external sense-organs make so bold as to operate on their corresponding sensory domains, sound, etc.,[782] nor is anything there attested that is external and ultimately real, such as sound, etc., nor is any other cause of the determinate cognition [experienced in dreaming] to be apprehended as something external [to dream itself], whether slightly different [from dream], such as nescience, etc.,[783] or as identical to it [viz., dream itself] nor can [such a cause] be established by argument [when the dream is over].[784] Still, everything [that one can possibly imagine] does appear in dreams.[785]

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[780]I.e., the *taijasa* form of *ātman/brahman*, as defined by MāU 4 (and ĀŚ I 1–5). Not only does the dreaming subject 'experience the subtle': *praviviktabhuj* (ĀŚ I 3), but also 'the subtle satisfies him': *tarpayate [...] viviktaṃ tu taijasam* (ĀŚ I 4). This is the state of internal cognition: *antaḥprajñā* (MāU 4; ĀŚ I 1). Compare the following upaniṣadic passages, which predate the formulation of the notion of *tejas/taijasa* and its incorporation into the doctrine of the *ātman*'s quadripartition: BĀU IV 3, 9: *sa [puruṣaḥ] yatra prasvapiti asya lokasya sarvāvato mātrām apādāya svayaṃ vihatya svayaṃ nirmāya svena bhāsā svena jyotiṣā prasvapiti/ atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃ jyotir bhavati*, 'When he goes to sleep, he takes along the material (*mātrā*) of this all-embracing world, himself tears it apart, himself builds it up; he sleeps (dreams) by his own brightness, by his own light. In that state the person becomes self-illuminated'; and BĀU IV 3, 14: *atho khalv āhuḥ jāgaritadeśa evāsyaiṣaḥ/ yāni hy eva jāgrat paśyati tāni supta iti/ atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃ jyotir bhavati*, 'Others, however, say that (the state of sleep) is just his waking state for whatever objects he sees when awake, those too, he sees, when asleep; (not so) for in the dream-state the person is self-illuminated'.

[781]This Light is the manifesting power of *brahman*.

[782]Cf. BĀU IV 3, 11: *svapnena śārīram abhiprahatya/ asuptaḥ suptān abhicākaśīti//*, 'Having struck down in sleep what belongs to the body, he himself sleepless looks down, on the sleeping (senses)'.

[783]For *avidyā* operates in the "objective" world, whereas the cause of whatever is experienced within a dream is to be found in dreaming itself or in the dreamer. The discussion will be taken up again in YR ad 48. Cf. BĀUBh IV 3, 9: the dream is circumscribed by the body of the dreamer, a 'dream body' (*svapnadeha*), 'constituted of latent dispositions' (*vāsanāmaya*), 'like a māyic (or magic) body' (*māyāmayam iva*) — *'svayaṃ nirmāya' nirmāṇaṃ kṛtvā vāsanāmayaṃ svapnadehaṃ māyāmayam iva*. According to Hiriyanna, Śaṅkara's *māyā* and *avidyā* are to be understood as more or less referring to the same thing. If a distinction is to be forced, one may be taken to represent the "objective" side of the phenomenal world, the other its "subjective" side — but the distinction itself illustrates the force of *māyā*, and *a fortiori*, of *avidyā*. In other words, bound souls are the substratum of *avidyā*; whereas the substratum of *māyā* is Īśvara, who casts illusions on the bound souls as does a magician who is not trapped by it. And such is the deeply rooted effect of *māyā* that each bound soul clings to his ignorance; *māyā* is meant for elseone, not for Īśvara.

[784]The passage explains in what manner the dreaming subject experiences phenomena in their subtle form. See ĀŚ II 1–5, which discusses the unreality of dream-phenomena from a logical perspective.

[785]Cf. BĀU IV 3, 9–10: *[...] atrāyaṃ puruṣaḥ svayaṃjyotir bhavati// na tatra rathā na rathayogā na panthāno bhavanty atha rathān rathayogān pathaḥ sṛjate na tatrānandā mudaḥ pramudo bhavanty athānandān mudaḥ pramudaḥ sṛjate na tatra veśāntāḥ puṣkariṇyaḥ sravantyo bhavanty atha veśāntān puṣkariṇīḥ sravantīḥ sṛjate sa hi kartā*, 'In that state the person becomes self-

What is implied by all this[786] is that it is he, the Lord, the luminous god[787] endowed with his own essential nature [of consciousness],[788] who has assumed the condition of diverse cognizers, and as if dreaming,[789] who then reveals to each cognizer in his own dream a unique universe,[790] after dividing (*pravibhajya*) his own Self into the marvelous diversity of numerous subjects, houses, cities, palaces, etc., through his illuminative [i.e., manifesting] [power of] freedom.

Hence, the Brahmavādins accept that the freedom of *brahman* is nothing else than dream [i.e., manifests itself as dream]. For it is stated in the Vedānta texts:

> Dividing (*pravibhajya*) himself by himself and creating entities of various kinds, the Lord of all, being all forms, appears (*prakāśate*) as the enjoyer in a dream.[791]

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illuminated. There are no chariots there, nor animals to be yoked to them, no roads, but he creates (projects from himself) chariots, animals to be yoked to them and roads. There are no joys there, no pleasures, no delights, but he creates joys, pleasures and delights. There are no tanks there, no lotus-pools, no rivers, but he creates tanks, lotus-pools and rivers. He, indeed, is the agent (maker or creator)'. Note that ĀŚ II 3, in dealing with the unreality of dream-phenomena, alludes precisely to this text: *abhāvaś ca rathādīnāṃ śrūyate nyāyapūrvakam/*, 'The non-existence of [dream-]chariots and the like is taught by the Śruti, accompanied by reasonings'.

[786] *ata idam arthabalād āyātam.*

[787] *deva* is, etymologically, the 'luminous one' (see YR ad 15 and 45), which suits the commentary as it explains *prakāśamāhātmyāt*. Moreover, YR's exposition agrees with the passage of the BĀU quoted supra, which establishes that the dreaming subject is luminous in and of himself, and, as such, creative.

[788] Or 'whose essential nature is [to be] himself [viz., being pure consciousness, he cannot be other than himself]'.

[789] *svapnāyamāna* — note the denominative. Cf. BĀU IV 3, 13 concerning the golden (*hiraṇmaya*) *puruṣa*: *svapnānta uccāvacam īyamāno rūpāṇi devaḥ kurute bahūni/ uteva strībhiḥ saha modamāno jakṣad utevāpi bhayāni paśyan//*, 'In the state of dream going up and down, the god makes many forms for himself, now as it were enjoying himself in the company of women or laughing or even beholding fearful sights'.

[790] *asādhāraṇa* — here, Barnett seems to understand *a contrario*: 'The Lord [...] reveals to each dreamer a common universe' — whereas the privacy of dream is attested by one's own experience: my dreams are mine alone. To the sovereign freedom of the Lord corresponds the equal freedom of the finite dreamer.

[791] Quoted in *Vākyapadīyavṛtti* [VPvṛ] I 119. The reading is *vedānteṣu*, in KSTS and in all our manuscripts, except for the Wilson MS, which reads *vedāntiṣu*. We have opted for the reading *vedānteṣu* — in any case more satisfactory grammatically. This verse is found as a quote in VPvṛ I 119 [119 Iyer = 127 Biardeau], with one variant: *pravartate* instead of *prakāśate*. Iyer translates (p. 115): 'The Lord of All, the All-embracing, the Enjoyer, after dividing Himself and after having created many different things, proceeds to sleep'. Biardeau has (p. 163): 'Se divisant lui-même et créant des objets de toutes sortes, le sujet devient, dans le rêve, souverain de toutes choses et fait de toutes choses' [— 'Dividing himself and creating objects of all kinds, the subject becomes, in dreaming, the sovereign of all things and is made of all things']. The verse seems to have been famous in the Śaiva circles, for Rāmakaṇṭha quotes it — although with two variants: *sarvaśaktiḥ*, 'endowed with all powers' (for *sarvamayaḥ*) and *prapadyate* (for *pravartate*) — in his *Vivṛti* to SpK III 1–2 (p. 102), in

Thus, the cause here [viz., of what is experienced in dream] is the glorification (*māhātmya*) of his Light alone [that is, the glorification implicit in his power of manifestation].

Therefore, the dream of *brahman* is the condition termed 'Splendor' (*tejas*) [namely, 'dream' (in the kārikā) refers to the luminous state of *brahman*].

Likewise, **the state of sleep is [that of] the [pure] Knower.**

The state of sleep (*suptāvasthā*), that is the deep sleep (*suṣupta*) of all cognizers is called the **'Knower'** (*prājña*),[792] meaning that it is the knowing state (*prājñāvasthā*) of *brahman*.

That is to say, in deep sleep, only the Wisdom (*prajñā*)[793] of *brahman*

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the context of the Lord's revealing himself in dream to the yogin. Now, what is the source of this verse? Rāmakaṇṭha attributes it to Bhartṛhari, from which statement we may infer that Rāmakaṇṭha, and probably other Kashmirian Śaivites, considered Bhartṛhari to be the author of the *Vṛtti*. The question that remains is whether Bhartṛhari too cites the verse, or whether it is his own (see Biardeau [VP: 162], who observes that the northern manuscripts attribute the verse to Bhartṛhari himself). Although, as observed by Biardeau (p. 163), the text sounds rather upaniṣadic ('La résonance en est plutôt upaniṣadique'), the verse has not been traced in the upaniṣadic corpus. Taking into account three indices, it may be inferred that this passage of YR's commentary on the dream state reflects the views of the Grammarians, whose affinity with the Trika is so marked that YR believes himself able to reformulate in Traika terms Bhartṛhari's positions: the three are 1) the source of the quote (VPvṛ I 119 [= 127]; 2) the presence of the same key-term, *pravibhajya*, both in YR's gloss and in the quote supporting it; and 3) the frequency of the dream metaphor in the VP and in its *Vṛtti* — see, besides VP 119 and its *Vṛtti* quoted here, VPvṛ I 1: *[...] vivartaḥ / svapnaviṣayapratibhāsavat*, 'Phenomenal manifestation is like the appearances in a dream'; VPvṛ I 4: *ekasya hi brahmaṇas [...] svapnavijñānapuruṣavad abahistattvāḥ [...] bhoktṛbhoktavyabhogagranthayo vivartante*, 'In this One *brahman* [...], "knots" of the nature of subject, object and experience manifest, having no external reality, like the beings perceived in dream'. It seems indubitable, then, that in introducing a citation that is to be found *'vedānteṣu'*, YR is referring to a commentary on Bhartṛhari (and, perhaps, of Bhartṛhari); it follows that the 'Brahmavādin' whose doctrine is supported by the quote is a Śabdabrahmavādin, that is, a grammarian of the school of Bhartṛhari. Moreover, it is noteworthy that early (preśaṅkarite) Vedānta, the VP with its *Vṛtti*, and the Trika, all have a similar conception of diversity: they hold that phenomenal multiplicity is not illusory, that, in its subtle form, it is the Lord's 'manifestation' (*pratibhāsa*, in VP; *ābhāsa*, in Trika), wherein the Lord as consciousness — as in a dream — appears as the triad of subject, object and experience itself.

[792]*prājña* — the term is variously translated: 'Understanding' (Barnett PS: 731); the 'Cognitional' (Hume BĀU: 392); 'wise' and 'intelligent' (Bhattacharya ĀŚ); ' "serenely" aware' (Fort 1990: 151); the 'enlightened', the 'knower' (Gupta ĀŚ: 180, 181); 'le Percipient' (Bouy ĀŚ: 86). The first occurrence of the term is probably found at BĀU IV 3, 21, which describes deep sleep through the metaphor of the man who "knows nothing without or within" while in the arms of his beloved. Defining *prājña*, MāU 5 borrows from BĀU IV 3, 19: *[...] evam evāyaṃ puruṣa etasmā antāya dhāvati] yatra supto na kaṃ cana kāmaṃ kāmayate na kaṃ cana svapnaṃ paśyati [...]*, '[...] even so this person hastens to that state (of self) where he desires no desires and sees no dream'; on the dissolution of all desires, characteristic of this state, see also BĀU IV 3, 21. It is the state of 'massive cognition', variously termed *prajñānaghana* (MāU 5) ('masse de pure conscience objectale', so Bouy, p. 86), *ghanaprajñā* (ĀŚ I 1), and *jñānaghana*, as here, in PS 35.

[793]So generally Conze 1974; Bugault 1968 translates 'la sapience'.

remains, who has become thus the seed of the universe.[794]

[Deep sleep] is the great Void (*mahāśūnya*),[795] where objects, etc., are dissolved, where root impressions[796] only remain, inasmuch as phenomenal display has vanished for all knowers, [along with] the dichotomy of knower and known. There, *brahman* remains at the very center [of all beings] as the principle of Knowing (*prajñātṛtayā*).

This [condition of 'Knower', viz., *brahman*] is the substratum of the root impressions implicit in the display of the world's marvelous diversity — as blue, pleasure, etc. — that belong to every [individual] cognizer — as in [many] examples drawn from ordinary experience, such as that of the awakened one who [remembers what he] has experienced previously.[797]

Otherwise, had the stable[798] *brahman* not shone forth as the nature of the Knower (*prajñātṛ*) in this condition [of deep sleep], by encompassing everything [that is knowable], wherefrom could have arisen, in the reawakened cognizer, the memory (*smṛti*) of things previously experienced — via the recall of such experience [through judgments like]: 'just so this happened?'[799] Nor could have arisen the experiences: 'I slept well, I slept badly', or 'I [slept as though] completely senseless'.

So says Bhaṭṭadivākaravatsa:[800]

> [O Lord, who is the Self,] if all experienced objects were not preserved within you by appropriating them fully, no memory, whereby [we are] not robbed of the things that we have [once] known, could possibly arise.

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[794] Cf. MāU 6: *eṣa sarveśvara eṣa sarvajña eṣo 'ntaryāmy eṣa yoniḥ sarvasya prabhavāpyayau hi bhutānām*, 'This is the Lord of all, this is the knower of all, this is the inner controller; this is the source of all; this is the beginning and the end of beings'. From the viewpoint of the divine, the *vaiśvānara* corresponds to Virāj, and *prājña* to the universal Lord; cf. BĀU IV 4, 22: *sarvasya vaśī sarvasyeśānaḥ sarvasyādhipatiḥ [...] eṣa sarveśvara eṣa bhūtādhipatir eṣa bhūtapālaḥ [...]*.

[795] Cf. *Bhāskarī* ad ĪPV III 2, 12, according to which deep sleep, in which the experiencer is predominant, is the state of both the *prāṇapramātṛ* and the *śūnyapramātṛ* (*pramātṛpradhānāyāṃ prāṇaśūnyapramātravasthāyāṃ suṣuptāvasthā*) — the *śūnyapramātṛ*, who belongs to the category of the Pralayākalas on the scale of the seven *saptapramātṛ*s.

[796] We borrow this rendering of *saṃskāra* from Dasgupta 1975: 263 and passim.

[797] Lit., 'such as [the memory of] what has been previously experienced by the awakened one'.

[798] *sthira* — cf. BĀU IV 4, 20, where *ātman/brahman* is said to be *dhruva*, 'stable'.

[799] Or 'to the extent that experiences move in us [namely, that we are conscious of them], expressed in judgements like [...]'.

[800] Probably another name of Bhāskara, the author of a commentary (the *Śivasūtravārttika*) on the *Śivasūtra* and of the *Kakṣyāstotra*, a hymn to the goddess frequently quoted in Kashmirian Śaiva literature. Divākaravatsa, the 'dear son [lit., 'calf'] of Divākara', so styles himself in the colophons to his *Vārttika*. The verse quoted here is also quoted (and attributed to Bhaṭṭadivākara) in ĪPVV, vol. II: 3; it is quoted without its source in TĀV V 137, vol. III: 1067, in a passage dealing with memory. YR quotes another verse, borrowed from the *Kakṣyāstotra*, in his gloss to PS 51; also ĪPVV, vol. II: 13, 14 and 145; for other quotes, see Dyczkowski SpK: 29–30 and notes.

It has thus been proclaimed [by the kārikā] that deep sleep, consisting of consciousness [although still under *māyā*], [corresponds to] the state of *brahman* called 'Knower' (*prājña*). Why? **Because it [the deep sleep] is a mass of consciousness** (*jñānaghanatvāt*).[801]

[Moreover,] since this is to be taken as a cause in relation both to deep sleep and to the Fourth state, it [viz., *jñānaghanatvāt*] should be supplied in both places.[802]

This state of deep sleep is a **mass of consciousness**, inasmuch as it takes the form of Light.[803]

Nevertheles, tarnished by the root impressions left there by the dissolution of the universe [viz., in the condition of deep sleep of *brahman*], it is not [absolutely] pure consciousness (*śuddhacit*).[804]

As it has been stated in *Spandaśāstra*:

> The all-pervading Lord reveals himself, in the two states [of waking and dream], as possessed of the supreme Power (*paramā śaktiḥ*) of [diversifying himself into] knowledge and the knowable, but, elsewhere, he reveals himself as consciousness.[805]

And, **beyond it, there is the Fourth**;[806] **beyond** that — namely, deep sleep — different from it, there is the Fourth form of *brahman*, consisting entirely of unalloyed bliss, for the root impressions [that produce] the latent dispositions proper to the limited soul have there entirely vanished, as is suitable to the status [of the Fourth, understood as other than the third].[807]

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[801] In deep sleep, absence of duality is experienced. The notion *cidghana*, 'mass of consciousness', implies that the subject no longer apprehends duality, recovers his basic unity (he is *ekībhūta*, as stated by MāU 4), with the result that he experiences bliss: *ānandabhuj* (MāU 5; ĀŚ I 9), that he himself is bliss: *ānandamaya* (MāU 5). Cf. ĀŚ I 12 on *prājña*: *nātmānaṃ na parāṃś caiva na satyaṃ nāpi cānr̥tam/ prājñaḥ kiṃ cana saṃvetti […]*, 'Prājña knows nothing — neither himself nor others, neither truth nor falsehood' (tr. Bhattacharya); and, on the subject in deep sleep, BĀU IV 3, 21 (quoted supra); BĀU IV 3, 23: *na tu tad dvitīyam asti tato 'nyad vibhaktaṃ yat paśyet*, 'There is not, however, a second, nothing else separate, from him that he could see'. On the term *jñānaghana*, see n. 792.

[802] ĀŚ I 13a formulates the same truth: *dvaitasyāgrahanaṃ tulyam ubhayoḥ prājñaturyayoḥ*, 'Non-apprehension of duality is similar in both *prājña* and *turya*'.

[803] See, infra, the quotation by YR of SpK I 18.

[804] ĀŚ I 13b also distinguishes between *prājña* and *turya*, but differently, by recourse to the concept of *bījanidrā*, 'germinal' or 'causal sleep', present in the former, and absent in the latter. In the former, diversity emerges again and again from the state of pure potentiality. Compare YR, here: 'In deep sleep, only the sapience (*prajñā*) of *brahman* remains, who has become thus the seed (*bīja*) of the universe'.

[805] SpK I 18. As pointed out by SpN I 18, according to some exegetes, 'elsewhere' refers to both deep sleep and the Fourth state; according to others, to deep sleep alone.

[806] MāU 7 gives the first explicit definition of the Fourth state, called *caturtha*. ĀŚ I 10–18 develops this definition.

[807] For speculations on *turīya* (or its variant *turya*), see Malamoud 1989: 140ff. As he

Since no name suitable to the meaning [of that Fourth state] can be given, it has simply been called here the **'Fourth'**, thus designating it numerically by means of an ordinal suffix[808] — namely, the ordinal of the cardinal 'four'; for it is the repository[809] of the triad of states previously expounded — the [string] threaded through all of them together.[810]

[To the question —] 'How then, if it is threaded through the three states, can it be beyond them?' the master responds: **'Because it is a mass of consciousness'.**

Since all those states — waking, etc. — are pervaded by the ignorance of cognizers, these being [necessarily] prone to difference, the Fourth has the shape of unalloyed consciousness (*jñānaghana*), Light and bliss, for all root impressions have there vanished, consequent upon the cessation of the perturbance (*kṣobha*) bringing about differentiation into subject and object. Therefore, though situated within them, it is **beyond**, that is, is different from them, for it has transcended those [three limited] states, being nothing but consciousness itself.

Thus, does the free and all-encompassing *brahman* expand[811] its nature ultimately nondual, yet diversified into various states.[812]

Kārikā 36

If so, then it would follow that the failure to recognize the Self would of necessity soil[813] all classes of cognizing subject, inasmuch as the pure supreme Self still finds itself threaded through each and every cognizer. The master demonstrates that it is not so with an example:

36. As no cloud, smoke or dust can soil the surface of the sky, so the supreme Person is untouched by the alterations brought about

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observes (n. 10): 'L'analyse étymologique comparative permet d'établir que *turīya* est construit sur une forme contractée du radical *catur*, "quatre". [...] Mais la spéculation philosophique [...] fait de *turīya* un dérivé de la racine verbale TR̥, TUR, "franchir", et interprète cet adjectif comme "ce qui est au-delà". Cf. Renou 1978: 86' [— 'Comparative etymological analysis shows that *turīya* is constructed from a contracted form of the root *catur*, "four". [...] But philosophical speculation [...] made *turīya* derive from the verbal root *tr̥*, *tur*, 'to cross', and interpreted this adjective as "that which is beyond". Cf. Renou 1978: 86'].

[808] *pūraṇapratyaya*.

[809] Viz., the place where the three previous states merge (see YR ad 34). This hints at the transcendent aspect of *brahman*.

[810] That is, the string accounts for the unity of the ensemble, the necklace, and, at the same time, is found within all the parts, the pearls; see YR ad 34.

[811] *vijr̥mbhate*.

[812] YR's concluding remarks on the vedāntic *ātman/brahman* are made in Trika terms. It is the supreme Śakti of the Lord, in the form of his power of absolute freedom (*svātantryaśakti*), that opts either for transcendence or for immanence.

[813] *akhyātimālinya* — lit., 'dirt of non-recognition'.

through *māyā*.[814]

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:] the naturally clear surface of the sky remains unsoiled by clouds, smoke or quantities of dust, although these appear against [the backdrop of] that sky[815] — nor are thereby its eternity and infinite extension negated; rather, the sky remains just sky, whatever [transitory] state embellishes it,[816] as happens with reflections in the mirror,[817] for the sky [like the mirror] is invariably recognized (*pratyabhijñāna*) as such.

Likewise, i.e., similarly, the Lord is **not touched by the alterations brought about through *māyā***, although these alterations are situated in the Lord himself; these modifications arise out of [immemorial] nescience and consist of the numerous and diverse states occurring in innumerable cognizers: birth, death, etc.[818] His own nature has not been abrogated by those modifications, for he is the **supreme Person** (*paraḥ puruṣaḥ*):[819] he represents the first glimmering (*ullāsa*), and the [final] place of repose of all mundane men (*puruṣa*).[820]

For this reason, he ever manifests himself (*sphurati*) as the principle of experience itself at the heart of each and every percipient subject. This has been indicated by the word '**supreme**'. Therefore, as happens with the magician[821] [whose magical tricks, which he himself creates, delude

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[814] Verse similar to ĀPS 35, apart from one important difference: *prakṛtivikārair aparamṛṣṭaḥ paraḥ puruṣaḥ//* (ĀPS 35cd) /*māyāvikṛtibhir aparamṛṣṭaḥ paraḥ puruṣaḥ* (PS 36). ĀŚ III 8 formulates the matter positively, denouncing those who are not enlightened: *yathā bhavati bālānāṃ gaganaṃ malinaṃ malaiḥ/ tathā bhavaty abuddhānām ātmāpi malino malaiḥ//*, 'Just as, in the eyes of simple people, the sky is soiled with impurities, so, for those lacking in wisdom, the *ātman* itself is soiled with impurities (*mala*)'.

[815] Cf. the traditional derivation of *ākāśa*: *ā samantāt kāśata ity ākāśam*, 'That which shines on all sides is *ākāśa*'. See ĀPS 35, BhG XIII 32 (*yathā sarvagataṃ saukṣmyād ākāśaṃ nopalipyate/ sarvatrāvasthito dehe tathātmā nopalipyate//*), ĀŚ III 8 quoted n. 814, Ś ad loc., BSBh I 2, 8; I 3, 19, II 3, 17. Cf. YR ad 72 and ad 83–84 (n. 1255).

[816] Lit., 'by whatever [transitory] state it is variegated'.

[817] Cf. kā. 12–13 and YR ad loc.

[818] These are the 'modifications of becoming' (*bhāvavikāra*); see n. 295. Thus, by an analogy with space, it is shown that the *ātman* is the same in all finite souls, and that this *ātman* is neither soiled nor subject to transmigration in any real sense. Defilements and 'modifications' are but effects of *māyā*. Cf. ĀPS 51: *janmavināśanagamanāgamamalasaṃbandhavarjito nityam/ ākāśa iva ghaṭādiṣu sarvātmā sarvadopetaḥ//*, 'The Self of all, which is permanently free of connection to birth and destruction, to coming and going, and to impurities, is ever [seemingly] connected [to birth, destruction, etc.], like the ether in jars, etc., [in that the ether seems to be connected with the jar's origination, destruction, etc., although it is not really connected to these]'. (tr. Danielson, revised), and the similar statement of ĀŚ III 9: *maraṇe saṃbhave caiva gatyāgamanayor api/ sthitau sarvaśarīreṣv ākāśenāvilakṣaṇaḥ//*, 'Whether death, birth, departing and coming, or staying [in this world] is concerned, [the *ātman*] present in all bodies is not different from space'. See also, PS 29, and the corresponding statement in ĀPS 21.

[819] Cf. YR ad 50.

[820] Cf. YR ad 1, where *sarvālaya* of the kārikā is glossed by *sarvaviśrāntisthāna*.

[821] *aindrajālika*.

others without deluding him], the modifications associated with *māyā* that proceed from him, consisting of non-Light, do not abrogate the Lord himself.[822] As had been said by my teacher's teacher's teacher, in the *Nareśvaraviveka*:[823]

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[822]On the illusory power of the *ātman* (or Lord, here), see ĀŚ III 10a: *saṃghātāḥ svapnavat sarve ātmamāyāvisarjitāḥ/*, 'The corporal aggregates, as happens in a dream, are created by the illusory power (*māyā*) of the *ātman*'. Also ĀŚ II 12; 19; ŚvU IV 10a: *māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyān māyinaṃ tu maheśvaram*, 'Know then that *prakṛti* is *māyā*, and wielder of *māyā* (*māyin*) is the Great Lord'.

[823]*Nareśvaraviveka* = *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi* [APS] 20–21a. The editors of this volume in the KSTS (Jagadisha Chandra Chatterji and the "Pandits" of the "Research Department of the Kashmir State") have "corrected" the reference of the quote, attributing it to the *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi*, though their manuscripts all have: *parameṣṭhinā nareśvaraviveke*; all eight manuscripts at our disposal confirm this: all read "*nareśvaraviveke*". Indeed, the quote figures in the *Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi* 20–21a, whereas the *Nareśvaraviveka*, although frequently quoted in the Śaiva literature, is not available. No such title as *Nareśvaraviveka* [NV] figures in the India Office Library Catalogue (ed. 1938–1957). The *Catalogus Catalogorum* of Aufrecht, based probably on a MS of our *Paramārthasāra*, notes it as the work of Parameṣṭhin, cited by 'Vitastapurī' (*sic*) — no doubt an error of interpretation of our passage of YR's commentary ad 36, inasmuch as Vitastāpurī is the city designated by YR as his place of residence in the final strophe of his commentary. Yet, the NV is given an important place in the works of Śaivism (see, esp., its numerous quotations in the ĪPVV, and that in the PM, p. 57). Therefore, the question is: does the verse belongs to the NV or to the APS, and if belonging to the NV, what is this work and who is its author? The verse cited here is apparently wellknown. It is found in TĀV V 8a (citing the first verse: *yady apy arthasthitiḥ* ...), ĪPV I 3, 7 (vol. I: 143; first verse), ĪPV I 8, 9 (vol. I: 420; citing the same verse and a half as in YR), ĪPVV I 3, 7 (vol. I: 287; citing the *pratīka*: *yady apy arthasthitiḥ*), ĪPVV I 8, 10 (vol. II: 433; citing the *pratīka*), and PM 19. There is no explicit attribution (whether title or author) in TĀV V 8a, nor in ĪPVV I 3, 7. Nevertheless, ĪPVV I 8, 10 attributes it explicitly to the APS, as does the PM. On the other hand, ĪPV I 3, 7 cites it as that of 'the *ācārya*' ('*yad uktam ācāryeṇaiva*' — which is glossed by Bhāskara: '*atrācāryasammatim āha*'), and ĪPV I 8, 10 as that of 'the *granthakṛt*' ('*yathoktaṃ granthakṛtaiva*' — glossed by Bhāskara: '*atra śrīmad utpaladevasya sammatim āha*' and: '*granthakṛtā — śrīmad utpaladevena*'). From these occurrences, it can be inferred that the author of the verse is Utpala, and that the text from which it is borrowed is the APS, rather than the NV — inasmuch as AG almost always refers explicitly to the NV when he cites it: '*yan Nareśvaravivekaḥ*' or '*tathā Nareśvaravivekaḥ*', as observed by A. Sanderson (private correspondence). Despite the manuscripts of the *Paramārthasāravivṛtti* [PSV], there is little chance that the verse here cited by YR belongs to the NV, unless we admit that the verse is present in the two texts. Still, YR attributes this verse to his *paramesṭhin*, the guru of the guru of his guru, that is, to Utpala (if the *paraṃparā* is as follows: Kṣemarāja, Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva) — unless it is to Lakṣmaṇagupta that the verse is to be attributed, as proposed by A. Sanderson. On this basis, it might be supposed that YR could have been mistaken in the matter of the text's name, and that the source of that confusion might be that the two texts had the same author, Utpaladeva — a mistake that could easily have happened, inasmuch as the two passages in the *Vimarśinī* where the verse here cited by YR appears refer only to the author, and that only generically, as *ācārya* or *granthakṛt*, and not to the work's title. The hypothesis that the NV be attributed to Utpala would explain as well the evident doctrinal relationship of the NV and the ĪPK, and the many times the ĪPK cites the NV. It remains surprising, however, that AG cites the NV without ever mentioning that it is the work of Utpala (or of another of his teachers). R. Torella (private correspondence), recognizing an 'Utpala-like' character in the NV, may be mentioned as providing further support for this thesis.

Although common experience,[824] is conditioned[825] by reference to embodied souls limited by breath and the subtle body, yet it is anchored also in the supreme Self. How could there be limitation[826] of it [the supreme Self] by breath [etc.], when breath has the Self for its very essence?[827]

Kārikā 37

But how is it possible that mundane men, though in reality nothing but uniform consciousness (*ekacit*), are affected by a medley of various states, such as pleasure, pain, delusion, birth, death, etc., each of which is distinctive?[828] The master gives an example:

37. Though the space within one jar is infused with dust, other [spaces within other jars] are not thereby defiled. So it is with those embodied souls that experience differences of pleasure and pain.[829]

[824] *arthasthiti* — lit., 'state of things', 'course of ordinary events'. Bhāskara ad ĪPV I 3, 7 glosses: *arthasthitir arthaviṣayo vyavahāraḥ*, ad I 8, 9: *arthasthitir arthaviṣayo jñānādivyavahāraḥ* and concludes: *na hi prāṇapuryaṣṭakarahitād ghaṭāder arthasthitir dṛśyate*, 'for such common experience (*arthasthiti* = *vyavahāra*) is not to be had from pots, etc., which are devoid of breath and the subtle body'.

[825] Bhāskara glosses *niruddhā* as '*sthitiṃ gatā*' (ad ĪPV I 3, 7), and as '*niyatā*' (ad ĪPV I 8, 9).

[826] Bhāskara glosses *yantraṇā* as '*pariccheda*'.

[827] The context in which this verse is quoted in ĪPVV I 3, 7 is particularly illuminating inasmuch as it implies a reference to BhG XV 15 (*mattaḥ smṛtir jñānam apohanaṃ ca*, 'From Me derive memory, knowledge and exclusion' — our transl.): *anena śaktitrayeṇa viśve vyavahārāḥ/ tac ca bhagavata eva śaktitrayaṃ yat tathābhūtānubhavitṛsmṛtṛvikalpayitṛsvabhāvacaitramaitrādyavabhāsanam/ sa eva hi tena tena vapuṣā jānāti smarati vikalpayati ca/ yathoktam ācāryeṇaiva ...*, 'All worldly behaviors depend upon this triad of powers (*śaktitraya*) [namely, knowledge (*jñāna*), in the sense of direct experience, memory (*smṛti*), and exclusion (*apohana*), in the sense of differentiating, that is, limited, knowledge. It is this triad of the Lord's powers that Caitra, Maitra, and all others, manifest, as so many experiencing, remembering and cognizing subjects. [In reality] it is he who knows [viz., directly experiences], remembers and cognizes through the variety of limited subjects. Thus said our teacher [...]'. Utpala's own *vṛtti* ad ĪPK I 3, 7 cites BhG XV 15, in support of the view according to which the energies of knowledge, etc. (*jñānādikāḥ śaktayaḥ*), pertain to the principle of consciousness (*cittattva*) alone. The supreme Self (*paramātman*) of APS 20–21a is none other than the principle of consciousness (*cittattva*) of Utpala's *vṛtti* ad ĪPK I 3, 7; see AG's Traika interpretation of BhG XV 15, quoted n. 453.

[828] The argument here is slightly different from the preceding — its inverse, so to speak; compare the analogous dialectic of the Advaita, where, once the existence of a unique and omnipresent *brahman* is admitted, the problem becomes that of explaining the existence of phenomenal diversity. It is the diversity of finitude itself that is the index of the non-reality of finitude. Infinitude alone is real.

[829] Verse exactly repeating ĀPS 36. Cf. also ĀŚ III 5 (echoing ĀPS 36?): *yathaikasmin ghaṭākāśe rajodhūmādibhir yute/ na sarve saṃprayujyante tadvaj jīvāḥ sukhādibhiḥ//*, 'Just as, if one space within a jar is filled with dust, smoke, etc., not all [spaces in all jars] are so filled, so is the case with the individual souls regarding joy, etc. [i.e., similarly, if one individual soul is filled with joy, etc., not all souls are filled with joy, etc.]'. ĀŚ III 6 (quoted n. 833)

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:]

Though **one** space within a [specific] jar is infused[830] with quantities of dust, **other such** spaces within [other] jars **do not** thereby **become defiled**, that is, infused, with dust; these spaces remain [essentially] spotless, because what is common to all of them is the quality of space [and not any adventitious quality, such as being dusty].

The space, itself spotless, pervasive and unvarying, that has come to be limited by the restriction (*saṃkoca*) of the jar, belongs as such to that jar only, nor are those [analogous] spaces [confined within other] jars or [behind] curtains to be confused with one another, whether they be fumigated with black aloe or made odorous with musk, or simply be bad-smelling[831] — because it is of the nature of space to be one,[832] and because the distinctions [if such there be] are made in reference to jars themselves and the like [and not to space as such].

Moreover, though real space is situated [everywhere] uniformly, jars and the like, delimited as they are by restrictions — such as [enclosing] sides — that refer only to the jar itself [and not to space], make display of a great variety of [apparently] different spaces.[833]

Thus, it is the restriction alone made by the jar that is thus qualified by a spatial predicate[834] [and not the reverse], because in such terms alone are practical affairs conducted[835] [namely, it is useful to speak of the 'space' as belonging to the 'jar'; it is not useful to speak of the 'jar' as belonging to or delimiting 'space'].[836]

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further develops the idea.

[830]*samācchādita* — lit., 'covered'.

[831]The meaning of *viṭhira* (a *kāśmīra* word?) is doubtful. A jar intended for pickles may be meant, for these are prepared with *asa foetida*. The fumigation or perfuming of the space in the jar, which makes the space unique, corresponds, as *upameya* in the analogy, to the *vāsanās*, the dispositions responsible for the seeming individuations of the universal *ātman*. YR is playing here, at the end, on the etymological ambiguity of the terms *vāsanā* and *adhivāsita*, which may be derived either from the root *vas*, 'to dwell' (a more probable etymology, according to Renou 1997, vol. II: 778, who translates 'residence'), or *vās*, 'to perfume'.

[832]Note the unique character of space (*ākāśa*) among the elements enumerated by the Vaiśeṣikas; it is said not to be a *sāmānya*, 'universal', precisely because, unlike all the other elements, it has no instances.

[833]ĀŚ III 6 formulates the same truth: *rūpakāryasamākhyāś ca bhidyante tatra tatra vai/ ākāśasya na bhedo 'sti tadvaj jīveṣu nirṇayaḥ//*, 'The form, the function and the denomination [of the spaces contained in jars, etc.] differ indeed from one to another, although difference cannot be predicated of space itself. So it is with the limited selves'. Śaṅkara, ad ĀŚ III 5, mentioning containers such as jars (*ghaṭa*), water-pots (*karaka*) and bedrooms (*apavaraka*), explains that they differ from each other by form (they are small, large, etc.), function (drawing water, keeping it, going to sleep), or denomination (*ghaṭa, karaka, apavaraka*). The differences proceed from the containers, not from the space, which is not qualified by the containers.

[834]We have emended *tathā avaśiṣyate* to *tathā viśiṣyate*; see our 'List of variants' in 'On the Sanskrit text'.

[835]*arthakriyākāritvāt* — lit., '[and this is justified] by the use to which the jar is put'.

[836]The affairs of men are conducted with particular ends in view, ends that are supplied by

Nor is it the case that this putative corruption, etc., of the space within a [specific] jar conceals the [undivided] nature [of space], nor that the different spaces thus delimited by the jar, etc., are confused[837] with one another.

Like that — that is, in the same way — those **embodied souls** (*jīva*) — that is, mundane men (*puruṣa*) — though essentially nothing but uniform consciousness, have been made finite by rejecting their own essence, which is full, pervasive, a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, enclosing themselves in the triad of coverings (*kośatraya*) that are [the impurities] of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing oneself the agent of actions[838] — in virtue of the Supreme Lord's power of differentiation [or, power of delusive construction].

For which reason, although they are essentially uniform consciousness, they differ from one another, due to the evil disposition[839] of the delimitation imposed on them by the three coverings [viz., by the triad of impurities],[840] a delimitation that is specific to each [of the three], just as differ from one another spaces delimited by jars, curtains, etc.

For example, the delimitation brought about by the covering of *māyā* (*māyīyakośa*) is commonly referred to as the embodied soul.

Moreover, in none of the other schools of philosophy do the terms *jīva, puruṣa, ātman, aṇu,*[841] apply to the Supreme Lord, a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness.

Thus, these embodied souls, delimited by the sheaths [of impurities] — the impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc. — are not confused with one another, acquiring diverse bodies perfumed by beginningless and wonderfully varied latent dispositions[842] imposed on them by the impurity of

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men (*arthakriyākāritvāt*) — it is thus more useful to suppose that space has been delimited by the jar (we say that this jar has 'more' space in it that another, and thereby that the jar is 'larger'); it is less useful to affirm what is in fact the true point of view, that the jar is itself a random delimitation of space, in itself infinite and without parts. Usage normally reflects human activity and is thus explained; but metaphysics requires at times a more exact language.

[837] *vyāmiśraṇā* — examples of nouns in *-anā* (fem.) are attested — see Whitney 1983: § 1150.2.h, etc.

[838] *āṇavamāyīyaprākṛta* — see kārikā 32. Note that, here, *prākṛta [mala]* stands for *kārma [mala]*.

[839] *daurātmya*.

[840] Not all subjects are equally affected by the three impurities (*mala*). In effect, in the process of liberation, the *mumukṣu* ascends the hierarchy of the seven "cognizers" (*saptapramātṛ*) according to his ability to free himself progressively from the impurities (see Appendix 10, p. 330).

[841] These terms, of course, have many acceptations in the different systems of Indian thought. Possible references are to the Lokāyatas, which takes the *jīva*, 'principle of life', as the sole reality; to the Sāṃkhya, which understands the *puruṣa* as one of two fundamental principles; and possibly to the Vaiśeṣika, where *ātman* designates the category of "spiritual" substance and *aṇu* the 'atom' or fundamental unit of "nature".

[842] Same terminology in YR ad 53.

supposing oneself the agent of actions, having diverse intentions, and partaking of the differences expressed by the pairs of opposites — merit and demerit, heaven and hell, pleasure and pain, birth and death — just as are not confused the spaces within different jars [etc.], which, delimited by a [particular] jar, etc., are variously perfumed by diverse substances.

Thus, it is quite justified to conclude that, though essentially nothing but uniform consciousness, '[embodied souls] experience difference from one another because of their own delimitation'.

Kārikā 38

Thus, the particular states that refer to the host[843] of embodied souls are said to belong to the Lord only in a secondary sense [i.e., are only metaphorically ascribed to him], for none exist really there [viz., in the Lord]. The master says:

38. When the host of principles [namely, the sense-organs] is tranquil, the Lord is, as it were, tranquil; when delighted, he is delighted; when deluded, he is deluded; but, in truth, he is not so.[844]

When the host of principles, that is, the host of sense-organs, **is tranquil**, that is, when they have ceased to function, the supreme Self thereto pertinent is [also] deemed to have become **tranquil**, that is, to have perished, **as it were**.

Similarly, **when** that [host of sense-organs] is **delighted** (*hṛṣṭa*), that is, disposed to exult (*sāhlāda*), he is said metaphorically to be so [i.e., to be delighted].

Moreover, **when** [that host is] **deluded** (*mūḍhe* = ***vimohavati***), enveloped in *tamas*, he is [deemed to be] deluded (*mohavān* = ***mūḍhaḥ***), as for instance when he is seen as the origin of stationary beings.[845]

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[843] *maṇḍala*.

[844] In kā. 37, consciousness was considered from the perspective of the finite *jīva*, as involving an ever-recurring variety of states, such as pleasure and pain. Now, from the perspective of the Lord (*bhagavat*), these various states appear as aspects of his own Being here captioned in language suggestive of the three *guṇas* of the Sāṃkhya. Same content, but slightly different formulation, in ĀPS 34 (note a misprint in Silburn, who compares this kārikā with ĀPS 37), the main variant being that, here, *tattvagaṇa* replaces *manas* of ĀPS: *śānta iva manasi śānte hṛṣṭe hṛṣṭa iva mūḍha iva mūḍhe/ vyavahārastho na punaḥ paramārthata īśvaro bhavati*, 'In the usual conception, yet not according to ultimate reality, the Lord is, as it were, calm, if mind (*manas*) is calm; he is, as it were, joyed, if mind is joyed; he is, as it were, deluded, if mind is deluded' (tr. Danielson, modified); on the interpretation of ĀPS 34, see Danielson ĀPS, n. 136–137, pp. 56–57.

[845] *sthāvarayoni* — B&R cite, s.v. *sthāvara*, *in re* 'fixed' plants, the apparently parallel formation '*sthāvarotpatti*' from a medical text (but do not offer a gloss) and the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (III 10, 18ff.) avers that the seventh, among the nine "creations" of Brahmā, is that of 'fixed' (*taṣṭhuṣām*) entities — plants and trees — suggesting the possibility that Brahmā himself

But in truth (*paramārthataḥ*), that is, in point of view of fact (*vastuvṛt-tena*), **he**, the Supreme Lord, is **not so**, that is, [does not exist] in the same way as do [those phenomena]. For everything that partakes of insentience must either be born or be destroyed [or both]; but neither destruction nor origination apply to the unchanging Lord, whose nature is consciousness and whom we refer to [as enclosed] within the sheaths of *māyā*, etc. [846] Hence, the Lord is ever the same.

Kārikā 39

The error that has come to pass in the process of elaborating [the world of our experience] (*samutpattikrameṇa*) is moreover completely uprooted in the process of achieving enlightenment (*jñaptikrameṇa*). [847] And [therein consists] one's own freedom. The master says:

39. After initially setting aside the error that consists in the Self appearing in the form of the non-Self, the supreme Self sloughs off then the erroneous view whereby the non-Self is projected onto the Self. [848]

might justifiably be called "*sthāvarayoni*". On *sthāvara*, 'stationary being', meaning the sub-category of 'animals' that include plants and trees, see n. 322.

[846] *māyādikañcuka* — it is the hexadic sheath consisting of *māyā* and the five *kañcukas*.

[847] In the context of the 'process of creation', the external manifestation of the Lord viewed as a succession of principles (*tattva*), which is also the 'genesis of bondage', kārikās 30 and 31 have dealt with metaphysical ignorance (*avidyā*). Symmetrically, kārikās 39–40 expound the reverse process, that of liberation through knowledge, or enlightenment, i.e., through the realization, or 'recognition', of ultimate reality.

[848] There are two levels or grades of the error that constitutes human finitude (see, infra, TĀV V 105b–107a, vol. III: 1032). The first, described in PS 25 and 30, consists in taking the Self to be the non-Self, i.e., in forgetting one's own plenitude and in apprehending oneself as a finite subject, defined in relation to an object. Thereupon intervenes the second level of error: taking the non-Self (body, *buddhi*, etc.) to be the Self, that is, predicating the Self of the non-Self, so that we assert 'I am fat', 'I am intelligent', etc. As PS 31 formulates it, it is error heaped upon error ('rengrégement de mal', to borrow from *L'Avare*), 'darkness upon darkness' (*timirād api timiram idam*), or, having recourse to another analogy: 'a great "pustule upon a boil" ' (*gaṇḍasyopari mahān ayaṃ sphoṭaḥ*). Similar speculations on the two grades of error are seen throughout the PS (see YR ad 53, 60) and are also present in texts such as ĀŚ I 11, 13, 15. See n. 728; also TĀ V 105b–107a: *ātmany anātmābhimatau satyām eva hy anātmani// ātmābhimāno dehādau bandho muktis tu tal layaḥ/ ādāv anātmany ātmatve līne labdhe nijātmani// ātmany anātmatānāśe mahāvyāptiḥ pravartate/*, 'Bondage consists in taking the body, etc., which is not the Self, to be the Self, whereas taking the Self as the non-Self persists. Liberation (*mukti*) consists in the dissolution of those [two errors]. When the belief that the non-Self is the Self has first vanished, [and, thereafter,] when the Self is no longer considered to be the non-Self, so that [the real nature of] one's own Self is attained, the Great pervasion (*mahāvyāpti*) [i.e., the complete fusion with the ultimate reality] takes place'; on *mahāvyāpti*, see JR's gloss: *paraṃ pārameśvaryam udiyād ity arthaḥ*, 'Then, the supreme Lordship may rise'. TĀV ad loc. comments (vol. III: 1032): *iha khalu dvidhā bandha ātmany anātmābhimāno 'nātmany ātmābhimānaś ca, iti tad eva cāṇavaṃ malam ucyate*, 'Here,

[The Self,] **having firstly**, that is, in the beginning, **set aside its appearance in the form of the non-Self**, that is, in such insentient things as the body, etc., as signaled by judgments such as: 'I am slim', 'I am stout', which is nothing but predicating the Self of the non-Self[849] —

[— that is,] having abandoned the notion that the adventitious body and the like is to be seen as the cognizer,[850] thanks to the irruption (*sphuraṇā*) [into consciousness] of non-adventitious ipseity (*akṛtrimāhantā*), such that one now judges: 'I am a uniform mass of blissful consciousness; my nature is unconditioned; I am free';[851]

[having first done this,] the Self, its bondage to the body dissolved, and having thus approached the status of supreme Self, then **sloughs off the erroneous view** (*bhrānti*) that consists in the display of difference — that display which is generated by the conceit attributing to the body and the like the capacity to cognize (*dehādipramātṛtābhimāna*).

This erroneous view [consists in the projection of the non-Self] **onto that Self** — the universal category[852] whose form is manifestation (*sphuradrūpa*), whose embodiment is Light (*prakāśavapus*), even though it appears as its own components[853] [that is, as multiple].

[This may be further explained as follows:] [the Self] grinds utterly to dust [such illusion], in the realization: 'I alone manifest myself as the Self of the universe'.[854]

Of this the purport is: as long as the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self — the body, etc. — does not dissipate, so long does the delusion not dissolve[855] that consists in valorizing difference[856] in this world, [the things of] which are even so but the display of one's own Self (*svātmaprathā*).

Hence, it is the Lord alone, the supreme Self alone — that is, the Great Lord that is one's own Self[857] — who causes the destruction of the error consisting in the conceit that locates the non-Self in the Self, by destroying the erroneous view consisting in the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self — and in this matter none other has such capacity.

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there are two kinds of bondage: taking the Self as the non-Self, and the non-Self as the Self. This is called the *āṇavamala*, the impurity of [deeming oneself] finite'. Thereafter TĀV V 105b–107a quotes ĪPK III 2, 4 defining the twofold *āṇavamala*.

[849] Lit., '... [nothing but] consideration (*parāmarśana*) [of objects] having reference to the non-Self, in terms of the Self'.

[850] A synonym of *kṛtrimapramātṛ* is *kalpitapramātṛ*, see ĪPV I 5, 1 (vol. I: 197).

[851] *ahaṃ cidānandaikaghano 'navacchinnasvabhāvaḥ svatantraś ca.*

[852] *viśvapadārtha.*

[853] *svāṅgakalpa.*

[854] *aham eva eko viśvātmanā sphurāmi.*

[855] Same terminology in YR ad 53.

[856] *bhedaprathā* — lit., 'display of difference'.

[857] Cf. TĀV V 151: *svātmaiva hi parameśvaraḥ śivaḥ.*

Kārikā 40

Thus, because this pair of errors has been let go, there is left nothing at all for the adept of this discipline to accomplish, for he has become [identical with] the Supreme Lord. The master says:

40. In this way, when these twin delusions have been cut off, along with their roots, there is no penchant at all on the part of the supreme adept who has attained his goal to accomplish anything else. [858]

Once **in this way**, that is, in the manner expounded in the [previous] kārikā, the budding shoots of this **pair of errors** have been crushed,

of him who has attained his goal (*kr̥tārtha*), that is, by whom the **goal** (*artha*) — the realization of [ultimate] human purpose (*puruṣārtha*) — **has been effected** (*kr̥ta*), that is to say, reached, by sloughing off the entirety

[858] In addition to accounting for the two levels of error and the resulting conception of *mokṣa*, kārikā 39–40 deal implicity with the notion of *śāktopāya*, 'way of energy', which will again be taken up in those following (41 to 46). The doctrine of the *upāyas* has been considerably developed in the Trika at the instigation of AG who dedicates to their exposition, partly or entirely, the first five chapters of his TĀ. In TĀ I 167–170, AG presents the doctrine as derived from the MVT, the authoritative Scripture in this system, of which he quotes three verses (MVT II 23, 22 and 21), and says (TĀ I 213) that he received this system of classification from his teacher Śaṃbhunātha. To the original threefold classification, AG adds a fourth category, the *anupāya*, or 'non-means', 'non-way'. TĀ I 171–232 expounds in detail the four *upāyas*, *āṇavopāya*, *śāktopāya*, *śāṃbhavopāya* and *anupāya*, beginning with the lowest (on the four, see TĀ I-V, Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 52–60). That the *śāktopāya* is alluded to within the span of kārikās 39–46 is shown by the avat. ad 39, which states that 'the error is completely uprooted in the process of achieving enlightenment (*jñaptikrameṇa*)'. For what distinguishes the *śāktopāya* from the higher *śāṃbhavopāya* is precisely its discursive and sequential character, inseparable from recourse to 'enlightenment' and the practice of yoga. The *śāktopāya* is also called *jñānopāya*, 'means (or way) of knowledge', thus named, for Śiva, as 'possessor of the *śakti*' (*śaktimat*), is known through his *śakti*, who further divides herself into Will (*icchā*), Knowledge (*jñāna*) and Action (*kriyā*). It is also called *jñānaśaktyupāya*, 'means of cognitive energy', for it consists in the yogin's transforming his *jñānaśakti*, his cognitive energy, into an intuition, a mystical realization — *bhāvanā* in this system. *śāṃbhavopāya* is characterized by non-discursivity and immediacy; *śāktopāya* by discursivity and mediacy. *śāṃbhavopāya* and *śāktopāya* are respectively the effects of an 'extremely intense grace' (*tīvratīvraśaktipāta*) and of a 'moderately intense grace' (*tīvramadhyaśaktipāta*). Thus, TĀV (ad III 292, vol. II: 693) adduces the absence of 'extremely intense grace' as reason for the inability to follow the 'way of Śaṃbhu', and later observes (TĀV IV 276b) that 'the one purified by the most intense grace' is purified (*pavitrita*) with the *śāṃbhavopāya*: *kaścid eva tīvratamaśaktipātapavitritaḥ*. The repeated definition of the *śāṃbhavopāya* is "*akiṃciccintana*", the 'thought of nothing', that is, the experience of non-discursive consciousness (see TĀ I 168a = MVT II 23, which defines him who attains the *śāṃbhavopāya* as "*akiṃciccintaka*"; I 171; V 156b), whereas the meditative or mystical realization (*bhāvanā*), discursive by nature, characterizes the *śāktopāya*; cf. TĀV V 156b: *akiṃciccintanaṃ śāṃbhavaḥ/ bhāvanā śāktaḥ*; also TĀ I 178b–179a: *tenāvikalpā saṃvittir bhāvanādyanapekṣiṇī// śivatādātmyam āpannā samāveśo 'tra śāṃbhavaḥ/*, 'Therefore, the absorption proper to Śaṃbhu is non-discursive consciousness, independent of all *bhāvanā*, etc., in which one attains identity with Śiva'; see also Intr., p. 51. On *bhāvanā*, see Appendix 20, p. 345.

of restrictions limiting the recognition (*parijñapti*) of his own freedom, and who is thus disciplined in accord with most excellent yoga,

[of such a one] no **penchant**, that is, no activity of the mind, **is ever directed to the accomplishment of anything else**, that is, to any remaining acts such as pilgrimage, confining oneself to a certain region,[859] initiation, silent (or whispered) recitation, meditation, listening to the exposition [of the canons], etc.,[860] for,

> This is the supreme *dharma*, namely, to see the Self through discipline.[861]

Thus has been asserted the preeminence of the discipline tending to the realization of one's own Self (*svātmayoga*).[862] There is no [need of] effort elsewhere on the part of the consummate adept (*pūrṇayogin*), since he has realized that discipline.

As has been stated in the revered *Gītā*:

> When the jungle of delusion/ Thy mentality[863] shall get across,/ Then thou shalt come to aversion/ Towards what is to be heard and has been heard (in the Veda).[864]

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[859]Confining oneself to a certain region is a vow, an observance (*vrata*); cf. TĀ IV 258b–263a. PS 79–80 will dilate upon the vow of the *jñānin*.

[860]Same development in PS 69 and YR ad loc. One observes the same logic of exposition in the fourth chapter of TĀ, entirely dedicated to the *śāktopāya*. In the course of expounding the procedures at work in the *śāktopāya* — *vikalpasaṃskāra* (or *vikalpaśuddhi*), 'purification of the *vikalpas*' (1–12), mantric practices (181b–193) and other truly mystical practices, such as *japa*, etc. (194–211) — TĀ IV deals with the uselessness of external rituals (109b–122a), and proclaims (212–277), citing as authority the MVT (quoting MVT XVIII 74–84 as ślokas 213–221a), the vanity of prescriptions and prohibitions, especially those relating to purity and impurity; see also TS IV, pp. 31–32 (tr. Silburn 1981: 194), which concludes: *na hi śuddhir vastuno rūpaṃ nīlatvavat, anyatra tasyaiva aśuddhicodanāt*, 'Purity indeed does not constitute the essence of the thing, as does the blue color, for, elsewhere [viz., in other schools], the same thing would be declared as impure and as such the object of an injunction'.

[861]*Yājñavalkyasmṛti* [YājS] I 8. The complete verse is: *ijyācāradamāhiṃsādānasvādhyāyakarmaṇam/ ayaṃ tu paramo dharmo yad yogenātmadarśanam//*, 'There are [dharmic] actions such as sacrifice, good conduct, restraint of the senses, non-violence, liberality, study of the Vedas, but above all, there is a supreme *dharma*, which is the witnessing of the Self through discipline'. YR's version of the third *pāda* differs in a few particulars.

[862]The yoga referred to in the *śāktopāya* should not be mistaken for the type of practice proper to the *āṇavopāya*; cf. TĀ IV 88–109a, particularly 106–109a, which quotes MVT XVIII 74 (partly) and 78–79. TS IV, p. 27, defines the yoga proper to the *śāktopāya*: *yad anapekṣitavikalpaṃ svābhāvikaṃ paramārthatattvaṃ prakāśate tasyaiva sanātanatathāvidhaprakāśamātratārūḍhaye tatsvarūpānusandhānātmā vikalpaviśeṣo yogaḥ*, 'Yoga [here] means a particular [mental discipline, the mind exercising itself] vis-à-vis alternatives (*vikalpaviśeṣa*), whose essence is concentration (*anusandhāna*) on the nature of the supreme truth that shines [in us] naturally and without alternative (*anapekṣitavikalpa*), and is intended for confirming [or 'making commonplace': *rūḍhi*] that [truth] as nothing but that sempiternel shining (*prakāśa*) as such'.

[863]The reference to yoga and *buddhi* is an additional sign that the *śāktopāya* is at stake here; see TĀ I 214–215.

[864]BhG II 52. The perfect yogin no longer requires the teachings of the Śruti, i.e., of the

Kārikā 41

— Having explained [865] in [the kārikās] immediately following (*saṃprati*) [kā. 41–43] that [the supreme yogin] reaches a condition of identity with the universe, [866] itself replete with apparent differences, from Earth to Illusion [867] [— first,] by merging himself in (*āveśa*) the condition of Śakti, [868] which represents [the essential simultaneity of] difference-and-

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Vedas, whether they are those he has already heard and followed, or those that are yet to be heard. Such a yogin — on whom acts cannot possibly be enjoined or forbidden (cf. TĀ IV 212–221a — quotation from the MVT XVIII 74–82 — and IV 271–278a) is thus a *jīvanmukta*. Through one of the numerous etymological plays on the name Abhinavagupta, celebrated as the *jīvanmukta* par excellence, TĀV IV 278a further defines the *jīvanmukta* as 'the one protected (*°gupta = parirakṣita*) everywhere (*abhi° = abhitaḥ*), i.e., from all differentiation, by the praise (*°nava = stava*) [of his own Self]', who is therefore an 'extraordinary' (*ko 'pi*, glossed as *alaukikaḥ*) sage, 'qualified [for that sacrifice (*asmin... yāgavidhau*) that is the practice of the *śāktopāya*]'.

[865] From here, the style changes, now imbued with a mystical lyricism, equally evident in the kārikās (notably 47–50, with the striking entrance into the discourse of the first person) and in the commentary (in 41–46, metaphor follows upon metaphor and alliterations are frequent). As well, it is noteworthy that vv. 39–49 have no corresponding verses in the ĀPS, thus constituting a long parenthesis devoted to the esoteric teachings of the Trika. The correspondences resume with PS 50, which corresponds to ĀPS 50 and ĀPS 62. The syntax of this passage is complex. Grammatically, the entire avat. is one sentence, of which the main clause is our final paragraph ('In sum...'); what precedes is structured as three dependent clauses organized in three times around a gerund (*abhidhāya*, implying relative past time), a present participle (*abhidadhat*, implying correlation with the main verb, here simply *āha*), and a future participle (*unmīlayiṣyat*, implying intention), which we have separated also by paragraph indications. The avat. makes reference implicitly to the doctrine of the *upāyas*, and particularly to two among them: the *śāṃbhava°* and the *śākta°*, to which the terms *śāṃbhavapada* and *śāktabhūmikā* allude. It is in this context, implicitly established by kā. 38–40, that kā. 41–46 deal, sometimes allusively, with tantric practice, including mantras and *mudrās*, with special emphasis on the significance and potency of the mantra *SAUḤ*, which is also, according to AG, the esoteric purport of the entire PT, the text referred to by YR ad 43. According to the separate avat. to 43 and 46, what is at stake here, in these five kārikās, is the esoteric mantric tradition (*mantrasaṃpradāya*), especially that related to the mantra *SAUḤ*. Kārikās 43–46 disclose (with the help of the commentary) the potency (*vīrya*) proper to the mantra *SAUḤ*, which itself depends on the higher potency of the supreme and primordial mantra, *AHAṂ*, which encloses in itself 'the full power of all the phonemes, from *A* to *HA*, of which mantras consist' and draws them together 'in a single point of concentrated energy, the *bindu*, *Ṃ*, its final letter)' (Padoux 1992: 386); see n. 876.

[866] *tadabhedamayatā* — cf. YR ad 39: *aham eva eko viśvātmanā sphurāmi*, 'I alone manifest myself as the Self of the universe'.

[867] The reference is to the three *aṇḍas*: *pṛthvyaṇḍa*, *prakṛtyaṇḍa*, *māyāṇḍa*.

[868] *śāktabhūmikā* — similar terminology in TĀ XXXIV 2 (*śāktiṃ bhūmim upāśrayet*) which describes a progressive ascent to the nature of Bhairava through *āṇava°*, *śākta°* and *śāṃbhava° upāya*: *tato 'py āṇavasaṃtyāgāc chāktiṃ bhūmim upāśrayet/ tato 'pi śāṃbhavīm eva tāratamya-kramāt sphuṭam//*, 'Then, abandoning the level of the *āṇava[upāya]*, one attains the level of energy [viz., that of the *śāktopāya*], and, afterwards, in turn, clearly that of Śaṃbhu [viz., the *śāṃbhavopāya*]'. As stated by TĀ IV 187b–188a: *tac chaktitritayārohād bhairavīye cidātmani/ visṛjyate hi tat [...]*, 'It is through ascending the triad of the *śaktis* (*śaktitritaya*) that [the world] is emitted (or projected: *visṛjyate = visarga*: *Ḥ*) into the consciousness of Bhairava [where it rests]'. The process of reabsorption into pure consciousness is described here.

non-difference;[869] [— then,] by dissolving all difference as he realizes within himself (*samāpatti*)[870] the condition of Śaṃbhu, which is a mass of perfect Light and bliss,

— the master proceeds then [kā. 44] to explain that [this universe] is like a series of waves[871] which arise before our eyes as splendors surging ever forth from Śakti [as their sole source], [splendors] themselves likened to a great current flowing from the abode of Śaṃbhu, a veritable ocean of nectar,[872]

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[869]Cf. the very similar avat. to kā. 46, which describes the symmetric process of emanation (*sṛṣṭi*), q.v. The *śāktopāya* corresponds to the state of experience termed *bhedābheda*, 'difference-and-non-difference' or 'unity-in-difference', since the Lord/*sādhaka* conceives of the phenomenal universe as both distinct and not distinct from himself; see Intr., p. 25.

[870]*samāpatti* — the term, derived from the root *pad*, means literally, 'attain completely' or 'reach utterly'; therefore, in this context: 'realization in oneself', 'unison', 'coincidence', 'identity', 'fusion', 'union'; cf. SpN II 7 on *tadātmatāsamāpattiḥ*: *tadātmatāsamāpattiḥ śivāikyāveśo na tu pañcavaktrāder vyatiriktasyākārasya darśanaṃ, na tu niścayamātreṇa tadātmatāsamāpattir api tu icchato 'vikalpaviśvāhantātmakaśivaikyarūpecchāparāmarśādhirūḍhasya*, '*tadātmatāsamāpatti* [means] "absorption (*āveśa*) in Śiva in the form of one's identity (*aikya*) with him", and not the visual identification (*darśana*) with a particular form of him, such as the five-headed Śiva. This identification is not the result of a mere determinate cognition (*niścaya*), rather it is that of an "aspirant" (*icchat*) who is firmly fixed (*parāmarśa*) on his desire to identify himself with Śiva (*śivaikya*) as the universal "I" (*viśvāhantā*) not [given in] discursive awareness (*avikalpa*)'. Also TĀ I 171: *jñeyasamāpatti*, 'unison with what is to be known', and JR ad loc.: *avikalpātmakasaṃvittādātmyam abhyeti*, 'One attains identity (*tādātmya*) with non-discursive consciousness'; similarly TĀV V 121 (vol. III: 1046), which glosses *bījayonisamāpattyā* (121b) as *bījayonyātmakaśivaśaktyaikātmyena*, thus establishing the equivalence: *samāpatti* = *aikātmya*, 'identity'; also TĀ III 79, where, in a different context, *samāpatti* is glossed as *apṛthagbhāvenāvabhāsanam*, 'manifestation [qualified] by non-separation' [viz., 'coincidence', 'fusion'] (see also TĀV ad loc). See also ŚSV I 14, and ŚSV I 22, where *samāpatti* glosses *anusandhāna*, 'mental union', in the sūtra: *tatsvātantryāvabhāsitatadakhyātimayaṃ sarvam eva bandhaṃ yathoktodyamātmakabhairavasamāpattiḥ praśamayantī*, 'Identity/fusion with Bhairava, the sudden emergence (*udyama*) [of supreme I-consciousness], as has been already stated [ŚS I 5], sets at naught all bondage that is of the nature of the ignorance brought about by the absolute freedom [of the Lord/consciousness]'. PHvṛ (avat. ad 19) equates *samādhi*, *samāveśa* and *samāpatti*, and defines them as the 'attainment of consciousness and bliss' (*cidānandalābha*): *[...] cidānandalābhaḥ, sa eva ca paramayoginaḥ samāveśasamāpattyādiparyāyaḥ samādhiḥ.*

[871]*tattattaraṅgabhaṅgirūpatām* — cf. VBh 110: *jalasyevormayo vahner jvālābhaṅgyāḥ prabhā raveḥ/ mamaiva bhairavasyaitā viśvabhaṅgyo vibheditāḥ.*

[872]*mahāpravāhadeśīyaśāktaprasarollāsapramukham* — lit., 'which arise before our eyes (°*pramukham*) as splendors surging ever forth (°*prasarollāsa*°) from Śakti (°*śākta*°), [splendors] themselves likened to a great current (*mahāpravāhadeśīya*°) [...]'. Cf. TĀ V 123 and its commentary which may help to elucidate this passage: *atra bhairavanāthasya sasaṃkocavikāsikā/ bhāsate durghaṭā śaktir asaṃkocavikāsinaḥ//*, 'There, accomplishing the impossible, the energy of Bhairava, who never expands or contracts, manifests itself in expansion and contraction'. and TĀV ad loc.: *atrānandapūrṇe dhāmni asaṃkocavikāsino nistaraṅgajaladhiprakhyasya pūrṇasya prakāśasya sasaṃkocavikāsikā sadaiva sṛṣṭisaṃhāramayī, ata eva durghaṭakāriṇī svātantryākhyā śaktiḥ bhāsate svātmaikātmyena prathate, yan māhātmyādiyān viśvasphāraḥ sadaiva sṛṣṭisaṃhāradaśādhiśāyitām etīty arthaḥ*, ' "There" [means] in that place overflowing with delight; — "[Bhairava] who never expands or contracts" [refers to] all-encompassing Light, said to be [like] an ocean without waves; — "in expansion and contraction" [means] eternally composed of creative and destructive [forces]. — For this very reason, [his] "energy"

— and he does this in order to reveal,[873] next [kā. 45–46], the 'Heart of supreme consciousness' (*parasaṃviddhṛdaya*),[874] which consists in the unison (*sāmarasya*)[875] of Śiva, Śakti and the finite self, and whose source is the absolute identity (*paramādvaya*) wherein all differences are dissolved;

[is said to] "accomplish the impossible", in virtue of which it may also be termed freedom; — [and so, that energy] "manifests itself", [that is] it extends itself [as everything visible] inasmuch as it is [ever] identical with itself [viz., incapable of abolishing its own nature]'. And JR continues: '— because of whose grandiose work (*yan māhātmyāt*), the emergence of the universe [is attested] in such a form (*iyān* — viz., "takes on the limited form that we apprehend"), eternally tending toward being governed by conditions of creation and destruction'. See also TĀ IV 184b: *ūrmir eṣā vibodhābdher na saṃvid anayā vinā*, '[The *spanda*] is a wave in the ocean of consciousness, and consciousness [like the ocean] cannot be without a wave', where the wave (*ūrmi*) serves as a metaphor for *spanda/vimarśa*, and the ocean symbolizes pure consciousness, or Light (*prakāśa*); also, the following verse (in SpN I 1), quoted from an 'Āgama': *ūrmir eṣā vibodhābdheḥ śaktir icchātmikā prabhoḥ*, '[The Goddess, as Śakti] is the wave of the ocean of consciousness, the volitional power of the Lord' (tr. Singh SpK: 11). Cf. the hymns of the Krama-Mahārtha that celebrate the Kālīs, emanations of the supreme Kālī, who are also worshiped in the Wheel of energies: *Śrīkālikāstotra* 11; *Kramastotra* 1; AG's *Kramastotra* 10 (Silburn *Anuttarāṣṭikā*).

[873] *unmīlayiṣyat*.

[874] I.e., the pulsating Absolute, as invoked in the *maṅgalācaraṇa* of Kṣemarāja's *Parāpraveśikā*: *viśvātmakāṃ taduttīrṇāṃ hṛdayaṃ parameśituḥ/ parādiśaktirūpeṇa sphurantīṃ saṃvidaṃ numaḥ//*, 'Adoration to the Heart (*hṛdaya*) of the Supreme Lord, the absolute consciousness immanent in the universe and [as well] transcendent that manifests (*sphurantī*) in the form of the Supreme Śakti (*parāśakti*) and [in lesser powers], as well'. Thus, *hṛdaya* is the Anuttara, the 'unsurpassable' in which Śiva and Śakti unite, that is, the luminous consciousness (*prakāśa*) and the Light of Light, the 'self-referential consciousness' (to borrow the term of Muller-Ortega 1997), named *vimarśa*, of which *spanda* is one of the numerous synonyms. See also SpN IV 2: *prakāśavimarśātmakaṃ hṛdayam eva*. Definitions of the divine Heart emphasize sometimes its Śakti dimension, sometimes its *prakāśa* aspect, and sometimes they combine both. Nevertheless, the Heart, or Absolute, is to be seen as a triangle, for, as will be stressed by YR in his commentary on 41, this Heart-Absolute is the place in which merge not only Śiva and Śakti, but also *nara*, the finite soul, that is, the entire phenomenal world (*jagat*). It is also what is taught by the gloss on the *Parāpraveśikā* quoted above, but from the point of view of emanation: *iha khalu parameśvaraḥ prakāśātmā prakāśāś ca vimarśasvabhāvaḥ [...] svayaṃprakāśarūpaḥ parameśvaraḥ pārameśvaryā śaktyā śivādidharaṇyantajagadātmanā sphurati prakāśate ca*, 'The Supreme Lord who is luminous in and of himself (*svayaṃprakāśa*) appears and shines forth thanks to Śakti, his consort, as the world, starting from Śiva and ending in earth [— viz., the subtlest and the grossest forms of existence]'. On the Heart in Śaiva texts, see particularly Muller-Ortega 1997, Padoux PTLvṛ: 65–66; 1992: 387, 417–419. The mantra *SAUḤ* — whose essence is *AHAṂ*, the *paramantra*, 'supreme mantra' — is the phonic form of this pulsating Absolute. Symbolizing the pulsating Absolute, this mantra is also a means to attain that Absolute, through the mystical realization (*bhāvanā*) proper to the *śāktopāya*. Cf. YR ad 43, which quotes PT 9–10, where the mantra *SAUḤ* is said to be the 'Heart' (*hṛdaya*) 'of the nature of Bhairava/supreme consciousness' (*bhairavātman*).

[875] Here is one of the symbolic justifications of the term 'Trika', the 'Triad': *nara*, Śakti and Śiva stand respectively for the knowable (*vedya*, or the 'object to be known'), knowledge (*vedana*), and the knower (*vedaka*), again symbolically equated with the phonemes *S*, *AU* and *Ḥ*; see PTLvṛ 21–24: *tad etad vedyavedanavedakaviśrāntitrayam ayaṃ varṇatrayasvarūpaṃ tat trayam*, 'Such is the nature of the three phonemes [*S-AU-Ḥ*]. It is a triad for it consists of a threefold repose in the knowable, knowledge and the knower'.

further, the essential potency (*vīrya*) [of that revelation] is contained in the Great formula (*mahāmantra*), as may be confirmed in one's own experience.

In sum, he declares [kā. 41–46] that the universe is made one [and is absorbed in the pure Being], through the procedure of synthesizing (*saṃkalana*) the natures of the three spheres, as [stated] in the Āgamas:[876]

41. For[877] the triad of Earth, Nature and Illusion,[878] erroneously consigned[879] to the status of 'that which is to be known', becomes, by the force of the realization of nonduality,[880] a residue of pure Being.

As to the threefold [reality] in the form of the gross, the subtle and the supreme, which constitutes the essence of the spheres of Earth, Nature, and Illusion respectively, [that was at first] **erroneously consigned to the status of what is to be known**, that is, did attain the status of field of knowledge, [it is that very reality which now] **becomes a residue of pure Being** (*sanmātra*), that is, whose essence is nothing but Being, which, in turn, is nothing but Light, **by the force**, that is, the excellence, of what is [termed] **the realization of nonduality**, in accordance with the rule taught in the revered *Kālikākrama*:[881]

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[876]After this preamble, YR's commentary on each kā. makes clear that the progression of the text (kā. 41–46) is modeled on that of the enunciation of *SAUḤ*. It also indicates how the symbolic meaning of the mantra is to be construed, constituent by constituent. Kā. 41–42 allude thus to *S(a)*, the first phoneme of *SAUḤ*; kā. 43 associates *AU* with *S*; kā. 44 deals then with *AU* specifically; kā. 45 alludes to *Ḥ*, which completes the mantra, whose enunciation reflects the movement whereby the world is internalized within consciousness; kā. 46 represents the enunciation of *SAUḤ* in the reverse movement of externalizing the world by the same consciousness.

[877]Glossing *hi* of 41b with *yasmāt*, YR's commentary emphasizes the logical link between kārikās 40 and 41: 'There is no penchant at all on the part of the supreme adept who has attained his goal to accomplish anything else' (40), 'for', by the power of *bhāvanā*, he sees phenomenal diversity as 'a residue of pure Being' (41).

[878]As shown by the gloss, three of the four *aṇḍas* are referred to here.

[879]°*āpatita*.

[880]*advaitabhāvana* — note the usage here of the neuter (*bhāvana*), in the verse and commentary, for metrical reasons, instead of the more common feminine form (on *bhāvanā* as meditative realization, see YR ad PS 52 and 68). Kārikā 41 deals with the meditative realization in which the *śāktopāya* culminates. The last sentence of the general avat. ad 41–46 amounts to a description of that experience: 'In sum, he declares that the universe is made one through the procedure of synthesizing the natures of the three spheres'. It is YR's commentary that develops the esoteric meaning of the kārikā. It will take up the question again while explaining kā. 43, revealing more explicitly that mystical realization is obtained through meditation on the mantra *SAUḤ*. Therefore, by implication, it appears that kārikā 41 aims at giving a cryptically symbolic interpretation of *S* [= *sat*, 'pure Being'], the first phoneme of *SAUḤ*. Note that Silburn does not translate *advaita*° in the compound *advaitabhāvanabalāt*: 'Car cette trinité: terre, nature, illusion, qui accède à l'objectivité se réduit, grâce à l'efficace de la réalisation mystique, à l'être pur'.

[881]The same passage is quoted in PM 2, a Krama text, and attributed to the *Devikākrama*,

> Cognition/consciousness (*jñāna*)[882] manifests itself externally and internally as a variety of forms.[883] In the absence of cognition/consciousness, no object exists. Hence, the world has the form of cognition/consciousness. In the absence of cognition/consciousness, no entities can be made into objects by anyone. From this it is concluded that cognition/consciousness constitutes the essence of those entities.

hi is used here in the sense of 'for' (*yasmāt*).

Kārikā 42

[The master] confirms this thesis [by means of an example], with the intention of [further] establishing the non-reality of difference:

42. Just as girdles, earrings, and bracelets, by setting aside their differences, are seen to be gold,[884] so likewise, the universe appears

which thus appears to be another name of the *Kālikākrama*. This text has not come down to us, except through quotations. Kṣemarāja, in ŚSV III 30 (ad *svaśaktipracayo 'sya viśvam*, 'The universe is the unfolding of his own energy'), quotes a longer version of the same passage, ascribed to the *Kālikākrama*, whose conclusion is: *yugapadvedanāj jñānajñeyayor ekarūpatā*, '[The conclusion] that knowledge and the known have one and the same nature [derives] from their being simultaneously apprehended' (cf. Silburn's transl. [SŚ: 99] and Torella's transl. [ĪPK: XXVIII, n. 42]) — an argument also made by the Vijñānavādins: the invariable correspondence between symbol and signified object establishes that the latter is not independent of the former; see Sanderson's interpretation of the verse as quoted in ŚSV III 30 (2007: 369–370). The *pratīka* of the verse that follows those quoted here by YR (*asti nāstivibhāgena* ...) is again quoted in ŚSV III 31. The same two verses quoted by YR are cited in TĀV III 57 (vol. II: 418) and V 80 (vol. III: 2006), and ŚSV quotes other verses, ad III 31, 32, 40, 41, 44. It is interesting to note that YR quotes here a text of a Krama background; see Intr., p. 21.

[882] We translate *jñāna* as 'cognition/consciousness' in the light of Kṣemarāja's commentary on the parallel passage of the NT (also quoted in ŚSV III 30). *jñānamaya*, epithet of the Lord, is there glossed as *cinmātraparamārthaḥ*, 'whose ultimate meaning is that it is "nothing but cognition/consciousness."'

[883] Consciousness appears externally as objective experience: of the jar, or the color blue, etc., and internally as subjective experience: of pleasure, pain, etc.

[884] At issue is the thesis that phenomenal diversity is not ontologically different from pure Being. Cf. SpP 2 [= ad I 2], pp. 12–13: *yato bodhyasya svayaṃ sattaiva nāsty ato bodhr̥rūpam anāvr̥tam evāvasthādvaye 'pi*, 'No object of consciousness can exist independently [of the subject], thus the conscious subject [who is, on the contrary, perfectly autonomous] is completely unobscured in both the states [of cosmic manifestation and withdrawal]' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 147). Thereafter, SpP 2 quotes two parallel stanzas, which explain the metaphor of gold and its ornaments as alluding to the double movement of creation and dissolution: *yathā hemno rūpakeṣu vaicitryaṃ svāparicyuteḥ/ atha nityasvarūpasya tathā te viśvarupatā// yathā galitarūpasya hemnaḥ piṇḍātmanā sthitiḥ/ tathā galitavedyasya tava śuddhacidātmatā//*, 'Just as gold fashioned into jewelery is, without undergoing any change, wonderfully varied, so is Your form as all things [which You assume even as] You persist just as You are. Just as gold, losing its form, persists as a gold ingot (*piṇḍa*), in the same way

as pure Being, when difference is set aside. [885]

As, indeed, golden ornaments — girdles, etc. — are gold and nothing else for him who is interested only in gold, by abstracting the particular form [imposed on the gold], namely, the girdle; and as gold, silver, bronze, copper, lead, etc., appear as metal only [and not as the particular metals the names suggest] to him who is interested in metal as such, **so likewise, this universe, when difference is set aside**, is **pure Being** (*sanmātra*) — that whose essence is Being alone (*sattāmātra*) — for the yogin [whose mind is] grounded in non-discursive awareness (*pratibhāsa*) alone, by whom has been jettisoned the stain of thought-constructs, such as those enjoining abandonment [of whatever is prohibited or not agreeable] or acceptance [of whatever is prescribed or agreeable] — in accordance with the rule laid down by the revered Kallaṭa:

> That [viz., the *mudrā śaktivikāsa*, 'blossoming of energy'] is accomplished by means of the transformation [of consciousness, even] in the presence of forms, etc. [886]

Kārikā 43

Now, alluding to [887] the tradition of the mystic formula, [888] the master describes the ascent of the universe, limited as it is in the form of finite beings, [889] to the state of Śakti [i.e., self-consciousness], according to the

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Your pure conscious nature persists when objectivity falls away [from You]' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 147, modified). See also, in a Vaiṣṇava context, *Saṃvitprakāśa* I 104b–106a, quoted in SpP (p. 4). It establishes that, whether the world is an illusory change in the Absolute, or is considered a product of real change in the Absolute, such as is the case with the numerous ornaments made of gold, the Absolute, the ultimate reality and ground of phenomenal diversity, remains substantially the same: *[...] pariṇāme sa eva tvaṃ suvarṇam iva kuṇḍale*, '[...] In case of [the world considered as real] change [in the Absolute], it is You who persist, as the gold [remains gold] in the very form of the earring'. Also *Saṃvitprakāśa* I 56–57 quoted in SpP 5 [= ad I 5] and LT XIV 38–39. Such speculations (and YR's here in particular) go back ultimately to ChU VI 1, 4ff., Uddālaka's discourse on the unity of Being: ... *sarvaṃ mṛnmayaṃ vijñātaṃ syād vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mṛttikety eva satyam*, etc.; the examples of gold (*loha*), and iron (*kṛṣṇāyasa*) follow.

[885] Through other analogies (limbs and body, clay objects and clay itself), ĀPS 46 presents the same argument, whereas ĀPS 58–59 describe how the yogin merges plurality (lit., 'duality', *dvaita*) into the state of *brahman* by meditative realization (*bhāvanā*).

[886] We have derived the meaning of this rather enigmatic statement from the context of PHvṛ 18, which quotes the same hemistich and similarly ascribes it to Kallaṭa without giving the title of the work from which it is borrowed. On Kallaṭa, see Appendix 19, p. 343.

[887] *kaṭākṣayan* — lit., 'casting a sidelong glance at'.

[888] *mantrasaṃpradāya* — YR reveals here, although cryptically (for he quotes two esoteric verses of the PT), that this portion of the text can be seen, on a second level of interpretation, as dealing with the mystical meaning of the mantra *SAUḤ*, which is the phonic form of the Anuttara, the vibrating absolute in which the triad of *nara* (*jagat*), Śakti and Śiva (= *brahman*) merges.

[889] See the avat. ad 41 and 46.

wellknown [path taught in the] Āgamas which depends upon abandoning the appearance of limitation:

43. That [universe so qualified], which is *brahman*, supreme, pure, tranquil, undifferentiated, even, whole, immortal, real,[890] **reposes in Śakti,**[891] **whose form is luminosity.**

[YR takes up these epithets, one after another, and comments on them, apprehending, if not a causal, at least a rhetorical sequence:]

This, namely, this universe, whose essence is pure Being is called ***brahman***, because it extends.[892] As say those expert in the upaniṣads:

> In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone [...].[893]

Having said this (or 'therefore' — *iti*), it is **supreme** (*para*), because it is full (*pūrṇa*);[894] and it is **pure** (*śuddha*),[895] due to the absence of [thought-constructs such as] injunctions and prohibitions;[896] [furthermore,] it is **tranquil** (*śānta*), due to the repression of particularity; and for that very reason, it is **undifferentiated** (*abhedātmaka*); it is **even** (*sama*) [i.e., ever identical to itself], due to the absence of increase or decrease — [It is said:]

> Even a part represents the universality of *brahman* [viz., its capacity to assume all forms]. Neither has it been exceeded, nor can it be diminished.[897]

Such being the case, it is **whole** (*sakala*), and for that reason, **immortal** (*amṛta*), that is, imperishable;[898] and it is **real** (*satya*), in keeping with the theses set forth by the revered Bhartṛhari:

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[890] The same pattern of enumeration is evident in kā. 10–11.

[891] That is, YR explains, 'it becomes composed of that' (*tanmayībhavati*), in effect, 'becomes identical with [supreme energy]'.

[892] *bṛhattvāt* — on the etymology of *brahman*, see YR ad 51 (and n. 975) and 104.

[893] ChU VI 2, 1. The complete text is: *sad eva saumya idam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam*, 'In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone, one only without a second'. Note that the *Laghuvṛtti* ad PT (whose subject is the mantra *SAUḤ*) quotes the same passage while commenting on verses 4–5.

[894] See YR ad PS 1 for a similar definition of *para*.

[895] As shown by PS 10–11, which enumerates *śuddha* among the epithets of the ultimate principle (*paratattva*), and YR ad loc., 'pure' means 'free of stain (*vimala*), due to the absence of the soot-like impurity (*aśuddhimaṣī*) found in thought constructs'. Symmetrically, impurity derives from those very thought constructs — hence, in *māyā*, from differentiation.

[896] See YR ad 42 who gives *tyaktahānādāna* as an example of *vikalpa*; also YR ad 10–11.

[897] Verse already quoted by YR ad 5, but, there, put in the mouth of an objector stressing the paradoxical character of a doctrine that maintains both that the Lord is all and that the finite soul is different from him. Here, PS 43 answers the objection with the epithet 'real' (*satya*).

[898] YR ad 10–11 glosses 'free of dissolution and creation' (*layodayavihīna*) with 'eternal' (*sanātana*).

> Of the real and unreal elements that are found in every object, the real element is the genus, whereas the unreal one is the particular.[899]

And:

> That which exists in the beginning, in the end and also in the middle, alone has reality.[900]

And so indeed this universe [viz., *brahman*], which has as its essence pure Being, **reposes in that** supreme **energy** (*parā śaktiḥ*) **whose form is luminosity** (*bhāsvarūpa*), which consists in the unison of the energies of willing, knowing and acting.[901]

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[899] VP III 1, 32 (tr. Iyer). For the discussion of a variant, see 'On the Sanskrit Text'.

[900] Lit., '(is) its [viz., *brahman*'s] truth/reality'. The element that perdures is equivalent to the Being of the object. In this way, it is signified that the gold, not the ring, is the Real. SpN I 5 quotes the entire verse (whose source has not been identified), of which the second hemistich is: *na yad ābhāsate tasya satyatvaṃ tāvad eva hi//*, 'That which simply appears has no reality; it is real only as long as it appears' (tr. Singh SpK: 48). Kṣemarāja offers a clue for understanding the verse, explaining that *eva* has to be added three times in the first hemistich (*sāvadhāraṇatvāt sarvavākyānām evakāro 'tra trir yojyaḥ*), so as to read: *yad ādau ca tasya eva satyatā, yad ante ca tasya eva satyatā, yan madhye ca tasya eva satyatā*. The citation occurs in the midst of Kṣemarāja's discussion of the supreme Subject which, defined as *spanda-śakti*, is taken to be sole reality and is to be distinguished from the empirical, finite, psychosomatic subject (*māyāpramātṛ*). Other conceptions of ultimate reality that amount to taking as real what is but transitory (such as the Buddhist view of a continuum of instantaneous cognitions) are therefore unreal from the viewpoint of the Absolute (see Appendix 14, p. 338, the discussion in its entirety). The Lord's eternity proves his reality; all other 'realities' being but transitory and mere appearance (*ābhāsa*). Whatever has a beginning and an end, whatever appears and disappears, does not really exist. Is real only that which is without origin and without end, in other words that which exists in the 'beginning, in the middle and in the end' — the eternal, the supreme principle, the *ātman/brahman*. Cf. BhG II 16a: *nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ/*, 'Of the unreal [according to Śaṅkara, heat, cold, etc., i.e., pairs of opposites, and the body, subject to change] there is no existence; the real [*ātman/brahman*, according to Śaṅkara] does not cease to exist [lit., 'has no non-existence']' (our transl.); VP I 1: *anādinidhanaṃ brahma [...]*, 'this *brahman* which is without beginning or end [...]' Also ĀŚ II 6a [= ĀŚ IV 31a]: *ādāv ante ca yan nāsti vartamāne 'pi tat tathā/*, 'That which is not at the beginning, nor at the end, is not also in the present [meaning: that which is not in the beginning, nor in the middle, nor in the end, therefore, that which is but transitory, is not real]'; cf. Ś ad loc.: *yad ādāv ante ca nāsti vastu mṛgatṛṣṇikādi tan madhye 'pi nāstīti niścitaṃ loke*, 'That which is not in the beginning, nor in the end, such as the mirage, etc., is not in the middle also. This is an established truth in this world'. This statement of ĀŚ II 6a is famous: not only it is taken up again in ĀŚ IV 31a, but also, in the same terms, in *Pañcadaśī* XIII 68b; and, with variants, in YV IV 45, 46 (very near to the text ascribed to Bhartṛhari quoted here by YR: *ādāv ante ca yan nāsti kīdṛśī tasya satyatā/ ādāv ante ca yan nityaṃ tat satyaṃ nāma netarat*); V 5, 9; III 4, 62; III 11, 13. Although both YR and SpN I 5 attribute this verse to the 'revered Bhartṛhari' (*tatrabhavadbhartṛhari*), it is not found in the present VP. Might it be inferred that it belongs to the lost *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* quoted in ŚDvṛ, p. 84, as well as in SpP, p. 4 (as *Dhātusamīkṣā*) and pp. 16 and 21 (as *Ṣaḍdhātusamīkṣā*)?

[901] Thus forming the Trident (*triśūla*) of energies, itself equated with *AU* in the spelling of *S-AU-Ḥ*, so that the first two constituents of *S-AU-Ḥ* are alluded to in kā. 43; on the Trident, see also n. 909 and PS 45 (n. 922).

[It reposes in, i.e.,] it becomes one with that (*tanmayībhavati*) supreme energy, in consequence of what has been stated:

The disposition of objects is founded on consciousness. [902]

Now [903] [the term] ***śāntam*, 'tranquil'**, [could be re-parsed as a compound of *śa* and *anta*]: 'that which is at the end of [viz., follows] *ś*' (*śakārasyānte*) [in the usual "alphabetic" order of the Sanskrit syllabary], namely, the cerebral [sibilant *ṣ*, or *ṣa*]. [Hence] the ***brahman***, whose essence is Being (*sat*) alone, is [*sa*, the dental sibilant that is] *'tataḥ param'*, 'next to [viz., that follows] that [*ṣa*, alluded to by *śāntam* in the kārikā]'. [904] It is [therefore termed] **immortal** (*amṛta*), [in the sense that it is a] 'seed of immortality' [or an 'ambrosial seed'] (*amṛtabīja*), [905] [as well

[902] The source of the verse has not been traced. We have derived this interpretation of *vyavasthiti* from its grammatical usage, 'conditioned alternative'. The assertion thus means that the things of the world do not dispose themselves according to their own rules or by some unknown fate; their disposition is founded on consciousness. Same quotation (with the variant: *°vyavasthitayaḥ*, plural), and in the same context, namely, that of the exposition of the mantra *SAUḤ*, in TĀV IV 185b (vol. III: 832), and — in the reading: *saṃvinniṣṭhā hi viṣayavyavasthitiḥ* — in the context of defining *bhāvanā*, in TĀV XXVIII 358b–359a; commenting upon the two verses: *yataḥ sarvānumānānāṃ svasaṃvedananiṣṭhau// pramātrantarasadbhāvaḥ saṃvinniṣṭho na tadgataḥ/*, JR observes that the existence of other cognizers is founded in that [consciousness] and not in [the object to be known and which is not visible], whose essence [viz., whose existence] can be known [only] through inference (... *pramātṛ ... atra tanniṣṭha eva, na tv anumeyasvarūpaniṣṭha iti*); TĀ XXVIII 359b–360a confirms: *ghaṭader astitā saṃvinniṣṭhitā na tu tadgatā// tadvan mātrantare 'py eṣā saṃvinniṣṭhā na tadgatā/*, '[Just as] the existence (*astitā*) of the jar, etc., is founded on consciousness, and not in reference to that [jar]//, so likewise, as regards another cognizer (*mātṛ*), his existence is founded on consciousness, not in reference to that [other subject]'. See PT 24; also, Vāmana quoted by SpN II 3–4: *ālambya saṃvidaṃ yasmāt saṃvedyaṃ na svabhāvataḥ/ tasmāt saṃviditaṃ sarvam iti saṃvinmayo bhavet//*, 'Since what is to be known [is known] after having taken refuge in consciousness, and not in and of itself (*svabhāvataḥ*), therefore, everything [is what it is] in virtue of its being known; this being the case, it would be made of consciousness' (we differ from Silburn's transl. [Silburn SpK: 105]).

[903] Now, YR begins again the interpretation of some of these epithets, in the esoteric context of phonemic emanation, and particularly, the realization of the mantra *SAUḤ*.

[904] '*param*' here may well be the reutilization in another sense of the *param* of the kārikā. Let us summarize: 1. *śāntam* = *ṣa*; 2. what 'follows that [*ṣa*]' (*tataḥ param*) is *sa*; 3. *sa*, in *S-AU-Ḥ*, represents *brahman* as *sat*, 'Being', 'existing' — which, as such, is also termed the 'third *brahman*', as stated by PT 9, quoted further in YR's commentary ad 43. In a passage dealing with phonemic emanation, TĀ III 167 defines the phoneme *SA* as 'the undivided supreme *brahman*' (*tad eva brahma paramam avibhaktam*). TĀV ad loc., after quoting ChU III 14, 1: *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma*, has recourse to BhG XVII 23, which establishes the traditional nomenclature of *brahman*: *auṃ tat sad iti nirdeśo brahmaṇas trividhaḥ smṛtaḥ/* (verse again quoted by TĀV ad V 142–144, a passage which deals again with the mantra *SAUḤ*, from the point of view of the *āṇavopāya*). Thus, *sat* is the third *brahman* (coming after *oṃ* and *tat* in the enumeration). Therefore, *SA* [or *S*], the initial of *sat*, or the third *brahman*, is also symbolically designated as such.

[905] *amṛtabīja*, 'ambrosial seed', stands here for *SA*, and is not to be taken here in its strictly technical sense, namely, as the name given to the four cerebral vowels — *ṛ ṝ ḷ ḹ* — (see TĀ III 91–92a). The clue to interpreting this very passage of YR's gloss is perhaps found in TĀ III

as] **pure** (*śuddha*), on account of its contiguity to the abode of Sādākhya [viz., Sadāśiva].[906]

And for this reason, it [viz., *brahman*, or the universe] is **even** (*sama*) and **whole** (*sakala*), because everything has now an equal essence (*sarvasamarasīkaraṇa*), consequent upon the experience: 'I am this All'.[907] And, finally, it is **true** (*satya*), due the dissolution [characteristic of the condition of Sadāśiva] of nescience [which is the source of error].

As has been taught by the Lord himself in the revered *Triṃśikā*:

> The third *brahman*, O fair hipped one, ...[908]
>
> [the complete text is: 'United with the fourteenth (phoneme, viz., *AU*),[909] O blessed one, the third *brahman* (defined as *sat*, therefore represented as *SA*, or *S*, the initial of *sat*), O fair

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165b–166a: *tata eva sakāre 'smin sphuṭaṃ viśvaṃ prakāśate// amrtaṃ ca paraṃ dhāma yoginas tat pracakṣate*, 'Therefore, it is in the phoneme *SA* that the universe clearly appears// And the yogins call it [viz., *SA*] the immortal and supreme abode (*dhāman*)'; TĀV ad loc. introduces the notion of *amṛtabīja*: *[...] amṛtabījatayokteś ca guravas tat parāmṛtaṃ dhāma pracakṣate — sarvaśāstreṣu kathayantīty arthaḥ*, '[...] Because of the mention [of it, viz., *SA*] as being the seed of ambrosia (*amṛtabījatayā*), the teachers call it [viz., *SA*] the immortal and supreme abode, that is, they state [it as such] in all the śāstras'. In a different context, namely, while dealing with the four *amṛtabījas*, or *amṛtavarṇas*, TĀ III 91–92a defines ambrosia (*amṛta*) as the supreme wonderment (*paracamatkāra*) of consciousness at rest within itself: *[...] ātmany eva ca viśrāntyā tat proktam amṛtātmakam*, '[This tetrad of cerebral vowels] is said to have ambrosia for its nature for it reposes in itself'; see also TĀV III 91: *asya varṇacatuṣṭayasya [...] svātmamātraviśrāntyā paracamatkāramayatvam*, 'Since these four phonemes repose in their own Self, and nowhere else, they consist in supreme wonderment (*paracamatkāra*)'.

[906] By pervading as *sat* the first three *aṇḍas*, the third *brahman* (or *SA*) represents the manifest world (though still *in potentia*, as it appears in the *śuddhādhvan*), and thus corresponds to the level of Sadāśiva; see PTLvṛ 9: *yad idaṃ tṛtīyaṃ brahma sadāśivatattvātmakam [...] asphuṭībhūtedantātmakagrāhyarāśilakṣaṇam [...]*, 'That third *brahman* (*tṛtīyaṃ brahma*), whose essence is the Sadāśiva principle, is characterized by the entire group of knowable objects, whose objectivity (*idantā*), nevertheless, is not yet fully manifested'. Same term (*sādākhya*) in ĪPK III 1, 2; ĪPV III 1, 2 (vol. II: 217–218) explains the word *sādākhya* from a nominal base *sadākhyā*, of which the second element *ākhyā* is understood in the sense of *prakhyā*, 'appearance, manifestation', which gives the result: 'the manifestation (*prakhyā*) from this moment on of "*sat*" (*yataḥ prabhṛti sad iti prakhyā*)'. Such an explanation reinforces the connection with Sadāśiva of whose element '*sadā*' is derived from the same root. It is possible that YR employs *sādākhyā* here as *sadāśiva* in order to bring out the element '*sat*' in the '*sanmātra*' of the preceding commentary, this particular derivation given by AG having become a common place of the tradition. This explanation would also serve as a reply to those who understand the name *sādākhyā* according to a more straightforward etymology as 'concerning him whose name contains the element *sadā* (adj.)', thus, by implication, *sadāśiva*. According to ĪPVV (vol. III: 264), *sadā* in Sadāśiva means that the nature of Śiva (*śivatā*) persists, even if, at this level, objectivity (*idantā*) begins to appear (*idantonmeṣe 'pi śivatehi sadāśabdena uktam*). The experience of *śuddhabrahman* takes place in the third *tattva*, that of Sadāśiva. When the entire universe is experienced as *sanmātra*, this experience is called the abode, or state, of Sadāśiva. For, in the state of Sadāśiva, when one experiences: 'I am this universe', all dichotomy is transcended.

[907] *aham idaṃ sarvam*.

[908] PT 9. YR gives only the *pratīka* of this famous śloka, itself alluding to *SAUḤ*, without either enunciating it, or even naming its constituents, designated only through periphrases; the śloka is quoted in *Dīpikā* ad *Yoginīhṛdaya* [YH] II 4 (Dviveda YH: 109). The complete text is: *caturdaśayutaṃ bhadre tithīśāntasamanvitam/ tṛtīyaṃ brahma suśroṇi hṛdayaṃ bhairavātmanaḥ//*. Thus this śloka cryptically spells out (*S* + *AU* + *Ḥ*) the mantra *SAUḤ*. See Padoux 1992: 418; TĀ IV 186–189.

[909] *AU* is the fourteenth phoneme (*tithi*) in the orders of both the alphabet and phonemic

hipped one, well-joined with (the letter *Ḥ*) that comes at the end of the "Lords of the phonemes" (viz., at the end of the vowels),[910] is the heart of Bhairava's Self'.][911]

This [universe] is that very *brahman* — experienced (*avamṛṣṭa*) in the process of becoming immortal,[912] at the heart of everything, and extending to the plane of Sadāśiva — which reposes in Energy, as previously described [viz., 'whose form is luminosity'].

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emanation. Referring to the MVT IV 25, TĀ III 104b–105a calls it *triśūla*, 'Trident': *asmiṃś caturdaśe dhāmni sphuṭībhūtatriśaktike// triśūlatvam ataḥ prāha śāstā śrīpūrvaśāsane/*, 'As, in this fourteenth stage [= *AU*], the three energies [namely, *icchā*, *jñāna*, *kriyā*] are manifested, the [divine] Teacher has named it [i.e., this fourteenth stage] "Trident", in the First Teaching [= the MVT] (*śrīpūrvaśāsana*)'. See ŚSV II 7, where *AU* is designated as *śūlabīja*, the 'germ of the Trident', inasmuch as it proceeds from the fusion of the three *śaktis* — *icchā*, *jñāna*, *kriyā* — with a predominance of *kriyāśakti*: *[...] śūlabījaṃ ca icchājñānaśaktivyāptapūrṇakriyāśaktipradhānatvāt śaktitrayasaṃghaṭṭanamayaṃ pradarśya [...]*.

[910] PTLvṛ glosses *tithīśāntasamanvitam* with *[...] visargaḥ tasmin samyag aviyogenānvitaṃ viśrāntam*. There are fifteen 'Lords of the *tithis*', that is, fifteen vowels from *a* to the *bindu aṃ*; and *tithīśānta*, 'that which comes at the end of the Lords of the *tithis*, viz., of the vowels', designates the *visarga*, the sixteenth phoneme. On *tithi*, see Padoux PTLvṛ: 80, n. 57; on the *visarga* as the sixteenth *tithi*, see PTLvṛ 9: *tithīśānāṃ pañcadaśānāṃ svarāṇāṃ yo 'ntaḥ paryantasthitibhūto visargaḥ*, 'The one that is at the end of the 'Lords of the *tithis*' (*tithīśa*), i.e., of the fifteen vowels, is the *visarga*, the ultimate abode [of manifestation]', and Padoux PTLvṛ: 80, n. 59; also PTV 9 (Singh: 84 [Skt. text]): *caturdaśa okārāṃkāramadhyagaḥ/ tithīśānto visargaḥ tṛtīyaṃ brahma ṣahamadhyagam/ etad bījaṃ vastuto viśvasya/ tathā hi yatkiṃcit sat pārthivaprākṛtamāyīyarūpaṃ bhāsate tad icchāyāṃ jñāne vā kriyāyāṃ vā patitam api sarvātmakatvāt trikarūpaṃ paratra śivapade visṛjyate sarvaṃ ca śivapadād visṛjyate*, 'The "fourteenth" is [*au*, the vowel] that comes between *o* and *aṃ*. *tithīśāntaḥ* is *visarga*, i.e., *ḥ*. *tṛtīyaṃ brahma* is the *sa* that comes between *ṣa* and *ha*. [*S*+*AU*+*Ḥ*], such is the [mantra that is the] generating seed (*bīja*) of the universe. Whatever appears as existing (*sat*) [symbolized by *S*] — whether it pertain to the sphere of the Earth, or Nature, or Illusion — it, falling within [the specific realm of] either *icchā* or *jñāna* or *kriyā*, takes still the form of the triad [of the energies symbolized by *AU*], for it is of the form of all. And this all that is emitted within the abode of Śiva is also emitted out of it [in the form of the *visarga*]'. Moreover, the PTV gives even more interpretations for each term of the śloka 9, including the sixteen interpretations given in reference to each of the sixteen phonemes, from *a* to *ḥ*. Sometimes, *tithīśa* (sg.), the 'Lord of the vowels', refers to the fifteenth phoneme only, the *anusvāra*, or *bindu*, *ṃ*, 'whose essence is the cognizer (*vedakātmakabindu°*)', as stated by PTLvṛ 5–9. However that may be, *tithīśāntaḥ*, the 'phoneme following the *anusvāra*, *ṃ*', designates as well the *visarga ḥ*, which is not counted among the *tithis*, because, as 'emission', it is at once the source of the entire process of the phonemic emanation. Therefore *SAUḤ* is the mantra that symbolizes the Anuttara, the transcendental reality.

[911] With such formulation (*hṛdayaṃ bhairavātmanaḥ*), the verse alludes again to the mantra *SAUḤ*, also named *hṛdayabīja*. On a PTV (p. 266, l. 4–267, l. 7) forced interpretation of the verse as referring to alcoholic liquor and the five 'jewels' or 'ambrosias' of the Kaulas (namely, semen, menstrual blood, urine, excrement, and phlegm), see Sanderson 2005: 111–114, n. 63.

[912] *amṛtībhāva* and *amṛtīkaraṇa* are two terms occuring in *sādhanā*: it is the transformation of him who is perishable into imperishable, eternal.

Kārikā 44

Whatever does not repose in the supreme energy under the headings of [i.e., as manifesting itself through the energies of] acting, knowing or willing, does not exist.[913] The master says:

44. By contrast, whatever is not touched by that [source] whose essence is to illumine[914] and [which will then manifest one of the three aspects of the Śakti, whereby] one may say: 'it is desired', 'it is known', or 'it is done', has the status of a flower in the sky.[915]

Whatever entity, even if present externally in the guise of an object,[916] if it **not be touched** by consciousness and made radiant under the headings of Will, Knowledge and Action — if it not be endowed with that bursting forth of the Energy named Parā (*parāśaktisphāra*) [or *parā* for *para*, 'supreme energy'], whose single essence informs universally[917] the triad of its several energies — such an entity, devoid of any power [to appear] (*vikala*), inasmuch as it is indicated by a name alone,[918] is like a

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[913]Lit., 'amounts to nothing at all'. See Padoux 1992: 418; TĀ IV 186–189.

[914]YR glosses *bhāsvarūpeṇa* with *icchājñānakriyāmukhena bhāsvareṇa [...] bodhena*; see also TĀ VIII 3, n. below.

[915]Same reasoning and image in TĀ VIII 3 (quoted in TĀV VII 62, vol. III: 1342), in the context of describing the *adhvans*, which stand for the phenomenal universe: *adhvā samasta evāyaṃ cinmātre saṃpratiṣṭhitaḥ/ yat tatra na hi viśrāntaṃ tan nabhaḥkusumāyate//*, 'A path (*adhvan*), in general, is grounded in pure consciousness (*cinmātra*). That which does not repose there [in pure consciousness] is like a flower in the sky [i.e., does not exist [— is mere words]'; JR comments: *nabhaḥkusumāyate iti na kiṃcit syād ity arthaḥ*. Cf. TĀ IV 186b–188a, quoted n. 922, which, apropos the triadic *śakti*, argues similarly (the allusion being to the mantra *SAUḤ*). However, the Trika speculation goes even further, for even this flower in the sky, although it is indeed a thing materially non-existent, does exist really, inasmuch as, being imagined, it exists in consciousness itself. The phrase as such is thus equivocal and points perhaps to the same *coincidentia oppositorum* that often affects extremes. Thus conceived, existence is called *mahāsattā*, 'great' or 'transcendental existence'; on these speculations, see ĪPK I 5, 3 (quoted n. 265); ĪPV I 5, 14 (vol. I: 259–260): *sā ca khapuṣpādikam api vyāpnotīti mahatī*, 'This [existence (*sattā*)] is "great" (*mahatī*) for it pervades everything including the sky-flower'; and MM 32: *kaḥ sadbhāvaviśeṣaḥ kusumād bhavati gaganakusumasya/ yat sphuraṇānuprāṇo lokaḥ sphuraṇaṃ ca sarvasāmānyam//*, 'From the viewpoint of real existence, what is the difference between the sky-flower and the [real] flower, since the world exists only as manifestation [of the Lord-consciousness], and that this manifestation-consciousness is the same in all?' (the PM quotes ĪPV I 5, 14). On *mahāsattā*, see also PM 66; Sanderson 2005: 130, n. 100.

[916]*yad vastu vastuvr̥ttena* — The two occurrences of the word *vastu* are to be taken here as suggestive of the poetic figure *paunaruktya*: the second, in effect, qualifies the first.

[917]*sāmarasya* — the meaning here would then be: it is the same Śakti who animates the three emanations, and it is that undifferentiated energy alone that is capable of explaining the energies that each, in its apparent difference, embodies.

[918]Possible allusion here to the *tatprakhyā(nyāya)* of the Mīmāṃsā, an interpretive device that aids in the identification of names of rites in consequence of substances or divinities that have therein been mentioned — the idea being that neither of the latter need be mentioned twice, and consequently any second mention of same (such as the word 'agnihotra'

flower in the sky.

By this argument has been pointed out the potency of the [three] modes [namely, Will, Knowledge, Action] constitutive of the Trident that [hover] over and above the modes of existence [— that is, that are presumed by everything that can be said to "exist"].

Kārikā 45

By restating[919] that the universe merges with the abode of energy, the master makes evident that it is identical [with supreme consciousness] as a complete realization of the abode of Śaṃbhu:[920]

45. This entirety is emitted by the god of gods into himself, the Supreme Lord, the ultimate reality to which has been given the name Śiva, who adopts the discipline of embracing the Trident of energies.

Thus, this **entirety** — by which is ultimately meant the *brahman* previously expounded,[921] on account of its form as pure Being —

is emitted[922] **by the god**, that is, by the Lord who is none other than

in the injunction 'agnihotraṃ juhoti') has to be a name (to avoid the stain of pleonasm). See Edgerton *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* [MNP] 273: 146.

919 See kā. 41–43.

920 *śāṃbhavapadasamāpattyā* — similar statement found in the general avat. ad 41–46.

921 In PS 43. Lit., 'this entirety (*samastam api*), whose highest reality [or whose ultimate meaning] (*paramārtha*) is that *brahman* previously spoken of [...]'.

922 The verb *visṛjyate* has also an esoteric meaning referring to the *visarga* [= *Ḥ*] at the end of the mantra *SAUḤ*. See TĀ IV 186–189a: *tathā hi sad idaṃ brahmamūlaṃ māyāṇḍasaṃjñitam/ icchājñānakriyārohaṃ vinā naiva sad ucyate//, tac chaktitritayārohād bhairavīye cidātmani/ visṛjyate hi tat tasmād bahir vātha visṛjyate/ evaṃ sadrūpataivaiṣāṃ satāṃ śaktitrayātmatāṃ// visargaṃ parabodhena samākṣipyaiva vartate/*, 'Indeed, this Being (*sat* = *S*) [that is, at once, the real (*sat*) universe composed of the three *aṇḍas* described in PS 43, and the pure Being (*sanmātra*) that is its true essence], which, rooted in *brahman* [viz., in *brahmāṇḍa* = *pṛthvyaṇḍa*], is [ultimately] termed *māyāṇḍa* [viz., the *aṇḍa* inclusive of *prakṛty°* and *pṛthvy°* (or *brahma°*) *aṇḍa* — as the four *aṇḍas* fit within one another, as emphasized by YR ad PS 4 —], is not called 'existent' (*sat*) unless it rises to (*āroha*) [the level of the energies of] Will, Knowledge and Action [viz., to *AU*, or *śaktyaṇḍa*]. For it is only by ascending (*āroha*) to that triad of energies (*śaktitritā*) that it [viz., that Being, or real world, in the form of the three *aṇḍas*] is emitted (*visṛjyate* = *visarga*: *Ḥ*) into Bhairava's Self, which is pure consciousness [where it goes on resounding]; or that it is [again] emitted out from that [pure consciousness]. Thus, the reality (*sadrūpatā*) [*sat*, in the form of *S*] of those *aṇḍas*, [which are] real ['only inasmuch as they appear in the form of the universe', explains JR], takes place only [viz., does exist only, or is realized only] through supreme consciousness (*parabodha*) [or with supreme consciousness (as supreme Agent)], when its [that of *sat*, or *S*] coalescence with (*samākṣipya*) [*AU* as] the essence of the triad of energies and the *visarga* [= *Ḥ*] is accomplished [that is, according to JR, "[this reality] manifests itself by virtue of its identity with the supreme Cognizer thanks to the progressive ascent to the *visarga*"]' (cf. Padoux's [1992: 418], Sanderson's [1990: 57] and Gnoli's [TĀ: 103] translations); TĀV ad loc. explains: *evaṃ yathoktayuktyā, eṣāṃ brahmāṇḍādīnāṃ satāṃ viśvarūpatayā pratibhāsamānānām eva, sadrūpatā parabodhena saha śaktitrayātmatāṃ visargaṃ ca samākṣpyaiva*

Supreme Śiva ...

... of gods — deities, from Brahmā to Sadāśiva, but also, the sense-faculties, which illuminate all things —[923]

— into the ultimate reality to which has been given the name Śiva, that **Supreme Lord**, who is a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness, [or, in other words,] into the [adept's] own essential nature,

— by adopting the discipline of embracing[924] **the Trident of energies** (*śaktitriśūla*), that is by the progressive realization of the Energy named Parā [or *parā* for *para*, supreme energy] [symbolized by *AU*] according to the method already expounded;[925] [— in other words, the entirety that is in effect Śiva] attains identity with him [namely, himself], through complete absorption therein, due to the excellence of inner-directed awareness (*vimarśana*).

And it makes no sense to attribute agency to any other [being or principle] whatsoever, nor is there any other cognizer other than this Cognizer.

And it is that Lord alone, ascending through the different levels [of subjectivity], who appears (*sphuraṇa*) as the different [categories of] cognizers, from ordinary souls to Rudras. Hence, it is most appropriate to state [that this 'entirety' is emitted into himself] **by the god of gods**.

Thus has been demonstrated the mode of existence of the [inward] emission [of the universe].[926]

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vartate, visargopārohakrameṇa parapramātraikātmyena prasphuratīty arthaḥ. Thus it appears that, somehow, the exposition of the PS together with its commentary helps in understanding that puzzling passage of TĀ. And it is shown that the *visarga* at the end of *SAUḤ* symbolizes both the inward, referred to in PS 45, and outward projection of the universe (in PS 46). As Padoux (1992: 419) explains this synthesis: 'The span of creation, from the Earth to *māyā*, is, in the *mantra*, taken in its essence as pure being (*sat* = *S*). It is then absorbed in the three energies of Śiva (*AU*), thanks to which it is imbued with consciousness (more specifically with the self-revelatory and free awareness called *vimarśa*), to be afterwards (but eternally, out of time) emitted (= *Ḥ*) in consciousness [...] both internally and externally'.

[923]In accordance with its etymological meaning of 'luminous', *deva* can be taken by extension to refer to the sense-faculties; see the notion of *karaṇadevī*s, or *karaṇadevatās*, goddesses that are the organs of sense, in YR ad 47 and 80.

[924]*parigama* — cf. *Abhijñānaśakuntalā*'s final stanza (*bharatavākya*), where Śiva as Nīlalohita is given the epithet of *parigataśaktiḥ*, thus glossed by Rāghavabhaṭṭa: *parito gatā vyāptā śaktiḥ sāmarthyam asyety anena tattacchaktitvaṃ vyajyate*, ' "*śakti*", "energy", [means] "capacity", "*gatā*", "gone around", [means] "suffused by" (*vyāptā*), [*parigataśakti* means] "he whose energy has been encompassed all around"; by this expression he [the poet] suggests the possession of multiple energies'.

[925]Namely, by means of *SAUḤ*.

[926]*visargavṛtti*, as symbolized by the final *visarga* of *SAUḤ*.

Kārikā 46

Thus, having shown so far, from the perspective of reabsorption, that the differentiated world, the world of finite being, attains unison with Śiva, formed of undifferentiated consciousness, by ascending to the abode of energy [i.e., by attaining the *śāktopāya*],[927] which is based on difference-and-non-difference,[928] the master next says that it is Śiva himself, solely formed of consciousness, who, surging forth (*ullāsya*) as Energy, appears (*sphurati*) as the universe, [the universe] of finite being. Nor, he says, is there any form of Energy or of finite being separate from Śiva.[929] It is Śiva himself who thus appears as the [universe, now seen as the] solidification of his own essence;[930] — in other words (*iti*), [the master now] explains [in the following kārikā] the process of emergence which consists in the bursting forth of the Great formula (*mahāmantrasphāra*) [viz., *SAUḤ*]:

46. Conversely, through the orderly emergence of the five energies,[931] that wondrous triad of spheres[932] is created also externally, by acquiring an outward Self.

It is the Supreme Śiva, whose Self is the unison of the pentad of energies, viz., Consciousness, Bliss, Will, Knowledge and Action, **by whom is created**[933] **the triad of spheres**, made **wonderful** by a variety of worlds, etc., and he does this by disclosing in turn the [five] levels [of pure subjectivity], viz., Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and *śuddhavidyā*, whereby [each one of the pentad of energies, viz.,] Consciousness, Bliss, Will, Knowledge and Action, is severally displayed as predominant;[934] [— in other words] **by acquiring an outward Self**, that is, by showing himself as external manifestation [that is, as the universe].

By the term **conversely** (*punar api*), the master shows that the Supreme Śiva himself, ever free, remains ever thus, projecting on the surface of himself (*svabhitti*) the play of the emerging and disappearing display of the universe, [a playful display,] which, although not different from his

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[927] Same formulation in the avat. ad 43.

[928] Cf. the avat. ad 41.

[929] Cf. SpK II 4a, quoted n. 452, and TĀ IV 275a: *sarvaṃ śivamayam*.

[930] *nijarasāśyānatā* — see first *maṅgalācaraṇa* of YR's commentary, and n. 224.

[931] This orderly emergence of the Lord's energies or powers takes place first ideally, as *śuddhādhvan*, of which the *śaktyaṇḍa* encompasses the last four constituents: Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and *śuddhavidyā*. The same orderly emergence of the Lord's energies is responsible for the successive levels of Speech; see n. 443.

[932] I.e., the universe seen as a triad formed of the spheres of *māyā*, *prakṛti*, and *pṛthivī*, already enumerated in reverse order in kā. 41, which deals with the process of the reabsorption of the universe in consciousness.

[933] Thus is confirmed that kā. 46 deals with the *sṛṣṭikrama*.

[934] Cf. PS 14 and YR ad loc.

own Self, appears yet as different.[935] And there is nothing that is different from him.

Kārikās 47–50

And so, in response to questions such as 'who is he, whom we call "Śiva"?' — the Lord whose habitus is the play of the emerging and dissolving universe — and 'where does he reside?' and 'by what means of knowledge do we know him?' the master explains, using terms expressive of the pronoun 'I',[936] that Śiva is the very self of everything that exists, that, being in evidence (*sphuran*) everywhere in virtue of being established first [as condition for everything else],[937] he enjoins the creation and all that follows from it:

47. In this way, setting in motion, thanks to the discipline of his play,[938] the machine[939] that is the Wheel of energies, the god [, now the yogin, says:][940] 'It is *I*,[941] whose form has been purified, who am situated in the role of the hero [setting in motion] the great Wheel of energies.[942]

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[935] Cf. YR ad 34: 'That which does not appear against the backdrop (*bhitti*) of the Supreme Lord does not appear externally either'.

[936] *asmacchabdavācaka* — on the "*ahaṃstuti*" that represent kārikās 47–50, see Intr., p. 25.

[937] *ādisiddhatā* — see YR ad 1, n. 255.

[938] That is, the play in which he engages by making appear and disappear the universe, as encoded in the mantra *SAUḤ*.

[939] See below: the image is that of the water-wheel (*araghaṭṭa*).

[940] Certain indications suggest here a transition from a cosmological and doctrinal perspective to one in which the practicing adept, or yogin, is central. Such are the term *yoga*, 'discipline', the term *deva*, applied often to men of a certain stature, the compound *śuddharūpaḥ*, suggesting a transformation, and the term *nāyaka*, with overtones of the dramatic 'protagonist' — the principal character in the eternal play of Śiva.

[941] Silburn translates differently: 'Et ainsi le dieu [...] est le Je [...]'.

[942] Cf. TĀ I 109–112 (Dyczkowski 1989: 117). AG's *Dehasthadevatācakrastotra*, which celebrates the great Wheel of energies. Also MM 26. As emphasized by Kṣemarāja and Utpalavaiṣṇava in their commentaries, the first and last verse of the SpK are celebrations of the Lord of the Wheel of energies, the *cakreśvara*, defined in SpK III 19 as the *bhoktṛ*, the '[universal] enjoyer', that is, the 'ultimate (or transcendental) cognizer' (*paramapramātṛ*, SpN ad loc.). The commentary continues: *paramapramātṛtāṃ satīm eva pratyabhijñānakrameṇāvalambate/ tataś ca prathamasūtranirṇītasya śakticakrasya svamarīcinicayasyeśvaro 'dhipatir bhavet/ anenaiva ca dehena maheśvaratvam avāpnoty eveti yāvat/*, 'He [viz., the yogin] attains the status of ultimate cognizer, which [he is] already, by means of the method of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*). Hence, one becomes Lord of the Wheel of energies, referred to in the first verse, i.e., of the collective whole of one's own "rays" [emanating from the Self]. In other words, one attains to universal mastery (*maheśvaratva*) with this very body', whereas SpP 51 explains: *evaṃ sati svātantryāptes tataś cakreśvaraḥ śakticakrasvāmī sarvajñatādiyutaḥ*, 'Being thus [i.e., in this state of absorption], [the yogin] is the Lord of the Wheel (*cakreśvara*), for he has attained freedom. He is the Master of the Wheel of energies (*śakticakrasvāmin*), who is endowed with omniscience and other [divine attributes]'. Also ŚS I 21: *śuddhavidyodayāc*

48. It is in *Me* that the universe appears, as in a spotless mirror jars and the like. From *Me* comes forth the All, as does the wonderful diversity of dreams from one asleep.

49. It is *I* who have taken on the form of all things, thus resembling the body, whose nature it is to have hands, feet, and the like.[943] **It is *I* who appear in each and every thing, just as the nature of light appears in all existent things.**[944]

50. Though devoid of corporeal sense-organs, it is *I* who am the one who sees, the one who hears, the one who smells.[945] **Though not an agent, it is *I* who compose the wonderfully varied Siddhāntas, Āgamas and Tarkas'.**[946]

Thus (*iti*) means here 'in the manner just explained';
setting in motion means 'causing to revolve';
the **machine** (*yantra*) means 'the infinite collection of energies implied by the pentad of energies' — Consciousness, etc.;[947]
thanks to the discipline of his play means 'by his playful intervals[948] of creation, etc.', arising out of and sinking back into [his formless state],

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cakreśatvasiddhiḥ, 'When perfect Knowledge (*śuddhavidyā*) appears, one obtains full mastery over the Wheel [of energies] (*cakreśatva*)', and ŚSV ad loc.: *vaiśvātmyaprathavāñchayā yadā śaktiṃ saṃdhatte tadā aham eva sarvam iti śuddhavidyodayāt viśvātmakasvaśakticakreśatvarūpaṃ māheśvaryam asya siddhyati*, 'When he joins [himself] to Śakti with the desire of extending [himself] as the soul of all things, then, thanks to the dawning [in him] of that Perfect knowledge (*śuddhavidyā*): "I am all", his universal mastery (*māheśvarya*) is established, whereby he takes the form of Master of the Wheel of his own energies (*svaśakticakreśatva*), which are the essence of all things'. Thus the Lord of the Wheel of energies, Śiva, and the *jīvanmukta* are identical.

[943] That is,'thus resembling the body, which is the same for all beings, consisting essentially of hands, feet, and the like, and yet assumes different forms'. According to YR (see the commentary ad 5 and ad 49), bodies are infinitely diverse, though consisting essentially of hands and feet, etc.

[944] Cf. ĀPS 46–47 (see Mahadevan 1975: 20). Here, PS 49 carries the argument to its conclusion: all entities, that is to say, all cognitions, are to be traced back to the Cognizer, who is the 'I'. Therefore, ultimately, there is no reality other than the supreme 'I', whose very nature is to manifest itself, to 'shine forth', taking advantage of entities/cognitions, which have no other role than to facilitate that 'shining forth', hence they too are '*bhāsvarūpa*'.

[945] Cf. BĀU IV 3, 23–30, BĀU IV 4, 22: *sa vā eṣa mahān aja ātmā yo 'yaṃ vijñānamayaḥ prāṇeṣu*, 'Verily, he is the great unborn Self who is this (person) consisting of knowledge among the senses'.

[946] PS 50a rewrites and condenses ĀPS 62, itself inspired by ŚvU III 19, which quote YR ad PS 50 and R ad ĀPS 62. PS 50b borrows from ĀPS 65a the single word: *siddhāntāgamatarkāḥ*, and finesses the scholastic debate that is featured in ĀPS 62 by making Śiva, the god who is none other than one's own Self, the supreme 'I', proclaim his absolute sovereignty. For an interpretation of PS 50, see Intr., pp. 6 and 9. Cf. BhG XV 15: *vedāntakṛd vedavid eva cāham*, 'And I am the author of the Upaniṣads and the Vedas' knower', and AG ad loc.

[947] On the pentad of energies, emblematic of innumerable other energies, see PS 10–11 and YR ad loc.

[948] *helākrama*.

in the manner of a device consisting of jars forming a water-wheel [that descend into and emerge from a well].

I, myself (*aham eva*), here signifies the **'god'** who is the **'I'** of all living beings;[949] such awareness of one's own Self, the essence of which is the marvel of supreme ipseity, the sound that is never sounded (*anāhato nādātmā*), is the **god** who is nothing but the incontrovertable Self of every being, and who thus appears (*sphurati*) as engaged in play.[950]

It is thus established that Śiva is he who is founded in his own nature.[951]

Similarly, he **'whose form has been purified'**[952] means 'he, the context [of whose thoughts] has transcended the realm of mental constructions'.

Furthermore, he is **situated**, namely, he remains ever **in the role of the hero**[953] **[setting in motion] the great Wheel of energies** — in the role that conveys to the presiding deities of the sense-organs (*karaṇadevatā*) the freedom [to indulge *ad libitum*] in worldly pursuits, such as taking or rejecting objects. For, unless the capacities of the sense-organs [i.e., one's own faculties] repose in consciousness, their existence as having such and such a nature is not evident [i.e., they do not really exist, being without function].

Therefore, in order to acquire even their own nature, they continuously rely on him alone who is possessed of energy[ies] [as their substratum].[954]

This being the case, because the Lord presides over the hearts of all cognizers, the notion that he presides over a limited range of existence (*niyatabhuvana*) [i.e., over a finite expanse of being only] is ruled out.

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[949]Implicit here is a demonstration of God's reality: for if God is none other than my own Self, to deny his existence is to deny my own Self — which to the Śaivas appears impossible and self-contradictory. Theme taken up again, now explicitly, in YR ad 50.

[950]YR's commentary on this passage can be understood in several ways, depending on how one construes the various *iti* which are there found in rather confusing imbrication. The translation reflects what we have taken to be the most direct and, indeed, logical, reading — which seeks to link the two key terms of verse 47, *aham* 'I' and *deva* 'god', in such a way as to establish their identity. And this is done through the "middle term", 'consciousness', which is the essence of both. YR begins by citing the *aham* of the verse — *aham iti* — then notes that this reference to the first person singular implies reference to god himself, *deva*, as the 'I' of all conscious beings — *devaḥ sarvaprāṇinām aham iti*. But such an 'I' is of course nothing but reflective awareness, freed of all personal attributes — *parāmarśa* — which YR goes on to describe in such a way to make evident the equation of 'consciousness' and 'I' — *anāhato ... parāmarśaḥ, sa eva ... sarvasyaiva svātmaiva* — at which level we encounter again *deva* 'god', as that very auto-referential all-encompassing consciousness, which by definition has no "purpose" other than that of manifesting itself — *devaḥ krīḍanaśīlaḥ sphurati iti*.

[951]*svasvarūpaniṣṭha* — the yogin is referred to here.

[952]For alienation from one's own nature, in the form of the *āṇavamala*, is the supreme impurity (see PS 24).

[953]*nāyaka* — a term borrowed from dramaturgy: derived from the root *nī* 'to lead', the *nāyaka* of the drama is its 'hero' who 'guides' the plot.

[954]Cf. the *Sarvamaṅgalāśāstra*, quoted by YR ad PS 4 and Appendix 4, p. 322.

And so **the All** — whatever is thought to compose a whole — **appears only in *Me***, after the manner of the reflection in the mirror, that is, it appears, its significance fully realized only in the experience of the 'I'[955] as previously explained; in other words, the All appears (*sphurati*) as the [absolute] ipseity that is its very essence.

And **from *Me***, from that form that is complete, namely, my own Self, designated as 'I', the all-inclusive (*sakala*) universe **comes forth**, leaving no remainder, that is, it appears before the cognizer, as something removed from him.[956]

If one asks: — 'How [is this possible]?' the master replies: **'as does the wonderful diversity of dreams from one asleep'.**

Just as the diversely wonderful variety of objects appearing in dream — cities, enclosures, temples, etc. — expands from the sleeping cognizer in the dream-state, even though there is no external object — such objects being grounded in nothing but his own consciousness, as no other cause such as nescience, etc., can be said to exist[957] — so, likewise, does the universe come forth from that form designated as 'I', a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness, for no other cause specified in the [other] schools of thought can be suitably alleged.

It is *I* who have taken on the form of all things.

By **'I'** (*aham iti*) he means [the 'I' that affirms itself in saying:] 'I am' (*asmi*),[958] which is the complete self-reflection of consciousness in itself (*caitanyaparāmarśa*); [this is the 'I'] **who have taken on the form of all [things]**, because it has acceded to the status of cognizer in various bodies, etc. — in other words, all forms are mine, because [this same reflective consciousness] is evident, internally undifferentiated, even in cowherds, children, women, etc.

Is there a parallel [for this unprecedented plasticity]? [Yes, he answers:] **'[thus] resembling the body, whose nature it is to have hands, feet, and the like'.**

Just as, generally, the body, which is the same for all beings, consisting essentially of hands, feet, and the like, assumes different forms, in accordance with the particularity of each cognizer,[959] just in the same way, the

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[955] *asmadarthaviśrāntam* — lit., 'having come to repose in the meaning of [the word/experience] "I" '.

[956] 'As something removed [from him]' (*apahṛtatayā*) — intended to explain *mattaḥ*: the "whole" is now divided into subject and object, percipient subject and objectified universe, which latter "appears" before me, as something "else".

[957] Cf. PS 12–13 and YR ad 35.

[958] *aham* and *asmi* are often treated as synonyms, such that one is often glossed by the other — as here. By this stratagem, the author elegantly reconciles the two aspects of cognition here concerned: *aham*, internal (contemplative, nominal) awareness; *asmi* external (active, verbal) awareness.

[959] Cf. YR ad 5.

single entity, which we have characterized as consciousness, assumes all forms, for taking up residence everywhere.

Similarly, **it is *I* who appear** (*aham eva sphurāmi*) **in each and every thing**, that is, in this [phenomenal universe] that takes the form of knower, knowledge and the known, for [it is *I* who] appear (*prakāśanāt*) as the principle of experience that is at the heart of every [existent thing/percipient subject] as its own Self.

How does this take place? The master replies: **'just as the nature of light [appears] in [all] existent things'.**

that is, just as, in diverse things, the **nature of light** (*bhāsvarūpa*), that is to say, something that has the inexhaustible capacity of illuminating (*dyotanaśīla*), blazes intensely, in the same way, in this soulless (*jaḍa*) world, a single entity having the form of consciousness blazes intensely as 'I'.

Moreover, [the master says:] **'the one who sees, etc.'.**

'Though devoid of corporeal sense-organs[960] **[it is *I* who am the one who sees, etc.]'** means that [the yogin finds his] purposes accomplished,[961] inasmuch as he reposes everywhere in perfect ipseity (*pūrṇāhantāviśrānti*), while saying to himself: 'It is *I* who see, hear, smell, taste, touch, for my body is consciousness (*cinmūrtatva*) itself'.[962]

Indeed, the host of corporeal sense-organs thinks: '*I* see, etc.'[963] — but such cannot be the case in, for example, the state of deep sleep, for there is no one there who sees, etc.

Therefore, it is the supreme Person[964] himself who is the enjoyer of our enjoyments of objects, who remains ever in the heart of all beings, who is a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, and who gives rise (*samullāsaka*) to the host of corporeal sense-organs, though he be devoid of them; it is he who is signified by the word 'I'.

So says the Śruti:

> Without foot or hand, (yet) swift and grasping, he sees without eye, he hears without ear. He knows whatever is to be known; of him there is none who knows. They call him the Primeval, the Supreme Person.[965]

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[960] YR here is not claiming that the *jīvanmukta* is devoid of sense-organs, but that his perceptions no longer function on the corporeal level, subjecting him to the body. And this, of course, is a sign of *jīvanmukti*.

[961] Same notion of *kṛtakṛtyatā* in PS 81 (adaptation of ĀPS 79); PS 40 presents a similar notion: *kṛtārthatā*. Cf. BSBh I 1, 4; thus is *kṛtakṛtyatā* another sign of *jīvanmukti*.

[962] *cinmūrtatvād aham eva paśyāmi śṛṇomi jighrāmi rasayāmi spṛśāmi.*

[963] The position alluded to here, perhaps ironically, may be that of the Buddhists, for whom the *skandhas* are functionally independent.

[964] *paraḥ puruṣaḥ* — cf. PS 36.

[965] ŚvU III 19. Same quotation in R ad ĀPS 62.

Thus, **though not an agent, [it is *I* who compose] Siddhāntas, Āgamas, etc.**

That is, though not myself their creator, I cause the multitudinous wonders that are the Siddhāntas, etc., [to come into being], having entered into the intentions of gods, sages and men, being [already] in essence their inner intuition (*antaḥpratibhā*) and desirous of expounding [these doctrines] either in abridgement or in more elaborate form.

Nor is it possible that corporeal sense-organs be the instrument of that process, being in themselves insentient and little better than clods of earth.

Thus, through all such intermediaries,[966] it is *I* who am the creator of all valid means of knowledge.

For this reason, it might also be said that, in [support of] the existence of the Great Lord that is one's own Self and is of the nature of supreme ipseity, no [otherwise suitable] valid means of knowledge can ever be adduced, nor is such ever employed. Thus is Śiva everywhere established — the very Self of all beings — in terms of their faculty of experiencing, as demonstrated in the 'I' that can never be denied. It is this Śiva who is established first as prior condition in [regards to the operation of] every valid means of knowledge [that is, the means of knowing cannot function unless Śiva be admitted as their basis].

Kārikā 51

Thus, through the process expounded above, the yogin becomes one with the nature of the transcendental *brahman*, reflecting (*pratyavamr̥śan*) with determination[967] on his own Self: 'This might is all mine':[968]

51. Thus, once the postulation of duality has ceased, [the adept,] after overcoming the bewildering power of illusion,[969] should merge in *brahman* as milk merges in milk, and water in water.[970]

In this way, by the device of sustained concentration [on the truth that] the 'I' [of the meditator] is one with all things (*sarvāhaṃbhāva*),

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[966] *vyavadhāna*.

[967] *dārḍhyena*.

[968] ĪPK IV 12: *sarvo mamāyaṃ vibhavaḥ*: 2nd occurrence of the quote (see YR ad 33).

[969] *mohanīṃ māyām*. The association of *māyā* with the adjective *mohanī*, 'bewildering', illustrates the difficulty inherent in translating *māyā* as 'Illusion'. For, if *māyā* were nothing but an illusion, it would *ipso facto* be 'bewildering'. In an Indian perspective, such 'bewildering' is not fully illusory — for *māyā* represents all the 'reality' of the actual world, thus agreeing with its derivation from the root *mā*, 'to fashion'. The translation of *māyā* as 'Illusion' amounts to missing the active, productive aspect of the notion, which is precisely its force or power. It is this force, or power, on which all our notions of the Real are grounded, that is bewildering.

[970] PS 51 borrows from ĀPS 58 and 59 (PS 51a = ĀPS 59a; PS 51b = ĀPS 58a).

once the postulation of duality has ceased, that is, once the display of difference has vanished,

after overcoming the bewildering power of illusion, that is, after jettisoning the nescience implicit in the conceit of affirming the Self in place of the non-Self, that is the cause of the display of difference[971] — having thus dismissed all constriction by virtue of the formula: 'I, myself, am the Self of the universe',[972]

he who has knowledge (*jñānin*)[973] **should [now] merge in *brahman***, that is, should, after dissolving all limitation, attain identity[974] with *brahman*, which is a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, is complete and is suited to expanding,[975] and which is his own nature.

And to him who asks: — 'What [might illustrate this mergence]?' the master responds, saying: **'in water, etc.'.**

Just as **water** — the water drawn up [from wells] by means of different jars, etc. — or just as **milk** — differentiated as coming from thousands of cows, whether emaciated or corpulent — just as this **water** or this **milk** is nevertheless taken as one undifferentiated thing when it enters [as water] **into [other] water** or [as milk] **into [other] milk**, due to the disappearance of that limitation which is the [consequence of] differences among jars or among [cows] emaciated [or corpulent] — such that no difference is there evident,

so, likewise, by setting at naught the notions [of *brahman*] as variously body, vital breath, subtle body or the Void, *brahman* verily is realized.[976]

As Bhaṭṭadivākaravatsa says in the *Kakṣyāstotra*:[977]

> Once the island consisting of the idea of the body has been washed away, once singleness of thought has been attained[978] in the pure river of consciousness, and when, on the other hand, you have retained the host of senses in your inner being,[979] [only then, O Lord,] do you appear, one, eternal, the essence of everything.

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971 Cf. YR ad 39.

972 *aham eva viśvātmā*.

973 First occurrence of the term.

974 *tādātmya* — see n. 629.

975 *bṛṃhaṇātmaka* — etymological play on *brahman*, as 'that which expands (root *bṛh* or *bṛṃh*, 'grow, envelop, expand'); see YR ad 43 and 104, and n. 892, 1434.

976 See kā. 31, where the same issue is discussed.

977 ĪPVV (vol. III: 388), SpV I 9 (p. 40) and SpP 25 [= ad I 25] (p. 31) quote the same verse from the *Kakṣyāstotra*; on Bhaṭṭadivākaravatsa, see n. 800.

978 *prāptaikadhye* — we take this to be a case of double sandhi: *prāpta aikadhye*.

979 Lit., 'when you have not caused the host of senses to detach (*avyāvṛtya*) from you inwardly'.

Kārikā 52

Thus, for the yogin who has ascended to the state of *brahman* (*brahmasattā*), even the overwhelming presence of dichotomies has its source in *brahman*,[980] and does not suffice to interrupt [the continuity of] his own nature. The master says:

52. Thus, once the host of principles has been reintegrated into Śiva through meditative realization, what sorrow is there, what delusion for him who views everything as *brahman*?[981]

Thus, in the way previously demonstrated, **when** — for the yogin whose bonds, the sheaths, have fallen off — **the host of principles**, namely, the group of sense-organs [as instruments of subjectivity] and their domains, the elements (*bhūta*), **has been reintegrated into Śiva**,

through meditative realization (*bhāvanā*) — that is, through the firm understanding that this universe is [identical with] his own unfragmented (*ekā*) consciousness — [when, in other words, the yogin] has attained the state of ultimate nonduality,[982]

then, for him who thus sees **everything** — that is, the group of principles — as ***brahman***, the overwhelming dichotomies indicated by [the persistence of] sorrow and delusion are indeed as nothing, and hence, do not occasion any distress, for they all have their source in *brahman*, and have assumed the form of the yogin's own nature [viz., of his consciousness].

Kārikā 53

But, says an objector, inasmuch as the body of him who knows necessarily persists, even if he has acceded to ultimate nondual [consciousness], why

[980] *brahmamaya* — lit., 'is made of *brahman*', 'is nothing but *brahman*'.

[981] PS 52 borrows again (see n. 970) from ĀPS 59, with alterations required by Śaiva doctrine, namely, *tattvasamūhe* for *dvaitasamūhe*, *śivamayatvam* for *brahmabhūyam*: *ittham dvaitasamūhe bhāvanayā brahmabhūyam upayāte/ ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ sarvaṃ brahmāvalokayataḥ//* 'If, in that way, the sum-total of plurality has receded into the state of Brahman thanks to the force of realization (*bhāvanā*), what delusion, what grief [can there be] for one who sees *brahman* as the All' (tr. Danielson, modified). Cf. *Īśopaniṣad* 6–7: *yas tu sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmany evānupaśyati//sarvabhūteṣu cātmānaṃ tato na vijugupsate// yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāny ātmaivābhūd vijānataḥ// tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śoka ekatvam anupaśyataḥ//*, 'And he who sees all beings in his own self and his own self in all beings, he does not feel any revulsion by reason of such a view. When, to one who knows, all beings have, verily, become one with his own self, then what delusion and what sorrow can be to him who has seen oneness?'; also KāU I 2, 22: *aśarīraṃ sarīreṣv anavastheṣv avavasthitam// mahāntaṃ vibhum ātmānaṃ matvā dhīro na śocati*, 'Knowing the self who is the bodiless among bodies, the stable among the unstable, the great, the all-pervading, the wise man does not grieve'.

[982] *paramādvaya* — same term in YR ad 1 and PS 53. On *bhāvanā*, see YR ad 68 and Appendix 20, p. 345.

would not, in that case, the accumulation of the fruits of his actions, be they auspicious or inauspicious, which are occasioned by that body, make itself evident? The master refutes this objection:

53. The auspicious and inauspicious fruits of actions arise only from association with faulty knowledge. Not easy to overcome indeed are faults arising from association, just as company kept with a thief [is dangerous] for one who is not a thief.[983]

The accumulation of the many fruits of meritorious and non-meritorious actions — performing the horse sacrifice or killing a brahmin, etc.[984] — **arises only from association with faulty knowledge** (*mithyājñāna*).

'I am possessed of a body', 'let this horse sacrifice, etc., be for me a means [of obtaining a desired result]'[985] — such is perverse knowledge,[986] consisting in the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self.[987]

From embracing[988] such faulty knowledge only [comes], for the fettered soul, the accumulation of the auspicious and inauspicious fruits of actions. Being constantly pervaded by such accumulation [— in the form of the latent dispositions[989] — the fettered soul] becomes a receptacle for the sufferings of this world of transmigration.

But, says an objector, how is it, for all that, that such bondage (*paśutva*) continues to afflict the cognizer, though his nature be [identical with] *brahman*? In response, the master alludes[990] to a parallel case, saying: **'Not easy, etc.'.**[991]

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[983] Verse partially similar to ĀPS 52, notably to 52b, which offers the same analogy of the thief. The reasoning and the image seem to be Sāṃkhya in origin — see SK 20, and GBh ad loc.: *yathācauraś cauraiḥ saha gṛhītaś caura iti*, 'As one who is not a thief, caught in the company of thieves, is taken to be a thief [...]'. We differ from L. Silburn who, taking *saṃgama* and *saṅga* in their first meaning of 'attachment', translates: '[...] fâcheux est le vice de l'attachement comme l'union d'un voleur à un homme qui ne serait pourtant pas un voleur' [— '[...] regrettable is the vice of attachment as is the company of a thief'].

[984] Cf. PS 70, and the very similar ĀPS 77.

[985] The favourable results would be *svarga* or *cakravartitva*, universal sovereignty.

[986] *vaiparītyena jñānam* — lit., 'knowledge by inversion', 'knowledge that is not knowledge'. On these notions, see YS I 8: *viparyayo mithyājñānam atadrūpapratiṣṭham*; ĀŚ XIII 2 and the three commentators ad loc. — namely, Ānandajñāna, Bodhanidhi, Rāmatīrtha — who take *avidyā* as the cause of *mithyājñāna*; *Upadeśasāhasrī* I 10, 8 and III 3, 116 (see Mayeda 1979: 45, 78, 95, 125, n. 9).

[987] Our text differs here from the KSTS edition. For a discussion of the variants and the textual problem, see 'On the Sanskrit Text'.

[988] Thus is glossed *saṃgama* of the kārikā. SK 20 has *saṃyoga*.

[989] The term *adhivāsita*, 'pervaded', suggests the notion of *vāsanā*; see n. 831.

[990] *upakṣipati*.

[991] The kārikā, it seems, addresses to the question of "human condition". Is man, by nature, bound to the karmic condition, or is the karmic condition, in some sense, occasional or accidental? AG responds here that the question is one of association rather than of nature and that liberation is therefore possible; cf. kā. 67–68, and YR ad 67, who emphasizes the fact that the law of karman depends, in ultimate terms, on *vikalpas*; cf. *Upadeśasāhasrī* II 2, 45–48.

[Bondage comes to afflict the cognizer, though his nature be identical with *brahman*,] because **the faults arising from association** are in all cases difficult to endure — that is, just as contact with a wicked person serves to convey a fault that pertains to that person alone even to him who is most righteous, likewise, association with delusion born of nescience brings the cognizer, though pure, into contact with auspicious and inauspicious actions, so that he assumes the state of a bound soul.

Kārikā 54

Birth, death, and similar [insupportable experiences] do not belong to the yogin who has assumed the form of *brahman* (*brahmarūpa*); rather, they belong only to cognizers under the dominion of *māyā*. Thus the master says:

54. Those fools who here cultivate the nescience that results from devoting themselves to worldly transactions go to birth and death, bound by the restraints of merits and demerits.

Those cognizers who, defiled by the desire for fruits, and thinking the body to be the Self, serve the **nescience** that consists of attributing merit and demerit to worldly transactions, by adopting means intended for the acquisition of fruits such as heaven, hell, etc., in this world — furthermore, [a nescience that is identical with] *māyā* that consists in the display of difference —

... **are fools**, that is to say, are ignorant, bound by the chains of merit and demerit; they are born and die again and again in order to experience the fruit of those [actions], and thus become receptacles for the unceasing sufferings of existence.

On the other hand, it is not the case that the yogin, whose veil of delusion (*mohāvaraṇa*)[992] has been destroyed, who has cast off the bondage of merit and demerit, and who is now of the nature of *brahman* (*brahmasvabhāva*), is born or dies.

Kārikā 55

Thus, actions, even those effected during the period of nescience, are destroyed by the emergence of knowledge only, and not otherwise. The master says:

55. For even those actions, whose nature is merit or demerit that have been stored up during the period of ignorance, vanish thanks

[992]Same term in YR ad 56; see also kā. 15.

to the radiance of knowledge, just as is consumed [in a moment] goose-down which has accumulated for a long time. [993]

During the period of ignorance, that is, during the contingent state [994] in which the conceit of self posits an adventitious cognizer (*kṛtrimapramātṛ*),

action, which has been **stored up**, that is, made one's own, in the form of [its resulting] merit or demerit, because of our striving after fruits corresponding to it,

thanks to the radiance of knowledge, that is, thanks to the radiance of a discriminating knowledge (*viśiṣṭajñāna*),

vanishes.

[In other words] the realization (*vijñāna*) that 'I am indeed the supreme *brahman*' [995] is capable of consuming [as would a fire] the adventitious [condition of] cognizer; and thanks to the power of its effulgence (*prabhā*), the [actions accumulated] come to nothing, through repeated reflection [on one's identity with *brahman*].

This process may be compared to what? The master replies: **'It is like goose-down which has accumulated for a long time'.**

Just as [avian] 'cotton' — that is to say, goose-down — which has accumulated for a long time is turned into ashes in a moment, when ignited by fire,

just so disintegrates the entire accumulation of the fruits of action in the lapse of an instant, when ignited by the fire of discriminating knowledge (*vijñānavahni*).

As has been stated in the revered *Gītā*:

> As firewood a kindled fire/ Reduces to ashes, Arjuna,/ The fire of knowledge all actions/ Reduces to ashes even so. [996]

Kārikā 56

Not only are the [consequences of] actions previously accomplished dissolved by the grace of knowledge; neither does present action eventuate in enjoyment of results, thanks to the [yogin's] vision fueled by knowledge [and thus burning up ignorance]. Hence the master says:

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[993] That is, when touched by fire. YR glosses *tūla* as *haṃsaroma*, 'down of the goose', of which *haṃsatūla*, lit., 'goose-cotton', is a synonym. Barnett translates 'down', Silburn 'cotton' and Pandit 'heaps of cotton'. Cf. *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama* (*vidyāpāda* II 6–7), quoted in TĀV I 46: *tataḥ sa bhagavān īśaḥ ... pradadāha muneḥ sarvam ajñānaṃ tṛṇarāśivat.*

[994] *avasara.*

[995] *aham eva paraṃ brahma.*

[996] BhG IV 37.

56. Once knowledge has been attained, action,[997] **though performed, tends to no fruit. Therefore, how could [the yogin's] birth be effected? Once the connection with the bondage of birth is severed, the sun of Śiva shines with its rays unhindered.**[998]

Once reflection on the Great Lord that is oneself has grown [viz., into a fixed practice], **action**, whether auspicious or inauspicious, **though performed**, is not so bold as to offer up its corresponding fruit, for the conceit of self [that leads to the notion] of an adventitious cognizer is now absent.

This being the case, because the fruits of action are lacking, in what way can [re]birth be said to exist — dependent as it is on the enjoyment of [the fruits of] action? Of the yogin there would be no rebirth. Such is the purport of the verse.

Now, one may ask: — 'If he be not born again after the perishing of this body,[999] then, of what sort is he? [viz., how is he to be described?]'

The master answers: **'Once [the connection with the bondage of] birth is severed, etc.'.**

That is, [the yogin] is such that his **connection** (*yoga*), his relation, to bondage in the shape of birth has departed.

He whose veil of delusion[1000] has been destroyed now **shines as the sun in the guise of Śiva**, that is, comes into evidence (*sphurati*) **with [his] rays unhindered**, with the host of rays of his consciousness (*cinmarīci*); and there is for him no such thing as the liberation postulated by other schools of thought, if that means going somewhere else [viz., such as *svarga*, heaven, as say the Mīmāṃsakas].[1001] For him, there ensues only that state wherein his own energies are fully deployed (*svaśaktivikasvaratā*),[1002] for the constriction imposed by the sheaths of *māyā*, etc., has vanished.[1003]

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[997] The nominative *karma*, of kā. 55, is the common grammatical subject of 55 and 56, as made clear by YR.

[998] Lit., 'with its very own rays'.

[999] *piṇḍapātāt* — lit., 'after the perishing of this lump [of flesh]'.

[1000] Same term in YR ad 54. Cf. SpK I 25: *[...] prabudhaḥ syād anāvṛtaḥ*, 'The Enlightened one is unveiled'.

[1001] *kutracit prāptiḥ* — Here, YR anticipates PS 60: *mokṣasya naiva kiṃcid dhāmāsti na cāpi gamanam anyatra/*. Mīmāmsakas, Vaiṣṇavas and others are of the opinion that, from this world, the soul moves on to another abode — whether it be called *svarga*, 'heaven' — or simply the Lord's presence. The path is that of *saṃnyāsa*, 'renunciation', or *parivrājya*, 'going about', as a mendicant. On the idea of *mokṣa* in both Mīmāṃsaka schools, see Hiriyanna 1993: 332ff.

[1002] Same term in YR ad 60: *svātmaśaktivikasvaratā*; also YR ad 61: *vikasvaraśaktiḥ*.

[1003] By contrast, in the nondual Śivaism of Kashmir, *mokṣa* is defined — as it is here — as the 'state wherein one's own energies are fully deployed' (*svaśaktivikasvaratā*), which results from the vanishing of the constriction imposed by the hexad of *kañcukas*; the metaphor is completed by its association with the "floral" image implied in the pair *saṃkoca/vikāsa*: just as bondage is the "closing up" of the innate *śaktis*, liberation is their "blossoming". Again, YR anticipates PS 60, where he glosses *svaśaktyabhivyaktā* of the kārikā with *svātmaśaktivikas-*

Kārikā 57

The master now describes [more fully] this process:[1004]

57. As the seed, freed from the husk, the bran and the beard, no longer generates the sprout, so likewise, the Self, freed from the impurities of deeming itself finite, of considering the world as objective, of supposing itself the agent of actions, no longer generates the sprout of existence.

Just as, separated **from the beard, the husk and the bran**,[1005] the rice-seed, though still embraced by soil, water and the sun's heat,[1006] **no longer** functions as a cause in respect of that effect indicated by the genesis of the sprout,[1007] because of the absence of the ensemble of [factors such as] the beard, etc., which are [essential to] the very nature of the seed,

so likewise, freed, that is, separated, **from** the impurity of **deeming itself finite** (*āṇava*), metaphorically represented by the bran, **from** the impurity of **considering the world as objective** (*māyā*), represented by the husk, and **from** the impurity of **supposing itself the agent of actions** (*karman*), represented by the beard, **the Self**, that is, consciousness, because of the absence of the ensemble of factors constituting the triad of impurities, no longer enjoins **the sprout of existence**, that is, [no longer supports] germination of phenomenal existence.

None but the Great Lord himself there persists, contemplating (*parāmṛśan*) within himself the marvel of the host of objects that [constantly]

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varatā. Cf. YR ad 24: 'Thus the Self, although fully open (*vikasvara*) becomes contracted [i.e., is reduced to finitude] (*saṃkucitīkṛta*)', and YR ad 60 and 61, in the course of his exposition of *mokṣa*. That same notion of liberation is conveyed by *prathā* (*prathana*); cf. TĀ I 156: *mokṣo hi nāma naivānyaḥ svarūpaprathanaṃ hi saḥ*, 'Liberation is indeed none else than the display of one's own essence', and TĀ I 161–162: *[...] ātmaprathā mokṣas [...]*, 'Liberation is the display of the Self'. See also TĀV I 24, p. 57: *saiva ca prakāśānandaghanasyātmanas tāttvikaṃ svarūpaṃ tatprathanam eva mokṣam*, 'That [perfect knowledge (*pūrṇā khyātiḥ*)] is the true essence of the Self, which is a mass of Light and bliss. The display of that [true essence] is liberation'. From among Śiva's innumerable energies, five principal ones stand out. They, which were limited when Śiva chose to become a *paśu*, now blossom.

[1004] *yukti*.

[1005] Thus is *mokṣa* defined as separation from the sheaths that are the three impurities.

[1006] Cf. the second conclusive stanza of ĪPV: *[...] bhaumān rasāñ jalamayāṃś ca na sasyapuṣṭau muktvārkam ekam iha yojayituṃ kṣamo 'nyaḥ//*, 'No other than the sun is capable of uniting the juices (*rasa*) of earth and water for the development of grains' (tr. Pandey); and *Bhāskarī* ad loc.: *bhaumān bhūmigatān rasān jalamayāṃś ca grīṣmād eva kṣīnān svamarīcicakrāntar niveśya varṣiṇyādimarīcibhiḥ sasyapuṣṭyau yojayitum arkaṃ vinā ko 'nyaḥ kṣamaḥ/*, 'What else than the sun, once it is installed within the circle of its own rays, is capable of uniting, by means of its rays, again accompanied by rain, the juices of earth (*bhaumān* = *bhūmigatān*) and water, exhausted by summer heat, so that seeds develop?'

[1007] The grain that is separated from its envelope loses its power of generation. Another possibility is to heat it, as exemplified in kārikā 58 and 62.

appear and disappear, multifarious and ubiquitous.[1008]

Kārikā 58

Thus, for him who has knowledge, whose seeds [of action] within those sheaths have been burnt up by the fire of knowledge (*jñānāgni*), there is no occasion at all for apprehension, nor is anything to be attained or avoided. Thus, the master says:

58. He who knows the Self fears nothing, for everything has his own form. And he is never aggrieved for, as regards the ultimate reality, the quality of the perishable does not exist.

He who knows the Self (*ātmajña*), that is, who knows the freedom of the Great Lord as his own, **fears nothing**, that is, he has no fear of anyone — king, enemy or any other living creature.

Why is this so? The master says: **'for everything has his own form'.**

Since **everything** (*sarva*), that is to say, this world (*viśva*), the aggregate of objects,[1009] assumes, **for him** who knows the non-difference of the Great Lord and his own Self, **the form**, the shape, **of his own Self**, a body solely formed of great Light, in consequence of the fact that Light/consciousness is everywhere,[1010]

... [since this is so] it is Light alone that is evident (*prakāśate*), both as the [cognizing] Self [viz., the subject] and as the other [viz., the knowable, the object], because of its independence.[1011]

Therefore, whatever occasion for fear there may appear in this world, how can that occasion generate fear for him who is so, for it is, as it were, a part of himself? — Even more so, since only an entity different from oneself can become a cause of fear.

What Yama [the presiding deity of death][1012] or other deity, indeed, is there who, different from it, could set a limit to that Self, which is in all respects complete? Of whom would he who has knowledge be afraid? — he who has rejected the conceit that locates the Self in the body?

Therefore, once he comprehends his own form in all things, [the *jñānin*,] though abiding in this world of transmigration, remains one and unfragmented, and acts without apprehension, inasmuch as he has shaken off the dichotomy between himself and the [supposed] other.

[1008] Same notion (*viśvavartin*) in YR ad 30 and 31.

[1009] Cf. the famous verse of TĀ I 332, which addresses the *padārthajāta*.

[1010] That is to say, '... for [the definition of reality as] Light is applicable everywhere [to whatever is real]'. Cf. YR ad 5 and 8: *sarvatrasaṃvidanugamāt*.

[1011] That is, because it can know no obstacle, is entirely self-referent. Let the reflections come and go in this mirror which I am — I, that unity, remain ever there. These are the very terms of APS 13 (see n. 265), quoted in ĪPV ad I 1, 5 and I 5, 3, as well as in SpN I 5.

[1012] YR now takes up the question of the greatest fear, that of death.

As had been said by my teacher's teacher's teacher:

> For him who is eternally joyful in this world [understood as] completely filled with himself alone, what is there to fear? — He who sees, O Lord, this entire realm of objects as your body, lacking any alternative? [1013]

And also the author of the present work:

> One man says: 'I am alone' in this world of transmigration; he is distraught with the [bitter] taste of violent fears. There is another who says: 'I am alone; who is other than I? Thus, my fear is gone, I am secure!' [1014]

Furthermore, **he is never aggrieved, etc.**, that is, he who knows the Self is not **aggrieved** by such thoughts as, for instance: 'my wealth is lost', or 'my wife ..., etc.', 'I am devoid [of food, strength, etc.]', 'I am afflicted with disease', or 'I am dying' ...

... and this is because, in the manner previously explained, **the quality of the perishable does not exist**, that is to say, the quality of the destructible is not to be found, **as regards the ultimate reality** — that primordial (*tāttvika*) entity whose form is consciousness, that is ever turned within and is [in the last analysis] nothing but the cognizer.

For everything that appears as something to be effected or is determined [1015] as 'this' or 'that' [viz., as ecceity] — [everything] whose essence is conceit of self — originates and perishes.

But this is not so in the case of the Self, which consists of consciousness, whose essence is [absolute] ipseity, which is never adventitious and is [forever] free, for it makes no sense to posit of it an effort aiming at producing an effect [in any way other than itself].

Nor is it the case — for all that — that [for him, the contemplating ascetic] there is any interruption of his own form [viz., here involving continued existence in his body], [it is simply that, for him,] the contemplating ascetic, though he remains in his body, sorrow and the like, which

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[1013] ŚSĀ XIII 16. *avikalpa* — that is: 'lacking any alternative [to yourself; hence to himself, who is not different from you]'. The term *avikalpa* is translated according to the grammatical meaning of *vikalpa*, 'alternative'.

[1014] The source of the citation has not been traced, although it is probably quoted from a *stotra* of AG, the '*granthakāra*'. Śivopādhyāya's commentary (18th cent.) ad VBh 104 quotes the verse (VBh: 90) which it attributes to a '*pūrvaguru*'. Cf. BĀU I 4, 2: *so 'bibhet/ tasmād ekākī bibheti sa hāyam īkṣāṃ cakre yan mad anyan nāsti kasmān nu bibhemīti tata evāsya bhayaṃ vīyāya kasmād dhy abheṣyad dvitīyād vai bhayaṃ bhavati//*, 'He was afraid. Therefore one who is alone is afraid. This one then thought to himself: "since there is nothing else than myself, of what am I afraid?" Thereupon his fear, verily, passed away, for, of what should he have been afraid? Assuredly it is from a second that far arises'.

[1015] *avacchinna* — see n. 701.

are born of the body, make no appearance as things covering over his essential form.[1016]

Kārikā 59

And no defect of incompleteness could possibly attach to the mind of him who has this knowledge, because his sustained concentration on the nature of the Great Lord as nothing other than his own Self has become unshakable.

This the master now explains:

59. What misfortune is there, and whose would it be, when he becomes the Great Lord at the very moment he realizes: 'It is I [who am the Lord]?' There can be none on account of the collection that has been made of jewels of ultimate meaning,[1017] heaped up in the most secret treasure-room of the heart.[1018]

Most secret (*atigūḍha*) here means 'extremely well guarded' (*gupta*); such is **the treasure-room**[1019] **that is the heart**,[1020] namely, the store-room whose nature it is to serve as repository for the inmost essence of all ultimate meanings (*paramārtha*).

Thus, **ultimate meaning** — the essence of which is the knowledge of one's own Self taught by a true teacher and engrained [in the student] thanks to an extraordinarily acute trust [in the teacher] — is said to be a **collection of jewels**, that is, it is like a collection of jewels, inasmuch as it is the source of all splendors (*vibhūti*). Thanks to this ultimate meaning,

[1016]Here, the commentary answers a possible objection: 'Had such a yogin really identified with Śiva, as you maintain, how could have he gone on living in his own form (*svarūpa*), that is, as still remaining in his body?' Here, it is the notion of *jīvanmukta* that is discussed, a notion rejected by most of the "Realists", logicians and others. The Trika's answer is that his form cannot be affected by his body, inasmuch as his body does not have any longer an influence on his mind, whereas sorrow is born from the association with the body alone.

[1017]Viz., of Śaiva doctrine. We might recall the equivocation that underlies the word *paramārtha* throughout this text: the 'ultimate meaning' (*paramārtha*) that is here taught is the 'ultimate reality' (*paramārtha*); see Intr., n. 7.

[1018]Same analogy in the *maṅgalācaraṇa* ad ĪPV I 4: *padārtharatnanikaraṃ nijahṛdgañjapuñjitam/ grathnantaṃ smṛtisūtrāntaḥ saṃtatyaiva stumaḥ śivam//*, 'We praise Śiva in continuous fashion, who strings together the multitude of objects, like jewels, that are gathered up in the treasure-room of his heart (*hṛdgañja*), [spacing them] along the thread of memory (*smṛtisūtra*)'.

[1019]*gañja* is attested in the *Rājataraṅgiṇī* and in the *Kathāsaritsāgara* (10th-11th cent.), both also from Kashmir. Either the Sanskrit term is a sanskritization of the Persian ganj, or it is a borrowing from Old-Persian *ganja — a term, which, if it happens not to be attested in Achaemenid inscriptions, has been borrowed by Gk. γάζα; see Mayrhofer KEWA I: 315.

[1020]The similitude extends to aspects of the things compared — such as *vibhūti*, *prarūḍha*, *gañja*, which are understood as *double entendres* (*śleṣa*) — as well as to the things themselves.

even the soul yet embodied **becomes the Great Lord**, that is, may experience the freedom of the Light that is his own Self, whose characteristic feature is repose in supreme ipseity (*parāhantāviśrānti*), a freedom that is complete and made manifest in the awareness: **'It is I [who am the Lord]'**, [1021] that is, 'I am all this [universe]'. [1022]

This being the case, **what** miserable **misfortune**, that is, sense of impoverishment, could for him obtain? Or, what meretricious excess of [spiritual] power (*vibhūti*), etc., might also be implied [if it were supposed that he were not already complete]? [1023]

For all objects are essentially of the nature of appearance and when they do appear, for the yogin they appear as though they were himself [viz., parts of himself]. [1024] Hence, how can the objects pretend [to further] either his perfection or corruption? Thus, for him there can be no misfortune, etc.

Furthermore, **whose** [misfortune would it be]? That is, 'what possible substratum might there be for such misfortune?' Well, let us admit [since misfortune is indeed experienced] that it is they who think the body, etc., to be the Self who are the substrata of this misfortune, inasmuch as they may either, by attaining it, become master (*īśvara*) of the desired object different from them, or, by losing it, be made void of that object.

He, on the other hand, who has knowledge, for whom the ultimate meaning [obtains] thanks to his reflection on non-adventitious ipseity — he who [thus] becomes the Great Lord, reflecting: 'I am all', [1025] inasmuch as the object to be desired is now inseparable from him [1026] — how can he be the receptacle of misfortune, etc., in the absence of either acquiring or losing that which is different from him?

Thus have been explained [suitably], as expressing (*vācaka*) non-fortuitous meanings, the qualifications *'hṛdaya'* ('heart'), *'prarūḍhaparamārtha'* ('heaped up [jewels of] ultimate meaning [viz., of Śaiva doctrine]'), and *'mahān'* ('great'), [as applying, respectively, to] *'gañja'* ('treasure-room'), *'ratnasaṃcaya'* ('collection of jewels') and *'īśvara'* ('Lord') [in the kārikā]. [1027]

[1021] *aham eva.*

[1022] *sarvam idam asmi.*

[1023] Powers (*vibhūti*) employed for purely personal, that is, 'magic', aims, such as levitation, etc., are referred to here. According to YR, recourse to such 'powers' has its occasion in a sense of impoverishment, itself incompatible with the sense of plenitude characteristic of the true yogin.

[1024] *svātmakalpa.*

[1025] *sarvam asmi.*

[1026] Note the parallelism between '*vyatiriktasyaiṣaṇīyasya prāptyā īśvarāḥ*' and '*avyatiriktena eṣaṇīyena maheśvaraḥ*'.

[1027] YR here anticipates the objection that the figurative language of the kārikā does not suitably apply to ultimate reality, and that such comparisons are capricious or fortuitous. The analogy may be conventional as indicated by its use elsewhere in Śaiva texts, such as

Kārikā 60

The master now says what is the nature of liberation:

60. Neither has liberation any abode, nor does it involve a going elsewhere. Liberation is the manifestation of one's own energies realized by cutting the knot of ignorance. [1028]

Of liberation (*mokṣa*), that is, of that state of isolation (*kaivalya*) the essence of which is the marvel of supreme ipseity, no **abode** is evident, no place apart, for [in such a state] the delimitations of space, time and particular embodiment are absent. [1029]

For the same reason, **neither** is liberation **a going elsewhere**, into some place apart, [1030] a dissolution [of the self] — as it is in the view of the dualists, where it is said to dissolve above (*ūrdhvam*) [the cranial 'aperture of *brahman*' (*brahmarandhra*)], at a 'point twelve finger spaces (ca. 20 to 25 cm.) directly above' (*dvādaśānta*, viz., the uppermost *cakra*), by leaving (*utkrāntyā*) [the body], after piercing through the *cakras*, starting from the one at the base [of the spine] (*ādhāracakra*). [1031]

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the *maṅgalācaraṇa* ad ĪPV I 4 (quoted n. 1018).

[1028] *ajñānagranthi* — cf. ĀPS 73, whose second hemistich differs slightly: *ajñānamayagranther bhedo yas taṃ vidur mokṣam//*, 'Breaking the fetter which consists of ignorance: that is what one knows as Release'. Not only does the Śaiva PS introduce the concept of *śakti*, but emphasizes it, as shown by the commentary, which includes a syntactical *śleṣa* on *svaśakti*; see n. 1036. Cf. also *Sarvajñabhairava* quoted by SpP 1, p. 7: *nānyatra gamanaṃ sthānaṃ mokṣo 'sti surasundari/ ajñānagranthibhedo yaḥ sa mokṣa iti kathyate//*, 'O fair Goddess, neither does liberation involve a going elsewhere, nor is it a place [apart to be discovered]. It is said that liberation is but breaking the knot of ignorance'. Cf. further the maxim quoted thrice by PM 53, 60, 64: *calitvā yāsyate kutra sarvaṃ śivamayaṃ yataḥ*, 'If he sets out, where shall he go, since everything is made of Śiva?'; note that this hemistich is part of a longer text quoted in PM 60, which, Silburn tells us (MM: 171), is recited daily, at the end of meals, by Kashmiri paṇḍits.

[1029] Similar phraseology in YR ad 64–66, which takes up again the definition of *mokṣa*.

[1030] Cf. BĀU IV 4, 7 quoted n. 1062 and Ś ad loc.: *atra asminn eva śarīre vartamānaḥ brahma samaśnute, brahmabhāvaṃ mokṣaṃ pratipadyata ity arthaḥ/ ataḥ mokṣaḥ na deśāntaragamanādi apekṣate*, '[...] *And attains Brahman*, the identity with Brahman, i.e., liberation, *living in this very body*. Hence liberation does not require such things as going to some other place' (tr. Swāmī Mādhavānanda).

[1031] The term *utkrānti*, nominally 'ascent', is here to be understood in the technical sense of 'terminal Egress', or, as it is sometimes rendered, 'yogic suicide' (see Vasudeva MVT: 437ff.). As such, it refers to the practice of elevating the breath (that is, the vital principle) along the dorsal nervous cord from the generative nucleus at its base to the cranium, then "cutting it off" with the mantra named *kālarātrī*, the 'Night which is Death' (MVT XVII 30), as it emerges from the top of the head. The notion is mentioned in MVT (XVII 25–34), *Kiraṇatantra*, ch. 59, 1cd, and 28ab, SvT VII 314ab, *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama*, *Yogapāda* VII 41–48, and in the *Ūrmikaulārṇava* (available in MS only), quoted by TĀ XIV 31–32a and 33–35a as well as (in a more elaborate way) by TĀV ad loc. YR's rejection here of the notion, attributing it to "dualists" inasmuch as it involves a "displacement" of the vital airs as a precondition of 'liberation', echoes TĀ XIV 31–37, where the notion is discussed in the context of *jīvanmukti*. Placing himself under the authority of the *Ūrmikaulārṇava*, which denies to the 'dualistic'

Such is liberation. As has been stated:

> If the existence of Śiva [as consciousness] is all-pervasive, what purpose is there in terminal Egress (*utkrānti*)? If the ultimate principle [— scil., 'of reality'] is not all-pervasive, what purpose is there in terminal Egress? [1032]

There are, as well, many other varieties of liberation of such sort, postulated by other schools. Were they to be dilated upon here, they would bring with them the danger of an overly prolix text. Hence, they will not be dilated upon. [In summary, however, we may say that] in all such cases [viz., other types of liberation], because they are open to the impurity of dualism (*dvaitamala*), the desire for liberation (*mokṣalipsā*) [has been redirected] to what is not liberation (*amokṣa*), resulting in the mere appearance of liberation (*mokṣābhāsa*). [1033]

What then is the definition of liberation? The master says in reply: ... **'[by cutting the knot of] ignorance, etc.'.**

Ignorance is that delusion generated by the nescience implicit in the conceit that locates the Self in the non-Self — the body, etc. — whose antecedent is the conceit that locates the non-Self in the Self. [1034]

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practice of *utkrānti* any salutary virtue, AG tries to resolve the paradox represented by the fact that *utkrānti* is nevertheless taught in the MVT, a text that is authoritative for the nondualistic doctrine of the Trika. The disapprobation here of "yogic suicide" is one with the view that becoming Śiva does not require the destruction of a body that is in any case not different from Śiva. Moreover, the idea that suicide is a means to liberation clashes with the notion of *jīvanmukti*, the core teaching of the PS. Dissociating itself from older notions of liberation, involving a 'going elsewhere' at the moment of death, Trika adopts a view more in line with its doctrine of *śakti* — 'Liberation is the manifestation of one's own energies [realized] by cutting the knot of ignorance', as says PS 60. At the same time, Trika thereby clarifies the sense in which *jīvanmukti* itself is a necessary consequence of this "cutting": at the very instant the yogin severs the knot of nescience, he accedes to liberation, once and for all. A similar refutation of *utkrānti* is found in SpP 30, quoted in Intr., n. 151. Note also the generalized euphemistic sense of *utkrānti*, 'the flight or passage of the soul (out of the body), death' (Apte, citing BS II 3, 19), of which this "yogic" application is little but a specialization.

[1032] The reference has not been found, although the text is very close to the passage from the *Ūrmikaula[arṇava]* (or *Ūrmimahākula*), quoted by TĀV XIV 33b–35a (vol. V: 2432): *[...] asti ced bhagavān vyāpī kathayotkramaṇena kim/ nāsti ced bhagavān vyāpī kathayotkramaṇena kim.* On the *Ūrmikaulārṇava*, a work of Krama Kaulism, which is available only in MS (NAK MS 5-5207 (incomplete) Paper. Newari script), see Sanderson 2005: 133–134. The *Ūrmikaula* is quoted in TĀ XIV 31b–32a, 33b–35a.

[1033] Cf. ĪPV I 1, 1 (vol. I: 26): *anyatratyo hi apavargaḥ kutaścin muktir na sarvata iti niḥśreyasābhāsa iti vakṣyāmaḥ*, 'The release [expounded] elsewhere, which [inevitably] has the form "liberation is contingent and not universal" [lit., "liberation is somewhere and not everywhere"], we will say is nothing but the *appearance* of the ultimate'. According to the *Bhāskarī*, the adjective '"*anyatratyaḥ*", "existing elsewhere", points here to the doctrines of the Buddhists, etc.' (*anyatra — bauddhasiddhāntādiṣu bhavaḥ anyatratyaḥ*), and the *Bhāskarī* concludes: *māyādes tattvāt na tu śuddhavidyāder api*, 'By this [he means that this so-called "liberation"] derives from the principle of *māyā* rather than from pure knowledge (*śuddhavidyā*), etc.'.

[1034] The order of the two errors is that adopted by YR ad PS 31 and 61; cf. YR ad 53.

That very [delusion] is a **knot**, that is, is like a knot, for it engenders a constriction of the all-encompassing nature [of the Self]; that is to say, it is a fettering of one's inherent pervasiveness,[1035] etc., which we have characterized as one's own freedom — a fettering that stems from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.;

[whereas] the **cutting** of that knot, its cleaving, means the splitting asunder of the knot we have characterized as the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., once the [adept's] sustained concentration on the inherent freedom of his own all-encompassing Self has become unshakable.

Because of this tearing asunder, there is the **manifestation** (*abhivyaktatā*) [of one's own energies] — or [, what is the same thing,] the full deployment of the energies of one's Self, **through one's own energies**[1036] — properties whose specific characteristic is the freedom of the Self. And it is this [full expansion] that is **liberation** unexcelled.

Here is the purport of what has been said. [Consider the following illustration:] Although it is space, and endowed with innate and eternal attributes such as pervasiveness, etc., such space, when constricted by its relation to the [inner] sides of the jar, etc., is spoken of as 'jar-space' [viz., a 'space belonging to or within the jar'] and is endowed with attributes such as non-pervasiveness, etc. — and so displays itself as different from [endless] space.

Similarly, once the constriction attributable to the sides of the jar, etc., is removed, that same 'jar-space', etc., [again] becomes instantly endowed with attributes such as pervasiveness, etc. — and there is no concurrent manifestation (*āvirbhāva*) of any novel attribute[1037] deriving from the breaking of the jar, etc.[1038]

In just this way, consciousness, when constricted by the limitations deriving from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., is said to be 'as if bound';

and similarly, once the bondage that consists of [the conceit] attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize, has come to an end through the manifestation of the knowledge of one's own nature, that same consciousness is said to be 'as if liberated',[1039] [since now it is] fully deployed

[1035]Pervasiveness implies omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence; see n. 561.

[1036]Same terminology (*svaśaktivikasvaratā*) in YR ad 56, defining *mokṣa*; see also YR ad 61: *mukto vikasvaraśaktir bhavet*, 'liberated, that is, endowed with [fully] deployed energies'. The commentary involves a syntactical *śleṣa*, the *svaśakti*° of the compound is to be taken both as an objective genitive ('manifestation of one's own energy') and as an instrumental ('manifestation through one's own energies').

[1037]In Vedānta, the 'sides of the jar' provide a standard example of *upādhi* — the 'limiting extrinsic condition' which, when present, falsely divides and multiplies a reality intrinsically one and indivisible.

[1038]Cf. ĀPS 51; ĀŚ III 4–5; BSBh II 1, 22 and II 2, 24. For speculations on *ghaṭākāśa*, see also YR ad PS 16, 24 and 37.

[1039]Bondage and liberation are equally illusory, a point often associated with Mādhyamikas.

through the discrimination of its own energies [of independence, etc.].

Hence bondage as well as liberation are both essentially [functions of] conceit of self affecting the limited cognizer; it is not that any events of this sort really take place in the reality that is consciousness (*saṃvittattva*) — the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) [of this system].

Therefore, nothing at all novel is realized in liberation: there is displayed nothing but one's own innate nature. The same truth is stated also in the *Viṣṇudharma*: [1040]

> As the well is not the cause of the production of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which already exist — for whence should that originate which is not? [1041] As, when the bellows-

See also SK 62: *tasmān na badhyate nāpi mucyate nāpi saṃsarati kaś cit/saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ*; also SpP 1, which quotes Vāmanadatta's *Saṃvitprakāśa* (referred to as the *Ātmasaptati*, the 'Seventy Verses on the Self') II 58: *vastusthityā na bandho 'sti tadabhāvān na muktatā/ vikalpaghaṭitāv etāv ubhāv api na kiñcana//*, 'In truth, there is no bondage; in its absence there is no liberation. Both are concocted from thought constructs, neither is anything at all'; as well as AG's *Anuttarāṣṭikā* 2: *saṃsāro 'sti na tattvatas tanubhṛtāṃ bandhasya vārtaiva kā bandho yasya na jātu tasya vitathā muktasya muktikriyā/ mithyāmohakṛd eṣa rajjubhujagacchāyāpiśācabrahmo mā kiṃcit tyaja mā gṛhāṇa vihara* [v.l. in TĀV I 331, vol. I: 305: *virama*] *svastho yathāvasthitaḥ//*, 'Transmigration does not truly exist. Why then talk of the bondage of the embodied soul? Pointless is activity aimed at freedom when one is already free, bondage never having been; all such confusion is produced by erroneous delusion, as when one mistakes a rope for a serpent or a shadow for a demon. So give up nothing, acquire nothing; just take it easy! You are [already] healthy and well-situated'; also ŚD III 72: *tathā tathā śivāvasthā svecchātaḥ sa tadātmakaḥ/ tadātmatve nāsti bandhas tadabhāvān na mokṣaṇanam//*, '(Even when duality prevails) thus, Śiva's state is like that in accord with His own (free) will and that (duality) is of His nature. Thus as it is such, there is no bondage and liberation is not due to its absence' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 364); cf. ĀŚ II 32, ĀPS 69, YV III 100, 40.

[1040] *Viṣṇudharmāḥ*, 'Precepts for the Worship of Viṣṇu', of which the *Viṣṇudharmottara* professes to be the latter part, is ascribed to Śaunaka, the chief narrator of the text, by the *Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāṣya* (IV 4, 3). It is a compilation, in the form of embedded dialogues and narratives, belonging to 'the liturgical literature of early Viṣṇuism' as stated by Grünendahl (*Viṣṇudharma*: IX). Its date is uncertain: between the 3rd and 11th cent. AD, as proposed by Grünendahl (pp. 72–73), which is corroborated by Rāmānuja's *Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāṣya* (11th–12th cent.), which quotes the text, as well as by the present citation, from the same period. Rāmānuja's reference to the *Viṣṇudharma* mitigates somewhat Grünendahl's skepticism regarding the text's 'alleged authority among the Śrīvaiṣṇavas' (*Viṣṇudharma*, pt 3: 61–63).

[1041] The first stanza of the puzzling verse, cited *verbatim* by Rāmānuja, is so translated by Thibaut (*Śrībhāṣya*, pt. 3: 758), who takes the apparent hapax *jalāmbara* ('water-garment') as "rain water" — perhaps understanding the 'sheet of water' that makes an Indian downpour sometimes seem as substantial as a veil. Many variants occur, however, in the manuscripts (see note below), indicating that the image (whatever it was) was not universally grasped. Thibaut does not explain his translation further. Several other infelicities mar the Sanskrit of these lines, making the overall sense less than certain. In any case, if the citation is relevant to the present argument, YR probably understands the 'expanse of water' and the 'well' (that is, a 'water-enclosure') to function here much in the same way as he does the 'expanse of space' and the 'jar' (that is, a 'space-enclosure') of the following illustration. Note that, just before the verse (100, 51) quoted here by YR ('As, when the bellows-hide is

hide is ripped, the wind [that escapes] is not other than wind [itself]; just so, the soul is [not other] than *brahman*, once the bondage of merit and demerit has been destroyed.[1042]

Kārikā 61

Now the master makes it known that he who has knowledge — whose bonds of ignorance have been destroyed — is liberated, though he continues to occupy his body out of benevolence for others:

61. He who has cut the knot of ignorance, whose doubts have vanished, who has put aside error, whose merits and demerits have been destroyed, is liberated, though still joined with his body.

Even though conjoined with a body, he who has found the knowledge of his own Self, though he yet lives (*jīvann api*), is **liberated** (*muktaḥ*), that is, he is endowed with fully deployed energies (*vikasvaraśakti*), for there no more exists the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.

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ripped [...]'), the *Viṣṇudharma* (100, 50) offers the analogy of the *ghaṭākāśa* occuring earlier in YR's commentary ad 60: *ghaṭadhvaṃse ghaṭākāśaṃ na bhinnaṃ nabhaso yathā/ brahmaṇā heyavidhvaṃse viṣṇvākhyena pumāṃs tathā//*. In Thibaut's translation, the following verse of the original text (VD 100, 50–51, see note below) reads as follows: '— thus knowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested through the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for they are eternal'.

[1042] *Viṣṇudharma* 100, 56; 100, 51. In Grünendahl's edition, the two ślokas quoted here by YR are not consecutive; the former being 100, 56, the latter, 100, 51. It is noteworthy that the first śloka appears to have been popular, for it is often quoted, as, for instance, in the *Ātmasiddhi* and in Rāmānuja's *Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāṣya* IV 4, 3, two texts that have the same reading of the verse (in Narasiṃhācārya's edition (1910) of the *Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāṣya*, this verse is identified as *Viṣṇudharma* 104, 56). In the light of the edition of the *Viṣṇudharma* and the passage quoted by Rāmānuja, it would seem that YR has altered the text, omitting the correlative phrase of the first śloka, and joining to it an anterior verse. The original text, as quoted in Narasiṃhācārya's and Abhyankar's editions of the *Śārirakamīmāṃsābhāṣya*, reads as follows: *yathā na kriyate jyotsnā malaprakṣālanān maṇeḥ/ doṣaprahāṇān na jñānam ātmanaḥ kriyate tathā// yathodapānakaraṇāt kriyate na jalāmbaram/ sad eva nīyate vyaktim asataḥ saṃbhavaḥ kutaḥ// yathā* [*tathā*, in Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, LXVIII, pt I, 1914] *heyaguṇadhvaṃsād avabodhādayo guṇāḥ/ prakāśyante na janyante nityā evātmano hi te//*, 'As the luster of the gem is not created by the act of polishing, so the essential intelligence of the Self is not created by the putting off of imperfections. As the well is not the cause of the production of rain water, but only serves to manifest water which already exist — for whence should that originate which is not? — thus knowledge and the other attributes of the Self are only manifested through the putting off of evil qualities; they are not produced, for they are eternal' (tr. Thibaut). Cf. the text critically edited by Grünendahl, which reads differently (and apparently less satisfactorily) verses 55–56: *yathā na kriyate jyotsnā malaprakṣālanādinā / doṣaprahāṇān na jñānam ātmanaḥ kriyate tathā// yathodupānakaraṇāt kriyate na jalāmbaram/ sadaiva nīyate vyaktim asataḥ saṃbhavaḥ kutaḥ// yathā heyagaṇadhvaṃsād avabodhādayo guṇāḥ/ prakāśyante na janyante nityā evātmano hite//* (Grünendahl observes that all MSS. have hybrid '-ôdupāna-', except N1: '-ôda-', and B: yathôpadānakaraṇāt kriyate jalasaṃcayam; D-mss.: -lântaram).

But, says an opponent, if bondage is [as you say] association with the body, how then could such a one be liberated, since an association with the [body is supposed]?

In response, the master says: **'He who has cut, etc.'**.

He by whom the knot formed of ignorance has been **cut**, that is, split asunder, is so [liberated] — the bond formed by the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc., which has arisen thanks to the [mistaken] cognition that [the Self] is incomplete (*apūrṇatvakhyāti*).

Similarly, [is liberated] **he whose doubts have vanished**, that is, whose doubts have been destroyed;

and again, **he by whom error**, that is, illusion formed of duality, **has been put aside**, that is, abolished, thanks to the acquisition of the knowledge of ultimate nonduality;

and finally (*evam*), it is he who is such [as has been described, namely, he who is liberated and yet lives], the auspicious or inauspicious [consequences of] whose [deeds] have been destroyed by sustained concentration — whether [those consequences] be conducive to *dharma* [viz., enjoined] or to its opposite [viz., prohibited], inasmuch as the root impressions [produced by them] have been dissolved, for there no longer exists any notion [associating the] body with the Self.

By this, it has been explained that 'bondage is ignorance itself'[1043] [rather than the body as such, or a connection with the body, as implied by the objection].

And he whose [ignorance] is destroyed, even while remains a rapport with the body, is at that very moment liberated (*muktaḥ*), though he still lives (*jīvann eva*). It is not that bondage involves necessarily a connection with a body.

The removal of that ignorance is liberation. However, [it may be added that,] with the perishing of the body, complete (*pūrṇa*) liberation is attained.[1044]

Kārikā 62

Though his body remains as the effect of actions [previously done], the acts of him who is thus liberated while living, while he continues to act, are ignited by knowledge [and are performed] merely for the sake of the body's [previously enjoined] journey,[1045] and not for the sake of any fruit.

[1043] In fact, one of the meanings of the second sūtra of the *Śivasūtra*: *jñānaṃ bandhaḥ*.

[1044] First sketch, here, of a distinction between liberation in this life, *jīvanmukti*, and liberation at death, which later traditions will term *videhamukti*. The question will be taken up again in YR ad 83, and more explicitly at the end of the commentary on 85–86; see Intr., p. 43.

[1045] *śarīrayātrā*.

The master now explains this:

62. Just as the seed parched by fire loses its power of sprouting, so is the act no longer conducive to rebirth that has been burnt in the fire of knowledge. [1046]

Just as the rice-seed parched by fire, though conjoined with soil, water and heat, is no longer capable of generating sprouts, etc., due to a defect in the [required] aggregate [of conditions], so, in the same way, **the act that has been burnt in the fire of knowledge**, that is, scorched by the radiance of ultimate nondual consciousness — whose power [of accruing results] has thus been burnt up — **is** no longer **conducive to** generating the fruit that is **rebirth**, when the body of him who has knowledge finally perishes; [1047] that is, such an act does not cause the creation of a further body, like the burnt-up seed in respect of the sprout,

... and this is the case whatever be the action, whether auspicious or inauspicious, so long as it be performed by abandoning the thought of what is to be avoided and what is enjoined, this itself conditioned on one's having ceased to confound the body, etc., with the Self — which occurs when one realizes: 'It is I who appear (*sphurāmi*) as the Self of everything'. [1048]

Therefore, the act done in such a way as to focus (*abhisaṃdhāna*) energy of consciousness (*citiśakti*) [1049] on the absence of consequence (*aphala*) is not able again to give rise to birth, inasmuch as that energy is formed of the notion that the 'I' [of the meditator] is one with all things [— viz., 'I am this all', or 'this all is indistinguishable from me']. [1050]

[1046] Cf. kārikā 57 where is described another way of rendering a seed unproductive.

[1047] This is the doctrine, expounded at length in the *Bhagavadgītā*, and proclaimed in the Buddha's first sermon: it is not the act as such that binds, but the intention that motivates it; as long as its fruit is not desired, the act retains its constitutive and obligatory character, whether ritual (*Gītā*) or compassionate (Buddha); argument taken up again in PS 67.

[1048] *aham eva ittham viśvātmanā sphurāmi.*

[1049] First occurrence of the notion. See ĪPK I 5, 13: *citiḥ pratyavamarśātmā parā vāk svarasoditā*, 'Consciousness (*citi*) has as its essential nature reflective awareness; it is the supreme Speech that arises freely', and the *Vimarśinī*, where *citi* is commented upon by *citikriyā*, the 'activity of consciousness'. Cf. ŚSV I 1: *citikriyā sarvasāmānyarūpā*, 'The activity of consciousness is universal throughout'; also PH 1 (quoted in PM 26): *citiḥ svatantrā viśvasiddhihetuḥ*, 'Free consciousness is the cause bringing about the universe', and the auto-commentary ad loc. The principal concern of PH is the manner in which *citi* chooses to limit itself and become *citta*, empirical consciousness (v. 5), thereafter ultimately regaining its absolute being (v. 13). The term *citiśakti* is found in YS IV 34; qualified as '*svarūpapratiṣṭhā*', 'established in its own nature', it serves as a synonym to *kaivalya*, 'autonomy'.

[1050] Similar statement in YR ad 51.

Kārikā 63

If, then, this is so, how[1051] has this energy of consciousness[1052] come to be possessed of a body — since it is already fully developed (*vikasvara*) [as supreme ipseity]? The master says:

63. Indeed, energy of consciousness,[1053] delimited by the efficient force[1054] [unleashed by ritual acts undertaken in this life, whose result] is a future body suitable to [the fulfillment of] those acts — acts themselves that are made possible by limiting the intellect [to egocentric purposes][1055] — comes into possession of a new

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[1051] The rare form *kathaṃkāram* is worthy of a grammatical note: such instances of the relatively infrequent gerund suffix '*ṇamul*' (*-am*), authorized by P. III 4, 27 are themselves exceptional (see another instance of *ṇamul* in kā. 104). Monier-Williams cites *Śiśupālavadha* (2.52) for this form, where, according to Mallinātha's commentary, the suffix has no proper sense, that is, does not alter the sense of the term to which it attaches — here the adverb *katham*. The *Kāśikā* specifies that in such usages, the 'gerund' must be understood as pertaining to the main predicate, which rules out its use in cases such as *anyathākṛtvā śiro bhuṅkte*, 'having nodded [lit., 'having disposed his head otherwise'], he eats' (*anyathākāraṃ bhuṅkte*, 'he eats differently', would be legitimate). Same term in the avat. ad 85–86.

[1052] Or 'that form of energy that is called "consciousness." '

[1053] *citi* — we translate as 'energy of consciousness', as YR glosses *citi* with *citiśakti*.

[1054] *bhāvanā*, here, in the light of YR's gloss and the examples there given, seems to be used in its Mīmāṃsaka sense of 'efficient force' (so Edgerton, *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, q.v.) attaching to the act, specifically to the ritual act (cf. its derivation from the causative, *bhāvayati*). Our interpretation thus differs from those of previous translators (we underline the renderings of *bhāvanā*). Cf. Barnett: 'Owing to the *conception* of a future body corresponding to [present] works, [a conception] arising from limitation of intelligence, the Thought becomes accordingly contracted on the dissolution of the present body'; Silburn (echoing Barnett): 'En effet, grâce à *la faculté qu'elle possède d'imaginer* un corps futur conforme à l'acte (qu'elle accomplit) en mettant en œuvre un intellect limité, la conscience se contracte proportionnellement à la dissolution du corps actuel'; B. N. Pandit: 'An individual finite I-consciousness, having a deep rooted conception of finitude with regard to itself, is lead (*sic*) by the *impression* of its future body, formed in accordance with its deeds, to the consequent position after the end of its current form'. These three interpretations appear to be based on a specifically Śaiva sense of *bhāvanā*, the spiritual realization preceding *mokṣa* itself — which in any case is not that far removed from the original Mīmāṃsaka meaning. According to the Mīmāṃsā, the act does not end with its material result (which may be nothing but the ashes of the sacrifice), but is prolonged, through its 'efficient force' up to the moment of its "real" fruition: the fulfilled wish of the performer. Even this "real" result depends on the 'efficient force' generated by the previous ritual act. Those questioning this sacrificial model (cf. BĀU VI 2, 15–16; MuU I 2, 5–11) noted that since the previous (ritual) act is occasional, impermanent, its 'efficient force' (needed to maintain the sacrificer 'in heaven', for example) cannot be thought itself to be permanent, and must itself be destined to exhaustion in its turn, becoming then but another element in an endless series of impermanent causes and effects. Later on, YR will emphasize that this 'efficient force' is articulated through the *vāsanās* produced in the mind by ritual acts; see n. 1060. Cf. BhG II 66, where Edgerton's interpretation of *bhāvanā*, 'efficient-force', should no doubt be understood in a more spiritual sense; cf. Śaṅkara: *na cāsty ayuktasya bhāvanā ātmajñānābhiniveśaḥ*.

[1055] Egocentric purposes such as attainment of sovereignty or possession of much wealth.

body, [1056] **once this present body has fallen away.**

[Yogarāja now undertakes an explanation of various problematic elements of the kārikā while composing them into a coherent statement of the kārikā's purport:]

From what follows (*yasmāt*) [we will, in good time, draw a suitable conclusion, introduced by *tasmāt*, 'therefore', but in the meantime, it behooves us to clarify the various terms composing the kārikā and to state their syntactic interrelation more clearly:]

by limiting the intellect means 'on account of the determination [to act in a certain way], originating in the failure to recognize [the Self as such], and [tainted] by the dirt of desire, which is itself conditioned on latent dispositions deriving from the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.';

the act performed [in accordance with such limitation] means 'an act suitable to an agent who is qualified by such latent dispositions' — as for instance when he says: 'I will perform a horse sacrifice', 'may I be happy in this world and in the world beyond', 'may I never be sorrowful', 'let me attain the abode of Indra through this rite';

the future body [of that agent] means 'the body that will come into being later', once has been extinguished one's entitlement to a body needed to enjoy the results of those actions whose fruition has already begun (*prārabdhakarman*) [1057]

— which body will be **suitable to** perform those actions that are assured further development thanks to the latent dispositions (*vāsanāprarūḍhi*) [preserved] in the mind, and thus is fit to serve as enjoyer of fruits acquired in conformity which such acts;

the efficient force attaching to that [future body] means 'the further development of those latent dispositions' [formed in the mind in consequence of the act], in which [are latent] the results of the action [1058] wished for — as for instance, when one says: 'Let me obtain universal sovereignty, etc., by performing a rite such as the horse sacrifice, etc.'.

It is through this [efficient force (unleashed by ritual acts undertaken in this life, whose result) is a future body suitable to (the fulfillment of) those acts] that the energy of consciousness, although replete in all respects, is affected by the impurity of supposing oneself the agent of actions, which itself originates in the impurities of deeming oneself finite, and of regarding the world as objective; this energy, though all-pervasive, becomes thus

[1056] Lit., 'becomes [again] thus'.

[1057] The act (*karman*) is often distinguished into three sub-varieties: *kriyamānakarman*, the act now being performed, whose results are yet to be enjoyed; *sañcitakarman*, act already performed, whose results have not yet begun to be enjoyed, and remain stored up, latent; and *prārabdhakarman*, the act whose results have begun to be experienced, but not yet exhausted.

[1058] See n. 1054 and 1060.

delimited,[1059] just as does the space within the jar;

— and so, this energy [of consciousness], **once the [present] body has fallen away**, still affected by limiting factors such as the latent dispositions belonging [properly] to the body that enjoys the results following from its actions,[1060] **becomes again thus** [that is, comes into possession of a new body].

[Here] the **body** is [said to be] the enjoyer **of this**, namely, the results of those actions whose fruition has begun;

— by its **destruction** is meant death, so-called because of the disappearance of those enjoyments;

— and once the [present] body has fallen away, **consciousness**, wherein the latent dispositions provoked by actions [yet unfulfilled] have been roused, **becomes [again] thus**, that is, becomes endowed with that body, through whose agency the fruits of one's previous actions are acquired, and which thus becomes the enjoyer of the results of those actions — on account of which even consciousness becomes a receptacle for the enjoyment of heaven and hell, etc. [as consequences of one's good or bad actions].

[All this being the case,] it follows (*tasmāt*) that, once [consciousness] has taken on a body (*śarīrībhūtva*) [as described above], whatever action be performed in temptation of a finite fruit is more than capable of providing a new birth wherein one will enjoy the result [suitable to that action].[1061]

But, on the other hand, since the further development of latent dispositions (*vāsanāpraroha*) is no longer an issue, how can an action, having freed itself from the [thrall of the] body (*aśarīrībhūtva*),[1062] and done under the guise of consciousness itself by one who thinks: 'I am *brahman*, the

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[1059] *saṃkucitā*.

[1060] This is the notion of *karmavipāka*, the ripening of the act, whose ultimate source may be found in the philosophy of ritual. Between the actual performance of the act and the experience of its fruit, the efficient force of the act lies dormant in the form of a *vāsanā*, which, according to one of its etymologies, is a fragrance permeating the body. But the fruits of some acts require a different type of body — that of a man, woman, king, ant, elephant, nymph, etc.

[1061] Such is the answer to the objection raised in the avat.: 'how can consciousness become embodied?'

[1062] On the notion of *aśarīratva*, see Intr., pp. 27 and 46, and n. 1212 ad 79–80. Cf. BĀU IV 4, 7 (quoted in *Jīvanmuktiviveka* IV; the verse occurs also at KaU II 3, 14): *yadā sarve pramucyante kāma ye 'sya hṛdi śritāḥ/ atha martyo 'mṛto bhavati, atra brahma samaśnute// iti tad yathāhinirlayanī valmīke mṛtā pratyastā śayīta, evam evedaṃ śarīraṃ śete, athāyam aśarīro 'mṛtaḥ prāṇo, brahmaiva, teja eva [...]*, ' "When all the desires that dwell in the heart are cast away, then does the mortal become immortal, then he attains *Brahman* here (in this very body)." Just as the slough of a snake lies on an anthill, dead, cast off, even so lies this body. But this disembodied, immortal life is *Brahman* only, is light indeed [...]'; see Ś ad loc. (quoted n. 1030): considering his body, which formerly was nothing but an obstacle to his consciousness, as a mere tatter, of no more importance to him than is the skin that the serpent sloughs off, the 'knower' acts henceforth disinterestedly, indifferently, focusing only on his status as 'liberated while living'.

All',[1063] be [thought] capable of facilitating the rebirth of all-pervading energy of consciousness?[1064] This is the master's intended meaning.[1065]

Kārikās 64–66

Now, if it is the case that action done in conformity with the principle of non-Self (*anātmatayā*) [that is, done while mistaking the Self for the non-Self] eventuates in the cognizing subject's continuing transmigration, then surely the nature of the Self should be described, in virtue of which one does not become [again] enmeshed in transmigration. Although this has already been explained,[1066] he speaks of it again in order that his disciples may take it to heart [and interiorize it]:[1067]

64–66. Once one has become aware that his Self is formed of Śiva — the Lord that is unblemished consciousness, who has transcended all that involves knowers and agents,[1068] who is extended [to the entire universe], is formed of the Light that neither sets nor rises, whose intentions are ever true,[1069] who is beyond all mere inclination conditioned by [the particularities of] time or space, who is stable, immutable, ever replete, the unique cause of the processes of dissolution and origination that involve countless hosts of energies, the excellent instigator of injunctions of creation and so on[1070] — is it possible that such a one be subject to transmigration? Of one who is extended [to the entire universe], whence or whither is motion possible?

Once the cognizer, whose heart has been transfixed by [the Lord's] grace,[1071] and who has overcome the conceit attributing to the body and

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[1063] *sarvaṃ brahmāsmi.*

[1064] Or, might *vyāpinyāḥ citiśakteḥ* be taken to be an ablative: 'on account of that all-pervading conscious energy'?

[1065] *iti tātparyārthaḥ* — with this term the entire commentary concludes. Whereas the previous statements expounded a point of view in some sense negative, inasmuch as they sought to explain the idea of reincarnation, the final statement represents their 'implication' (*tātparya*), which is their positive counterpart, and serves also to relativize the previous exposition.

[1066] The same reasoning is at issue in kā. 9.

[1067] *hṛdayaṅgamīkartum* — recurrent idiom; see, for instance, *hṛdayaṅgamībhāva* in PTLvṛ 2a.

[1068] *sarvasamuttīrṇaboddhṛkartṛmayam* — the compound, which YR does not fully parse, appears to be susceptible of several analyses; as a BV, it could mean 'who has transcended all that involves knowers and agents'; as a TP, it could mean either 'made of all-transcending knowers and agents [referring to the *jīvanmuktas*, of whom there may be more than one]', or 'made of [viz., who has made himself into] an all-transcending knower and agent'.

[1069] In the sense that 'whatever he desires, it happens thus', as explains YR.

[1070] Cf. Barnett: 'cunning creator of the laws of creation and other conditions', and Silburn: 'ordonnateur très expert des œuvres de création et autres'.

[1071] *paraśaktipāta* — lit., 'descent of [the Lord's] supreme energy'; see YR ad 9.

the like the capacity to cognize,[1072] **has become aware that his own Self is formed of Śiva** [see kārikā 66], that is, once he recognizes that he is a uniform mass of blissful consciousness, **how indeed** could he — now knowing himself to be identical with the Great Lord — **be subject to transmigration**, that is, in what way could he become enmeshed [again] in the cycle of existence?

He could not. And as well, because he [alone] transmigrates whose nature is the subtle body which is composed of consciousness and non-consciousness on account of its connection with the impurity of supposing himself to be the agent of actions. How, moreover, could he who is formed solely of consciousness (*cidekamūrti*), who is, in substance, Śiva (*śivamaya*) be subject to transmigration — for his sheaths of impurity have been destroyed, notably that of deeming himself finite, etc.? Such is the author's intended meaning.

An interlocutor may ask: — 'What harm is there [viz., to your thesis] if one who is solely formed of consciousness were said to be subject to transmigration?'

Suspecting such an objection, the master utters the words starting with **'extended'**:

of an extended [to the entire universe] cognizer, that is one not qualified by time, space or their particular embodiment,[1073] how **is motion ['to' or motion] 'from'** possible? Such a cognizer has already pervaded all things! He is [therefore] complete, inasmuch as the latent dispositions have terminated [that were occasioned] by what he had done while under the influence of the conceit that locates the Self in the body, etc.

Is there any place beyond him[1074] from which he might differentiate himself [and thereto] effect a transmigration, a going elsewhere, [such other place] being different?

Indeed, the cases of ablative, locative, and so on, have opportunity only in regard to one who is qualified by the conceit attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize. It makes no sense even to apply the word 'transmigration' to the cognizer who, being solely formed of consciousness, is himself nothing but *brahman* (*brahmabhūta*), unqualified by [the limitations] of space and time.

What kind of Self is it — formed of Śiva [you say] — that he would become aware of? The master says in reply: **'unblemished consciousness, etc.'**.

[YR proceeds to a grammatical analysis of the components of the description given in the three kārikās:]

[1072] Same phraseology in YR ad 39 as well as YR ad 1: *parimitapramātṛtādhaspadīkāreṇa*.
[1073] Similar phraseology in YR ad 60, which deals with the definition of *mokṣa*.
[1074] *tadatirikta*.

By [unblemished] **consciousness** is meant [that Śiva is] pure consciousness (*śuddhacaitanya*), as being free from impurity — that from which the accumulation of impurities, the impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc., has departed.

Similarly, **[he] has transcended everything**, or is unexcelled, for his independence of knowledge and action,[1075] already mentioned, is so described[1076] [viz., as *sarvasamuttīrṇaboddhṛkartṛmayam*].

By **extended** is meant 'all-pervasive', due to the absence of delimitation brought about by space, etc.

Similarly, his **form**, that is, his body, **is Light**[1077] itself, namely, the blazing torch of consciousness, of which the setting or the rising, that is, the dissolution and the creation, are never seen.

And also, [that Śiva] is such that **his intentions** (*saṃkalpa*), that is, his unimpeded caprices (*vihāra*), **are true** (*satya*), that is, are ultimately meaningful (*paramārtha*),[1078] in the sense that 'whatever he desires, it happens thus'.

And [that Śiva] is [kārikā 65] free from [the need to] investigate, whose motivation is [conditioned by] time, space, or their particular embodiment, for he is endowed with the attributes of omnipresence and permanence.

He is therefore **stable**, that is, immovable; he is **immutable**, and imperishable; he is thus **Lord** (*īśvara*), and independent.

Moreover, he is **ever replete**, that is, he wants nothing [to complete himself, is free of dependency].[1079]

He is [the agent,] free as regards any injunction to arouse or suppress those **very many**, that is, exceedingly numerous, hosts of energies [manifesting themselves] in objects such as jars, cloths, etc. — energies that are presided over by the [deified] energies Brāhmī, etc. [viz., the *mātṛkās*], [and whose countless names] arise from the mass [or totality] of sounds.[1080]

[1075] *svātantrya* may have been suggested to YR here by the mention of two of the three energies (*icchā* is not mentioned) said to be the first concretization of Śiva's *svātantryaśakti*.

[1076] In this way, YR avoids glossing grammatically the problematic second half of the compound.

[1077] Same term *bhārūpa* in kā. 9; *bhāsvarūpa* in kā. 43–44.

[1078] Being never devoid of meaning, they are necessarily real, or necessarily exist.

[1079] Same definition in YR ad 10–11.

[1080] The image of the Wheel of energies (*śakticakra*) is implicit in this description; see PS 4 and SpK I 1, quoted n. 301. Moreover, the passage here is parallel with that of YR ad 10–11. The underlying perspective is this: all objects, whether insentient or sentient, whether past, present, or future, may be seen as expressing the energies of Śiva's consciousness. Such objects have for their presiding deities the eight *mātṛs* (or *mātṛkās*) who are forms assumed by Śiva, and were sent by Brahmā to earth to destroy demons. In effect, since there is no thought without corresponding words, the entire sphere of plurality may be seen as the work of Speech, which is itself, ultimately, that same potentality, or dynamism, of consciousness that has received the name of *vimarśa* in nondual Śivaism of Kashmir. The *vācaka* exists

Also, he is **the excellent instigator of the injunctions of creation and so on**, that is, he is an extremely skilled **instigator**, or establisher [of such activities].

Thus, he who knows that the Great Lord is his own Self, replete in every respect, in accordance with the qualifications that have been detailed above, will no longer — whatever he does — participate in the cycle of transmigration, since the seeds of [further] action have been burnt up. In sum, he becomes liberated (*vimuktaḥ*) while still living (*jīvann eva*).

Kārikā 67

In order to teach [once again] that an act does not eventuate in any fruit — provided it is done by him who knows, who no longer thirsts after the fruits of action thanks to the success of his reflection (*pratyavamarśa*) on himself — the master now offers a mundane illustration confirmed by everyone's experience:

67. It has thus been established by all possible arguments[1081] **that the act done by him who knows bears no fruit. For, in worldly affairs, no fruit attaches to him who, persistently, affirms: 'It is not mine, it is his'.**

'I am indeed formed [entirely] of consciousness, free, the accomplisher of all actions inasmuch as I exist as the innermost Being[1082] of all cognizers',[1083] or [*mutatis mutandis*], 'I am not their accomplisher, it is the divine (*pārameśvarī*) energy of freedom that does this'.[1084] One or the other being the case,[1085] what follows for me, who am essentially pure consciousness?'[1086]

It is **due to such arguments**, that is, due to reasonings whose nature has been previously set forth, **that the action which is accomplished**, namely, done and fully realized, by the cognizer who knows the nature of

on three levels: *varṇa*, letter; *pāda*, word; and *mantra*, sentence, utterance; in the same way, the *vācya* is triple: *tattva*, principle; *bhuvana*, universe; and *kalā*, fragment, or thought. *varṇas* are also called *mātṛkas*, for they are the source of words; and, as such, they represent innumerable energies or powers. This *bahutaraśaktivrāta*, the 'countless hosts of energies', echoes here the *śakticakra* of SpK I 1. Here, one of the purposes of the triad of kārikās (64–66) is to teach the essential complementarity of the two aspects termed *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*, or Śiva and Śakti.

[1081] 'api' in its totalizing sense, viz., *yuktibhir sarvair api*.

[1082] *antaratamatva*.

[1083] *aham eva cidghanaḥ svatantraḥ sarvapramātrantaratamatvena sarvakarmakārī*.

[1084] *nāhaṃ kartā pārameśvarī svātantryaśaktir itthaṃ karoti*.

[1085] *etavatā* — lit., 'from this much'.

[1086] Here, Yogarāja synthetizes the content of the three previous kārikās, making the *jñānin* speak in the first person. The conclusion, so far implicit, is: 'it follows from the above that you can act without being burdened with fruits'.

his own Self as previously set forth in both cases,[1087] **bears no fruit**, that is, is unconnected with any fruit, inasmuch as there is nothing left for him to avoid or to acquire, because of the absence of any notion relating the body, etc., and the 'I'.[1088]

Since all adventitious constructions [such as taking the body as Self] have been dissolved for the knower of the Self (*ātmajñānin*) in both ways as previously explained, where would the action, even though accomplished, make connection with a result?

The answer is: nowhere [that is, no connection is possible], for, in other words, no basis exists for enabling (*svabhāva*) the conceit attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize.

Indeed, the basis [of attributing a result to an agent] is the arbitrary convention of presuming, on the part of the cognizer, that the fruit pertains to the act done.[1089]

But the act of him who knows, which exhausts itself in its very form [without any reference to a result], due to the absence of any such presumption [that the fruit is that of the action done], is not connected with any result.

Now, where might we find a similar case, where an act is related to a result only through a presumption [on the part of the mind]?

The master replies, saying: **'It is not mine, [it is his], etc.'.**

That is, [such a case] is [readily] seen, and is not unprecedented. For instance, the sacrificial act, etc. [is done by the officiating priest, saying]: **'It is not mine, it is his',**[1090] [that is, it belongs] to a certain sacrificial patron who is desirous [of the result].

Thus (*iti*), in accordance with that idea, namely, that, though a sacrificial act has been accomplished [by me, the *yājaka*], that act is not [mine], given the lack of any intention [on my part] having to do with its fruit, for **in the world** [of affairs, *loke*], I am [seen as sufficiently] motivated by the salary [that I retain], and because the act itself is deemed to be associated with a supramundane[1091] fruit [viz., 'heaven', etc.]. And so, in accordance with the maxim: 'Officiating priests (*yājaka*) execute the

[1087] The two cases referred to are the *jñānin* as agent, and the Lord as agent.

[1088] Here we understand *dehādyahaṃbhāva* on the model of *viṣayaviṣayībhāva*.

[1089] *rūḍhi* — in its linguistic application, *rūḍhi* designates the direct and unmediated connection between the word (or its pronunciation) and its sense (or its apprehension) — what we would call the "conventional" sense of the word, as opposed to the "derived" meaning (*yoga*), in which etymological derivation plays a part. In the Indian view of things, the word may be seen as "growing" (root *ruh*) into its natural or inherent apprehension, as "flowering" according to a natural law. Here, it is the *rūḍhi* of 'act' and 'fruit' that serves as basis for assigning the act to an agent — a linkage that philosophical reasonings (as well as those of the *Gītā*) attempt to break, by dissociating the agent from the fruit. On *rūḍhi*, see also n. 1101 and 1371.

[1090] *na mamedam api tu tasya.*

[1091] *pāralaukika.*

sacrifice [for another, *yajanti*, active voice]; the patron of the sacrifice (*yajamāna*) sacrifices [for himself, *yajate*, middle voice]', although the officiating priests (*ṛtvij*) accomplish by themselves the sacrificial act [it is with this in mind that they do so]: 'This sacrificial act, this horse sacrifice, etc., does not belong to us at all; but rather to the meritorious [patron] who has taken the vow [to perform it] (*dīkṣita*); we, in truth, here at this sacrifice, are desirous only of the stipulated remuneration.[1092] [Actually] there are none of us here;[1093] rather it is the patron of the sacrifice who enjoys the fruits, heaven, etc., brought about by this act'.[1094]

Thus, because for them there exists no presumption linking the act and the fruit, the act, though done by them, is not linked to any fruit such as heaven, etc.

But, here, the patron of the sacrifice, though doing by himself no sacrificial act, and expecting [i.e., requiring] the acts to be performed by the priests, thinks: 'these sacrificial acts, this horse sacrifice, etc., are mine, and these priests are engaged in this act thanks to my wealth'. Thus 'mine alone will be the results, heaven, etc., certain to ensue after my body perishes'.

Hence, though he does nothing [in fact], the act is for him connected with its result, since he insists on the presumption that the result of the act be desired.

It is for this reason that [the Pāṇinīyas enjoin] the middle voice (*ātmanepada*) after [the term expressing] the agent dedicated [to perform the sacrifice] (*dīkṣita*), in accordance with the rule *kartrabhiprāye kriyāphale*,[1095] [thus giving the correct forms] *yajate* [3rd sg. pres.], *yajamānaḥ* [nom. sg. masc., present participle]; but when the agent is not intended [as the beneficiary], it is the active voice (*parasmaipada*) [that is enjoined — according to Renou, by I 3, 78], hence: *yajanti* (3rd pl., pres.), *yājakāḥ* (nomen agentis in *-aka*, by II 2, 15).

Such is the insurmountable power[1096] of independent thought-constructs[1097] that an act, though done by oneself, is not connected with

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[1092]Without which the ritual would be invalid.

[1093]This rather forceful expression is meant to emphasize the gap between the agent of the act and its result. The officiating priests are aware that they are at the sacrifice as agents, but not as enjoyers. They are formally present, but, in truth, only the *yajamāna* is there, inasmuch as the ritual act exists only in view of its result.

[1094]The question here is whether the *adhikāra* of the fruit is always attached to the *kartṛ* (by virtue of its karman — which is necessarily that of the *kartṛ*) or whether it can be transferred to someone else, in keeping with his expectation. Compare the Buddhists' view that only desire creates bondage.

[1095]P. I 3, 72 (cited here without its initial portion, *svaritañitaḥ [...]*): '(Les désinences du moyen valent) après (une racine munie dans le *Dhātupāṭha* d'un exposant consistant en un ton) modulé [...] ou un *ñ*, quand le fruit de l'action se dirige vers l'agent [...]' (tr. Renou P.: 55).

[1096]*mahiman*.

[1097]Note that here the brahmanical sacrifice is part and parcel of "wordly affairs". And the

its result [for that person], in the absence of any presumption [associating the agent with] the result; while an act, though done by others, may be connected [for oneself] with its result, if one insists on the conceit: 'this [act] is mine'.

Therefore, just as priestly actions [are not fruitful], so the act performed by the yogin is not fruitful, in the absence of any such presumption as to the fruit.

Kārikā 68

Thus, in all his actions [viz., in whatever action he undertakes], he who knows would be illuminated [as such], for his thoughts are bereft of the stains of supposition as to what he must or must not do. Thus the master says:

68. Thus awakened by the winds of his meditative realization, [1098] **as he pours an oblation** [1099] **of all his thought-constructs into the blazing fire of the Self, he becomes fire itself.** [1100]

[The term] **meditative realization** (*bhāvanā*) is used [here by us, Śaivas] as conventionally synonymous [1101] with 'awareness' (*vimarśa*), in the

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notion of *vikalpa* is there required, either as the fruit is dissociated from the act or as the fruit is assumed by another, who merely witnesses the acts of others. Thus the example offered here aims at a circumscribed point: can the agent be dissociated from the fruit of his own act?

[1098] See Appendix 20, p. 345.

[1099] Same speculation and metaphor in PS 76, describing the symbolic oblation (*homa*) of duality into the fire of consciousness. The parallelism of PS 68 and 76 is emphasized by the use of the present participle *juhvat* in the former and the noun *homa* in the latter, both terms being derived from the root *hu*, 'to pour an oblation'. The *śāktopāya* is alluded to here, as shown by the word *bhāvanā*, and the metaphor of *homa*, which implies the wider metaphor of *yajña* or *yāga*, 'sacrifice', a Trika technical term, which stands for the practice of the *śāktopāya*; cf. TĀ IV 277–278a, and TS IV, p. 25: *[...] tatra bhāvānāṃ sarveṣāṃ parameśvara eva sthitiḥ nānyad vyatiriktam astīti vikalparūḍhisiddhaye parameśvara eva sarvabhāvārpaṇaṃ yāgaḥ*, 'The "sacrifice" is the offering of all things to the Supreme Lord in order to strengthen the conviction that everything abides in the Supreme Lord and that nothing is distinct from him'. Cf. Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vīravāmanaka's verse (quoted in YR ad 76), which spins out the metaphor of the internal *yajña*. The image is as old as ChU V 19, 1ff., VIII 5, 1, *inter alia*. It is implicit even in BĀU I 1, 1.

[1100] Cf. ŚS II 8: *śarīraṃ haviḥ* and ŚSV ad loc.: *sarvair yat pramātṛtvenābhiṣiktaṃ sthūlasūkṣmādisvarūpaṃ śarīraṃ tad mahāyoginaḥ parasmin cidagnau hūyamānaṃ haviḥ*, 'This body, gross, subtle, etc., that all beings consecrate (*abhiṣikta*) as "cognizer", is the oblation poured by the great yogin in the supreme fire of consciousness'; also ŚSV I 6: *viśvasya saṃhāro dehātmatayā bāhyatayā cāvasthitasyāpi sataḥ parasaṃvidagnisādbhāvo bhavatīty arthaḥ*, 'Then occurs the dissolution of the universe, that is to say, though existence may continue as body and external objects, it is now identified with the fire of the highest consciousness (*parasaṃvid*) [viz., it appears only as consciousness]'.

[1101] *rūḍhi*, normally the direct and unconditionned denotative sense of a word, here taken

context of the Self [as justified by the insight]: 'It is I who am the Great Lord in the form of consciousness, who manifest (*sphurāmi*) ever thus, intensely'.[1102]

Thus, that is, in the way elaborated earlier, **awakened** by [the winds of][1103] his **meditative realization**, he who knows, while **pouring an oblation of all his thought-constructs** ... — [by this, the master means that] all such suppositions as 'I am a bound soul, tied up in the bondage of actions', 'I am my body, these are my sons, my wife, etc.', or 'this act will lead to heaven or hell, etc.' are set aside[1104] in the awareness that 'It is I who am all this'[1105] —

[... pouring thus an oblation] **into the fire of the Self** (*ātmajyotis*), that is, into the **blazing** fire of consciousness, whose essence is the marvel of supreme ipseity;

that is, offering them by merging them into the essence of non-discursive consciousness,[1106]

he becomes Fire [itself], that is, once the fuel consisting of thought-constructs ready to be consumed has been exhausted, the fire of consciousness (*cidagni*), being that which consumes, is itself perfected. In other words, it is what remains [when the combustion is over], having no form other than that of the transcendental cognizer.[1107]

Inasmuch as this [meditative realization] proceeds steadily, it is called **wind**, that is, it is compared to wind; for, in a similar way, fire covered by ashes is awakened by the wind.

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somewhat freely as a kind of *paryāya*, 'synonym', in accordance with Renou's insight (1942: s.v. '*paryāya*') regarding technical terms. The synonymy may obtain only within a school, as, for example, within grammar, where terms such as *vṛddhi*, *guṇa*, etc., signify classes of sounds (P. I 1, 1: *vṛddhir ādaic*), whereas outside the school they have other, more etymologically predictable, meanings, 'growth', 'quality' — or, in other schools, equally conventional but different meanings, as in *dharmaśāstra*, where *vṛddhi* may mean 'interest' (on a loan). The notation of a context here (*ātmani*) serves to distinguish this usage of *bhāvanā* from the more general usage.

[1102] *aham eva caitanyamaheśvaraḥ sarvātmanā sarvadā evaṃ sphurāmi.*

[1103] The full explanation of the simile has been placed at the end of the commentary in order not to interrupt the syntactical analysis of the verse.

[1104] *śeṣībhūta* — *śeṣībhū* means literally: 'become a remainder' or 'become ancillary'.

[1105] *aham eva idaṃ sarvam.*

[1106] Same idea, and same formulation in YR ad 71.

[1107] The allusion here to vedic rituals is obvious. Mīmāṃsakas have discussed at length the question of the ritual fire's "efficacy", for its consequences were deemed to extend far beyond the cinders that were its only visible result. Here, the "fire" is interiorized, it is transformed into pure consciousness, and becomes itself the "remains" of the combustion of "transitory" states of mind; it occupies thus the place of the Mīmāṃsaka's '*apūrva*' or '*adṛṣṭa*', which had been thought to be the mechanism through which the 'karman' of the sacrifice (viz., the sacrifice itself) worked itself out. But this '*adṛṣṭa*' has one quality that the Mīmāṃsaka's reasoned '*adṛṣṭa*' most significantly lacked: it is the self-evidence of consciousness itself.

Kārikā 69

How [concretely] does one who delights in practicing the discipline of supreme knowledge [or 'that leads to supreme knowledge'] (*jñānayoga*), in the way expounded above, spend his time, by [what means] sustaining himself for the rest [of his life]? [1108] The master says:

69. Eating whatever he finds, clad in whatever is available, tranquil, inhabiting anywhere at all, he is liberated who is the Self of all beings. [1109]

Eating whatever edible object is put [1110] before him, marveling at it [that is, delighting in it], accepting whatever comes to him without effort on his part, and paying no heed to the [usual] restriction: 'this is pure, this is impure; this is bad food, this is dainty' — for he has abandoned the suppositions as to what he must or must not do.

Likewise, **clad in whatever [is available]**, that is, covered up with a tattered garment, or the hide [of an animal], or tree bark, or a cotton cloth, or even with those garments whose essence is the divine [sky] (*divyātman*, viz., naked); being thus desirous of simply covering his body, neither does he despise one or praise another, for in neither mode is there any question of distinction or discredit.

Why is this? Because he is **tranquil**, having transcended thought-constructs, such as pleasure and pain.

[1108] *śeṣavartanayā.*

[1109] *sarvabhūtātman* — or, according to the commentary: 'he whose being is [composed of] all beings'; cf. *sarvātman* in PS 82, and YR ad loc. Cf. ĀPS 76, a similar verse, but with *yatra kvacana ca śāyī*, in the place of *yatra kvacana nivāsī*. Cf. ĀŚ II 37b quoted n. 1129; on another interpretation of *calācalaniketa*, see n. 1112); also PS 81, which similarly emphasizes the yogin's sovereign freedom: *[...] tiṣṭhati yatheṣṭam*, 'He remains [viz., lives on] [acting] as he wishes'. Here begins a long description of the yogin, which ends in kā. 84. For similar speculations on yoga as contemplative union, free from any consideration of caste, or pollution, see BĀU IV 4, 23 (*sarvam ātmānaṃ paśyati, nainaṃ pāpmā tarati, sarvaṃ pāpmānaṃ tarati*, '[...] He sees all in the Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil'), and BhG V 18, which holds that 'In a knowledge-and-cultivation-perfected/ Brahman, a cow, an elephant,/ And in a mere dog, and an outcaste,/ The wise see the same thing' (*vidyāvinayasaṃpanne brāhmaṇe gavi hastini/ śuni caiva śvapāke ca paṇḍitāḥ samadarśinaḥ//*); also ĀPS 77 (almost identical to our PS 70), and ĀŚ III 39, which defines yoga as *asparśa*, 'free from contact', i.e., free from all 'relation' or 'connection' (*saṃbandha*) [Ś ad loc.] with [Anubhūtisvarūpa and Ānandagiri ad loc.] either the *varṇāśramadharma*, the laws of caste and stage of life, or pollution (*mala*); cf. Bouy ĀŚ: 182. The yogin described here, in PS 69 [= ĀPS 76], is, according to the Śaiva doctrine, the *jīvanmukta*, a state that ĀŚ II 38 describes without naming such an ascetic *jīvanmukta*: there *tattvībhūta*, 'having become Reality', is a synonym of BhG VI 27 *brahmabhūta*, 'having become [one with] *brahman*', which Ś ad loc. glosses as 'who is liberated while living, i.e., who is sure that, indeed, the *brahman* is all' (*jīvanmuktaṃ brahmaiva sarvam ity evaṃ niścayavantaṃ brahmabhūtam*). ĀŚV II 38 quotes BhG V 18c and BhG XIII 27: *samaṃ sarveṣu bhūteṣu tiṣṭhantaṃ parameśvaram/ [...] yaḥ paśyati sa paśyati//*, 'Alike in all beings/ Abiding, the Supreme Lord,/ [...] Who sees him, he (truly) sees'.

[1110] Lit., 'falls', scil., 'in his begging-bowl'.

Likewise, **inhabiting anywhere at all;**

anywhere, in a place of whatever sort, being merely desirous of shelter for himself; nor should [holy] sites, shrines, or places of pilgrimage, etc., be adopted by him [as residences], just because they are pure, nor should cremation grounds or the dwellings of outcaste be avoided, etc., [merely] because they are impure.[1111] He dwells at whatever place falls to his lot without any effort on his part, for [his thoughts are] bereft of the stains of weighing what is pure and what is not.[1112]

Such a one **is liberated** (*vimucyate*);

he **is liberated**, for he spends his time acting [solely] for the benefit of others, thus sustaining himself for the rest [of his life];[1113] that is, he becomes one with the Supreme Lord (*paramaśivībhavati*).

As it has been stated:

> Covered by this or that [garment], fed with this or that [food], reposing here or there, such a man the gods know to be a [true] brahmin.[1114]

And in *Mokṣadharma[prakaraṇa]*:

> I, the pure one, observe the 'vow of the python', by which eating fruits, taking meals, or drinking are unregulated, in which space and time are 'modified'[1115] in accordance with the evolutions of fate [alone], which offers happiness to the heart [of him who observes it], and which is not observed by the wicked.[1116]

[1111] TĀ IV 213–275, which quotes (IV 213–221a) the older text of the MVT XVIII 74–81, deals lengthily with the vanity involved in considerations of purity and impurity — the subject-matter of PS 69–71 and 73. See also PS 83 = ĀPS 81, and ŚDvṛ I 48, quoted n. 454.

[1112] Cf. BhG XII 19b, which defines him who is dear to the Lord as *aniketa*, 'homeless'. Parallel statement in MBh XIV 43, 40b: *acalaś cāniketaś ca kṣetrajñaḥ sa paro vibhuḥ*, and ĀŚ II 37b (quoted n. 1129), in which the ascetic (*yati*) is described as *calācalaniketas*, 'n'ayant pas de demeure fixe' [— 'having an unstable residence'] (Bouy); 'with an unfixed home' (Bhattacharya); 'having no residence whatever' (Karmarkar). Ś ad loc. analyzes differently: 'having as his residence the "moving" (*cala*) and the 'unmoving" (*acala*)', i.e., the body and the true nature of the Self (*ātmatattva*); accordingly, Gupta ĀŚ translates: 'with the self alone for home or his body'.

[1113] *śeṣavartanayā*.

[1114] *brāhmaṇa* — that is, 'one who is instilled with knowledge of the *brahman*': MBh XII 237, 12 (Crit. Ed.), from the *Mokṣadharma*, as is the citation following. The *yas* of the third *pāda* is, in the Crit. Ed., replaced by *ca*, itself considered problematic. The verse appears also several times in the addenda of the Crit. Ed.

[1115] *vibhakta* — lit., 'declined'.

[1116] MBh XII 172, 27. *vratam ājagaram*. See Nīlakaṇṭha ad '*vratam ājagaram*': *ajagaro hy ayatnenaiva jīvati, tasyedam [vratam]*. The entirety of chapter 27th deals with the exposition of this *vrata* by an ascetic who develops the same themes as does YR here. In this passage of MBh, the metaphor of the python may illustrate *yādṛcchika* of ĀŚ II 37b. What is celebrated here is a life of randomness. It is exemplified by the 'vow of the python' to which a Hindi

But how, by acting thus [— by living in this way], can the knower of the Self himself be liberated?

The master replies, saying: **'the Self of all beings'.**

Because the knower of the Self knows himself as **the Self of all beings** — the compound *sarvabhūtātman* meaning [both] that he is the Self of all beings, and that all beings are his own Self[1117]— nothing exists for him as bondage; everything is conducive to his liberation.[1118]

Kārikā 70

Nor does one so described, who is devoid of conceit of self,[1119] suffer the slightest risk of acquiring merit or demerit, whatever he does. The master says:

70. Whether he performs a hundred thousand horse sacrifices, or kills a hundred thousand brahmins, he who knows ultimate reality is not affected by merits or demerits. He is stainless.[1120]

If sometimes **he who knows ultimate reality** (*paramārthavid*), that is, knows that the essence of his nature is the Great Lord's identity with his own Self, performs prescribed acts such as the countless sacrifices — the horse sacrifice, *rājasūya*, *aptoryāma*,[1121] etc. — he takes them merely as duties to be performed in a spirit of play only (*krīḍārtham*), for he is free from the conceit that consists in desiring a result (*phalakāmanābhimāna*);

— or, considering himself as non-identical with his body (*aśarīratā*), [if he commits] great sins all of which are prohibited, such as killing brahmins, partaking of liquor, committing theft, etc., which are the results of thoughtlessness;[1122]

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poet, Malūkadāsa (Malūkdās), in the 16th cent., refers: *ajagara karai na cākarī, pañchī karai na kām/ dāsa malūkā kahi gaye saba ke dātā rāma*, 'The python does not attend and the bird does not work, [yet they receive their daily food]. Malukādās says that Rāma is the supreme bestower'. Moreover such a life may be also defined as a life freed from any social duty, as formulated by PS 40 and YR ad loc.

1117 Cf. BĀU I 4, 16: *atho 'yaṃ vā ātmā sarveṣāṃ bhūtānāṃ lokaḥ*, 'Now this self, verily, is the world of all beings'; ŚvU III 21a: *vedāham etam ajaraṃ purāṇaṃ sarvātmānaṃ sarvagataṃ vibhutvāt*, 'I know this undecaying, ancient (primeval) Self of all, present in everything on account of infinity'.

1118 Cf. *Saṃvitprakāśa* II 58, quoted n. 1039.

1119 On *abhimāna*, see PS 19 and YR thereon, as well as YR ad 68.

1120 Verse similar to ĀPS 77, with the difference that ĀPS, in contrasting a thousand horse sacrifices with a hundred thousand brahmanicides, lays stress on the seriousness of the sin. The verse is quoted in the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* (p. 74/p. 285), which attributes it to Śeṣa's *Āryāpañcāśīti*. Cf., for the content of kā. 69–70, the verses from the *Niśāṭana* quoted in TĀ XXVIII 72–75a, in n. 1240.

1121 The *aptoryāma* is a particular way of offering the *soma* sacrifice.

1122 *pramāda*.

— in either cases, he who knows [the true Self] **is touched**, or polluted, **neither by the merits**, that is, by the auspicious results, **nor by the demerits**, that is, by the inauspicious [results — be they heaven or hell — pertaining to these acts, for the acts are done] with the thought: 'It is just the Will of the Supreme Lord that manifests itself (*vijṛmbhate*) in this way; what matters it to me?'[1123] for gone is the conceit of thinking that 'this is mine'.

Why is this? The master replies: **'he is stainless'**, for the impurities of deeming himself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing himself the agent of actions, which are the causes of transmigration, have vanished, have perished [utterly].

Thus, it is the polluted cognizer who is subject to the [egotistical] conceit that 'this belongs to me', for his faculty of cognition is [lodged in] a body, etc., so qualified; [he alone is thus] subjected to the accumulation of merits and demerits, because of the waywardness[1124] of the conceit that 'this is my auspicious act, this is my inauspicious act'.

But how can he be touched by merit or demerit whose store of the consequences of action has been exhausted — those accumulated impurities that are themselves the causes of possessiveness — once conceit of self has vanished?

As it has been stated in the revered *Bhagavadgītā*:

> Whose state (of mind) is not egoized,/ Whose intelligence is not stained,/ He, even tho he slays these folk,/ Does not slay, and is not bound (by his actions).[1125]

Kārikā 71

Pondering the manner of living fixed[1126] for one who knows the Self, the master says:

71. Living without self-deception, excitement, anger, infatuation, dejection, fear, greed, or delusion; uttering neither praises [of the gods][1127] **nor ritual formulae,**[1128] **and having no opinions whatever, he should behave as one insensible.**[1129]

[1123]*parameśvarecchaiva ittham vijṛmbhate mama kim āyātam.*

[1124]*daurātmya.*

[1125]BhG XVIII 17.

[1126]*niyatacaryā.*

[1127]Cf. ĀŚ II 35a: *vītarāgabhayakrodhair munibhir vedapāragaiḥ/[...].*

[1128]Cf. ĀŚ II 37a, quoted in the following note.

[1129]*jaḍa* — among the many possible (and misleading) translations of *jaḍa*, 'insensible' seems to capture best the several equivocations of the term; see Webster's: "1) incapable or bereft of feeling; 2) insentient; 3) unconscious; 4) not apparent to the senses, hence indifferent;

Self-deception (*mada*) means the 'conceit of attributing to the body, etc., the capacity to cognize';

excitement (*harṣa*) means the 'satisfaction' that results from acquiring something not heretofore acquired;

anger means 'wrath';

infatuation (*manmatha*) means 'thirsting for enjoyment';

dejection (*viṣāda*) means the 'state of confusion' (*mūḍhatva*) caused by separation from what one desires;

fear means the 'interruption [of composure]' caused by an enemy or by lions, tigers, etc.;

greed means 'small-mindedness' [i.e., considering only my own advantage];

delusion (*moha*) means '[considering things only] in terms of the relationship they have to "one's own self" '.[1130]

Though such [forms of limited] awareness arise from time to time as transitory affectations of the body, he [the *jñānin*] sets them aside, saying: 'I am *brahman*, the All'. [1131] He realizes that they are residues [left behind in the process] of becoming aware of his own Self, after merging them into his own non-discursive consciousness, as forms thereof.

Similarly, it is he who has gone beyond [the need of] praises and ritual formulae.[1132] Inasmuch as there is nothing different from himself to be praised, he needs use no hymn of praise, etc.; nor has he to rely on ritual

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5) devoid of sensibility, apathetic, also unaware; 6) devoid of reason, meaning (now rare)." Verse similar to ĀPS 78, although not identical. Note particularly, in the compound, °*lobhamoha*° replacing °*paruṣa*°, the absence of *avāgbuddhi* (in 71a), and *avādamatiḥ* replacing *agādhamatiḥ*. We differ from L. Silburn who renders *avādamatiḥ* as 'sans parole ni pensée' [— 'without words or thought'], perhaps under the influence of the *avāgbuddhi*, 'without words or thought' (ĀPS 78a). We understand *avādamatiḥ*, as 'whose mind is not [filled with stray] opinions'— see the commentary below; on the description of the one who knows the Self as *avāgbuddhi*, see BĀU IV 4, 21: *tam eva dhīro vijñāya/ prajñāṃ kurvīta brāhmanaḥ/ nānudhyāyād bahūñ chabdān/ vāco viglāpanaṃ hi tat*, 'Let a wise Brāhmaṇa after knowing him alone, practise (the means to) wisdom. let him not reflect on many words, for there is mere weariness of speech'. Similar statement in ĀŚ II 36b–37: *[...] advaitaṃ samanuprāpya jaḍaval lokam ācaret// nistutir nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca/ calācalaniketaś ca yatir yādṛcchiko bhavet//*, 'Having realized nonduality, one should behave as a fool among people. Giving no praise, paying no homage, nor pronouncing *svadhā* [i.e., not offering libations to the Manes/Ancestors], with an unfixed home, and acting spontaneously [without willing anything] (*yādṛcchika*), one should become an ascetic' (tr. Bhattacharya, modified as to the meaning of *yādṛcchika*; on another interpretation of *calācalaniketa*, see n. 1112). Compare BĀU III 5, 1 (partially quoted by ĀŚV II 36–37): *etaṃ vai tam ātmānaṃ viditvā brāhmaṇāḥ putraiṣaṇāyāś ca [...] vyutthāya atha bhikṣācaryaṃ caranti*, 'The Brāhmaṇas, having known that self, having overcome the desire for sons [...], live the life of mendicants'.

[1130] *ātmātmīyabhāva.*

[1131] *sarvaṃ brahmāsmi.* See YR ad 68.

[1132] Same syntagm in ĀPS 78b. It is further developed in ĀŚ II 37a: *nistutir nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca/*, as well as in AG's PS 73. Several parallel passages in MBh; especially MBh I 110, 9; XII 237, 24 (quoted by BĀUBh III 5, 1); XII 261, 2; XIV 46, 43; XIV 47, 10 (*nirdvaṃdvo nirnamaskāro niḥsvadhākāra eva ca*); for further details, see Bouy ĀŚ: 141.

formulae (*mantra*) such as *vaṣaṭ*, etc., for there exists no specific divinity different from him [to be invoked thereby].

[What then does he do?] **He should just behave as one insensible,**[1133] **having no opinions whatever**. Since he is himself replete, due to the absence of all expectations, he is like one at a loss (*unmatta*); his mind has banished considerations having to do with actions taught in the injunctive treatises, such as those that specify the manner of accomplishing [rituals, etc.],[1134] or [those that involve] the existence of something to be apprehended in conformity with some mode of correct apprehension (*pramāṇa*) and requiring an accompanying apprehender (*pramātṛ*), such as 'this [conclusion] is proven, this [one] is not'.[1135]

Neither does he require instruction regarding himself, nor does he posit anything to be apprehended in order to instruct others.[1136]

Thus, having effectively conquered himself, considering that all is *brahman*,[1137] he should disport himself for purposes of play. For this reason, he has been described here as insensible.

Kārikā 72

If this is the case, then how is it that, while the body perdures, he who knows is not touched, as we are, by the group of [thought-constructs:] self-deception, etc., though they may be surrendered [unto the Self]?[1138] Here, the master gives the reason:[1139]

72. The group made up of self-deception, excitement, etc., arises from delusion caused by difference. How, indeed, could one who is

[1133]Compare ĀPS 78: *jaḍavad vicaret* and ĀŚ II 36b: *jaḍaval lokam ācaret.* Bouy ĀŚ: 141 translates 'comme un sot' [— 'as a fool'], i.e., according to Ś ad loc., without showing one's own powers and qualities.

[1134]*itikartavyatā*.

[1135]Two types of argument (*vāda*) are mentioned: that dealt with by the Mīmāṃsā concerning the correct mode of accomplishing a ritual act, always in the future, and that which pertains to perception, itself always actual — the sphere of logic (Nyāya), implying *prameya*, *pramāṇa* and *pramātṛ*.

[1136]YR refers here to the wellknown Naiyāyika distinction between reasoning employed for one's own instruction, and reasoning aimed at communicating with others (*svārtha/parārtha*) — the former, for instance, not being confined within the syllogism of five members.

[1137]*sarvaṃ brahma*.

[1138]*parivarjyamānenāpi* — lit., 'although they have been removed [from any influence over the liberated self]'.

[1139]AG has just explained that although such states perdure after our enlightenment, they subtend a different relationship with the body. The question then arises: if, as the argument implies, these corruptions — 'self-deception', etc. — persist, even removed from such influence, they cannot continue to manifest themselves apart from the complicity of the body, as their substratum, and inasmuch as the liberated self continues to exist in some relationship with the body — by definition, the state of *jīvanmukti* — then, how is it that the self is not further sullied by them, however unusual be the final relation between Self and body?

endowed with the highest awareness of the nondual Self be touched by such delusion?

The group made up of self-deception, etc., which has been explained in the previous kārikā, [arises] **from delusion caused by difference.**

Now, **delusion caused by difference**, having [always] the form of 'myself' and 'what is mine', is nothing but the view [that one's own Self] is not complete [i.e., is fragmented].

From this [delusion caused by difference], [the group, self-deception, etc.] **arises**, that is, comes into being, through the error that imposes duality (*dvaitabhrānti*) on fettered cognizers, via the notion that such and such is to be avoided, such and such adopted.

But he who is the most excellent of knowers, and is possessed of awareness (*bodha*) of the supreme nondual Self, as [expressed in the dictum:] 'I am *brahman*, the All',[1140] who thus becomes like space itself[1141] — **how**, in what way, **is he to be touched**, that is, polluted, **by this** group, self-deception, and the rest?[1142]

Indeed, one thing may sometimes convey the nature of another thing different from it;[1143] [as in the present case:] how can the group, made up of self-deception, etc., once it is understood as composed of *brahman*, lend itself to the obstruction of the knower of the Self, who is composed of *brahman*, and is therefore of the same genus?[1144]

Kārikā 73

And as well, the whole lot of hymns of praise and ritual oblations addressed to external [deities], all of which depend on duality, is not sufficient to satisfy him [the *jñānin*]. This, the master says:

73. There is nothing at all separate from the [knower of the Self] to be honored with an oblation or to be praised; would then he, who is liberated, who has no use for homages or ritual formulae, be satisfied with hymns of praise, etc.?[1145]

For the knower of the Self, whose form is that of nondual [viz., undifferentiated] consciousness, **nothing** exists that is **separate** from him —

[1140] *sarvaṃ brahmāsmi.*

[1141] Due to its lack of internal differentiation.

[1142] The logic of the argument, here, rests on the traditional understanding of *ākāśa*; see YR ad 36.

[1143] Inasmuch as the object and the subject have the same nature — namely, *brahman* — one, the object, which had been considered as "different" may be taken to reveal the nature of the other, the subject, also "different" — and vice versa.

[1144] When all is *brahman*, the *jñānin* is included in *brahman*, and so must be self-deception, etc.

[1145] Note that the entire passage (PS 69–73) echoes ĀŚ II 35–37.

that presents itself to him as different; [there is nothing] **to be praised**, such as a deity, [nothing] **to be honored with an oblation** — such that it is [in fact] praised or presented with an oblation.

Nor does **he** who knows the Self (*ātmajña*) attain satisfaction **by means of hymns of praise, etc.**, inasmuch as their execution is seen to be conditioned on an obligation.[1146]

Since he is composed of unfailing bliss, delighting ever in awareness of non-difference, he pays no heed to any adventitious [viz., non-spontaneous] [sort of] bliss.

Thus, it is he who has gone beyond [the need for] homages and ritual formulae that is celebrated in the Vedānta texts [viz., the upaniṣads] as the **one liberated** (*mukta*).

Kārikā 74

Nor has he any use for a divine abode different from himself — his own body is the locus of the divinity that is his Self (*ātmadevatā*); nor is there any other support for his consciousness. There is thus for him no other divine abode.[1147] The master says:

74. The divine abode for him is his own body — endowed with the thirty-six principles, and replete with œils de bœuf [viz., the sense-organs], constructions inset in the body[1148]— or [if not his own,

[1146]For merits arise from the act that has been enjoined, and demerit from the act that has been prohibited.

[1147]Compare kā. 74–80 with TĀ IV 194–211, which also deals with the mystical practices that are those of the *jñānin* in the *śaktopāya*.

[1148]The image is quite appropriate here, the sense-organs being analogous to the symbolic "windows" (*gavākṣa*) of the outward temple that allow "light" to pass, in retrograde fashion, from inside (that is from the deity itself) to outside, inasmuch as such "windows", being closed and as solid as a part of the wall, do not admit the rays of the sun into the temple; see Kramrisch 1946: 318–321, on *gavākṣa*; and the term *tamori* (see below), 'enemies of darkness', that glosses *gavākṣa*. The projection, in the process of Tantrika meditation, of the thirty-six *tattvas* upon the body transforms it into a microcosm; it is therefore a ritual notion, present in the oldest Tantras. The body as shrine appears to be a notion proper to the Kula branch, wherein the lineages (*kula*) of *yoginīs* are viewed as (extensions of) the sense-organs. We might observe here that the body-shrine of the kārikā, along with its architectural details, is possibly a late metaphor, inasmuch as the older Tantras do not generally mention statues, nor temples for public worship; see, nevertheless, the fourth chapter of the *Brahmayāmala* for references to images of wood or other substances used for worship. Hidden from the larger society bien-pensant, tantric rituals were originally celebrated in disused places, and were probably not housed in any permanent structure — although there was a 'sanctum' (*yāgagṛha*), a retinue of deities surrounding the site (*bāhyaparivāra*), and deities guarding its entrance; see Sanderson 1986: 173–174. Whenever AG speaks of daily external worship, its substratum is mainly a smooth mirror-like surface — for instance, a mirror or a sword-blade; it may also be 'a liṅga (provided it is private, moveable, not of fashioned stone, nor of any metal but gold), a rosary (*akṣasūtram*), a skull-cup (*mahāpātram*), a skull-staff

then] the body of another, or even an object, such as a jar. [1149]

For that knower of the Self, his own body or that of another [external to him], [1150] is the abode of the deity, for it is the substratum of everything that is to be enjoyed [viz., external objects] by the deity that is his own Self.

However, external locales, such as [temples of the] Meru [type], [1151] etc., become abodes of a deity, whenever they are so determined by a teacher through the adjunction (*kalana*) of the thirty-six principles, making them coextensive with a body. [1152]

Once the [image of the] deity dwelling there, though external [to one's own Self], is comprehended as formed of consciousness (*cidghana*) through being pervaded by one's own Self, then even that [image] becomes the deity there.

Otherwise, how could either one or the other [viz., the temple or the image], both inert, mere bits of rock, save [viz., free] (*uddharet*) devotees [from transmigratory experience], or conduct the dead into [the deity's] proximity, etc.? [1153]

Thus, **the body** itself is, in a direct sense, [1154] the abode of the deity, for it is the dwelling place of consciousness. And, dwelling in that body, the Self of all beings is the deity. Therefore the body alone is the abode of the deity for those who are enlightened.

(*khaṭvāṅgaḥ*), an image of painted clay (*citrapustam*), deodar wood or gold, [...] a copy of an esoteric scripture, an image on cloth (*paṭaḥ*) or an image traced on a human skull (*tūram*)' (Sanderson 1986: 170); on those questions, see also Törzsök 2003: 179–224, and Takashima 2005: 115–142.

[1149] We differ from Silburn, who translates: 'Son temple c'est son propre corps [...]. C'est aussi ce qui diffère de ce corps, à savoir vases et objets semblables'.

[1150] Probably a reference to the tantric partner; in the phraseology of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavas, the term *parakīyā* denotes the devotee and female partner par excellence, inasmuch as her love for the deity is unconditioned — unlike that of the *svakīyā*, who is linked to her husband by dharmic obligations.

[1151] Meru is probably intended here as an architectural term, designating a large temple; see Acharya 1979, s.v. (esp., *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* LVI/LV 20). On mount Meru seen as *axis mundi*, see SvT X 122ff. and TĀ VIII 43ff. (TĀ VIII 45b, which describes it as a '*bhairavaliṅga*', is quoted by Kṣemarāja ad SvT X 124).

[1152] *śarīravyāpti* — lit., '... through [their] pervasion by the body — pervasion characterized by the adjunction of the thirty-six principles'. I interpret *kalana* in its general meaning, 'effecting', 'putting on', here as a synonym of *nyāsa*; on the technical meaning of *kalana*, see n. 1177. Note that the guru's body as well as an external locale such as a temple, both involve imposition of the thirty-six principles, for the guru places them, one after another, on his own body, and then transfers them to an external object, such as a *liṅga*, a temple, or the body of an initiand; on this process, see *Somaśambhupaddhati*, vol. III; also, for an example of the process at work in interiorizing the thirty-six *tattvas*, see Sanderson 1986: 178–180, and fig. 2: 187.

[1153] Probably a reference to different conceptions of *mokṣa* (understood as proximity to, or identity with, the deity), or to different degrees in its attainment (see PS 96–102).

[1154] That is, not metaphorically. Here *mukhyā vṛtti* means *abhidhā*, the primary or denotative power of the word.

What sort [of body]? The master says: **'endowed with the thirty-six principles'.**

The external [object] is determined [to be the abode of the deity] when pervaded (*vyāpti*) by the thirty-six principles. Even more obviously is the body, in which the deity resides, **endowed** with [lit., 'sustained by' *bhṛtam*], that is, nourished,[1155] by the same thirty-six principles.

In the external abode of the deity, there is an arrangement [of windows in the form] of œils de bœuf; so too this [internal shrine, which is the body, may be said to be:] **replete with œils de bœuf** — [viz., the sense-organs], **constructions [that are inset] in the body**;

[The foregoing compound is to be understood as follows:]

— **replete with** means 'not deficient in',

— **construction** means the 'disposition of "enemies of darkness" (*tamori*)' **in the corporeal body** (***vigrahe*** = *śarīre*) — viz., the series of entryways that are the sensorial faculties.

Hence, [the body] is similar to the external abode of the deity.

Not only is the body [for the *jñānin*] the abode of the deity inasmuch as it is the dwelling place of consciousness, but as well, whatever [other] objects there are that are governed by consciousness, all of them are abodes of the deity for him [the *jñānin*].

With this in mind, the master says [in the verse]: **'or even the jar, etc.'**, for the pentad of sensory domains that constitute the objects of our enjoyment — here suggested metonymically by reference to jars, etc. — are indeed governed by consciousness through entryways consisting of organs such as the eye, etc. Furthermore, according to the teaching of the *Spandaśāstra*, they are themselves composed of consciousness:

> It is the [Lord] himself as the enjoyer who is, always and everywhere, established in and through the objects of enjoyment.[1156]

[1155] YR seems to understand the term *bhṛta* as alluding to one of the etymologies of the name 'Bhairava', according to which the first element derives from the root *bhṛ*, 'to carry, maintain, sustain'; see his commentary ad 75, where this etymology is given explicitly. For an analysis of various etymologies of Bhairava, see Kahrs 1998: 57–97.

[1156] SpK II 4b. Verse already quoted in YR ad 1. Cf. Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vāmana, quoted in SpN II 4: *ālambya saṃvidaṃ yasmāt saṃvedyaṃ na svabhāvataḥ/ tasmāt saṃviditaṃ sarvam iti saṃvinmayo bhavet//*, 'Since all [objects] are known insofar as they rest on consciousness, and not by themselves, they [exist only] as known. Hence, one should identify himself with consciousness' (is this Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vāmana the same author as the Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vīravāmanaka from whom YR ad 76 quotes a verse?). The same notions of a body endowed with thirty-six principles, and of external objects such as jars, etc., seen as not different from consciousness, that is, from Śiva, is found in the *Pratyabhijñāṭīkā*, quoted in SpN II 4: *śarīram api ye ṣaṭtriṃśattattvamayaṃ śivarūpatayā paśyanti arcayanti ca te siddhyanti ghaṭādikam api tathābhiniviśya paśyanti arcayanti ca te 'pi nāsty atra vivādaḥ*, 'Even those who perceive the body of thirty-six principles in the form of Śiva, and treat it with respect, acquire spiritual perfection. So do those who, investing even a jar, etc., with the form of Śiva, perceive it in the same

The entire universe of objects, such as jars, etc., is the potential body of him who knows, just like his already existing [actual] body.

This being the case, it [the universe of objects] is not different from himself, no more than his own body; it is **the abode of the deity**; that is, the **abode** of the god, wherein the objects of enjoyment are governed — [the god who is] playful [1157] and free, the Great Lord that is one's own Self.

Kārikā 75

Now, in external abode of the deity [viz., the temple], the devotee is, as a rule, seen to be engaged in worshiping the deity, having [previously] offered flowers, etc. But in respect of the abode of the deity that is the body itself, how does the knower of the Self behave, and what does he do? The master says:

75. And there [in that body so consecrated], he occupies himself in worshiping the great deity that is the supreme Self — Bhairava, also known as Śiva — ever accompanied by his own [consort of] energies, by offering thereunto articles of worship that are purified by awareness of the Self.

In the abode of the deity that is his own body, the accomplished yogin **occupies himself in worshiping** the deity who has assumed the form of the highest goal (*śreyas*) [viz., who has assumed the form of a goal more excellent than 'heaven' itself], [1158] namely, **Śiva, the auspicious deity**, who is none other than **Bhairava**, [the three syllables of whose name stand for] maintenance (***bha**raṇa*), withdrawal (***ra**vaṇa*) and ejection (***va**mana*) [of the world], [1159] inasmuch as [within him alone] all the sensory domains — sound, etc. — are enjoyed, dissolved, and made resplendent, [1160] who is, in turn, none other than **the supreme Self** that is termed [by us] consciousness, transcending everything ...

... [he goes on worshiping that deity,] that is, he should become

way, and treat it with respect. There is no controversy about it'.

[1157] Here, YR develops one of the traditional etymologies of *deva*, derived from the root *div*, 'to play'. See YR ad 15.

[1158] *prakr̥ṣṭaśreyorūpo devaḥ* — or 'the deity of an extremely propitious nature'; on *śreyas*, see n. 240.

[1159] "Bhairava" is, as here, traditionally explained as an acrostic — though its etymological meaning is also apparent: 'terrifying', a quasi-causative from *bhīru*, 'timid'.

[1160] Here, sense-objects such as sound, etc., are treated experientially — as enjoyed, dissolved and made resplendent — rather than as elements in the process of creation — maintenance, withdrawal, ejection.

resplendent (*parisphuret*)[1161] by propitiating that deity unceasingly, according to the process about to be expounded.

— Now is it not the case that the external deity is always accompanied by [consort and] attendants? Accompanied, then, by what entourage, should this [inner deity] be worshiped?

The master replies: **'[... the inner deity is] accompanied by his own [consort of] energies'.**

Here, by **his own** [energies, or powers], the master refers to the capacities of the sense-organs, the eye, etc., which function as the [outward-extending] rays of consciousness, and through which [the five inner] energies — Consciousness, Bliss, Will, Knowledge and Action — find their culmination;

by **'accompanied by'**, he means 'surrounded on all sides' by those [energies].

Now, responding to the question: 'Employing what [articles of worship] does he go on worshiping?', the master replies: **'[employing articles purified by] awareness of the Self'.**

Here, the **awareness** (*āmarśana*) meant is: 'My own Self is this All';[1162] that is, the reflection (*parāmarśa*) on oneself characterized by repose in perfect ipseity, achieved when all objects are experienced as formed of consciousness; further, **the articles** meant for worship, namely, the pentad of sensory domains, sound, etc., which are pure on account of the removal of insentience, have become **spotless** on account of that [reflection] whereby the imperfections resulting from the stain of duality have disappeared. It is with such articles that he worships, purified by the awareness of the Self.

Here is the purport of what has been said: the knower of the Self, having gathered up, effortlessly, the pentad of sensory domains, sound, etc., by means of the divinities that are the sensory organs, the ear, etc., and marveling at them in his heart, then effects their identity with his own Self, by abandoning [all thought of] the deleterious[1163] distinction between what is to be sought out and what is to be avoided.

Thus, the state of internally undifferentiated wonder — which is nothing but the manifestation (*sphuraṇa*)[1164] of perfect ipseity — that accompanies each and every moment of apprehending the sensory domains,[1165] is alone the worship appropriate to the god that is one's own Self.[1166]

[1161] This is intended as a gloss on *paripūjayan āste*, which we have been obliged, for reasons of syntax, to place at the head of the foregoing sentence.

[1162] *svātmaiva idaṃ sarvam.*

[1163] *kalaṅka.*

[1164] On this association of *camatkāra* and *sphuraṇa*, see the definition of *camatkāra* offered in the *vṛtti* ad DhĀl, in Appendix 3, p. 320.

[1165] Lit., '... that accompanies unceasingly each moment ...'.

[1166] Implicit reference, here, to aesthetic theory, as Śaiva thinkers developed it in Kashmir;

It is in this sense that sensory domains, sound, etc., are the instruments of worship. Knowing this (*iti*), the worshiper of the deity who is one's own Self must at each moment be attentive when appropriating those domains.[1167] This is what the knowers of the secret (*rahasyavid*) maintain.

Indeed, this has been confirmed by Rājānaka Rāma[1168] in one of his verses of praise:

> Show me, [O Lord], that Bhairava form of yours that is propitiated [only] by those energies — fiery (*taijasī*), etc.[1169] — that are engaged in conveying to you as offerings the things of this world collected through constant and unrestrained [i.e., spontaneous] exertion.[1170] Show it to me, who am a hero (*vīra*) moving in this [dark] night of existence (*bhavaniśā*), in a body that is nothing but a cremation ground replete with abundance of flesh, blood, serum, and bones.[1171]

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see Intr., p. 55.

[1167]It is the simple act of appropriating the fields of experience, which everyone does without effort and incessantly, that is transformed into the means of realizing their identity with the Self.

[1168]Rājānaka Rāma is one of the names by which Rāmakaṇṭha (ca. AD 950–1000; see Sanderson 2007: 411), the author of the SpV (and possibly of the *Sarvatobhadra*, a commentary on the BhG), is referred to in different sources. He presents himself, in the second conclusive stanza of his SpV, as the direct disciple of Utpaladeva (ca. 925–975; see Sanderson 2007: 352). Rājānaka Rāma is to be distinguished from two Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha: Rāmakaṇṭha I, the author of a now lost *Sadvṛtti*, who was the guru of Rāmakaṇṭha II's grandfather, and Rāmakaṇṭha II (fl. ca. AD 950–1000), the commentator on the *Kiraṇatantra* (see Goodall, *Kiraṇavṛtti*: IX). In his SpV (p. 164), Rājānaka Rāmakaṇṭha quotes a verse from a *stotra* that he says he composed himself; similarly, PHvṛ 11 quotes a verse found in SpV, p. 135, ascribing it to Śrīrāma. Rājānaka Rāmakaṇṭha may also be identified as the 'Śrī Rāmabhaṭṭāraka' referred to in Vāmadeva's *Janmamaraṇavicāra* (p. 21). From such indices, it may be concluded that he was also a poet, author of devotional hymns. If he may be identified with the author of the *Sarvatobhadra*, a commentary on the BhG (see Goodall *Kiraṇavṛtti*: IX), he has also laid claim to some poetical skill, referring to himself (p. 404) as the 'king of the poets' (*kavīndra*). 'Rājānaka' occurs frequently in titles of Kashmirian Śaiva teachers; see, for instance, colophons of Kṣemarāja or Jayaratha, respectively to PH and TĀ. See Stein (ad *Rājataraṅgiṇī* [RT] VI 108) RT: 244 (n.. 117): 'The title *Rājānaka*, meaning literally "almost a king", used to be given for services rendered to the king. [...] The title has survived in the form of Rāzdān as a family name of very frequent occurrence among the Brahmans of Kaśmīr'. The services were probably those of a minister, as may be inferred from an oblique reference to such a function in RT VI 117: *sa pārthivatvamantritvamiśrayā ceṣṭayā sphuran/ rājā rājānakaś ceti miśrām eva dhiyaṃ vyadhāt.*

[1169]The term *taijasī*, here, is probably the name of a *śakti* (or a *kalā*), who operates at the level of *māyā*, inasmuch as the verse of Rāmakaṇṭha, quoted here, describes Bhairava as propitiated by means of the phenomenal multiplicity that *śaktis* unceasingly reveal. For the expression *taijasī kalā*, see TĀV IX 40 citing the *Rauravāgama*: *tato 'dhiṣṭhāya māyāṃ sa parameśvaraḥ/ kṣobhayitvā svakiraṇair asṛjat taijasīṃ kalām//.*

[1170]See ŚS I 5: *udyamo bhairavaḥ*, 'Spontaneous emergence [of supreme consciousness], such is Bhairava'.

[1171]Meter: *śārdūlavikrīḍita*. Bhairava, the terrible Lord, inhabits the cremation ground. Hence, the body, which is, on the one hand, the abode of the deity, may also be seen, on

Kārikā 76

At the conclusion of [the ritual of] worship, an oblation should be made into the fire. So, how does that [injunction apply] to the knower of the Self? The master replies:

76. For him who is engaged in offering into the blazing fire of consciousness all the great seeds of difference [that blossom forth] on the presupposition of inner versus outer, the oblation is made without effort.[1172]

For him — the worshiper, in the way just described, of the deity that is his own Self —

the oblation — the [pouring of substances] that refreshes the fire —

into the blazing — radiating with the marvel of supreme ipseity —

fire of consciousness, is accomplished,

without effort — without the bother [associated with collecting and] owning sesame, clarified butter, fuel, etc.

[And] what does [he in fact] do? The master replies with [the phrase beginning with] **'inner [versus] outer'**. — Here,

outer refers to the postulation, by a cognizer, of [something] beyond himself,[1173] in respect of what is to be cognized, such as [the color] blue, etc. —

[**inner** refers to the corresponding] postulation in respect of what is to be grasped within, such as pleasure, etc. — It is

difference of this sort, namely, the diversity native to the functioning [of the *antaḥkaraṇa*] that is **the great seed** (*mahābīja*) [of bondage], for out of it emerge the cognizer and cognizable objects — [functioning that consists in] definitive knowledge (*niścaya* — i.e., 'this is not that'), postulation [of ecceity] (*saṃkalpana* — i.e., 'these things are not me') and conceit of self (*abhimāna* — i.e., 'this is mine');[1174] [all such differences

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the other, as a cremation ground. The implication is that the body of the yogin is subject to dissolution in the 'fires' of his austerities, as is the dead man's corpse on the funeral pyre.

[1172]Cf. PS 68; also SpN II 5: *mahāyogī jīvann eva prāṇādimān api vijñānāgninirdagdhāśeṣa-bandhano dehapāte tu śiva eva jīvaṃś cedṛn mukta eva na tu kathañ cid api baddhaḥ*, 'The great ascetic, even while he lives and is possessed of breath and the [other faculties], is [not bound by] any fetters, which [lit., 'is such that all his fetters...'] have been burnt up in the fire of his knowledge; when his body falls away, he is Śiva himself; and while living is, as such, already liberated, [for] he is not bound in any way at all'. Cf. TĀ IV 201–2; TS IV, p. 26 (tr. Silburn 1981: 193).

[1173]*svapara*.

[1174]The translation of the terms *niścaya* and *saṃkalpana* differs slightly from that of PS 19, for the point of view here is that of the yogin. For him, perception itself, which reveals difference, must be overcome; previously, the perspective was that of the ultimate, Śiva, engaged in elaborating the phenomenal world. Compare the "twin" perspectives of Sāṃkhya and Yoga — the one elaborating a theoretical construct and the other promoting its abolition. In this world of diversity, every mental operation has three aspects: discrimination (or identi-

belong to or depend on the distinctions between] 'cognizer' and 'thing to be cognized', between the 'inner' and the 'outer' — Now, it is

the collection [of such seeds] **that he offers** [into the fire of consciousness] — seeds that are themselves nothing but postulates of the mind (*kalpanā*) and being themselves the source of all [other] difference.

[This collection] is indeed a [shapeless] heap,[1175] because difference is infinite.

[And he] **offers**, makes oblation of, this [collection] into the fire of his own Self, by merging it into non-discursive consciousness, achieved through the vision of ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality.[1176]

This is the purport of the verse: for the yogin whose being is identified with the transcendental *brahman*, the essential (*akr̥trima*) oblation consists in annulling the determination (*kalana*)[1177] that there be a subject who cognizes and an object to be cognized that are beyond himself;

[and annulling that, for him] comes about naturally (*svarasasiddha*), for there is no longer any conceit attributing to his body, etc., the capacity to cognize.

As has been stated by Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vīravāmanaka:[1178]

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fying the elements of the flux), differentiation (or identifying the self as subject vis-à-vis the flux, as object), and appropriation (or establishing a relation between the self and the object — the 'this', the 'I', and the 'mine').

[1175] *rāśi.*

[1176] Cf. YR ad 83: *paramādvayadr̥ś.*

[1177] *kalana* has a specialized meaning in the Trika. Padoux translates: 'dynamisme limitateur', 'limiting dynamism'. Most traditional etymologies presume a link with *kāla*, 'time', which, according to Mayrhofer (s.v.) is illusory (he cites Lat. *celer*, Gk. κέλλω 'impel', which agrees nicely with the sense proposed here). Compare the term's often attested (but also contested) medical meaning, 'the "thrust" of the embryo in the womb'. The meaning should be something like 'determine', 'compel to be precise'; it is the annihilation of that "thrust" toward determination, that "need" to distinguish, that "distinguishes" the mental oblation of the yogin. The notion of *kalana* would then be related to the 'sheath' (*kañcuka*) termed here *kalā*, 'tendency to act in respect of a determinate agent'; cf. *kalā vāyurūpā kiṃcitkartr̥tvena prerikā* (PTLvr̥ 5ff.). Finally, 'determination' appears to capture the different meanings implied by Padoux's excellent 'dynamisme limitateur'. Also to be rejected is the false doublet sometimes proposed, *kalana/karaṇa*.

[1178] Verse also quoted, without explicit attribution, by PM 42. In his introduction to Vāmanadatta's *Saṃvitprakāśa* (pp. 7–8) M. Dyczkowski observes that it is not at all certain whether the Vīravāmanaka said here by YR to be the author of the quoted text is the same person as the Vāmanadatta, author of the *Saṃvitprakāśa*. Dyczkowski gives several arguments 1) Vāmanadatta, author of the *Saṃvitprakāśa*, presents himself as a Pāñcarātrin, whereas the epithet 'vīra' generally applies to Śaivas; 2) the sacrifice there described is more of a Śaiva than of a Vaiṣṇava model; 3) the verse quoted by YR cannot be traced in the manuscripts of the *Saṃvitprakāśa* (although it might be supposed that those MSS are incomplete, or that the verse is quoted from another work of the same Vāmanadatta). In all probability, there is room to believe that we are dealing with two different authors, inasmuch as SpN II 4 cites a verse attributed to 'Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vāmana' (see n. 1156) — a verse that is not attested in the available manuscripts of the *Saṃvitprakāśa*. Might it not be then the case that the Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vāmana of the SpN is the same author as the Bhaṭṭa Śrī Vīravāmana(ka) to which YR attributes the present verse?

We perform obligatorily that supra-mundane sacrifice[1179] in which the forest of duality provides the [required] firewood, and death itself is the great animal [to be sacrificed].

Kārikā 77

The master now describes the [way of] meditation (*dhyāna*) of such a sacrificer:

77. And unceasing is his meditation; moreover, the Lord [who is his Self] creates manifold forms. That alone constitutes his meditation — [the realization] that the true form of things is nothing but that which is drawn [on the wall of consciousness] by his imagination.

Every form, thought to be a fixed form, is subject to disappearance, owing to the unsteadiness of the mind.[1180]

Moreover, that **meditation is unceasing**, since **the Lord**, the Great Master who, although infinite, has the form of one's own Self, **creates manifold forms**, in virtue of his freedom [to compose] thought-constructs, whereby the essence of his energy of action [is manifested],

— that is, he ceaselessly inscribes the numerous objects that are nothing but constructions of his imagination, as forms upon the mirror of his intellect.[1181] It is these [constructions]

— **that alone** constitute the [*jñānin*'s] meditation, namely, his contemplation (*cintana*), itself exempt from coming into being and passing away, for there is nothing that is different from it.

But elsewhere, [when one meditates upon] a particular deity, there is a determination [of that stream of consciousness][1182] inasmuch as one predicates various faces and limbs [of the deity].

All acts of the mind are but sprouts emerging (*sphāra*) from this Energy named Parā [or supreme energy]; for him who knows this, the All [i.e., universe] has become without qualification, identical with the Supreme Lord.

And that alone constitutes his meditation — **[the realization] that the true form [of things]**, namely, ultimate reality, is that which has

[1179]See PS 68.

[1180]Lit., 'due to the [constant] movement elsewere of the operation of the mind'. The forms subsist as long as they find a substratum in the mind, but the latter is not thereby constrained.

[1181]The same term is found in YR ad 8, glossed by *pratibhāmukura*. Further, in the commentary ad 77, *saṃvidbhitti*, the 'wall of consciousness', appears as a gloss of *buddhidarpaṇa*.

[1182]Such a statement implies that particular forms of the deity, if paid too much attention, may distract the yogin from contemplating the ceaseless stream of divine activity they manifest.

been **drawn**, that is, painted, on the wall of consciousness (*saṃvidbhitti*) by the **imagination** (*saṃkalpa*), that is, by the [active] mind.

Thus, since all this that appears [viz., everything] has been delineated [for us] in the form of mental constructs, [it follows that] whatever has the form of an act of mind, never going beyond the realm of that which appears, is true [viz., real], for in every circumstance it is accompanied by consciousness.

This has been stated in the revered *Svacchandaśāstra*:

> Wherever the mind goes, there one should fix the mind. Having moved it [i.e., let go that fixation], where will you go, since all is composed of Śiva? [1183]

And similarly, in the *Śaivopaniṣad*:

> Wherever goes the mind, O beloved one, whether [its object be] external or internal, there is the condition of Śiva, for Śiva pervades everything. Where indeed will [the mind] go, [if not to him]? [1184]

Therefore, the meditation of such a yogin arises naturally. [1185]

Kārikā 78

And his would be what sort of silent (or whispered) recitations [viz., of what rosary would he 'speak' or 'tell' the beads]? The master says:

78. When he rotates in his inner awareness the entire sequence of universes, the [thirty-six] principles arranged sequentially, as well as the group of sense-organs, then this is termed his 'silent recitation'. [1186]

[1183] SvT IV 313. Same text quoted in ŚSV III 24, although with variants: *yatra yatra mano yāti jñeyaṃ tatraiva cintayet/ calitvā yāsyate kutra sarvaṃ śivamayaṃ yataḥ//*.

[1184] *Śaivopaniṣad* [= VBh 115]. *Śaivopaniṣad* is another name of the VBh to which AG refers also as the *Śivavijñānopaniṣad* in ĪPVV, vol. II: 405.

[1185] *svarasodita* — lit., 'emerging from its own essence'.

[1186] The kārikā has been translated in accordance with our understanding of the commentary. Another interpretation is possible — *akṣagaṇam* understood in explanatory apposition to *bhuvanāvalīm*, and *tattvakramakalpanām*, as an adjective also qualifying *bhuvanāvalīm* (although YR does not gloss it as a BV): 'And, when he rotates in his inner awareness (*bodha*) the entire sequence of universes, thought of as a [triadic] sequence of *tattvas*, [in the manner of] a collection of beads [viz., as his rosary (*akṣagaṇa* = metaphorically the *akṣamālā*)], then this is termed his "[silent] recitation" (*japa*)'. Cf. the definition of the *japa* in TĀ IV 194 and TS IV, p. 26; also ŚS III 27: *kathā japaḥ*, 'The conversation [of the *jīvanmukta*] is the recitation [of the mantra]', quoted here by YR ad 78, and by Kṣemarāja ad *Sāṃbapañcāśikā* 10 (see Padoux *Sāṃbapañcāśikā*: 570). Note the play on the words: *akṣagaṇa* of the kārikā being glossed as *akṣasūtra* and *akṣamālā*, with a *śleṣa* on *akṣa* (m.), 'bead' and *akṣa* (n.), 'sense-organ'.

The constant[ly recurring] reflection on supreme ipseity as not different from the universe itself, [which is pursued] in the manner about to be described, **is termed his 'silent recitation'** [viz., the mental 'speaking' or 'telling' of a rosary], and this is said to be not adventitious [— that is, is not a passing state, but is rather, seemingly, inherent, or natural].

— What is that ['recitation']? The master says:

'[He rotates] the entire sequence of universes (*bhuvana*)'. That is, [he rotates] the entire series of mansions (*prākāra*, viz., 'worlds')[1187] numbering 224 that are encompassed within the host of thirty-six principles;[1188] similarly, [he rotates] **the arrangement in sequence of principles** — that is, **the arrangement**, the accurate determination, **of the sequence of principles**, termed 'Self' (*ātman*), 'knowledge' (*vidyā*) and 'Śiva'.[1189]

As well [he rotates] the group of sense-organs, that is, [he rotates] also the collection of sense-organs, both internal and external.[1190]

All this [he does] **in his inner awareness** (*antarbodha*), that is, in his own consciousness, which has become [viz., which has been identified with] the rosary,[1191] formed of the energy of the middle breath (*madhyamaprāṇaśakti*).[1192]

[1187] According to MW, *bhuvana* may be a *varia lectio* for *bhavana*, 'house'; thus might be explained the use here of *prākāra*, 'mansion', as a gloss for '*bhuvana*'.

[1188] Our text differs here from the KSTS edition concerning the number of *bhuvanas*. For a discussion of the problem, see 'On the Sanskrit Text'. On the number of the *bhuvanas*, see Appendix 5, p. 323.

[1189] This refers to a manner of grouping the realities of the universe under three headings only — the three 'principles' (*tattva*) of *ātman*, *vidyā*, and Śiva — instead of the usual thirty-six of the Trika system: a 'trinity', named *tritattva* (SŚP, vol. III: 428ff.) or *tattvatraya* (YH III 85, Dviveda: 271), that is the object of a rapid form of *nirvāṇadīkṣā*, 'liberating initiation', designated as the *tritattvadīkṣā* (SŚP, vol. III: 428ff.). On the correspondence between the three all-encompassing principles and the thirty-six recognized by the system, on the one hand, and the five *kalās* and the *bhuvanas*, on the other, see SŚP, vol. III: 428ff. On the correspondences between the three principles and the parts of the body of the adept, see SŚP, vol. III, pl. XIV. According to Hélène Brunner, *op. cit.*: 436–437, who follows the explanation of Somaśaṃbhu, the *ātmatattva*, which comprises the thirty-two inferior principles, up to *śuddhavidyā* (thirty-one, viz., up to *māyā*, according to some authors), represents the domain of individuality and finitude; the *vidyātattva*, which brings together Īśvara and Sadāśiva (as well as *śuddhavidyā*, according to all texts except that of Somaśaṃbhu) is the domain of knowledge (*vidyā*), wherein the *ātman* enjoys both omniscience and omnipotence; the *śivatattva*, which coïncides with the *tattva* Śiva, is the domain where the *ātman* is recognized as not different from Śiva, and since Śiva is indissociable from Śakti, the three *tattvas* enumerated to here comprehend the thirty-six *tattvas* of the usual list. See also *Dīpikā* ad YH III 85 (p. 272–273), and Padoux YH: 307–308.

[1190] Probable reference to the gross form of the thirteen organs as well as to their inner powers, or presiding deities (*karaṇeśvarī*, *karaṇadevī*), who appear to the adept at the climax of his practice.

[1191] *akṣasūtra*.

[1192] Breathing, with its exhalations and inhalations, mimics the creator god who 'emits' and 'swallows' the universe periodically. The yogin strives to regulate his breath, sup-

When he rotates [all this] according to the sequence of the flows [of the breath — which is none other than *śakti* itself, seen as *vāc*, or phonic energy, and symbolized by the *kuṇḍalinī* — passing] through *bindu* and *nāda*[1193] — that is, when he revolves all this in his own consciousness in the manner of a water-wheel, in accordance with the sequence: creation, sustenance, resorption, that defines each exhalation of his breath; in other words, when each and every moment he considers [all this] to be composed of [nothing but] subtle phonic vibration (*nāda*) —

then this natural repose in perfect ipseity is indeed his 'recitation'.

Here is the purport of what has been said: 'recitation' is but the uttering [accompanied by yogic practice] (*uccāra*) of a mantra designating a deity fit to be denoted by it. And those recitations may be counted by means of the rosary[1194] accompanied by the [practitioner's] permeation with the energy of breath (*prāṇaśakti*), by [the simple device of] sequencing the turning of its "beads" [i.e., turning them one after the other].

However, for the yogin [experiencing] ultimate [or transcendent] nonduality, his own energy of breathing has become the thread [of the rosary],[1195] reverberating (*nadantī*) with the flow [of respirations] in the

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posing that its moments are the 'beads' of a rosary, of which breathing itself constitutes the thread. The *madhyamaprāṇa* is that *prāṇa* which rises without deviating through the *suṣumnā* canal, in the form of *kuṇḍalinī*; as such, it is called *udāna*, the 'rising breath'. According to Kṣemarāja ad SvT VII 10, the *madhyamaprāṇa* is that *prāṇa* which rises in the 'middle' *nāḍī*: *madhyanāḍyāśrayamadhyamaprāṇa°*. On *madhyamaprāṇa*, see NT VII 7: *tāṃ vahen madhyamaprāṇe prāṇāpānāntare dhruve*, and Kṣemarāja ad loc., vol. I: 153: *madhyamaprāṇe suṣumnāsthodānākhyaprāṇabrahmaṇi vahed nimajjitaprāṇāpānavyaptyunmagnatayā vimṛśet*, 'The *madhyamaprāṇa* is the breath, termed *udāna*, that passes through [the *nāḍī* termed] *suṣumnā*; in addition, it is termed "middle", because it issues from the fusion of *prāṇa* [the "ascending" breath (viz., exhalation)], and of *apāna* [the "descending" breath (viz., inhalation)]'; for a complete description of the process, see Sanderson 1986: 177ff. See also TĀ XXIX 236, where the term *madhyamaprāṇa* appears in the context of the *vedhadīkṣā* (a *dīkṣā* made by piercing the different *cakras* by means of the *madhyamaprāṇa*). On the five *prāṇas*, see Padoux 1992: 136, n. 140, and Olivelle BĀU: L-LI. On *japa* and its association with *prāṇa*, see SvT II 140a: *japaḥ prāṇasamaḥ kāryaḥ*; also Padoux 1987, and TAK II, s.v. *japa*.

[1193]*bindu* and *nāda* are different levels of the articulation (*uccāra*) of a mantra (see n. 1375). The commentary thus establishes that the kārikā refers to mantric practice, and associates that practice with *kuṇḍalinī* breathing techniques; see Padoux 1992: 83, according to whom phonic energy 'gradually condenses, and passing through an initial "resonance" (*nāda*), becomes a drop (*bindu*) of phonic energy, divides, and subsequently gives birth to the matrix of the phonemes (*mātṛkā*), then to the phonemes themselves (*varṇa*), and to words. This sound process is "that which expresses" (*vācaka*), and induces thereby the emergence of "that which is expressed" (*vācya*), namely, the world of objects (*artha*) or of the meanings that it expresses. The phonic energy is symbolized by the *kuṇḍalinī*, in her twin aspect, human and cosmic, connected with "breath" (*prāṇa*)'. Padoux (YH: 375) translates *nāda* as 'vibration phonique subtile' [— 'subtle phonic vibration'], or (1992): 'phonic resonance', 'subtle sound'.

[1194]*akṣamālā*.

[1195]Note that the word *tantu* is often used to describe the middle *śakti*, which is compared to a fibre of the lotus stalk (*mṛṇālatantu*); see *Kubjikāmatatantra* [KMT] XXIV 120–121, where the Goddess, in the form of *śakti*, the mother of the three worlds, situated in [the middle

middle breath; emerging naturally, [this energy] is said to be an innate [kind of] rosary, as it comprehends all the senses.[1196]

Since all this world is [composed of] objects to be expressed, [and] given that the universe consisting of thirty-six principles[1197] is established in this very same energy of breath, the Goddess (*bhagavatī*), who is supreme [awareness] (*parāsvabhāvā* — viz., *parāvāc* as *parāśakti*), assumes the form of vital breath via the sequence of arousal and release [that follow] at each exhalation of [the yogin's] breath. [Ever] aware (*vimṛśantī*) [of the absolute, i.e., the Supreme Śiva], she causes the attentive yogin to execute naturally [a suitable] recitation in each vibration (*spanda*) of his breath.[1198]

Here, in the *Śaivopaniṣad*, [we find] the number of recitations [given]:

> The 'recitation of the [mantra-]goddess' [viz., the mantra '*HAṂSAḤ*'] is taught as easy to accomplish; [one may repeat it] 21600 times in the span of one day and one night. It is difficult [only] for those who are dull.[1199]

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of, or between] *iḍā* and *piṅgalā*, has the form of a lotus stalk (communication of J. Törzsök). Same image in VBh 35, where the Goddess is compared to the filament of the lotus stalk: *bisasūtrābharūpā*.

[1196] *sarvākṣakroḍīkāreṇa sahajaiva akṣamālā ucyate* — after providing the generally accepted definition of the tantric *japa*, the commentary turns to the specific experience that is at issue in PS 78.

[1197] The terms *sarvam* and *viśvam* are coreferential, one implying a distributive view of the totality, the other a cumulative.

[1198] The *prāṇaśakti* that, until now, had been conceived of as an entity is now identified with the Goddess, herself viewed as the *kuṇḍalinī* (see TAK II, s.v. '*kuṇḍalinī*' and '*uccāra*'). In conformity with the two cardinal truths of the doctrine, 1) that everything is verbal (*vācya*), and 2) that the world is founded on breath (*prāṇa*), the Goddess assumes herself the form of breath (an hypostasis that the conception of breath as energy justifies), and becomes indissociable from the *japa* as such. Thus the Goddess is at once breath, *japa*, and the energy that utilises the yogin to execute the *japa*, to the extent that she inhabits and animates him in every limb. Thus is the yogin 'enthusiasmed', as it were, in the original sense of the word, that is, 'possessed by the deity'.

[1199] *Śaivopaniṣad* [= VBh 156]. Reference is made here to the mantra '*HAṂSAḤ*', that is, to the natural *japa* of a mantra that is the cycle of breathing itself, with its double movement of inspiration (*ha*) and exhalation (*sa*). The computation is effected thusly: if each cycle of inspiration and exhalation lasts for four seconds, there are fifteen cycles per minute, nine hundred per hour (15 x 60), and 21,600 per day (of 24 hours); the same computation is found in SvT VII 54–55a, and TĀ VII 47–52a (see Gnoli TĀ: 165). The practice of the *haṃsoccāra* is associated with the worship of the *kuṇḍalinī*, one of whose modalities is the *madhyaprāṇakuṇḍalinī* (see TĀ V 135–136; and TAK II, s.v.). This śloka (VBh 156) is quoted (with some alterations) in Kṣemarāja ad SvT VII 56, who attributes it to VBh; also in ŚSV III 27, but preceded by a verse that is absent of Śivopādhyāya's commentary ad VBh: *sakāreṇa bahir yāti hakāreṇa viśet punaḥ/ haṃsahaṃsety amuṃ mantraṃ jīvo japati nityaśaḥ//*, '[Breath] exhales with the sound *sa* and inhales with the sound *ha*. Therefore, the empirical individual ever repeat the mantra *haṃsa, haṃsa*' (tr. Singh ŚS: 190, modified); on the strength of the ŚSV, Silburn restores (p. 170, n. 4) this verse to the VBh; Padoux (1992: 140, n. 149) identifies the verse as *Dhyānabindūpaniṣad* 62, although he observes: 'this Upaniṣad as edited

And, in *Śivasūtra*, it has been stated:

His conversation is the recitation [of the mantra].[1200]

This recitation alone is the focus of those [adepts] whose feet are to be honored, possessed as they are of [perfect] concentration.

Kārikās 79–80

And this is his vow. The master says:

79–80. When he regards everything with the same glance, when he deems his awareness fully satisfied with the world seen as a cremation ground, and apprehends his body as nothing more than a staff surmounted by a skull,[1201] **and when he is able to hold in his**

(or compiled) by Upaniṣad Brahmayogin (Adyar, 1920) gives the two letters in the reversed order: *ha* for exhalation, *sa* for inhalation, but the principle remains the same'. The mantra '*haṃsa*' is the mantra of the absolute 'I', inasmuch as it symbolizes the supreme identification '*so 'ham*', 'I am this'. See SvT VII 56: *prāṇahaṃse sadā līnaḥ sādhakaḥ paratattvavit/ tasyāyaṃ japa uddiṣṭaḥ siddhimuktiphalapradaḥ//*, 'The adept reposes always in the *prāṇahaṃsa* and knows ultimate reality/. This is what is termed his recitation (*japa*). Thus does he obtain such fruits as liberation (*mukti*) and supernatural powers (*siddhi*)//'. Kṣemarāja comments: *iha prāṇo nirṇītaviśvamantravīryabhūtahaṃsāśrayatvāddhaṃsa iti/*, 'Here, the breath is termed *haṃsa*, because it is based on the *haṃsa*, wherein the efficacies of all the [other] *mantras* have been brought out', and quotes VBh 156. The mantra '*HAṂSAḤ*' is also known, although in texts later than the 12th cent. (e.g., in Śivopādhyāya's 18th cent. commentary ad VBh), as *ajapājapa* [lit., as translates Padoux, 'la récitation de la non-récitée' [— the 'recitation of the non-recited'], i.e., natural, or automatic, or spontaneous, *japa*. See Padoux 1987: 144–147; and TAK I, s.v. *ajapā, ajapājapa*; II, s.v. *japa*: 'la pratique de *l'ajapājapa* identifie le mantra récité et le souffle, ce mantra étant *haṃsa*, lequel est à la fois ces deux syllabes, le souffle central ascendant et l'énergie divine ou l'absolu, voir SvT 4. 262; BVU [= *Brahmavidyopaniṣad*] 57–80'. The identification of the *japa* referred to in PS 78 with the mantra *HAṂSAḤ* offers a clue for understanding the passage of YR's commentary ad loc.: 'when he rotates (*yat parivartayati*) [all this] according to the sequence of the flows [of the breath passing] through *bindu* and *nāda* [...]', for, according to Jñānaprakāśa's *Śivayogaratna* (śl. 4–5; 16th cent. AD), the breath is suspended thanks to the *bindu* which, being the *anusvāra* of the syllable *haṃ* of *haṃsa*, is in the center of the *ajapāmantra* (*ajapāmantramadhyasthabindunā*); see Padoux, 1987: 146; the *Śivayogaratna* has been edited and translated by T. Michaël.

[1200] ŚS III 27. See also VBh 145, quoted in ŚSV III 27, and in SvTU II 139a: *bhūyo bhūyaḥ pare bhāve bhāvanā bhāvyate hi yā/ japaḥ so 'tra svayaṃ nādo mantrātmā japya īdṛśaḥ//*, 'Indeed, the realization (*bhāvanā*) that is realized again and again within ultimate reality is the [true] recitation (*japa*); there [viz., within that *japa*] of itself the sonic resonance (*nāda*) of this sort is to be recited, being of the nature of mantra'. Same notion of the natural *japa* in TĀ IV 194: *akṛtrimaitaddhṛdayārūḍho yat kiṃcid ācaret/ prāṇyād vā mṛśate vāpi sa sarvo 'sya japo mataḥ//*, 'Whatever he does, firmly established in this non-adventitious Heart (*hṛdaya*), whether breathing or pondering, all this is considered to be his *japa*'. TĀV ad loc. quotes the same ŚS III 27 that YR refers to here, as well as (from some unknown source?): *bahyair api yo jalpaḥ sa japaḥ [...]/ ityādy uktam.*

[1201] Lit., '[an awareness] accompanied by the imagistic notion (*kalpana*) that his body is nothing but a "staff surmounted by a skull" (*khaṭvāṅga*)'. In other words, his body is treated

own hand [as his begging-bowl] any fragment of the knowable, [instead of] a skull,[1202] **filling it with the liquor of delighting in all the essences,**[1203] **then that is his vow, both easy and very difficult.**[1204]

When [he composes his mind] in the way that will be explained, **then that is his**, the knower of the Self's, **vow** — a [self-imposed] restriction intended to propitiate the deity that is his own Self.

What sort of vow? The master says: **'[a vow] both easy and very difficult'.**

Very difficult, that is, obtained by suffering made acceptable through the favor of the Supreme Lord, putting aside all other means [of libera-

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metaphorically as a '*khaṭvāṅga*', the staff that accompanies the ascetic on his journeys and which is one of his "characteristic marks" — a staff whose superior part is provided with or imagined as a skull. The literal meaning of '*khaṭvāṅga*' is 'leg or member (°*aṅga*) of a bed (*khaṭvā*°)'. In effect, the upper portion, or "head", of a bed's leg, in the shape of a parallelepipede, is pierced with three holes, through which the cords are threaded that constitute the supports of the traditional Indian bed. The two upper holes, parallel to the floor and slightly apart, can be seen as the orbital cavities of a cranium, while the third, below and between them, resembles a mouth. The term *khaṭvāṅga* appears (in the guise of the adjective *khaṭvāṅgin*) once only in the *Mānanavadharmaśāstra* [MDhŚ] XI 105, doubtless in its literal sense 'bed-post'; perhaps MDhŚ XI 72 (*kṛtvā śavaśiro dhvajam*, 'having made the head of a corpse his emblem') refers to our *khaṭvāṅga*, as an attribute of the ascetic (see, infra, *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra* [BĀDhS] I 1, 3); see also YājS III 243, which describes the mendicant ascetic 'carrying a bowl which is a skull' (*śiraḥkapālin*) 'with his emblem' (*dhvajavant*); cf. *Āpastambadharmasūtra* [= ĀpDhS] I 10, 29, 1, *khaṭvāṅgaṃdaṇḍārthe [...]*, '[...] taking a *khaṭvāṅga* as his walking stick'; the commentator Haradatta (14th–15th cent.) mentions the two interpretations of the term: either *khaṭvāṅga* is a 'part of a bed' or 'it is to be taken in the sense well known in the Tantra of the Kāpālikas' (*khaṭvāyā aṅgaṃ khaṭvāṅgam [...] kāpālikatantraprasiddhasya khaṭvāṅgasya vā grahaṇam*); also: *Gautamadharmasūtra* III 4, 4, 4, where the penitent is described as having two attributes: the *khaṭvāṅga* and the begging-bowl made of a skull (*khaṭvāṅgakapālapāṇir*), and BĀDhS I 1, 3: *kapālī khaṭvāṅgī [...] dhvajaṃ śavaśiraḥ kṛtvā*, 'carrying a skull and a *khaṭvāṅga*, [...] having made the head of a corpse his emblem'. Iconographically, the *khaṭvāṅga* is sometimes a stick surmounted by a skull (or by many skulls, as in Buddhist representations), sometimes a kind of stick or mace whose superior portion is sculpted in the form of a skull (see Illustration).

[1202]On *kapāla*, see MDhŚ VIII 93 (*kapālena ca bhikṣārthī [...]*), where the term signifies simply 'begging-bowl', as it does in vedic texts (see, for instance, ĀpDhS II 9, 23–10, BĀDhS II 10, 17, 23 — in the context of the *agnihotra*); cf. YājS III 243, quoted n. 1201, and ĀpDhS I 10, 28, 21: *[...] puruṣaśiraḥ pratīpānārtham ādāya*, '[...] Having taken the head/skull of a man in order to drink'. J. Törzsök pointed out the aforementionned textual references on *kapāla* and *khaṭvāṅga* in a lecture delivered at the EPHE, Vth Section (February 2008).

[1203]*viśvarasāsavapūrṇaṃ ... rasayati* — lit., 'he delights in [a begging-bowl that, rather than] a skull, [is nothing but] a piece of the knowable, which he holds in his own hand, filled with a liquor [composed of] all essences [or, of essences of all (things)]'. The term *viśvarasa*, interpreted as 'all essences' may imply a reference to the Tantric worship, in which the adept partakes of a mixture of sexual fluids, blood, alcohol, etc.; *viśvarasa* may, as well, be understood as 'the essences [of all the things] of the world'.

[1204]Cf. TĀ IV 258b–263a, on the futility of ordinary vows, which are, by no means, required 'for understanding the plenitude of one's own Self in its omnipresence' (*svātmanas tathā vaiśvarūpyeṇa pūrṇatvaṃ jñātum*); also TS IV, p. 27, which gives the Trika definition of *vrata*, quoting the *Nandaśikhā*: *sarvasāmyaṃ paraṃ vratam*, 'The highest vow is [to take] everything as identical'.

tion], for nescience itself has vanished. And it is **easy**, for it is obtained without the bother of adopting external ornamentation, such as bones, ashes, etc., or [of observing] restrictions as to food, etc.[1205]

What is that vow? The master replies [with the phrases beginning with] **'all'**; that is, [this vow is observed] when he contemplates **all this**, which is presented to his mind[1206] as formed of apparent difference with an eye to its lack of difference — [which sense of unity is inculcated] by reasoning, by traditional scripture, by experience and by meditative exercise (*abhiśīlana*) [and is confirmed in the insight]: 'It is I alone who myself manifest as all this'.[1207]

Thus says the revered *Bhagavadgītā*:

> Himself as in all beings,/ And all beings in himself,/ Sees he whose self is disciplined in discipline,/ Who sees the same in all things.[1208]

Thus the vow consists in the idea of non-difference become unshakable.

Moreover, **when he deems his awareness fully satisfied with the world seen as a cremation ground**, then this also is his vow.

[This is thus explained:] just as this **world** consisting both of objects to be known and of knowers may be deemed to be overwhelmed by [a great many] hundreds of corpses, namely, objects characterized by insentience — jars, bodies, etc. — so, verily, it may indeed be termed a **cremation ground**, that is, a garden where dwell the Fathers.[1209]

As well, since consciousness, [assuming the form of] the Goddess, alone is sentient, and whatever appears different from it — namely, the entire universe, which is illumined (*ullāsita*) by that awareness — is insentient and may be compared to a corpse, so is the universe [here quite properly compared to] a cremation ground.

Furthermore, **he deems his awareness satisfied** utterly with that **world seen as a cremation ground.** That is, he understands [his awareness] to be situated in the midst [of a cremation ground], made extremely frightful in virtue of the fact that whatever has come into being is subject to destruction.[1210]

He who takes a [mundane] vow (*vratin*) dwells, does he not, in a cremation ground; but he who lives by an other-worldly (*alaukika*) vow takes up residence in this world of transmigration — itself [a veritable] cremation ground made frightening by the fact that all cognizers and objects

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[1205] Cf. TĀ IV 213–232a, 240–247b.

[1206] *prātītika.*

[1207] *sarvam idam ekaḥ sphurāmi.*

[1208] BhG VI 29.

[1209] *pitṛvana.*

[1210] Or, taking the compound as a *dvandva*: 'by virtue of [scenes of] creation and destruction'.

of cognition are found to be perishable; like one insane, he plays games (*krīḍā*) with those fettered cognizers, who are [effectively] insentient, and with objects that are cognizable, such as jars, etc., which take the place of the dead [in the outward cremation ground]. [This he does,] considering: 'I alone am the ultimate reality, [embodying] the unique principle of consciousness, [which extends] everywhere'.[1211]

Moreover **he deems his awareness [fully satisfied with the world seen as a cremation ground] accompanied with the imagistic notion that his body is [nothing more than] a staff surmounted by a skull.**

Here, **the body** is **imagined as a staff surmounted by a skull** — which is the prescribed way of [viewing the body, metaphorically or in principle, as a] skeleton.

For the body of the yogin after all amounts to nothing but a corpse, is nothing but the remainder of root impressions [left by his previous experience],[1212] for he deems his [true] self to have gone beyond the body, owing to the extermination of his foul seizure by the conceit that his body is the locus of the cognizer.[1213]

For him who thinks thus, his body is imagined as stamped (°*mudrā*) with the form of a skeleton. [Therefore, **his awareness**] **is furnished** (*kalitām*), impressed (*mudritām*), with that [image], inasmuch as [his awareness is now presumed to be the] substratum for whatever is to be enjoyed.

Indeed, the heroic ascetic (*vīravratin*)[1214] situated in a cremation ground should be [viewed as if] marked [with the sign, or imprint] of the staff surmounted by a skull; for he, whose [true] form is his awareness, considers his own body as different from that awareness insofar as it is something to be known — hence the 'stamp of the staff surmounted by a skull' [is justly said to be upon it]. And that also constitutes his vow.

Similarly, **he delights in** (*rasayati*) [a begging-bowl that, rather than] a skull, [is nothing but] **a piece of the knowable** — that is, he takes pleasure (*carvayati*) in it — for, the **knowable** is anything having the form of the enjoyable, characterized by the pentad of objects, sound, etc.; it is delimited both by what there is to know and what there is to do.[1215]

[1211] *sarvatrāham eva ekacittattvaparamārthaḥ.*

[1212] This analogy of the *khaṭvāṅga* represents a tantric metaphorization of the notion of *aśarīratva*, which, in BĀU IV 4, 7, quoted n. 1062, is rendered by the slough of a snake. Cf. YR ad 83: 'free of the modes (*bhāva*) [determined] by the [hexad of] sheaths (*kañcuka*) whose first is *māyā*, he requires nothing else, merely supporting his body as [basis for exhausting] the [unexpended] remainder (*śeṣa*) of [previous] impressions (*saṃskāra*), in the way the [potter's] wheel [goes on] rotating (*cakrabhrama*) [after the potter has ceased impelling it]'; and: 'In any case, how could there be awareness (*smṛti*) at the end without there being affirmation of root impressions (*saṃskāra*) left by his previous experience (*pūrvānubhava*)?'

[1213] Lit., (taking *durgraha* in the sense of *āgraha*) 'owing to the extermination of [those wise men's] [stubborn] insistence that the body [etc.] is the cognizer'.

[1214] Lit., 'he who has taken the heroic vow'.

[1215] See YR ad 21.

Thus the [knowable] is said here to be **a piece**, equivalent to the piece of skull [used as a begging-bowl by Śaiva ascetics], which is nothing but **a** [fragment of] **skull**, that is, a shard of the cranial bone — **in which he delights**, that is, at which he marvels, by reposing in perfect ipseity, periodically sipping the essence [of the knowable] — then that also is his vow.

That the drink of heroes (*vīrapāna*) placed in a skull is indeed savored by him who takes a vow is expressed by the words: **['filled with a liquor composed of] all the essences [of the entities of the universe]'.** [1216]

Moreover, the portion of the essence [present] **in all [entities**, or **in the universe]**, that is contained in the fragment of skull having the form of the knowable pentad of objects, sound, etc., namely, the part made of the ambrosia that is delight (*carvaṇā*) itself, is nothing other than what is called here **the liquor [composed] of [all] the essences [of the entities of the universe]**, for it offers supreme bliss (*paramānanda*); it is the best of drinks, and [that "skull"] is **filled** with it.

And this might [also] be said: by **skull** is [here intended] 'something serving as a receptacle', namely, the resistant part of the 'all' that may be analogized to a 'shard'; the 'drink' is the essential portion [1217] contained in that [scil., 'cup'], capable of creating wonder, for it offers exultation.

Now, a skull is held in the hand of one who has taken a vow; hence, the master says: **'[It is] held in his own hands'.** Here, **his own** means 'those belonging to him'; the term '*kara*', **'hand'** [signifies also] the 'rays of consciousness', essentially, the goddesses that are the organs of sense such as the eye, etc.; in them [scil., the 'hands', i.e., the 'rays' of consciousness, i.e., the goddesses, i.e., the organs of sense] is received the fragment of the knowable that [momentarily] assumes the character of an object, insofar as it is something to be enjoyed; hence the [metaphorical bowl] is said to be 'held in his own hands'.

As a drink is drunk with the aid of a [begging-bowl made of a] skull held in the hand, so by the [true] yogin is savored the liquor [composed] of all the essences, gathered unto him by means of the sense-organs, the eye, etc., which are the 'rays' of his consciousness (*saṃvitkara*), with the aid of that "skull" which is any piece of the knowable.

Here is the purport of what has been said: the yogin, gathering up, by means of the goddesses that are the organs of sense, the pentad of objects constantly offered to him in this way, partakes of constant repose in Bhairava, who is his own consciousness, by the act of reasoning itself. [1218]

[1216] There may be here a veiled reference to Kaula rites; see Masson, Patwardhan 1969: 38ff., esp., 42; also TĀ XXIX, 6 and passim.

[1217] *sārabhāga.*

[1218] A reference to the 'view that there is no second' (*advayadṛś*), as stated in the next sentence?

Until the very last moment, he leads [his life], as taught here, in conformity with the view that there is no second (*advayadṛś*).

Such is the vow of him who has cultivated the lotus feet of a true teacher. Beyond that is nothing but the desiccation of the body.

Kārikā 81

Now, summing up what has been previously expounded, the master explains that this doctrine is preeminent [among doctrines]:

81. So, having attained [that condition which is] called by the name Maheśvara, namely, ultimate reality, wherein he is shorn of birth and death, [the yogin] remains [in this world], [acting] as he wishes, because all that he manifests [henceforth] is the [pure] state of the agent of experience;[1219] **he has accomplished whatever he had to do.**[1220]

So, that is, in the manner just now expounded,[1221] **having apprehended** the secret that is **called by the name Maheśvara, namely, ultimate reality** — that is, having correctly experienced the Great Lord as he is in reality, in virtue of the unshakable realization[1222] [of that reality] in his own heart ...;

[Answering the question] 'what sort [of entity] is this [ultimate reality]?', the master explains: it is '**free from birth and death**', or, in other words, is that by which, when understood, there can be no more birth or death;

Having realized this [state], the yogin **remains [in this world], [acting] as he wishes, having accomplished whatever he had to do.**[1223] [This means:] the yogin, the final goal of whose existence (*parapuruṣārtha*) has been fulfilled, owing to the absence of anything further to be done, **remains [in this world]**, that is, continues [to live], passing his time **as he wishes**, without ever exceeding [the boundaries of] his own desire, his body kept ['in motion'] like the freely revolving wheel [which once set in motion by the potter goes on rotating without further effort on his part].[1224]

[1219] That is, unentangled with the perishable objects of this world.

[1220] Adaptation of ĀPS 79. On the notion of *kṛtakṛtyatā*, see YR ad 50.

[1221] This interpretation of *samanantara* is required by the context (see the avat., and the *iti* of the kārikā).

[1222] *pratipatti.*

[1223] Cf. PS 40.

[1224] Cf. SK 67: *samyagjñānādhigamād dharmādīnām akāraṇaprāptau/ tiṣṭhati saṃskāravaśāc cakrabhramavad dhṛtaśarīraḥ*, 'By the attainment of perfect wisdom, virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy; yet the spirit remains a while invested with the body, just

How is this possible? The master replies: **'because [all that] he manifests [henceforth] is the [pure] state of the agent of experience'** [unentangled with the perishable objects of this world] — that is, because, in all conditions [viz., in whatever circumstances he finds himself], **he is manifest** as the [pure] agent of experience [and not as an enjoyer], his is the effulgence (*parisphuraṇa*) attained through sustained concentration on that very secret. In other words, though remaining in his body, [the yogin] experiences bliss unsullied [by bodily contact].

Kārikā 82

Among living beings, anyone at all who thus knows his own Self [to be identical with the universal Self], would become one with that Self — with this in mind, the master now teaches the absence of any restriction as to whether [the student] is entitled [ritually to pursue such knowledge]:

82. He who knows the Self of all, thus described — [source of] supreme and incomparable bliss, omnipresent, utterly devoid of diversity — becomes one with that Self.

He who knows — whatsoever animate being knows — the **omnipresent** Śiva, who has been **thus** — in the way mentioned — **described**, that is, made known as a uniform and unqualified mass of blissful consciousness by the methods of argument, scripture, experience and sustained concentration — that is, anyone at all who has abandoned [all mundane] limitation **becomes one with that [Self]** — would be none other than Śiva himself. So is the verse to be construed.

In this case, there is no restriction as to whether the [student is ritually] entitled to [pursue] the knowledge of the Self, for all those, whoever they may be, who are afflicted by the faults of birth, death, etc. — even if they be animals — become one with him by recognizing (*pratyabhijñānāt*) that the Great Lord is one's own Self. Such is the reference[1225] of the word 'yat': **'he who ...'**.

Further, [this omnipresent Śiva] is how [to be described]?

[He is] **the Self of all**, the Self of all that cognizes and is cognized; or [taking the compound as a BV] he is that whose Self is [composed of]

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as a potter's wheel continues to revolve through the momentum of the impulse previously imparted to it' (tr. G. Jha) — of which the present passage (*[...] cakrabhramavad dhṛtaśarīraḥ tiṣṭhati [...]*) seems merely an emprunt. TĀ XXVIII 312–320a quotes ĀPS 81 (v. 312) and comments upon it (vv. 313–320a). It is noteworthy that TĀV ad loc. (avat. ad XXVIII 317) — that is, in the same context, inasmuch as PS 83 reproduces ĀPS 81— puts the quote of the same v. 67 of the SK in the mouth of an objector. Cf. PS 69 and ĀŚ II 37b (quoted n. 1109): *[...] yatir yādṛcchiko bhavet*, '[...] one should become an ascetic and live spontaneously, without willing anything'. Same image and phraseology in YR ad 83.

[1225] *parāmarśa*.

the entirety of knowers and things known; in other words, he is both the transcendent (*sarvottīrṇa*) and the immanent (*sarvamaya*).

Hence [this omnipresent Śiva] is [described as] **having shaken off**, or having set aside, **diversity**, the infinity of [phenomenal] difference, on account of his appearance (*sphuraṇa*) in the form of consciousness always and everywhere; he is further described as that **whose bliss is incomparable**, devoid of qualification and most excellent, because expectation [of any thing at all, for him] is lacking.

Anyone who knows thus his own Self would become Śiva (*śivarūpin*).

Kārikā 83

Such being the case, where should he who has understood that the Great Lord is his own Self give up his body, when his entitlement to that body has been extinguished, and to what [place] does he then go? The master now removes such doubts:

83. Whether he gives up his body in a place of pilgrimage or in the hut of an outcaste, be he conscious or not,[1226] **he goes [thence] to a condition of transcendent Isolation, his grieving at an end, for he was liberated at the very moment he acquired knowledge.**[1227]

The knower of the Self who has thus concentrated with determination upon (*pariśīlita*) his nature and whose heart has truly gained confidence

[1226] Lit., 'even if he be no longer conscious'.

[1227] This verse is borrowed from ĀPS 81 without alteration. AG quotes it in two other places: GAS ad VIII 5–7, referring to it as an 'authoritative Śruti' and TĀ XXVIII 312, where it is referred to by JR as an *āgama* — with a variant: *parityajet* for *parityajan*; note that TĀ XXVIII 315a comments upon the use of the optative, expressive of the possibility (*saṃbhāvanā*). The verse is quoted also (see S. Sastri ĀPS: 38, and Gnoli TĀ: 536, n. 5) in a late 14th cent. Vedānta text (2nd half of), Vidyāraṇya's *Jīvanmuktiviveka* (see Intr., n. 54). Cf. the similar verse from the *Ratnamālāśāstra*, quoted by the immediately preceding passage of TĀ XXVIII (v. 310): *rathyāntare mūtrapurīṣamadhye caṇḍālagehe niraye śmaśāne/ sacintako vā gatacintako vā jñānī vimokṣaṃ labhate 'pi cānte*, 'Even if at his final hour he finds himself in a roadway, or surrounded by urine and feces, or in the hut of an outcaste, or some other vile place, or in a cremation ground — whether he be conscious or unconscious — he nonetheless attains liberation [viz., he is freed from the fetters of the body] [for these pollutions, which are of the body, do not modify his already perfected state]'; and the (anonymous?) quote that follows that of ĀPS 81, in the same passage of GAS VIII 5–7: *tanuṃ tyajatu vā kāśyāṃ śvapacasya gṛhe 'thavā/ jñānasaṃprāptisamaye mukto 'sau vigatajvaraḥ//*, 'He may give up his body in Kāśī or in the house of an outcaste. He, whose [saṃsāric] fever is over, was liberated at the time of the attainment of *jñāna*' (tr. Sharma GAS: 160) — a verse also quoted 'from the Smṛti' (*smṛteḥ*), in the *Tattvabodha* attributed to Śaṅkara. Compare PS 83 (*kaivalyaṃ yāti*) and TĀ IV 212 (*atra yāto gato rūḍhiṃ kaivalyam adhigacchati/ lokair ālokyamāno hi dehabandhavidhau sthitaḥ*), which reinforces our hypothesis that the *śāktopāya* is the point of view of choice for the PS when evoking the figure of the *jīvanmukta* — chapter IV of the TĀ being devoted to that path.

through the vision of ultimate nonduality, saying to himself: 'All this universe is nothing but the freedom that is manifest in my own Self',[1228]

— whether abandoning his body **in a place of pilgrimage**, that is, in a most sacred place such as Prayāga, Puṣkara, Kurukṣetra, etc., or in the most defiled [of places], the residence of an outcaste, by which reference is meant a dwelling of the lowliest of men;

— thus, in either case, free from the vexation of seeking or avoiding [such places],

— **he goes to a condition of transcendent Isolation** (*kaivalya*) [viz., reaches 'separation' from the limited world of bondage] through knowledge of the Self alone; that is, in other words, after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation (*kevalatā*) that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness], composed solely of blissful consciousness, a condition quite apart from the host of causes and effects, such as the primal matter, etc.[1229]

From which it follows that for him there is no longer any discrimination of [licit] object [scil., 'of consciousness'] from illicit object,[1230] for he sees with an indifferent eye that all this universe is permeated with his Self and is presided over by the Supreme Lord; therefore, the **grief** that arises from doubts occasioned by [the presence of] choice **has been destroyed**, i.e., rejected. His **grief** is thus said to be **at an end**.

As it has been said in the revered *Nirvāṇayogottara*:

> It is a matter of indifference for them who know Śiva as ultimate principle whether death takes place in the Himalayas, or at Gaṅgādvāra [= Haridvāra], or in Vārāṇasī, or Kuru[kṣetra], or Prayāga, or [even] in the house of an outcaste, etc.[1231]

Nor there is any need for awareness (*smṛti*)[1232] at the time when body falls away. It is with this in mind that the master says: **'even if he be no longer conscious'.** Here, the meaning of the word **even** is: 'Let consciousness (*saṃsmṛti*) cease [, what does it matter]!'

Even if the knower of the Self **is no longer conscious** at the moment he abandons his body, being overpowered by the humors of wind, bile or

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[1228] *sarvam idaṃ svātmaprakāśasvātantryam.*

[1229] Cf. the way TĀ XXVIII 316–320a and JR ad loc. comment on *kaivalyaṃ yāti*, whose ambiguity is underlined. On *turya* and *turyātīta*, see PS 85–86 and Intr., p. 29.

[1230] *kṣetra/akṣetra.*

[1231] On the *Nirvāṇayogottara*, a manuscript of which is deposited in the Central Library in BHU (no./n° C 4246), see Dyczkowski *Saṃvitprakāśa*: 7, n. 1. On the vanity of prescriptions and prohibitions, see YR ad 69.

[1232] *smṛti* means 'memory' *stricto sensu*, but here, the word is employed more or less by synecdoche to signify 'consciousness' (of something) in general. The entire following discussion seems to imply the question: 'Can one arrive at *kaivalya* without being conscious at the moment of death?'

phlegm arising at that moment[1233] — that is, if consciousness of his own Self has departed — even if he thus, helpless, leaves his body, now comparable to wood or stone, even so, having already attained the knowledge of his own Self, he undoubtedly reaches [absolute] Isolation (*kaivalya*). Therefore, there is no particular significance[1234] attaching, at the time of death, either to awareness (*smaraṇa*) or to its absence, provided that one has [already] attained knowledge of his own Self.

Now, if one were to object: — Let there, then, be no distinction made, for him who is [fully] cognizant of the knowledge concerning his own Self, between a place of pilgrimage and its contrary — but, when you say: 'even if he be no longer conscious at the final moment', then, as far as the self-knowledge is concerned that had been understood as providing a means (*upāyatā*) [to liberation], if, at the moment of the body's falling away, he has [also] become unaware (*vismaraṇa*) of that very knowledge, how could he then be [said to be] liberated (*mukta*)? As has been stated in the revered *Gītā*:

> And at the hour of death, on Me alone/ Meditating, leaving the body/ Whoso dies, to My estate he/ Goes; there is no doubt of that.[1235]

And so, in such cases [as indicated in the *Gītā*], meditation (*smaraṇa*) is indeed [shown to be] useful; and even if one could [somehow] attain identity with him [the Lord] at the final moment, in the absence of any meditation on the Supreme Lord, then all fettered souls, even the stupid, would at the time of death, realize within themselves the Supreme Lord, for no distinction [between them and the knowers of the Self has been posited]; furthermore, all such statements [claiming some final benefit for the true knower, such as those you have been regaling us with in this work] would be unauthoritative.

But this is not the case. [Anticipating such arguments] the master says in reply: **'[he who became] liberated at the very moment of his acquiring knowledge'**. True, there may be no utilization of [conscious] meditation on his part [at the time of death]; however, it was at the very moment when the true teacher, [whispering] into the depth of his ear, conveyed to him the knowledge that the Great Lord is his own Self, that he acquired[1236] the ultimate meaning of the knowledge of his own Self: 'I myself am all this'.[1237]

Free of the modes determined by the [hexad of] sheaths whose first is *māyā*, he requires nothing else, merely supporting his body as [basis for

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[1233] Same development in YR ad 94–95.

[1234] *viśeṣa* — lit., 'difference'.

[1235] BhG VIII 5.

[1236] *adhirūḍha* — lit., 'mounted upon'.

[1237] *aham eva sarvam idam*. Cf. TĀ XXVIII 72–73a, which quotes the *Niśāṭana* (see n. 1240).

exhausting] the [unexpended] remainder of [previous] root impressions, in the way the [potter's] wheel [goes on] rotating [after the potter has ceased impelling it].[1238] Thus, [once he has acquired true knowledge,] there is no reason, at the final moment, for him to bother about awareness or its opposite, inasmuch as the corporeal sheath is effective only so long as a relation with the sheaths of the impurities of deeming oneself finite, and of regarding the world as objective that arise from ignorance exists.

But since the sheath created by ignorance has already been destroyed by [the guru's] instruction regarding knowledge of one's own [true] Self, how can any such corporeal sheath, [even] moribund, effect any control over the knower of the true Self at the end?

Thus, he would have been liberated (*muktaḥ*) at the moment the knowledge of the Self was explained to him, and he will go on living (*jīvann eva*) [till his *prārabdha* actions are exhausted].

As has been stated in the *Kularatnamālikā* which has a thousand verses:

> When the most excellent teacher teaches him correctly, he is undoubtedly liberated at that very moment; thereafter he inhabits [a body] merely [moving] like the revolving wheel [of the potter].[1239]

And also in the revered *Niśāṭana*:[1240]

[1238]*cakrabhrama* — SK 67 is implicitly present here. Same image in YR ad 81.

[1239]Lit., '... [thereafter] the mechanism continues to function'. Or 'liberated at that very moment, he would merely dwell in time like a potter's wheel [revolves for a time]'. *yantra*, meaning 'device' or 'mechanism' (in general), has been understood as referring to the potter's wheel, an image frequently attested; cf. TĀV XIII 231a: *yantram iti akiṃcitkaratvāt*, ' "A mechanism [scil., the potter's wheel]" is referred to here, for [the body, so understood] no longer does anything'. This is a wellknown verse cited also in PM 66 (with the variant: *yatra*) in the context of initiation by 'the teacher's sidelong-glance' (*gurukaṭākṣapāta*). ŚSV III 43 quotes it as belonging to the *Kularatnamālā* and gives the verse immediately following — verse that might refer to the *jīvanmukti* acquired through the 'non-means' (*anupāya*): *kiṃ punaś caikatānas tu pare brahmaṇi yaḥ sudhīḥ/ kṣaṇamātrasthito yogī sa mukto mocayet prajāḥ//*, 'How much more then the yogin of supreme understanding! If he is established in the highest Brahman with one-pointedness even for a moment, he is liberated himself and he liberates other people' (tr. Singh). TĀ XIII 230b–231a (with variant: *tadaiva kila mukto 'sau* for *muktas tenaiva kālena*) and XXXVII 27 both cite the same verse from the *[Kula]ratnamālā*: *yasmin kāle guruṇā nirvikalpaṃ prakāśitam/ muktas tenaiva kālena yantraṃ tiṣṭhati kevalam//*, of which the 2nd hemistich has the same form as the 2nd hemistich of the *Ratnamālā* cited by YR ad 83 and ŚSV III 43. The *Kularatnamālā* is abundantly mentioned in the TĀ as *Śrīkularatnamālā*, *Śrīratnamālā*, *Śrīmālā* (TĀ and TĀV I 274, XI 28, XIII 229b–231a, XV 594 (... *śrīmanmāloditam*), XXVIII 112, 128 (*śrīratnamālākulāgame*), 145, 256, 309, 310, 415–417a, XXIX 55, 192b–195a, 201–202a, 238b–239a, 282–283, XXXI 60b (alluded to by *devyāyāmalamālayoḥ*?), XXXVII 25b–29 (variant of the text quoted in XIII 230–231).

[1240]The *Niśāṭana* (*Niśisaṃcāra*, *Niśācara*, *Niśicāra*, *Naiśasaṃcāra*, *Aṭana*) is a pre-10th cent. Kaula text, which has survived in a manuscript in Kathmandu: NAK 1–1606 (palm-leaf, Newari script); see Sanderson 2005: 110–112, 133; 2007: 375. It is abundantly mentioned in TĀ and TĀV: I 51, IV 78b, IV 177–178a, VI 31b, XII 23b–24a, XIII 197, 241b–242a, XIV 43b–45, XV 83–97a, 105b–107a, 596, XVI 200a (according to JR, *śāstre* is implicitly

> [In the time it takes] to milk a cow or an arrow to fall, which may be encompassed in the blink of an eye, he who has once identified himself [lit., 'united himself'] with the ultimate principle, is liberated and he may liberate others. How can there be then, for him whose Self has merged previously, for a moment, into the transcendental *brahman*, [any question of] awareness at the end of life?

Moreover, by whom else can the last moment of the knower of the Self (*ātmavid*) be directly experienced, apart from the witness that is his own experience? — On the strength of which witness one might posit the existence in him of awareness or its opposite, inasmuch as 'those who see horizontally' [viz., fettered subjects][1241] are not privy to any such realm of experience? Therefore, in this matter, let the omniscient ones be asked their opinion.[1242]

Moreover, from the mere movement of the body at the time of death, one cannot infer that the moment of abandoning the body is to be taken as either auspicious or inauspicious [that is, that it would lead or not to liberation] for him who has realized the ultimate truth.[1243]

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referring to the *Niśāṭana*), XXVIII 72–75a, which quotes from the *Niśāṭana*: *śrīmanniśāṭane 'py uktaṃ kathanānveṣaṇād api/ śrotrābhyantarasaṃprāpte guruvaktrād vinirgate// muktas tadaiva kāle tu yantraṃ tiṣṭhati kevalam/ surāpaḥ steyahārī ca brahmahā gurutalpagaḥ// anyajo vā dvijo vātha bālo vṛddho yuvāpi vā/ paryantavāsī yo jñānī deśasyāpi pavitrakaḥ// tatra saṃnihito devaḥ sadevīkaḥ sakiṅkaraḥ//*, 'In the *Niśāṭana* — as soon as it leaves the mouth of the teacher, as soon as it is received in the space of the ear [of the student], even if [the latter] must still inquire as to the sense of the teaching — it is said that [the hearer] is liberated at that very moment; the "machine" [viz., the body; the implicit image being that of the potter's wheel] alone persists — whether he be a drunkard or a thief or a killer of brahmins or a visitor in the bed of his teacher, whether he be born a brahmin or born elsewhere, whether he be a child, an old man, or a youth; an enlightened man in the neighborhood purifies the very place, for the god is there present, along with his consort and retinue'.

[1241] Is the term intended in the sense of 'those who see only what is in front of their faces'?

[1242] Is there a shade of irony here — 'Therefore, in this matter, let the [so-called] omniscient ones (*sarvajña*) be asked [their opinion]'?

[1243] This passage refers to the practice, well attested in India, of inferring the future moral state of the dying person from his condition at the last moment — which is indeed decisive in that respect; see Edgerton 1927, pt III: 219–249. Likewise, AG, commenting upon BhG VIII 7, distinguishes between the external state of the dying man, which is purely 'circumstantial' (*vastuvṛttopanata*), and his internal state (*antardāśā*), which consists in being steeped in the thought of the Lord, i.e., in the awareness of one's own Self. Of this condition people in attendance on the dying man are but deluded witnesses, and cannot presume anything as to his journey beyond, whereas the only true witness of that experience is the experience itself. GAS VIII 7 emphasizes, somewhat sarcastically, that there is no question of becoming that object the thought of which accidentally crosses the mind at the final moment: *kiṃ vastu vṛttopanatam eva tad bhavati tasminn antye kṣaṇe/ nanu putrakalatrabandhusmṛteḥ śiśirodakapānāder vāntye kṣaṇe dṛṣṭaṃ smaraṇam iti tadbhāvāpattiḥ syāt/ maivam*, 'Can it be the case that he [the dying man] becomes only the object brought in fact [to his awareness] at the final moment? Can he possibly become what he sees or remembers at the final moment — a friend, wife, or child that he has recollected or the cool drink [that he has then been

Therefore, necessarily, the Supreme Lord, abiding ever in his own Self, causes him who has acquired knowledge of the Self and who has been made over into the condition of that [viz., into the condition of the cosmos, or of the Supreme Lord] [1244] to be aware (*smarati*) of his own nature, though at the time of death he resembles wood or stone.

As has been stated by the Lord in the *Lakṣmīsaṃhitā*: [1245]

> O Nārada, these mortals who are aware of me as they carry on their activities in perfect health, [1246] I take note of them, who resemble wood or stone at the time of their end. [1247]

And:

> His mind firm and his body healthy, he who is ever conscious of my universal form, so long as perdures the equilibrium of earthly elements — I am aware of him, my devotee, as he dies, resembling stone or wood; I lead him on the supreme pathway.

Thus, here, the cause [of salvation mentioned] is the fact that he has once and for all become [identical with] the being of the [universe, or the Supreme Lord]. In any case, how could there be awareness at the end without there being affirmation of root impressions left by his previous experience? Therefore he who knows has no need of anything at all at the moment of dying.

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offered]? Hardly!' (with the variants of the NSP edition); cf. PS 90–91 and 94–95.

[1244] *tadbhāvabhāvita* — the translation of *tadbhāvabhāvita* is borrowed from Edgerton ad BhG VIII 6. In his GAS VIII 6–7, AG discusses the term's meaning, referring to the thought-processes of those who are enlightened (*jñānin*): *ye hi sadā bhagavantaṃ bhāvayanty evaṃ bhūtvā bhaviṣyāma iti teṣāṃ tajjaḥ saṃskāro 'nyasaṃskārapratibandhīti nyāyena [...]*, 'Those who constantly realize the Lord, thinking "having become [one with him], we will [ever] so be" — for them, "the root impression born of that [truth-bearing insight (*ṛtaṃbhārā prajñā*, in YS I 48)] obstructs other root impressions (*anyasaṃskārapratibandhin*)" [YS I 50]. According to that maxim [...]'. Then, concludes AG: *saṃvinmātrasatattvaparameśvarasvabhāvataiva bhavati*, 'one becomes merged with the Supreme Lord who is in essence consciousness alone'. Note that we differ in this matter from Sharma (GAS: 161), who has not recognized the reference to YS I 48 and 50; see, *inter alia*, Whicher 2005: 611. For other occurrences of *tadbhāvabhāvita*, see avat. to 90–91 (and BhG VIII 6 quoted by YR ad 90–91), YR ad 94–95, and n. 1328, which gives a longer excerpt of GAS VIII 6–7.

[1245] Not to be mistaken for the *Lakṣmītantra*; the *Catalogue of Pañcarātra Saṃhitā* (ed. Sadhu Parampurushdas and Sadhu Shrutiprakashdas) cites (p. 57, 73) Dr. P. P. Apte's unpublished thesis, *Pañcarātra Saṃhitās: A Study* (University of Pune, 1962) which distinguishes between the *Lakṣmī Tantram* and the *Lakṣmī Saṃhitā* (communication of Marion Rastelli). YR's quote, attributed to the *Lakṣmīsaṃhitā*, does not figure in the extant *Lakṣmītantra*, which suggests that the two works may be different. Sanderson 2009: 69–70 refers to the Pāñcarātrika text, the *Mahālakṣmīsaṃhitā*, available in MS.

[1246] Similar phraseology in YR ad 90–91 and 94–95.

[1247] The source of the first quotation is probably the *Lakṣmīsaṃhitā*, as the following one, although the expression *yad uktam* (which introduces it) may allude to an unnamed source.

Kārikā 84

If then having recourse to places of pilgrimage, etc., is, as stated above, not subsidiary [to the way of life of the renunciate, viz., not necessary to it] in any context whatever, then why are [such practices] adopted by the wise?[1248] [In answer to this objection] the master describes the specific sphere [in which actions such as pilgrimage, etc., are licit]:

84. Visiting places of pilgrimage[1249] is meant for acquisition of merit; going to one's death in an outcaste's dwelling eventuates in hell. But what does this matter to him who is unaffected by the stains of merit and demerit?[1250]

There are those, even though wise, who have not yet freed themselves completely from the notion that the body and the like is the locus of the cognizer,[1251] and who have [developed as yet] no confidence in the inquiry into the knowledge of their own Self. It is they who, [in an effort to] accumulate merit, perform sacrifices or effect acts of pious liberality[1252] [such as building wells, temples], etc., or who acquire demerit [by performing impious actions]. It is for them that visiting places of pilgrimage, such as Prayāga, etc., is ordained, [or] resorting to a holy region at the time of death **in an effort to acquire merit**, that is, in an effort to attain a higher world[1253] [viz., a better birth].

Similarly, why would not **going to one's death in an outcaste's dwelling — going to one's death**, that is, reaching destruction [of the body], in an impious place, referred to metonymically by the term 'outcaste's [etc.] dwelling' — **eventuate [for them] in hell**? [Why would they not then] fall into a hell such as Avīci, etc.? For it is evident that they persist in considering the body as the locus of the cognizing subject.[1254]

Those such as are here described would for all intents and purposes be bound by unceasing birth and death, beset as they are by the confusion of the body, etc., and the Self, in accordance with the view that, after experiencing as well the pleasures [of heaven or hell] consistent with the place of their death, they are reborn in auspicious or inauspicious bodies, and die again.

For him, on the contrary, whose conceit that the body, etc., is the locus of the cognizer has entirely vanished due to the firm awareness [of

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[1248] *vidvas*.

[1249] *tīrthasevā* includes *tīrthayātrā*, the pilgrimage itself, and *tīrthāvasa*, residence at the *tīrtha*.

[1250] Same verse as ĀPS 82.

[1251] Lit., 'whose seizure by the notion that ... has not yet completely vanished'.

[1252] On this notion, see R̥S X 14, 8, MuU I 2, 10; also Malamoud 1976: 165–166.

[1253] *uttamaloka*.

[1254] Lit., 'For it is evident that [in their case] seizure by the notion that the body is the locus of the cognizer [yet persists]'.

the Self] arising from the knowledge of that Self — what signifies all this for him, whose consciousness is as [immaculate as] the firmament (*cinnabhas*),[1255] once interruption of contact with the latent dispositions composed essentially of merit and demerit has been effected [viz., who is no longer affected by such dispositions]?

Thus, since resorting to places of pilgrimage, etc., is meant for those partaking of auspicious and inauspicious actions, there is no utility, for the pure knower of the Self, in visiting such places, etc.

As it has been stated in the *Mānavadharmaśāstra*:

> If you have no dispute with King Yama Vaivasvata[1256]— the very one who dwells in your heart — then go not to the Ganges or to Gayā.[1257]

Here, Yama is nothing but the conceit that the body is the Self, which lies in the heart. Since this [idea] has been consumed [i.e., transcended] by those who have understood their own complete nature as [identical with] the Great Lord that is one's own Self, how can they resort to places of pilgrimage, etc.? This is the established truth.

Kārikās 85–86

Now, one may object: — It has been explained above [kārikās 57 and 62], has it not, that the Self, whose nature [is revealed] once the impurities of deeming oneself finite, of regarding the world as objective, of supposing oneself the agent of actions have been burnt up in [the fire of] knowledge, remains in its essential nature, when the body falls away, and does not engender any further sprouting of existence, just as a roasted seed does not engender any [further] budding.

Had the destruction of the body's sheath been contemporaneous with the appearance of the knowledge of the Self [that is, had one died at the moment of revelation], let it be so that [the Self] not engender any further [rebirth]. [That is, we accept your thesis on that stipulation.] On the other hand, since the fetters represented by the body's sheaths, etc., remain in evidence [in the case of the so-called *jīvanmukta*], how in heaven's name[1258] can he *not* be permeated by the attributes pertaining to the body

[1255]This image is widely present in Indian speculation. If anything may be compared with consciousness, the *comparans* is often sky (*nabhas*), or ether (*ākāśa*), for both are in principle clear, omnipresent, without beginning or end, abstract yet sensible. The metaphor is repeated in respect of the heart: *hṛdayākāśa*.

[1256]'The son of the Sun'.

[1257]MDhŚ VIII 92. Gayā is a favorite place for offering *śrāddha* to the Ancestors (*pitṛ*).

[1258]*kathaṃkāram* — same adjective in the avat. ad 63 (see note thereon). It is used here for rhetorical reasons.

[that is, with merits and demerits]? And once he is permeated by them, how can he not become [again] a transmigrating self at death ? The master now refutes this objection:

85. Placing the rice-kernel,[1259] **once it has been completely separated from husk and bran, again within the piece of husk, does not restore to the whole grain its identity**[1260] **associated with that form [that is, does not restore to it its capacity of generation].**

86. In the same manner, consciousness, once it has been separated from the complex of sheaths [that is the body, etc.], is [forever] completely alien to their touch, even though, as a liberated Self, it remains there [for a time] due to root impressions [previously accumulated].[1261]

[The compound *tuṣakambukasupr̥thakkr̥tataṇḍulakaṇatuṣadalāntarakṣepa* is to be understood as follows:] **Placing ... the rice-kernel [that has been] completely separated from husk and bran ... [again] within the piece of husk** — that is,]

placing within the piece of husk the rice-kernel, that is, putting it again where it was previously, [but now] **well separated**, that is, completely detached, **from husk and bran** —

does not restore the identity of [the husk and] the rice-kernel, that is, [does not restore] the tight coalescence [of the husk and the rice-kernel] — even though [that placement] was [previously] present in terms of a form[1262] such that a sprout would be enabled [that is, would germinate].

[In other words] the husk and the rice-kernel remain distinct just like two iron rods, and are not focused on enabling a single action [that is, whatever action ensues derives from the parts separately and not from the whole, in this case the seed].

[1259] According to Apte's dictionary, *taṇḍula* is the 'grain after threshing, unhusking and winnowing; especially rice'.

[1260] *tādātmya* — we take the term *tādātmya* in a technical sense (cf. its use in Vedānta and in aesthetics): 'relatable only to itself', that is, an 'identity', understood as the 'otherwise indescribable' unity of its constituents, which, in this case, is alone able to produce the effect, viz., the sprouting. In the metaphor, *tuṣa* appears two times, as *tuṣa* and as *tuṣadala*. As *tuṣa*, it stands for a congenital impurity, as does *kambuka*; as *tuṣadala*, it stands for the body that the *jñānin* occupies, much as cast-off clothes, after realizing the knowledge of the Self.

[1261] Silburn takes *saṃskāra* as 'purification' (as does Barnett), and translates: 'De même que la Conscience qui par des purifications est ici séparée des cuirasses qui la recouvrent [...]' [— 'Just as consciousness which, by purifications, is here separated from the armors covering it [...]']. These two verses correspond to ĀPS 44, although the metaphor is different: 'Just as clarified butter, drawn from milk, is not in that [milk] as before, if it is cast [back into it], so the spiritual Self, if it has [once] been separated from the Qualities (*guṇa*) of *prakr̥ti*, is not [together with these any longer]'.

[1262] *tadrūpatayā* = *tadrūpa°* in the compound.

In the same manner, namely, in the same way, **consciousness** (*saṃvit*), i.e., the intelligence (*cetanā*) of the knower of the Self,

separated from the complex of sheaths, that is, from the accumulation of sheaths such as the impurity of deeming oneself finite, etc. — that is, restored [to his pure state] by affirming through sustained concentration the knowledge of his Self, saying: 'It is I alone who am manifest, always, everywhere, as the universal Self, whose nature is the Great Lord that is my own Self' —[1263]

[that consciousness] **even though remaining there** for some time, that is, even though established [temporarily] in this complex of sheaths as a part[1264] [of a whole, composed of consciousness and body], thanks to the continuing existence of the body,

is [now] a liberated Self (*muktātman*), its bondage destroyed, and **is completely alien to the touch of those [sheaths].**

[To explain further:] it [viz., consciousness] is **completely alien to**, that is, is devoid of, **the touch** of that complex of sheaths, the body, etc. — ['touch' meaning here] the affliction[1265] that is born of the impurity of supposing oneself the agent of actions appearing in the shape of merit and demerit and as such is capable of engendering the sprout of transmigration (*saṃsārāṅkura*).[1266]

In the same way, the rice-kernel, put back in the [separated] piece of husk, is devoid of that contact [with the husk and the bran] that leads to the generation of the sprout.

This can be said: transmigration is generally caused by ignorance; however, the consciousness of the yogin is not a cause of transmigration, owing to the deficiency of required conditions[1267] [viz., the absence of the three impurities], themselves generated by ignorance, for his sheaths have been sundered by the knowledge of his own Self arisen in him. Nor is it the case that this bondage of the corporeal sheaths, remaining [for a time] as a remnant[1268] thanks to the power of root impressions, is capable of giving rise to the sprout of transmigration through the manifestation of [bondage's] own properties, for its root, ignorance, has been burnt up in the fire of knowledge.[1269]

[1263] *aham eva svātmamaheśvarasvabhāvo viśvātmanā sarvadā sarvatra sphurāmi.*

[1264] *śeṣavartanayā* — from the point of view of the body, consciousness is not the 'whole' (*śeṣin*), and their relationship, though necessary from a logical point of view, makes of consciousness the 'part' (*śeṣa*) that, upon death, vanishes, thus putting an end to that 'whole'.

[1265] *uparāga.*

[1266] Consciousness remains free from contact with merits and demerits, which, a function of the *kārmamala*, are the very cause of transmigration.

[1267] Lit., 'assemblage, collection'; namely, a *functional* assemblage, therefore a set of means or conditions in view of something.

[1268] *śeṣavartanayā.*

[1269] Transmigration is the result of impurities, which are themselves the result of nescience, which consists in taking the body as the Self. The idea is that the body is not the sole cause

This being the case, the [mind of the] knower of the Self (*jñānī*), while living (*jīvann eva*), is formed by the Fourth; and he transcends even that Fourth,[1270] once his body no longer exists.

Thus, in either case,[1271] [the yogin] need have no fear of transmigration.

Kārikās 87–88

Now, one may object: — Even though its own nature has been apprehended, the consciousness of the yogin is nevertheless impure inasmuch as it remains in a body that persists as a remnant, this consciousness — owing to the presence there, to a limited extent, of impurity deriving from its contingent association with the body (*dehopādhi*). This objection the master refutes by example:

87. A gem, made flawless by the most skilled artisan, though appearing flawed by its contingent association with the jewel-box, is revealed as limpid by nature,[1272] as soon as this contingency is removed.

88. Likewise, consciousness, whose [true] condition — thanks to the instruction of a true teacher — is flawless, freed as it is from its contingent association with a body, is freed as well from all other contingencies, and appears as Śiva.[1273]

[The comparison may be formulated as follows:]

A **gem**, its flawlessness verified[1274] by an extremely skilled lapidary, **though [appearing] flawed**, that is, though it becomes, in effect, clouded, thanks to the close contact of the jewel-box, reveals itself nevertheless **as limpid by nature**, that is, becomes flawless, just as it was previously, once it is separated from the contingent qualification of the jewel-box — such particular cause of obscuration (*āvaraṇa*) being no longer present.

Likewise, in this very same manner,

that **consciousness, whose [true] condition — thanks to the instruction of a true teacher — is flawless** (*evaṃ sadguruśāsanavimalasthiti vedanam*) ...

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of rebirth — ignorance is also required, which is a function of the spirit (not the body); and since ignorance has been consumed in the fire of knowledge, it no longer exists.

[1270]On *turīya* and *turyātīta*, see YR ad 1; on the "degrees" of liberation, see YR ad 61 and ad 83: '[...] after the destruction of his body, he attains a condition of Isolation (*kevalatā*) that is beyond the Fourth state [of consciousness], composed solely of blissful consciousness'.

[1271]The translation of *punaḥ* would be superfluous in this context.

[1272]*svacchaparamārthaḥ* — lit., 'such that its ultimate truth is limpidity'.

[1273]On the conjunction of particles, *api, iva*, see B&R, ss.vv.: §§ 2 (p. 303), 4 (p. 819).

[1274]*udyotita* — or 'assured' (lit., 'clarified').

[which sentence is thus explained:]

[**true teacher** means] a most excellent instructor, who has completely realized the knowledge of the all-encompassing Self;[1275]

[his **teachings** means] repetition [under his guidance, wherein is revealed] orally (*mukhāmnāya*) the [great] secret of the knowledge of the Self;[1276]

[consciousness] whose [true] condition [is flawless] means that the impurity of deeming oneself finite, which is the screen [on which are projected] the impurities of regarding the world as objective, and of supposing oneself the agent of actions, has vanished, like the flaw in the gold,[1277] owing to sustained concentration on that instruction.

And consciousness [purified] in this way is also like the sky above, owing to the disappearance of the original stains; it,

freed, i.e., separated, **from its contingent association with a body**,[1278] that is, from the **qualification** whose defining feature is the **body**, **appears** indeed **as Śiva**, owing to the absence of any further contingency ...

... or, what amounts to the same thing, [consciousness] manifests itself, when the body comes to an end, in virtue of the quality of Supreme Śiva [that it has acquired].

Just as the gem is manifest in and of its own nature, when its contingent association with the jewel-box is removed, so does consciousness, though immaculate already[1279] in the awareness (*avabodha*) of its own nature, manifest itself as indeed purified, owing to the termination of its contingent association with the body, judged to be impure.

Now, one may object: — But, just as the gem, though freed from its contingent association with the jewel-box, may again become tarnished by

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[1275]We take *paripūrṇa* as qualifying both *svātmajñāna°* and *°vid*. On other definitions of the *sadguru*, see TĀ IV 33–85.

[1276]Same expression in YR ad 96.

[1277]Cf. YR ad 17 and 24.

[1278]In the terminology of Indian logic, where in all probability the word found its original technical meaning, an *upādhi* is a rectifying addendum that transforms an otherwise invalid argument or proposition into a valid statement, notably by restricting its over-extended range. 'Where there's fire, there's smoke' is an example. The proposition is false as it stands, for the phenomenon of "smokeless" fire is well-attested. To correct the proposition, it suffices to add the *upādhi* 'provided that the fuel is moist'. Properly speaking, the *upādhi* in this sense belongs to the argument, not to the object, but because anything that serves to differentiate one entity from another may be considered an *upādhi* (as the branch that serves to distinguish one bird from another), the *upādhi* is often more or less loosely attached to the object, as in the present case. The *upādhi*, or 'contingent qualification', concerns then any circumstantial condition that cannot be said to belong to the object in terms of its very being, such as the weight of the lead, etc. The yogin's consciousness is devoid of such contingencies (that is, is deficient in *upādhi*) — nothing limits it, nothing circumscribes it.

[1279]While referring to the lapidary phrasing of the kārikā, YR reformulates the line in more normal syntax.

the adjunction of any number of other contingencies [such as dust, etc.], so likewise, consciousness, though freed from the contingency of the body, will still be impure, if it should receive, like the gem, another contingent qualification, inasmuch as it is affected by that contingency.

The master anticipates this objection by saying: **'[consciousness is] freed as well from all other contingencies'.**

The parallelism [1280] between the example and that which has been exemplified by it is not complete in all respects. [1281] After the falling away of the [yogin's] body — his only shape now the great Light formed of ultimate nonduality — all this [universe] becomes [for the yogin] his own body, as it were (*svāṅgakalpa*) — [which] had been thought to be a mere contingency.

And, further, he [the yogin] cannot be qualified by any other contingency, for there is no contingency whatever standing apart from this [plenitude]. [1282]

Thus, there is no [absolute] parallelism between [consciousness and] the gem as to the manner in which they accept contingent qualification. The acceptance of the contingency of a body is rooted, is it not, in ignorance, but once that ignorance has been cut off by the axe of Self-knowledge, [1283] how can there again be contact with any [further] contingency?

As it is said in the revered *Gītā*:

> Knowledge is obscured by ignorance;/ By that creatures are deluded.// But if by knowledge that ignorance/ Of men's souls is destroyed,/ Their knowledge like the sun/ Illumines that Highest. [1284]

Therefore, the yogin's own consciousness is ever pure, and pure only, for he knows his own true nature [as being the Self of all things]. [1285]

[1280] *sāmya*.

[1281] The universe becomes the permanent body of the yogin now freed from his transitory body. There, all contingent qualifications are impossible, for nothing can be added to or taken away from the by definition universal body.

[1282] Cf. YR ad 12–13.

[1283] Same image in TĀ IV 13: *durbhedapādapasyāsya mūlaṃ kṛntanti kovidāḥ/ dhārārūḍhena sattarkakuṭhāreṇeti niścayaḥ//*, 'Ceux qui savent tranchent à la racine l'arbre funeste de la division avec la hache de la raison intuitive aiguisée au plus haut degré' (tr. Padoux — 'Those who know cut the root of the ill-fated tree of difference with the axe of intuitive reason highly sharpened').

[1284] BhG V 15b–16.

[1285] This is another way of describing the experience of *mokṣa*, which has already been defined, from the viewpoint of nondual Śivaism of Kashmir, in kā. 60. See also MBh X 47, 12–15, quoted n. 425.

Kārikā 89

The accumulation of root impressions in the mind of him whose conduct has with determination been so fashioned accordingly [1286] [viz., fashioned to such ends as have been described in kā. 84 and its commentary] is the very cause in regard to which arise all contingent conditions. And indeed nothing else intervenes that is novel [1287] [i.e., no other cause of transmigratory experience need be suspected].

This is what the master says:

89. Having first, on the basis of normative teachings, or like authority, identified himself [with the objects and purposes therein enjoined], [1288] and with a faith [1289] therein that is unwavering, one attains rebirth in heaven, hell or the human condition. [1290]

The cognizer, who has made a repeated effort (*abhyāsa*), [1291] either in the domain of sacrificial action — whether for his own merit or for the

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[1286] *yathāvatpariśīlitavyāpāra°*.

[1287] *nūtanatvena*.

[1288] Cf. ŚB X 5 2, 20: *taṃ yathā yathopāsate tad eva bhavati*, 'In whatsoever form they serve him that he becomes' (tr. Eggeling); the reference being to Prajāpati, who assumes for the worshiper whatever form the worshiper meditates upon. This passage is frequently quoted by Śaṅkara in his commentaries; cf. MuU III 2, 9: *sa yo ha vai tat paramaṃ brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati*, 'He, verily, who knows the Supreme *Brahman*, becomes *Brahman* himself'; BĀU IV 4, 6: *brahmaiva san brahmāpy eti*, 'Being *Brahman* he goes to *Brahman*'; also BhG IV 11 (quoted by R ad ĀPS 66), BhG VIII 6 (quoted in YR ad 90–91), BhG XII 2 (quoted in SpN II 5); ĀPS 58 (quoted supra) and 66: *sarvākāro bhagavān upāsyate yena yena bhāvena/ taṃ taṃ bhāvaṃ bhūtvā cintāmaṇivat samabhyeti//*, 'By whichever appearance (*bhāva*) the Lord, who has all forms, is meditated upon, that appearance He adopts, as He is like a jewel fulfilling all wishes', and ĀŚ II 29. Among Trika texts, see SpK II 4 (*[...] na sāvasthā na yā śivaḥ*, '[...] there is no state which is not Śiva', and SpK II 6–7; SpN II 6–7 which quotes: *śivo bhūtvā śivaṃ yajet*, 'One should worship Śiva by becoming Śiva' (again quoted in ŚSĀ I 14, which corrects it in the same verse as '*bhakto bhūtvā*', 'One should worship Śiva after becoming his devotee'); ŚS II 2 (ŚSV ad loc. quoting SpK II 6); TĀ IV 207–8; YR ad PS 104. See also the concept of *tadbhāvabhāvita* in YR ad 83, ad 90–91 (n. 1308).

[1289] First occurrence of the term *śraddhā*.

[1290] This is a specific way of formulating the law of karman; see p. 29. In our translation, we differ from Silburn on two points: the understanding of *pūrvam* and that of the syntactical link of *śāstrādiprāmāṇyād* and *avicalitaśraddhyāpi*. She translates: 'Par une foi inébranlable aussi en l'autorité des Traités, etc., on devient identique à l'objet (de sa foi) et on accède juste avant (la mort) au ciel, à l'enfer (ou) à la condition humaine' [— 'By an unshakable faith also in the authority of the Treatises, etc., one becomes identical with the object [of one's faith] and reaches just before [death] heaven, hell, [or] the human condition']. We follow the commentary, which stresses the stages of the process: 'having at that moment (*tadaiva*) attained ... the identity with that ... he attains later (*uttaratra*), after death (*dehapātāt*), either heaven, or hell, or the human condition'.

[1291] On the notion of *abhyāsa*, see BhG VI 33–36 and Śaṅkara's definition in his commentary ad BhG VIII (*abhyāsayoga*) 8: *mayi cittasamarpaṇaviṣayabhūta ekasmiṃs tulyapratyayāvṛttilakṣaṇo vilakṣaṇapratyayānantarito 'bhyāsaḥ sa cābhyāso yogaḥ [...]*, ' "abhyāsa" consists in the repetition of the same kind of thought, uninterrupted by any contrary idea, with regard to Me alone who am the object of concentration of the mind; that repetition itself is "yoga" '.

benefit of others —

or in the domain of Self-knowledge — whether that effort is based on the authority of traditional scriptures, or on declarations resuming the traditional teaching of a preceptor,[1292] or on his own sustained concentration [aided by] reasoning, or even on the faith that arises from previously implanted latent dispositions — [1293]

[that cognizer,] **having attained identity** (*tanmayatā*) therewith, at that moment, thanks to the accumulation of root impressions based on such [activity] — an identity that is of the nature of the matters [therein] rehearsed time and time again —

when later on his body passes away, he reaches either **heaven**, that is, unexcelled felicity, or **hell**, that is, the sufferings consequent upon [residence in] the Avīci hell, etc., or [again] **the human condition**, that is, that state wherein both pleasures and pains [are native], in accordance with the latent dispositions [so engendered].

On the other hand, when his body perishes, nothing at all befalls the man (*puruṣa*, viz., the knower of the Self) who has rehearsed no [acts engendering] latent dispositions.

Indeed, with whatever intention the cognizer rehearses [his actions], he becomes one with that intention, and at the moment of death the object that he desires with clarity (*sphuṭatayā*) comes into evidence for the cognizer.

In this way, there can be no reversal [or setting at nought] of the matters that have been rehearsed [throughout life], nor can anything not of the nature of previously rehearsed activity come into play in some unprecedented fashion.[1294]

Thus, previous rehearsal (*pūrvābhyāsa*) is alone the cause of whatever [effect ensues]. This is the purport.

[1292]Lit., 'the declaration of the teaching-sequence of the teacher's teachings'. The implication is that such a teaching has authority.

[1293]These addenda develop the 'etc.' (*ādi*) of the kā. Cf. TS IV, p. 23: *kiṃ tu guror āgamanirūpaṇe vyāpāra āgamasya ca niḥśaṅkasajātīyatatprabandhaprasavanibandhanasamucitavikalpodaye vyāpāraḥ*, 'Moreover, the function of the teacher [lies] in laying out the Āgama texts; whereas the Āgama texts find their function in arousing a thought that is suitable to that text and founded on its development, [a thought] both devoid of doubt and commensurate [with the text]' (cf. Silburn 1981: 191).

[1294]*apūrvatvena* — the term is borrowed from Mīmāṃsā, where it signifies that which is "unprecedented" in the prescription of a sacrificial act, and is therefore the source of that act's "validity" or obligatory character (*dharma*). For example, an injunction to "cook" rice for presentation to the Ancestors has no such force, for we know already that rice must be cooked to be eaten, whereas the injunction to dehusk the rice "by hand" is dharmic, for of the many ways to thresh rice, that one alone is made known by the vedic text. The notion acquires ontological status in the developed doctrine of the ritualists — since the "authority" of the rite is consequentially certain, the *apūrva* in fact "exists" as the link between rite and result (if not immediate).

Kārikās 90–91

Therefore, for him who knows the Self, the cause of his coincidence with plenitude (*pūrṇaprathā*),[1295] at the time of abandoning his body, is the fact that he has once and for all become identical with the being of the [universe];[1296] nor should the moment of death, whether auspicious or inauspicious, be imagined a cause of heaven or hell for him, as is so often the case among ordinary people. To express this idea, the master says:

90. The final moment, as promoting an ulterior condition either auspicious or inauspicious, acquires the status of a contingent causal factor [only] for the deluded; for him [who knows], on the other hand, it is not a cause in regard to going onward [that is, in regard to his supposed acquisition of another body].[1297]

91. Even those [low-born —] domestic animals, birds, reptiles, and the like — who, perfected by previously acquired right knowledge, understand their [true] mode of being as that of the universal Self, attain that true mode of being [at the last moment].[1298]

Since [the notion of] the *jñānin* has been thoroughly expounded, [in the previous kārikās, it is now possible to state that] **the last moment**, that is, the final point of time coinciding with the loss of the body, [which is deemed to] **promote**,[1299] or serve, the **auspicious or inauspicious condition** [of the dying man], presumed by the witnesses (*pramātṛ*) in attendance on the basis of alterations in the body's humors, or by the [painful or peaceful] way the malignant disease is experienced ...

... [that final moment] **becomes a contingent factor**, that is, becomes a cause [of transmigration], **for those who are deluded**, that is, for those [limited] cognizers only who mistakenly take the body to be the Self.

Let that miserable [last moment] pass [in such a way for them]. But not for all that would it follow, **as far as the** adept (*yogin*) **is concerned**

[1295] Lit., 'of his extension into or over that which is full'.

[1296] See YR ad 83 and n. 1244.

[1297] See the commentary.

[1298] Silburn translates: 'Mais ce dernier instant qui, renforçant un état de vertu ou de péché, devient pour les ignorants un facteur de l'existence (future), n'est pas (pour ceux qui savent) cause déterminante de leur destinée. Alors même qu'ils seraient bête de somme, oiseau, reptile, etc., ceux qui reconnaissent leur propre destinée comme étant celle du Soi sont néanmoins purifiés par la parfaite compréhension qu'ils eurent jadis et ils vont (maintenant) à cette destinée' [— 'But that last moment which, strengthening a pious or sinful state, becomes a cause of the (future) existence for the ignorant ones, is not a cause determining (their) destiny (for those who know). Even if they are beasts of burden, birds, reptiles, etc., those who recognize their own destiny as that of the Self, are nevertheless purified by the perfect understanding that they formely had, and they go (now) to this destiny']. Our interpretation differs from hers; esp., '*gati*' we take as 'going' onward (v. 90); as 'manner of going, behaving, mode of being' (v. 91); Silburn translates *saṃskṛta* (as does Barnett) by 'purified'.

[1299] Lit., 'nourish'.

— he who has abolished the conceit that the body is the Self, and who is ever expert in perceiving the Great Lord as his own Self — that **the** last moment is an **incitement**, that is, is a cause in regard to **going** [onward], [supposing that thereby he would] attain another body after this body.

In order to illustrate[1300] the question: 'How does that follow?' the master says: **'Even those who** [...]**'**.

Even those of evil birth, namely, those who have acquired the status of an animal (*paśu*) due to the power of some intention or other [as revealed by the accumulation of their demerits], or because of a curse or the like, who come to realize, at the moment of death, **their proper mode of being**, that is, the state of their own self, **as that of the universal Self** ...[1301]

... even they, deluded though they may be [in their present condition], attain to the condition of their own [true] Self, if favored by the awakening of latent dispositions left by an awareness of their own Self gained previously [i.e., in previous births].

Such was the manner of the Lord of the elephants' liberation [from his curse],[1302] who, though for a time an animal nature, was awakened through deeply ingrained memories of devotions (*bhakti*) to the Supreme Lord that had been practiced previously with determination — whereupon, having praised Lord Viṣṇu he attained [again] his own nature, completely shaking off all the sheaths [of corporeal existence]. And what cause operated in respect of such recollection [of Viṣṇu, if not the deeply ingrained memories of his previous devotion]?

This is the meaning of the verse: the knower of the Self does sometimes abandon a body made motionless as wood or rock[1303] from the alteration of humors, etc.,[1304] arisen in it; he [sometimes even] mouthes random [nonsense], auspicious or inauspicious, such as 'monkey' or 'cat' [as seen in delirium]; but from these [states, it should not be inferred that] the knowledge and other [attainments][1305] are lost[1306] that he had perfected

[1300]The poetical figure *nidarśana* is defined as an illustration or a parallel case that confirms the general thesis or principle at issue — the 'setting sun', for example, which illustrates (and confirms) the thesis that 'greatness is followed inevitably by decline'.

[1301]*ātmatvena*, viz. '... their own self as being the universal Self [...]'. In the kārikā, the term is *tadātmatvena*, corresponding to YR's *ātmatvena*: the meaning appears to be the same. Similarly, Śaṅkara, commenting on BhG X 10, uses *ātmatvena*; see n. 1310.

[1302]It is the episode of the *gajendramokṣa* (*Bhāgavatapurāṇa* VIII 2–4).

[1303]Lit., 'the *jñānin*, whose movements are those of [a piece of] wood or rock [...]'.

[1304]'Etc.' here intends all the *karaṇas*, especially *buddhi*.

[1305]This 'etc.' might refer to *bhakti*, as is suggested by a parallel passage in YR ad 94–95: *[...] abhyastabhagavadbhakteḥ*.

[1306]Same exposition in AG ad BhG VIII 6, which verse (VIII 6) is also quoted here by YR. AG there contrasts *svasthāvasthāyām* with *asvasthāvasthāyām*, in the obvious senses of 'when healthy' (lit., 'in the condition of a man situated in himself') and its contrary, 'when unhealthy'; cf. the two verses from the *Lakṣmīsaṃhitā* quoted by YR ad 83. Probably to be understood as an argument *a fortiori*: if the last moment is not decisive in the case of the average man, how could it be so in the case of the *jñānin*?

in practice, while carrying on his activities in perfect health.[1307]

The various properties of the body, etc., pertain only to the body, etc.; they are not at all capable of occulting an object that is ever realized (*bhāvita*) [viz., the Great Lord as one's own Self].

Thus, in all such cases [whether it be a yogin or an ordinary person who dies], it is the ingrown [habit cultivated] up until the moment of death that is the supreme consideration (*paramārtha*) [that is, the deciding factor].

As it has been said in the revered *Gītā*:

> Whatsoever state (of being) meditating upon/ He leaves the body at death,/ To just that he goes, son of Kuntī,/ Always, being made to be in the condition of that.[1308]

And:

> To them, constantly disciplined,/[1309] Revering Me with love,/ I give that discipline of mind,/ Whereby they go unto Me.[1310]

[1307] *svasthaceṣṭatayā* — lit., 'in the manner of acting as a healthy [man] (*svastha*) [acts]'; *svastha* means 'situated in one's self', and, in most cases, the one who is thus 'situated in himself' is considered to be 'healthy', after the manner it is said of gems that they are *svastha*, when they are not affected by any condition extraneous to their nature (see B&R, s.v.); see also M. Hara 1995.

[1308] BhG VIII 6. In the same way, BhG VIII 6 (and 7a) is quoted by TĀ XXVIII 325–326a, while discussing the status of the *jīvanmukta* at the final hour. Cf. YR ad PS 83 and 89. Note that PS 83 (= ĀPS 81) is quoted *verbatim* by AG — under the general category of *śruti* — in his interpretation of BhG VIII 6. BhGBh VIII 6 explains *tadbhāvabhāvita* as: *tasmin bhāvaḥ tadbhāvaḥ sa bhāvitaḥ smaryamāṇatayābhyasto yena sa tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ san*, '*tadbhāvaḥ* means "existence in that [other]"; now, by whom (*yena*) that [existence] has been caused to exist — that is, exercised by *repeatedly* remembering it, it is he [of whom it may be said that he] "has been caused to be in the condition of that [other]": *tadbhāvabhāvitaḥ*'. According to GAS VIII 6, the meaning of the verse is this: *na tu yad evānte smaryate tattvam evāvāpyate iti [...] sadā yena bhāvitam antaḥkaraṇaṃ tad evānte prayāṇānantaraṃ prāpyate/ tac ca smaryate na veti nātra nirbandhaḥ*, 'It is not that whatever is remembered at the time of death [i.e., whatever thought crosses the mind] that forsooth is obtained [...]. That with which the heart has been all along informed, that indeed is attained, in the end, after death. This is not conditional on whether it is presented to the memory or not [at the exact moment of death]' (tr. Sharma, slightly modified). And, AG adds: *sarvāvasthāsu vyāvahārikīṣv api yasya bhagavattattvaṃ na hṛdayād apayāti tasya bhagavaty eva sakalakarmanyāsinaḥ satatabhagavanmayasyāvaśyaṃ svayam eva bhagavattattvaṃ smṛtiviṣayatāṃ yātīti sadā tadbhāvabhāvitatvaṃ cātra hetuḥ*, 'He [the *jñānin*], from whose heart the divine truth is never lost even in the course of all worldly pursuits, who has cast off all actions on the Lord and who is ever suffused with God, he definitely (*avaśyaṃ*) automatically (*svayam*) remembers the divine essence (at the time of death) — and the reason for this is that he is always steeped in it' (tr. Sharma). See n. 1288. The issue of the dying man's last thought and its effective force is dealt with *seriatim* until PS 94.

[1309] Śaṅkara glosses *satatayuktānām* with *nivṛttasarvabāhyaiṣaṇāṇām*, 'to those who are free from all desire for exterior [objects of enjoyment]'.

[1310] BhG X 10. In his commentary on this verse, Śaṅkara explains: *buddhiḥ samyagdarśanaṃ mattattvaviṣayaṃ tena yogo buddhiyogaḥ taṃ buddhiyogaṃ/ yena buddhiyogena samyagdarśanalakṣaṇena māṃ parameśvaram ātmabhūtam ātmatvena upayānti pratipadyante,*

It is the transformation of one's inner organ [into the Lord, or not, as the case may be] that constitutes the cause granting immediate direction [to the soul at death].

Kārikās 92–93

Thus, in accordance with the point of view set forth above, there is nothing unprecedented that can affect the knower of the Self once his body has perished — that would set aside, as something completely novel, his having become forever identical with the being of the [universe]. Thus it follows that the body only is perishable; it alone perishes [and not the identity of the liberated soul with the Lord acquired long ago]. There is no further growth of the dispositions [ensuant upon the moment of death]. So as to demonstrate this, the master says:

92. Thus, the conscious principle that survives in the interstices between bodies[1311] **is in effect composed of heaven or of hell.**[1312] **When the body perishes, it proceeds to associate with another body, in accordance [with the dispositions it has accumulated].**[1313]

93. Similarly, the [knower's] own essential Self remains in the condition it was in when it became manifest once and for all at the

'*buddhi* [here] means correct perception (*samyagdarśana*) having Me for an object; linkage (*yoga*) with that [correct perception] is *buddhiyoga*, or "*yoga* [viz., "discipline"] of correct perception". By this *buddhiyoga* which is distinguished by correct perception, they go unto Me, the Supreme Lord, having become [for them] the Self, [taking me] as their own Self (*ātmatvena*)'. The first mention of the notion of *buddhiyoga* in BhG is in II 49, where 'action' (*karman*) — which is, according to Śaṅkara's commentary, 'undertaken by one longing for results' (*karma phalārthinā kriyamāṇam*) — is said to be 'far inferior to *buddhiyoga* "discipline of wisdom" (or, as translated here by Edgerton, "discipline of mental attitude"), that is, far inferior to action undertaken with equanimity (*samatva*), because [action undertaken with desire for a result] is the cause of birth, death, etc.' (*dūreṇa [...] hy avaram [...] buddhiyogāt samatvabuddhiyuktāt karmaṇo janmamaraṇādihetutvāt*). Hence Kṛṣṇa's exhortation (II 49c): *buddhau śaraṇam anviccha*, 'In the mental attitude seek thy (religious) refuge', on which Śaṅkara: *paramārthajñānaśaraṇo bhavety arthaḥ*, 'Seek thy refuge in the knowledge of the ultimate reality [or supreme goal]; this is the purport'. Thus *buddhiyoga* is synonymous with *jñānayoga*.

[1311] *dehāntarālaga* — Silburn understands this differently (analyzing the compound, it would seem, as *dehāntara-ālagaḥ*): 'L'homme emprisonné à l'intérieur du corps est à lui-même son propre ciel et son propre enfer' (idem Barnett: 'Man imprisoned within the body is its own heaven and hell', and Pelissero, 'tale è quel principio cosciente individuale imprigionato all'interno di un corpo').

[1312] No doubt a synecdoche: the result (heaven or hell) replaces the process of getting there (the permanence of the *vāsanās*).

[1313] Lit., 'due to what is suitable to itself', glossed as *yathāhitavāsanānuguṇyāt*. This usage recalls the poetical notion of *aucitya* — which principle asserts that no element of the drama should violate the constraints of the main *rasa*.

moment knowledge was acquired; [1314] **it does not become otherwise when the body falls away.**

Thus, therefore, **the conscious principle** (*puruṣa*) which has entered into bodies, jars, etc., that is, the self (*ātman*) of each and every man, permeated as it is by the impurity of supposing itself the agent of actions, is **formed of heaven**, in the sense that its inner organ is permeated by latent dispositions [1315] [tending to the realization of] fruits of actions previously performed with the intention of attaining heaven, etc.; in other words, that very Self is the enjoyer of the fruit that is [called] heaven, inasmuch as the Self is then qualified by latent dispositions that have come to fruition in results such as heaven. [1316]

Likewise, the [Self, in which have] developed latent dispositions [induced by] previous evil actions, is the experiencer of the fruit called hell.

Thus it is the body alone that is the abode wherein are enjoyed the fruits of both categories of actions [— good and bad].

When that [body] perishes, [1317] **[the conscious principle proceeds to associate with another body] in accordance with [the dispositions it has accumulated].**

[The master means by this:] When the body perishes, [the conscious principle], in conformity with **its own** latent dispositions thus accumulated, associates itself without delay with another body, that is, with another abode whereby it may enjoy [fruits yet unexperienced] — through which association [the conscious principle] becomes the enjoyer at a later time of the fruits implied by the latent dispositions that were [strengthened] by specific actions [undertaken during a past life].

Likewise, **at the moment of [acquiring] knowledge**, that is, at the time the student [in the course of his instruction] becomes aware of (*prakāśana*) his own Self as taught by his teacher,

one's own essential Self (*svātman*), or consciousness (*caitanya*), **remains** forever **in the same condition it was in when it once** (*sakṛt*) **became manifest**, that is, [it remains] in the condition in which [it became manifest], once and for all (*ekavāram*), in consequence of this course of study [1318] — or [in other words] [that very Self] has acceded to the

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[1314] This statement echoes the famous verse *sakṛd vibhāto 'yam ātmā*, already quoted in YR ad 10–11.

[1315] Note the etymological figure: *vāsita/vāsanā*.

[1316] In all this exposition, as well as in kā. 92 itself, the notion of the *puryaṣṭaka*, or subtle body, is implicit, in the context of the *paśu*, for it is the *puryaṣṭaka* which, being the abode of the *vāsanās*, is responsible for transmigration (see n. 393 and 738). It vanishes only after *mokṣa* has taken place.

[1317] Lit., 'at the time of decomposition of that [body]'.

[1318] *krama* may be taken in two ways: either the particular tradition of instruction (e.g., *advaitakrama*) or the process, the procedure, followed by a particular *guru* in his teaching.

condition of self-reflection (*parāmarśa*) which is limited [only] by its characteristic quality of perfect freedom.

That essential Self is displayed to the *jñānin* by whom it is constantly in such form contemplated (*parāmṛṣṭa*),[1319] in accordance with that very form [in which it is contemplated],[1320] because of the development of latent dispositions [in previous lives tending thereto].[1321]

Nor is it the case, when the body falls away, that the essential Self of the knower which is already manifest, **becomes other** than this, that is, becomes hidden [from itself],

nor could what has thus become apparent ever not be apparent,[1322] for otherwise no one would devote himself to any discipline (*abhyaset*), and collapse of traditional practice[1323] of every sort would ensue, and all [distinctions such as those stated in *Sāṃkhyakārikā*] would become null and void:

> By virtue is obtained ascent to higher planes, by vice, descent to the lower; from wisdom results the Highest Good; and bondage from the reverse.[1324]

Therefore, at the moment of death, let the body be what it will; it is only the development of latent dispositions relating to the essential Self that constitutes the cause of every one's bondage or liberation.

Kārikās 94–95

If, moreover, in the body, due to a disorder of its humors, the ravages of dying are experienced, not for all that would the development of his practice [previously undertaken] be in any way impaired.

[1319] As he sees the Self, so he becomes the Self.

[1320] *tādrūpyeṇa*.

[1321] Or, if one were to read '*vāsanā-apraroha*', '... because of the non-development of dispositions [that would contrary such permanence]'. In either case, it is a matter of *vāsanās* that were accumulated during a previous life of the ascetic, and which either favor (or do not contrary) the acquisition of final beatitude, or act contrary to that acquisition, but which may be annulled. The reference here (as will be explained in the following verses) is to ascetic practices previously interrupted, but which have created "good karman" on which to draw in the lives to come.

[1322] *na hi bhātam abhātaṃ syāt*. For variants of this key-maxim of nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, see YR ad 30: *nāprakāśaḥ prakāśate* and YR ad 10–11: *sakṛd vibhāto 'yam ātmā*.

[1323] *vyavahāra*.

[1324] SK 44 (tr. G. Jha). These references (*abhyāsa*, *vyavahāra*), in YR's commentary, are to ascetic practices — the commentator says in conclusion that if such contradictions be admitted, the ascetic tradition itself, as it is conducted, would be rendered inoperative, for the end of the practice (final beatitude or illumination) would become inexplicable.

In order better to understand the condition [of the dying *jīvanmukta*] described above, the master develops the theme further:[1325]

94. Utter theft of the group of faculties, loss of memory, choking,[1326] rupture in vital points, particular diseases: such experiences are born of modifications affecting the body.[1327]

95. How could such experiences not belong to him, inasmuch as he is still associated with a body? Therefore, even if he be afflicted with delusion at the hour of death,[1328] the knower of the Self does

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[1325]*parighaṭayate* — the sense to attribute here to the verb *parighaṭ-* invites reflection: the only instance cited in B&R (from *Mṛcchakaṭikā*) and by MW of this combination of verb and preverb involves a musical context — "strumming" a lute. May we then suspect here a metaphorical "playing" on a theme, in the manner of an Indian *rāga*? Without preverb, the root *ghaṭ* often expresses the idea that the elements of an exposition "fit together" well, are "coherent" — and this usage is especially common in the negative: *etan na ghaṭate*.

[1326]Or 'death rattle'?

[1327]Silburn translates *śarīrasaṃskāra* as 'prédispositions corporelles' [— 'corporeal predispositions']. Since the context is that of a 'disorder of the humours' (*dhātuvaiṣamya*), we understand the compound in the sense 'modifications of the body'.

[1328]It is possible to understand *mohayoge* as a BV qualifying *maraṇāvasare*, and to translate: 'at the hour of death, even if it [this hour] is associated with delusion'. But we follow YR's interpretation in translating the kārikā (*maraṇakṣaṇajanitaśārīrājñānasaṃbandhe 'pi*). With this kārikā the question of the last moment is definitely resolved. This should be compared with AG's commentary ad BhG VIII 7, summarizing his position, which he presents at the end as that of his guru in this field, Bhaṭṭendurāja: *na hi so 'ntyaḥ kṣaṇaḥ sphuṭadehāvasthānāt/ na hy asāv antyaḥ kṣaṇo 'smadvivakṣito bhavādṛśair lakṣyate/ tatra tv antye kṣaṇe yenaiva rūpeṇa bhavitavyaṃ tatsaṃskārasya dūravartino 'pi deśakālavyavahitānām apy ānantaryam iti nyāyena prabodhena bhāvyam/ tadvāśāt tatsmaraṇaṃ tatsmṛtyā tadbhāvaprāptiḥ*, 'That [moment] is not the [true] last moment, because it concerns clearly the body [only]; on the other hand, the last moment that we are concerned with is not the last moment that these gentlemen [who speak in this way] intend. Whatever be the form [of an experience] that was once present [to the mind], one must, at the final moment, apprehend [the presence of] root impressions (*saṃskāra*) [left] by that [experience], however distant [it might have been] — in accordance with the dictum (YS IV 9, not quoted in its entirety by AG) "even [things, viz., in the YS's context, *vāsanās*] separated in space or time may exist in proximity". Thanks to these [root impressions], there is recollection of them; and in virtue of that recollection, one takes on the existence [indicated] by them'. Note that YS IV 9 reads: *jātideśakālavyavahitānām apy ānantaryaṃ smṛtisaṃskārayor ekarūpatvāt*. In translating the passage, we differ from Sharma, who does not recognize the quote from YS, and translates: 'By last moment is not meant the moment of obvious physical demise. The last moment we wish to talk of is not of the kind seen by you all (on the outside). At that last moment, whatever (mental) form ought to be will come to be by the logic that even a remote impression (*saṃskāra*), even in the case of those obscured by time and space, will be regained on account of belonging to the innermost nature. Under its influence memory (will arise) and through that memory that (appropriate) condition will be attained'. AG completes his exposition by saying that these 'traces' (*saṃskāra*) — hidden — may cancel the 'traces' more in evidence left by the behavior of the dying man at his final moment — because they enjoy a status that is more irrevocable, having in virtue of their very acquisition put an end to the temporality and particularity on which the chance behaviors listed above depend. It is for this reason that Kṛṣṇa recommends that one remember him always — there exist *saṃskāras* (*tajjāḥ*: those born of that — the identification with the divinity) that are able to cancel other *saṃskāras*

not lapse from ultimate reality [experienced] as his own Self.[1329]

The purloining[1330] **of the group of organs**, viz., the thirteen external and internal sense-organs, means the complete disappearance of their essential function. As, for example, [when] the sense-organs, beginning with the eye, make no pretense as to apprehending [external] objects, such as colors, etc.; or when the organs of action, beginning with the voice, cease, insofar as their functions of speaking, grasping, etc., are concerned. Neither can the intelligence (*buddhi*) [in such cases] determine[1331] the object as it is, nor the mind (*manas*) find a basis[1332] [in the data offered by the senses], and even the ego (*ahaṅkāra*) remains then in the condition of a latency (*saṃskāra*) [emerging only] from time to time.[1333]

Similarly, **loss of memory** means the spiriting away of the content of an experience: [as when] one who is about to die is unable to recognize an object placed before him, though apprehended hundreds of times [previously], even when urged to do so by his relatives.

For this reason, the fact that he has once and for all become identical with the being of the [universe, or the Supreme Lord] [— hence, his ultimate salvation] is beyond [viz., is not dependent on] vedic recitations [made at the time of death];[1334] nor do acts of liberality or anything else [done by relatives] in the final hours, like drawings on the sky, have any effect on his mind when it is in that condition [of identity] — but [if the relatives want to do them], there is no obstacle to doing so, inasmuch as

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hostile to them (*anyasaṃskārapratibandhin*, YS I 50), even if one is unconscious of them at the end; see also n. 1243 and 1244.

[1329] Or, be the ablative understood as an ablative of cause (according to an alternative interpretation of the corresponding passage in the commentary): 'Therefore, even if he be afflicted with delusion at the hour of death, the knower of the Self does not cease [to be such], because his own Self is now known as ultimate reality (or, be *svātmaparamārthāt* understood as a TP, 'because of the ultimacy of his own Self')'. In the commentary, be the compound *prarūḍhacaitanyapratyavamarśasatattvāt* analyzed as a TP, the translation would be: '[...] because his own Self is now known as ultimate reality, that is, because his essential nature is the developed awareness of his consciousness'.

[1330] *pramoṣa*.

[1331] On *adhyavasāya*, 'determination' (or *niścaya*), as the function of the *buddhi*, see n. 401 and 591.

[1332] *anavasthiti* — the term *anavasthiti* suggests the *regressus ad infinitum* of the logicians; its use here, in a Sāṃkhya-like context, suggests a 'mind' (*manas*) that 'goes in circles', not finding its normal basis in sense-perception.

[1333] The *saṃskāras* are not normally said to function in the absence of the sense-organs, of which they are the "root traces". What YR means here, probably, is that, deprived of the function of the sense-organs, nothing remains of the *ahaṅkāra* apart from traces previously accumulated, which, as traces, never rise to the level of consciousness of the dying person. On the respective functions of *buddhi*, *manas* and *ahaṅkāra* in the process of cognition, see PS 19.

[1334] *brahmavidyākathana* — lit., 'recitation of the knowledge of *brahman*'. We have opted for the (otherwise unusual) syntactical linkage of *vinā* with the following term.

they have been enjoined in the ritual texts.[1335]

[As for the compound, *śvāsakalilatā*, **'choking'**, lit., 'confinement of breath':] — by 'breath' (*śvāsa*) [is meant] 'vital air (*vāyu*) [that remains] in the throat'; its 'restriction' (*kalilatā*) in the area of the throat [is exemplified by] such things as stammering and hiccuping.[1336]

Similarly, **rupture in vital points** means 'disruption of the ligatures that bind the bones, etc.'.

And by **particular diseases** is meant 'fever, dysentery, and the like'.

Now, because of a disordering of the humors — wind, bile, phlegm — **of that body**, which is nothing but a material sheath (*bhūtakañcuka*), **the experiences**[1337] **born of such modifications affecting the body** are the experiences of suffering belonging to that body.

How, then, in what manner, **could that [experience] not belong** to the knower of the Self as well **inasmuch as he is [still] associated with a body**? It would indeed be [experienced]!

Therefore, because of [such objections], [the master has affirmed that] **the knower of the Self** — who [after all] has overcome the conceit that takes the body, etc., to be the Self and who has mastered the relationship between the Great Lord and his own Self[1338] — **does not lapse**, that is, does not go to a condition different, **from ultimate reality [experienced as] his own Self**[1339] — experience whose essential nature is the developed awareness that [he is nothing but] consciousness, even though there remains [at that moment] a connection with an ignorance born of the body that is itself generated by dying.

Since the knower of the Self, by whom the connection with the body has been cast aside, is not able to identify with experiences born of that body, he does not apprehend the moment immediately adjacent to the casting off of the body[1340] [such as would be the case] if he were merely an ordinary man. This being so, no unprecedented consequence ensues for him, whose heart is located in the Self[1341] and who has practiced devotion to the Lord as he carried on his activities in perfect health, via intentions

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[1335] Lit., 'such may be done merely for its ritual effectiveness (*itikartavyatā*), and has been so enjoined (*iti niyogaḥ*)'. The passage suggests that the recitations and the gifts at issue are those of relatives or others in attendance on the dying *jīvanmukta*, made in the hopes of easing his agony or of assuring him an easier passage.

[1336] The same symptoms are described in GAS VIII 7: *śvāsāyāsa, hikkā, gadgada*; cf. TĀ XXVIII 327b. See also YR ad PS 83.

[1337] *bhoga* — lit., 'delights'.

[1338] Or 'who has taken upon himself [a state of identity] with the Great Lord'. That is, leaving no room for any suspicion of difference.

[1339] Beyond the Self recognized as such, there is no further or more ultimate Real to be sought.

[1340] The meaning is perhaps that the dying *jīvanmukta* is no longer, in any case, in contact with the body at the moment when it gives signs of ceasing to function.

[1341] *svasthahṛdaya*.

that are self-formulated.[1342]

Therefore [we say that] the knower of the Self is liberated (*mukta*) at the very moment that his Self encompasses [the universe — *svātmaprathā*]; the modifications affecting the body no longer constitute for him any restraint — as has been already explained hundreds of times.

As for him who[se life] is composed of [choices between] piety or sin, and who ever confuses the body with the Self, how can he not come to identify with that body — for such identification arises from the experience of pleasure and pain and the like brought about by modifications affecting the body?

As it has been stated:

> But when under dominance of goodness/[1343] The body-bearing (soul) goes to dissolution,/[1344] Then to the worlds of them that know the highest,/ The spotless (worlds), he attains.[1345]

The [three] qualities — *sattva* and so on — which are attributes of Nature, constitute a constraint only for him who has identified himself with them [viz., with the qualities].

From which it follows moreover that, concentrating with determination [on them] as separate from that [Self], the qualities [constitute] no [constraint] for him. Therefore, the path of the knower of the Self is

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[1342] *svasaṃkalpitābhiprāyeṇa* — the acts, whether involuntary or not, of the dying *jīvanmukta* have no effect on him (that is, they do not produce any *apūrva*), for his thought is self-dependent: it is not open to any external influences.

[1343] See GAS XIV 14: *yadā samagreṇaiva janmanānavaratasāttvika-vyāpārābhyāsāt sattvaṃ vivṛddhaṃ bhavati tadā prāptapralayasya śubhalokāvāptiḥ*, 'When *sattva* becomes predominant as a result of carrying on *sāttvika* practices ceaselessly throughout one's entire life, then follows the attainment by the deceased of benign worlds' (tr. Sharma). Note that at the end of his commentary on XIV 14, AG takes advantage of the verse to reassert his own interpretation of the moment of death: *ye tu vyācakṣate maraṇakāla eva sattvādau vivṛddhe etāni phalānīti tena samyak śārīre 'nubhave praviṣṭāḥ/ yataḥ sarvasyaiva sarvathāntye kṣaṇe moha evopajāyate/ asmadvyākhyāyāṃ ca saṃvādīnīmāni ślokāntarāṇi.* According to the fact that the text would read better with *te* instead of *tena* (*tena* being superfluous here), we modify Sharma's translation: 'Those who say that these results follow upon the predominance of *sāttvika* or other qualities only at the moment of death are (pre-)occupied with physical experience [i.e., they take a grossly physical view of the situation]. For in case of everyone always at the last moment delusion (*moha*) alone appears. In this commentary of ours there are other verses consistent with these ideas'. YR here, by quoting BhG XIV 14 in the same context, seems to agree with AG.

[1344] 'He goes to dissolution', i.e., 'he dies' (*pralayaṃ maraṇaṃ yāti*) — so Śaṅkara.

[1345] BhG XIV 14. The BhG deals elaborately with the *guṇas* in this chapter. This statement of the BhG assumes as its context *jñāna*: what is the *siddhi* attained through knowledge? According to Śaṅkara, the 'knowers of the highest' are the 'knowers of such *tattvas* as *mahat* — i.e., *brahman*, etc.' (*mahadāditattvavidām*); the 'immaculate worlds of the knowers of the highest' may be understood as referring to intellection (*buddhi*) — immaculate because *sattva* is properly the *guṇa* of *buddhi*. Note that, in the same context, TĀ XXVIII 326b gives a paraphrase of BhG XIV 14–15, which TĀV ad loc. quotes in its entirety.

altogether different [from the path of those who have identified themselves with the qualities].

On the other hand, fettered cognizers who have not seen the feet of a preceptor [viz., who have not approached him for instruction], misconstrue[1346] the qualities that are proper to the [knower of the Self]. For instance, they might say: 'If he is a *jñānin*, why does he experience [such sufferings], his body stricken with disease, etc.? Why does he [still] support [them]?'[1347] Or, if he becomes inert at the time of death, they might say: 'He doesn't remember anything'.

Who is there who will question them, quarreling amongst themselves, since they are afflicted with such many-sided nescience? [Who is there who will say:] 'Even if this fellow is a *jñānin* and now gives evidence of traces [produced] by properties of the body, how for all that would he be defiled?'[1348]

The self-illumination of him who knows the Self remains ever the illumination of the Self, though that illumination be variegated by this or that [external] condition.[1349]

There is further no interruption in the pure experience of his own Self through which his knowledge might [in that interruption be said to] perish.

Though in him the power of the six qualities[1350] was complete, did not even Lord Vāsudeva, in his incarnation as Kr̥ṣṇa, experience the pain born of a hunter's arrow's wound, and did he not then abandon his material body? In this case, was there any cessation of the essential nature of the

[1346]*anyatra āpādayanti* — lit., 'transfer elsewhere'. The normal meaning of the verb suggests an inopportune transfer that augments the delusion of those already deluded *paśus*.

[1347]Lit., 'why does he wear, viz., put up with such suffering?'

[1348]The implication is that no one but the *jñānin* is able to ask such a question, and he is not in a position to do so.

[1349]Cf. YR ad 93: *nahi bhātam abhātaṃ syāt.*

[1350]*ṣāḍguṇya* — lit., 'the state of being endowed with six qualities'. LT II 24–36 enumerates the six along with their definitions: 1) *jñāna*, 'knowledge', 'omniscience'; 2) *aiśvarya* (II 28), 'lordship'; 3) *śakti* (II 29), 'ability', 'potency' ['to become the material cause of the world': *jagatprakr̥tibhāva*]; 4) *bala* (II 30), 'strength', i.e., 'absence of fatigue (*śramābhāva*) in connection with the production of the world'; 5) *vīrya* (II 31–33), 'virility', i.e., 'unaffectedness (*vikāravihara*) in spite of being the material cause' [this is a condition, says LT II 31, not found within the world where 'milk quickly loses its nature when curd comes into existence']; 6) *tejas* (II 34), 'splendor', 'might', which is said to be 'power to defeat others' (*parābhibhavanasāmarthya*). For a detailed exposition of the concept of *ṣāḍguṇya*, see Schrader (1973: 37–39). According to *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā* VI 25: *ṣāḍguṇyavigrahaṃ devam* and LT II 6: *jñānādyāḥ ṣaḍguṇā ete ṣāḍguṇyaṃ mama tadvapuḥ*, Schrader concludes: 'In their totality the *guṇas* make up the body of Vāsudeva [...] as well as of his consort Lakṣmī. [...] It is mainly in this form, to wit as a person qualified by the six *guṇas* and distinct from his Śakti, that God is called Vāsudeva'. As Schrader observes (p. 36): 'The old dogma that God is necessarily "free from [the three] *guṇas*" (*nirguṇa*) does not exclude His possessing the six ideal *guṇas* which, on the contrary, must be ascribed to Him, because without them there could be no "pure creation", and, all further evolution depending ad loc., no creation at all'.

Lord of the universe?[1351]

Modifications affecting the body, from that of the insect to Sadāśiva, are all of this sort; however, the latter [Sadāśiva] has a body composed solely of awareness of his own Self, whereas the former [the insect] has for its essence the conceit that the body, and so on, is the Self. So much is the difference [between gnat and God].

Thus the corporeal properties of the knower and of him who is not a knower (*ajñānin*) are perforce similar; but not for all that, is there any similarity of consequence.

Such a truth has been stated in the revered *Gītā*:

> One acts in conformity with his own/ Material nature,[1352] — even the wise man;/[1353] Beings follow (their own) nature;/ What will restraint accomplish?[1354]

[1351]The episode is narrated in MBh XVI 5, 19–20.

[1352]Such is the explanation of Śaṅkara: *prakṛtir nāma pūrvakṛtadharmādharmādisaṃskārāḥ vartamānajanmādau abhivyaktāḥ sā prakṛtiḥ* [according to the text published in the POS, p. 59], '*prakṛti* means the modifications [or perfectionings] (*saṃskāra*), such as piety and impiety, etc., acquired during past [lives] that become manifest in this present life'.

[1353]The explanation of Śaṅkara is as follows: *jñānavān api kiṃ punar mūrkhaḥ*, 'Even a wise man [so acts] — what indeed will a fool [do]?'

[1354]BhG III 33. Commenting *nigrahaḥ kiṃ kariṣyati*, 'What will restraint do here?', Śaṅkara adds, putting these words in the mouth of Kṛṣṇa, *mama vā anyasya*, '[What will restraint do here] from Me or anyone else?' The impressions of merit and demerit shape the nature (*prakṛti*) of every being, therefore they are also *prakṛti*, and the individual self behaves in keeping with this. It is common to both, *jñānin* and *ajñānin*, even if the result is not the same: the *jñānin* is able to move against *prakṛti* and, determining his own course, to attain liberation, whereas the non-*jñānin* falls prey to his own *prakṛti* determined by his own *saṃskāras*. The quotation from the *Gītā* substantiates the first part of the statement: when there is a body, the logic of the body will be there, whether it is the body of the *jñānin*, or of the one who is not a *jñānin*; this body will have to undergo all its attributes, or conditions, and no intervention, from any side, will be able to do anything. As far as the body is concerned, no control is possible: one cannot make one's body eternal. However, the situation is a different thing when it comes to consciousness, the perennial substratum of the transitory body. Trying to overcome both hatred and attachment, i.e., all kinds of *saṃskāras*, the *jñānin* is able to restrain, to control himself (it is the *nigraha* referred to in BhG), thus to transgress *prakṛti* — if not in the realm of differentiation, at least at the level of unity, when he strives for it — and to attain liberation. GAS ad III 33 explains this verse in a very clear way: *yo 'pi ca jñānī na tasya vyavahāre bhojanādau viparyāsaḥ kaścit/ api tu so 'pi sattvādyucitam eva ceṣṭate evam eva jānan/ ato bhūtānāṃ pṛthivyādīnāṃ prakṛtau vilayaḥ ātmā cākartā nityamukta iti kasya janmādinigrahaḥ*, 'He also who is a knower of the Self will be in no way averse to such worldly activities as eating, etc. Rather he acts properly in accordance with the *sattva*, etc., (that predominates in him) and he knows that "after this the elements such as earth, etc., will dissolve in *prakṛti*, but the *ātman*, which is a non-agent [a 'non-actor', as translated by Sharma] (*akartṛ*), is eternally free". [Therefore] to whom applies the restraint from birth, etc.? [I.e., to whom apply the measures intended to check the process of rebirth, etc.? Not to the *jñānin*]'; Sharma understands differently *kasya janmādinigrahaḥ*: 'Who is imprisonned in birth, etc.? [Not the man of knowledge.]'.

Kārikā 96

Now the master, explaining that the cause [of insight] is nothing but the marvelous [1355] descent of [the Lord's] supreme energy (*paraśaktipāta*), posits a difference of result in the process of perfectioning that attends upon the discipline of [acquiring] knowledge — which process may be instantaneous or progressive: [1356]

96. When [the yogin] accedes to this way of ultimate reality immediately, [upon instruction] from the mouth of the preceptor [himself], [1357] **then he becomes Śiva** [1358] **without further obstacle, in virtue of a grace that is extremely forceful.**

At the moment in which a person — [he can be] anyone at all for whom this birth is the last — **accedes**, that is to say, engages upon, **this way of ultimate reality** which has been explained [to him] hundreds of times already, [1359] [after hearing the teaching directly] **from the mouth of the preceptor**, that is, of a most excellent instructor — namely, the method consisting of the secret transmission by word-of-mouth [that leads to] perfect knowledge of one's own self (*svātmasaṃbodha*), and whose chief characteristic is complete autonomy ... [1360]

... [that person] **then**, that is, at that very moment — immediately upon [receiving] the teaching of the preceptor,

[becomes] Śiva himself, without further obstacle. [1361] As it has been stated in the *Śrīkula*: [1362]

[1355] Or 'marvelously variegated', 'variable'.

[1356] The question of variable grace has been taken up in kā. 9. From here, through kā. 102, YR develops kā. 9 elaborately, emphasizing its esoteric dimension.

[1357] Viz., merely on the strength of the preceptor's teachings.

[1358] ... *eva śiva* = *śiva eva*.

[1359] Same terms — *paramārthamārgam enam* — and same gloss in PS 100 and YR ad loc.

[1360] Same phraseology in YR ad PS 87.

[1361] According to YR, *eva* is to be taken with *śivaḥ* rather than with *nirvighnam*, as in the kārikā.

[1362] Perhaps, the text referred to here is the *Kularatnamālikā*, that YR quotes ad 83, especially because immediate liberation is the issue in both passages (note that Wilson MS ad 83 reads *śrīkularatnamālikāsāhasrikā*). Nevertheless *Śrīkula* can be the short form of a number of texts, for instance: the *Kulasāra*, which ŚSV III 43 quotes after the *Kularatnamālā*, the *Kulapañcāśikā*, the *Śrīkulaguhvara* [*°gahvara*] quoted or referred to in TĀV III 170, 174, XXVV 13–16, XXXII 49–50b, the *Śrīkulakrīḍāvatāra* (TĀV XXIX 36–39), the *Śrīkulakramodaya* (TĀV XXIX 63), etc. Reference is made here to the *kulācārya* and to the way his sidelong-glances (*kaṭākṣapāta*) constitute an "initiation", which gives the disciple access to *jīvanmukti*; according to the PM, MM 66 alludes to the instantaneity of realization (and therefore of liberation) which the sidelong-glance of the guru brings forth. In effect, the PM quotes a verse from the *Ratnamālā* (which is also quoted in two places in TĀ XIII 230b–231a and XXXVII 29, although with variants: *yantram* for *yatra*, *prakāśitam* for *prabhāṣitam*): *yasmin kāle tu guruṇā nirvikalpaṃ prabhāṣitam/ tadaiva kila mukto 'sau yatra tiṣṭhati kevalam*', and comments: '*[...] gurukaṭākṣapātalakṣaṇāt [...] kṣaṇād eva*'. Similarly, MM 67, whose subject-matter is

> He, O dear one, is instantly liberated, on whom the [guru who] knows the essence [of things, who knows the real] casts his glances, whether inadvertently,[1363] or playfully, or even respectfully.

Now, one may ask: — 'How might [the guru] initiate [his disciple] into a secret [teaching that involves a] verbal transmission of this sort?'[1364]

The master replies: **'in virtue of a grace that is extremely forceful** (*atitīvra*)**'.** In other words, **extremely forceful**, that is, harsh, is the **descent** (*pāta*) **of the energy** (*śakti*) of the Supreme Lord, its transfer (*avataraṇa*) to the lotus heart of the fettered soul, which is [also] termed [the Lord's] 'favor' (*anugraha*) — by which descent even the fettered soul becomes Śiva, that is, is liberated while he yet lives (*jīvann eva muktaḥ*), after hearing the teacher's communication of that verbal tradition.

As copper is turned into gold by pouring mercury upon it [so is the fettered soul transformed into Śiva].[1365]

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jīvanmukti, refers explicitly to the '*deśikakaṭākṣapāta*', that is, as explained in the PM, to the '*kulācāryakaṭākṣapāta*'. The sidelong-glance of the *kulācārya* is that of Śiva himself, adds the PM, citing an Āgama: *kulācāryam adhiṣṭhāya devo dīkṣayitā śivaḥ*, 'Taking up residence in the teacher of the Kula, the god is Śiva in the form of him who confers initiation'. Same reference to the *deśikakaṭākṣapāta* in PM 58.

[1363] *helayā* — it is perhaps worth noting that B&R, for the "root" *hel*, refers the reader to the root *krīḍ*. Mayrhofer recognizes no such "verb" but, for *helā* (whose etymology, as a noun, has not been satisfactorily clarified), refers chiefly to derived forms found in the two epics — to which one might add those of B&R for *helayā*: 'leichtsinniger Weise, mit Leichtigkeit, ohne sich irgend einen Zwang anzutun, ohne Weiteres, mir nichts dir nichts', which capture a range of the term's allusions, but weigh more heavily on the side of 'absence of intention', thus according well with the present passage. Those usages that tend toward 'elegantly, gracefully', etc., seem to be either contextual interpretations or late acceptations. The nominalized *helā*, found in the dramaturgical literature, seems rather a technical usage which extends a bit further the usual sense of the "adverbial" term (on that notion, see Bansat-Boudon 1991: 199–226). According to the dictionaries, it is only in such texts that the term is employed in its full nominal dress: the quasi-totality of non-dramatic citations is "adverbial" — our *helayā*; see also YR ad 98–99.

[1364] *mukhāmnāya* — the relevance of the objection appears to concern the sense to be attributed to the term *āmnāya*, which in normal usage presumes a long apprenticeship at the feet of the teacher — as in the case of learning the Veda, which requires eight years of daily study (note the borrowing of the term *āhnika* to designate the chapters of the TĀ itself), or learning Sanskrit grammar, which requires even more. YR seems eager to adduce that a verbal transmission of this sort is at issue, at least in the sense that the concluding "lesson" is received directly from the mouth of the master.

[1365] In the alchemical traditions of Āyurveda and Tantrism, mercury (*rasa* or *pārada*), by undergoing a certain process, called *pāradasaṃskāra* (which includes eighteen modes of transformation — *saṃskāra*), is ultimately 'perfected' (*siddha*). In the present context, mercury, which is celebrated at length as a means to acquire an enduring body, is also seen as a means of attaining the highest goal, liberation; see *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* IX, where, at the outset, it is explained that 'mercury is called *pārada*, because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of transmigratory states', and the citation, there, of the *Rasasiddhānta*: 'One not living cannot know the knowable, and therefore there is and must be life'. YR's commentary alludes only to that tradition according to which this mercury, poured into melted copper,

Now the purport of this is as follows: the acquisition of the knowledge of one's own Self has for its unique means (*upāya*) the favor of the Supreme Lord. Here, such [acts] as silent recitation, meditation, offering sacrifice, etc., which arise thanks to the [Lord's] power of causal constraint, are ineffectual as means.

Rather, in this case, the secret of the verbal tradition [received directly] from the mouth of the deity[1366] attracts violently,[1367] without delay, the heart of him whose heart[1368] has been pierced by the energy of [the Lord's] favor — thanks to which [reception] he becomes the Supreme Lord at once. Hence, the marvelous grace of the Supreme Lord should not be brought into question [or 'inquired into', 'doubted'].

Kārikā 97

As for the [aspirant] unto whom the [Lord's] grace descends with middling, feeble, or very feeble intensity, etc., he too may acquire the condition of Śiva (*śivatva*), when the body falls away, provided he has meditated (*vimr̥śat*) on the words of the preceptor up until the moment of death in accordance with the stages of his discipline (*yogakrama*). Thus, the master now explains:

97. Identification with Śiva[1369] is his [also] who accedes to the utterly transcendent state in graduated steps,[1370] finally gaining familiarity with the ultimate principle.[1371]

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instantly tranforms it into gold. Yet, the more speculative dimension of the alchemical process, as developed in what the *Rasasiddhānta* calls the *raseśvaradarśana*, is also implicitly present.

[1366] In the Āgamas, the first person is normally reserved to the deity, or to a sage; the office of the guru is to transmit their teachings.

[1367] Here the way of *haṭhapāka*, 'forced maturation', is referred to, which TĀ III 260–262 deals with elaborately.

[1368] The repetition is in the text itself, although it is not a strict case of "repetition" by Indian standards, for one instance of the word *hr̥daya* is a noun, whereas the other is part of an adjectival compound describing the acolyte (to be supplied).

[1369] *śivamayībhāva* — lit., 'making oneself into Śiva'.

[1370] *sopānapadakrameṇa* — Silburn translates: 'gravissant pas à pas l'échelle (des catégories)' [— 'the ladder (of the categories)'], but, in her commentary, which takes into account YR's, she understands that the reference here is to the *cakras*, which seems to be more correct. Also see her Intr., p. 45, in which she stresses that YR ad 97 alludes to the 'seven stages' of the *kuṇḍalinī*'s ascent. It appears, nevertheless, that YR enumerates eight of them.

[1371] On the linguistic application of the term *rūḍhi*, see n. 1089. The mention of *rūḍhi* in this odd context, as well as in the avat. to 98–99, may help to fix the sense of this problematic term. In effect, the problem the aspirant is deemed to face here is twofold: the words of the teacher have not induced in him a "sudden" insight (kā. 97) nor has that insight been vouschafed to him as he confronts his final moments (kā. 98–99). The term *rūḍhi* applies suitably in both contexts: the acolyte has not understood the "direct sense" of the teacher's instruction, and that sense remains mysterious to him even at the moment of death. In both

Thus, as has been said,[1372] **for him who**, because of the feeble descent of the [divine] energy, **accedes to the utterly transcendent state**, without having [at first] appropriated the teachings [of his master] regarding perfect knowledge (*pūrṇajñāna*), that is, who comes [at length] to experience directly the state that is above all the principles ...

— But, interrupts an objector, how [is this possible]? The master says: **'[It is done] in graduated steps'**, that is, little-by-little: [his awareness is concentrated first] in the bulb, then in the navel, then in the heart, etc.

The **steps** (*sopāna°*) are these: the 'bulb' (*kanda*), the navel (*nābhi*), the heart (*hṛd*), the throat (*kaṇṭha*),[1373] the soft palate (*lampikā*),[1374] the 'drop' (*bindu*), the 'resonance' (*nāda*, or 'phonation') [through which] energy [progresses], that is to say, they are the stages (*tīrtha*) for moving [the *śakti*] upwards;[1375] [each] of them is a **state** (*°pada°*) and [at the same

cases, what is missing is the *rūḍhi* — the 'immediate apprehension' that guarantees liberation; hence our translation by 'familiarity'.

[1372] *kila* — see Emeneau 1969: 241ff.

[1373] *nābhi, hṛd, kaṇṭha*, are three of the six *cakras* — but should not be confused with the organs themselves. The 'bulb', *kanda* (or *meḍhrakanda*), also named *guhyasthāna*, the 'secret place', is the opening of the *mūlādhāra* (the 'radical support', the lowest of the *cakras*, at the base of the spine, in the area of the genitals, where the different *nāḍīs*, or canals of vital energy, join). In fact, represented as a triangle in tantric accounts, the *mūlādhāra* may be turned downwards (then called *adhovaktra*, the 'downwards opening'), or upwards, and called *kanda*. Located at the root of the sexual organ [Avalon says 'between the genitals and the anus'] (i.e., five fingers below the navel, and two fingers above the membrum virile), near the anus, it allows the virile power to pass into the central channel; at that point, it is called *trikoṇa*, the 'triangular sanctuary', inasmuch as it is made of the three divine *śaktis*: *icchā, jñāna* and *kriyā*. See Silburn 1983: 43.

[1374] Rather, *lampikā* (or *lambikā*, lit., 'which hangs down') is the uvula, the flexible extremity of the soft palate. It is also called *tālu*, or *catuḥpada*, for it is seen as the intersection of four ways, and, as such, symbolized by a lotus with four petals where the two ways of the ordinary external breath (one descending in the lungs, the other going up through the trachea) cross the two ways specific to the interiorized breath of the *kuṇḍalinī* (one descending to the *mūlādhāra*, the other going up to the *brahmarandhra*). Described as located below the *brahmarandhra*, and turned toward the *bhrūmadhya*, the *lampikā*, as is the case with the *lalāṭa* (in the middle of the forehead) or the *triveṇi* (also situated at the level of the *bhrūmadhya*), is not a *cakra*. Rather it is a place where air gathers in such a way that breath changes its nature, and, becoming tenuous, is a source of peace and bliss. See Silburn 1983: 45, Silburn, Padoux TĀ: 274, Hugues 1997: 106–107, Sanderson 1986: 177–181.

[1375] *bindu, nāda* and *śakti* are included in the stages of ascent of the *kuṇḍalinī* (see VBh 30, and its commentary which details this twelvefold process, in Silburn VBh: 81–82). Explicitly relating to the realm of phonic energy, the first two are also associated with a specific place in the subtle body. *bindu*, representing "mental" energy, is located in *bhrūmadhyacakra*, and *nāda*, representing conceptual thought, in the space which extends from *lalāṭa*, in the middle of the forehead (the place for those subtle modulations of the phonic energy which are *ardhacandra* and *nirodhinī*, between *bindu* and *nāda* in the ascending movement), to the summit of the head. *śakti* (as a level of sound in the *uccāra*, viz., in the articulation of the mantra and the upward movement of phonic energy) is beyond the corporeal process, since the yogin has transcended the frame of the body at this stage. Through *nāda*, its unarticulated and almost imperceptible resonance (itself ending in *nādānta*, even more subtle, which resides higher, at the level of the *brahmarandhracakra*), that power of the mantra dissolves into *śakti*, Śiva's

time] an acquisition; [by going] from one [to another], by abandoning one and accepting another, there is **sequence** (°*kramaḥ*) —[1376]

... there is for this [kind of] yogin as well acquisition of the condition of Śiva[1377] on the occasion of abandoning his corporeal body,[1378] to the extent that he has grasped the ultimate reality evolving[1379] [within him] — [an acquisition] "by degrees".

Thus has been expounded the sequential procedure (*kramayukti*) [which too permits merging in the absolute].

Energy, which is its very source, and where some form of sonorous vibration remains. Then the dissolution of this sonorous vibration goes on, within *śakti* itself, with three more stages which are not referred to here, by YR, viz., *vyāpinī*, the 'Pervading', *samanā*, the 'Conscious', and *unmanā*, the 'Transmental level'. On this entire process, see Padoux PTLvṛ: 83ff., and Sanderson 1986: 178–180 (from whom we borrow the translation of *vyāpinī*, *samanā* and *unmanā*).

[1376]Thus, according to the commentary, *kuṇḍalinīyoga* seems to be referred to in the kārikā (see also the avat. which speaks of *yogakrama*). Unless (though less probably) one is to understand that AG meant another ascent: perhaps from an inferior practice, such as the visualization of deities, to the superior one of the PT, as AG understood it, meditation on sounds, etc. (see PT: 265–266, where occurs the desiderative noun *ārurukṣuḥ*, 'the one who desires to ascend'). This process of the ascending *kuṇḍalinī* is indissociable from the yogin's ascent through successive levels of phonic energy, experienced in the articulation of a mantra (probably the *parabīja SAUḤ*, as may be inferred from the similar passage of TĀ V 54b–62a); such is suggested by the reference to *bindu*, *nāda* and *śakti*. This ascent also coincides with the process of the reabsorption of the differentiated into pure consciousness (itself correlating with the cosmic reabsorption of the entire phenomenal manifestation). What is hinted at, here, is a complex and most elaborate practice involving the differentiated stages, up to the *nābhi*, of the *āṇavopāya*, the 'means, or way, of the finite soul', and the *śāktopāya*, the 'means, or way, of energy', referring to the ascent of the subtle energy through five stages (*hṛd*, *kaṇṭha*, *tālu*, *bhrūmadhya* and *lalāṭa*) before reaching the supreme phases that start from *nāda* (see Silburn VBh: 82). As stated above, PS 97 may be compared to TĀ V 56b–57a, not only because both passages use the term *sopāna*, but also because they appear to describe the same process. By enumerating *bindu*, *nāda* and *śakti*, YR's commentary seems to echo TĀ V 56b–57a, where the *kuṇḍalinī*, explicitly mentioned, is seen as 'blossoming into a garland (*mālikā*) [of subtle energies] going, through successive stages, from *bindu*, in the middle of the eye-brows, to *nādānta* and *śakti*'. JR, explaining *bhrūbindunādāntaśaktisopānamālikām*, expounds the process more fully, adding the missing items, viz., *nāda*, *vyāpinī* and *samanā*: 'The garland of [the subtle energies:] *bindu*, *nāda*, *nādānta*, *śakti*, *vyāpinī* and *samanā*, which are [considered as] degrees (*sopāna*), inasmuch as [the yogin] has recourse to ascending the steps higher and higher (*ūrdhvordhvapadārohopāyatvāt*)'.

[1377]Lit., 'of a condition whose essence is Śivahood'.

[1378]Such a yogin will attain the complete liberation that is named *videhamukti*, only at death, for the body remains in some way a sheath for him. This explains the two concepts of *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti*.

[1379]*paramārthapraroha*.

Kārikās 98–99

Should such familiarity[1380] [with the object of his practice] not be acquired, even though the adept has practiced confidently the yoga of "stages" (*kramayoga*), then some obstacle to the attainment of his desired goal has intervened. And if death itself should intervene with his goal yet unattained, then 'what will be the issue'? The master removes this apprehension:

98. But, it may at some time or other happen that for him [the "sequential" yogin], because of a pause[1381] in the course of his practice, death intervenes before he has gone to the extreme limit where ultimate reality is experienced,[1382] though his heart yearns to reach the [highest] state.

99. He, whom the Teaching[1383] terms 'fallen from discipline', becomes in consequence a lord of worlds full of wonderful enjoyments; then coming again into existence in a following birth, he will become Śiva,[1384] thanks to the stage of progress achieved when he paused.[1385]

And so,

because of a pause in the course [of his practice] means that, due to some obstacle, [the adept] who practices yoga (*yogābhyāsa*) in progressive stages[1386] has remained content with the experience acquired on one of the [lower] *cakra*-levels;

and, **before he has gone to the extreme limit where ultimate reality is experienced** means that he has not attained the state proposed [by his

[1380] *rūḍhi* — see n. 1089 and 1371.

[1381] See YR ad loc. *viśrānti* — 'pause', 'cessation', sometimes understood positively ('repose'), sometimes less so ('rest'). Here it is to be taken neutrally, for, despite the commentary, the 'cessation' of discipline may be either voluntary (as from laziness or premature satisfaction) or involuntary (as by lightning or sickness). The term, like many others in this tradition, has "poetic" overtones: the sense of fulfillment or completion that characterizes aesthetic experience (*rasa*); see Bansat-Boudon 1992.

[1382] Lit., 'that extreme edge [of that which is] made of ultimate reality'. Silburn understands *dhārā* as the 'culminating point': 'Mais celui qui s'arrêtant à mi-voie du recueillement n'accède pas au point culminant qui est la réalité suprême [...]'.

[1383] *śāstra* — see n. 1390.

[1384] *śivībhavati*.

[1385] Cf. BhG VI 41–44, particularly 41: 'Attaining the heavenly worlds of the doers of right,/ Dwelling there for endless years,/ In the house of pure and illustrious folk/ One that has fallen from discipline is born', and BhG VI 43–44a: 'There that association of mentality/ He obtains, which was his in his former body;/ And he strives from that point onward/ Unto perfection, son of Kuru (43).// For by the same former practice/ He is carried on even without his wish (44a)'. GAS VI 41 glosses 'for endless years' (*śāśvatīḥ samāḥ*) as 'for three years of Viṣṇu' (*śāśvatasya viṣṇoḥ samāḥ — vaiṣṇavāni trīni varṣāṇi*)!

[1386] *ullaṅghanakrameṇa*.

preceptor], which, above and beyond all the paths (*adhvan*),[1387] has the form of the ultimate principle;

If, however, **though his heart yearns to reach the [highest] state**, that is, though eager to realize[1388] the presence of ultimate reality, as taught [by his preceptor],

at some time or other, in the midst [of the process], an inopportune event[1389] is seen to befall him, then, what will be his future course when the body falls away, [inasmuch as] he had not attained what was to be attained?

The master replies: **'He [whom the Teaching terms] "fallen from discipline", etc.'.**

He is, in the Teaching, that is, in the authoritative text,[1390] **termed** or said to be **'fallen from discipline'** (*yogabhraṣṭa*),[1391] that is to say, he is **one fallen**, or swerving,[1392] **from the discipline [of realization]** (*yoga*), from absorption (*samādhi*) [in the absolute] — or from both.

What sort of person, then, would he be?

The master replies: **'[A lord of worlds full] of wonderful [enjoy-**

[1387]The paths referred to here are the 'six paths', the *ṣaḍadhvan* — the six factors of differentiation, thanks to which the entire creation or manifestation begins. By reversing the process, they are also ways of returning to unity — a meaning that is underlined by the traditional etymology of the word, from the root *ad*, 'to eat'; see TĀ VI 30: *adhvā krameṇa yātavye pade saṃprāptikāraṇam/ dvaitināṃ bhogyabhāvāt tu prabuddhānāṃ yato 'dyate*, '[The term] *adhvan* ('route') — given that the [final] state is to be reached in stages — here signifies the means of finally reaching [that state]; hence, because all things possessed of duality are ['en route'] to be consumed [lit., 'of the nature of something to be enjoyed'], [that 'route'] is said to be 'eaten' by those who are enlightened'. TĀV ad loc. explains: *yātavye pada iti śivatattvātmani/ bhedadaśāyāṃ hi tattattattvollaṅghanakrameṇa ṣaṭtriṃśaṃ śivatattvaṃ prāpyatvenoktam/ bhogyabhāvād ity adanīyatvāt/ adhigatasaṃvittattvā hi sarvaṃ svātmasātkurvantīti bhāvaḥ/ tenādhvaivādhvā, adyata ityadhvā ceti*, 'By "a place to be gone to" he means [the final stage of the discipline] invested with the Śiva-principle. Indeed, it has been said that the thirty-sixth principle, Śiva, is to be approached gradually by proceeding [upwards] from principle to principle — it being obvious that the condition of difference [then prevails]. By "for it is of the nature of something to be enjoyed" he means that it is fit to be eaten. The meaning is that those who have approached [or mastered] the principle of pure consciousness (*saṃvittattva*) [the 36th] have transformed everything into their own self [have "eaten" everything]; such is the meaning. Thus by "path" is here meant either "path" [simply, viz., the process], or "what is [to be] eaten, or consumed" [viz., the result — for in progressing toward the *śivatattva*, the route may also be said to be "eaten, or consumed" '. See n. 441.

[1388]*āsādana* — viz., 'bring himself into'.

[1389]*vipatti* = *maraṇa*, in the kā.

[1390]Thus is *śāstra* glossed as *āgamagrantha*. It seems likely that the 'śāstra' referred to here is the *Bhagavadgītā*, especially its sixth chapter, which deals with the nature of yoga. A discussion of the *yogabhraṣṭa* and his fate occurs there as well (see, in n. 1385, BhG VI 37–45, esp., v. 41, which is to be compared with PS 98–102). Even YR's question: *kā gatiḥ* echoes that of Arjuna to Kṛṣṇa, at the outset of the passage: *kāṃ gatiṃ gacchati*. Furthermore, in the commentary to kā. 102, below, YR explicitly quotes its first and last verses. See also ĀPS 85b (= PS 101b): *bhuvaneṣu sarvadevair yogabhraṣṭas tathā pūjyaḥ*.

[1391]Or 'from [the path of] yoga'.

[1392]Cf. BhG VI 37: *yogāc calitamānasaḥ*, he 'whose mind falls away from discipline'.

ments], etc.'.

When the body falls away, he becomes a **lord** (*pati*), a potentate (*īś-vara*), **in worlds** (*bhuvana*) that correspond to the levels [of meditation] attained when a pause [in his practice occurred] — worlds inhabited by the Lords of the *tattvas* (*tattveśvara*), and **which abound in wonderful enjoyments,**[1393] that is, in various marvels, such as women, food, beverages, garlands, garments, anointments, songs, music, etc. — in other words, immediately after dying, he is associated with these divine delights.

Again, once his entitlement to such delights is exhausted, how would he fare, who had fallen from discipline? [That is, what happens then to him?]

The master replies: **'[Thanks to the stage (of progress) achieved] when he paused, etc.'.**

Now, by **stage [of progress] achieved when he paused**, is meant the place, [for example, one of the *cakras*, the] *kanda*, etc., [at which his meditation was interrupted];

thanks to that [stage, means], thanks to its power of awakening root impressions [that were occasioned] as he exercised himself in that [place wherein a pause occurred],

he, **coming [again] into existence in a following birth**, viz., the next birth — that is, having acquired another fit body suitable for yogic practice in this world of transmigration,

and, after much effort, having taken possession [again] of the yoga he had previously practiced,

easily[1394] rises to[1395] the [highest] state [wherein is experienced] ultimate reality — which was his goal in his previous life — and, when his body falls away, becomes Śiva himself.[1396]

Kārikās 100–101

Now, when the body falls away, what is the [future] course of [the adept] who, though he practices [yogic] discipline [assiduously], finds no repose [viz., satisfaction], be it only a little [viz., 'even slight'], in any part [of the discipline], due to unsteadiness of mind (*manaścāñcalya*) — yet [despite this] retains faith in the discipline itself?[1397] To this concern, the master

[1393] Or 'where each world exhibits, in principle (°*pradhāna*), an enjoyment proper to itself, such as that of women, of food [...], etc.'.

[1394] *helayā*; cf. n. 1363.

[1395] Lit., 'mounts upon'.

[1396] *śiva eva bhavati*. His practice has lasted for two lives.

[1397] In the preceding verses (98–99) are treated two types of "failed" aspirants — both failures signaled by a 'viśrānti' in the discipline. Either the aspirant has found a 'satisfaction'

replies as follows:

100. But, as for [the adept] who, though practicing this path of ultimate reality, [1398] **does not attain true discipline, he will yet with delighted mind rejoice at length, partaking of the pleasures of the worlds of the gods.**

101. Just as a monarch who rules over the entire earth is venerated by all people in his domains, so is he who has fallen from discipline venerated by all the gods in their worlds. [1399]

Although **he practices this** path, whose essence is knowledge of his [true] Self, that has been explained [to him] hundreds of times, that is, though he devotes [himself to that practice] with faith and devotion,

— should he die in the midst of life without attaining the repose that is the mark of yoga proper, due to the circularity [1400] of mental faults [such as inattention, anger, etc.], [1401]

— then he, [whom we term] 'fallen from discipline', partakes of the pleasures of the worlds of the gods, his mind rejoicing; there he remains joyful **for a long time**, thanks to the force of his devotion, which to him is a favor, and the faith that had grown strong in him regarding [the efficacity of] the discipline leading to [final] insight; he is venerated by the gods themselves in their worlds, that is, in their respective abodes.

To whom is he comparable?

The master replies: to **'[... him who rules over] the entire [earth]'.**

(*viśrānti*) in some lower stage of the discipline (or presumably even outside it) that 'stops' him prematurely, or some unforeseen obstacle has intervened to give his practice pause (*viśrānti*) before it culminates — leaving him 'blocked' at an intermediate stage. In these kārikās (100–101), the final possibility is confronted — that even this last 'satisfaction' (*viśrānti*) is not vouchsafed to the aspirant: though he has pursued his practice assiduously and tirelessly, no 'pause' of any sort is accorded him before his demise. The sense of this puzzling term — *viśrānti* — is thus made clearer by AG's treatment here. The last possibility alludes perhaps to the case of the less-than-able student, destined to remain a 'failure' (in the present birth at least), determined though he may be. To him may be offered only the hope of 'pleasurable worlds' as a reward, a kind of booby prize, no doubt — a prize, perhaps, that shows also the inroads made by the *bhakti* tradition even in those traditions that would seem to have no place for easy devotion. Here as well, selfless faith has found its reward. Cf. BhG VI 34: *cañcalaṃ hi manaḥ*, and 37, where Arjuna enquires about the unsuccessful yogin who is yet possessed of faith (*śraddhayopetaḥ*).

[1398] *mārga* — scil. 'met-hodos', 'method'; see YR ad 18 and PS 96.

[1399] Cf. ĀPS 84–85: *paramārthamārgasādhanam ārabhyāprāpya yogam api nāma/ suralokabhogabhogī muditamanā modate suciram// viṣayeṣu sarvabhaumaḥ sarvajanaiḥ pūjyate yathā rājā/ bhuvaneṣu sarvadevair yogabhraṣṭas tathā pūjyaḥ//*, from which PS 101–102 borrows almost *verbatim*.

[1400] *anavasthāna* — lit., 'absence of basis'.

[1401] That is, the more one submits to their influence, the more they constitute obstacles to the yogin's progress. Or 'due to the absence of basis [of his practice, caused by] faults of the mind'.

Just as a monarch who rules over the entire earth, that is, a universal emperor, lord of the seven continents, **is venerated**, shown respect, **by all people in his domains**, in his various territories,

so likewise is he praised even by the gods, saying: 'By us is he to be revered, for his [next] birth will be his last;[1402] [indeed] he has cultivated nothing but dispassion [in this life]; merits and demerits have ceased to be for him objects [of experience]. It is he [after all] whose striving in a previous life was motivated by a desire to know regarding his own Self'. This is the purport.[1403]

Kārikā 102

What will be his future course after his entitlement to experience the pleasures of other worlds terminates? Replying to this question, the master says:

102. He reaches again the human condition after a considerable time and, then, by practicing [anew] his discipline, he attains [finally] divine immortality — from which state he does not return.[1404]

Having enjoyed the delights available in the divine worlds as just described, **after a** very long **time**, he who has fallen from discipline obtains, on the dissolution of his body, **divine immortality** (*divyam amr̥tam*), which is of the nature of the ultimate principle.[1405]

[This happy result following ineluctably …]

[1402]In YR ad 96, the same compound appears in the context of the *jīvanmukta* and has been translated accordingly 'of whom this birth is the last'.

[1403]The explanatory order of the commentary is here reversed. It seems that the clause: '*surair api bhuvaneṣu nijanijasthāneṣu pūjyo bhavati*', which precedes the question: 'To whom is he comparable?', is to be taken as a résumé of what follows, which is in fact the gloss of the final portion of the kārikā; this detailed explanation then closes with *iti yāvat*, indicating that it is "another" way to interpret the résumé.

[1404]Cf. ĀPS 86: *mahatā kālena mahān mānuṣyaṃ prāpya yogam abhyasya/ prāpnoti divyam amr̥taṃ yat tat paramaṃ padaṃ viṣṇoḥ/*, and BhG VI 45, which, developped by our verses 100–102, is quoted below by YR at the end of his gloss on 102: *prayatnād yatamānas tu yogī saṃśuddhakilbiṣaḥ/ anekajanmasaṃsiddhas tato yāti parāṃ gatim//*, 'But striving zealously,/ With sins cleansed, the disciplined man,/ Perfected thru many rebirths,/ Then (finally) goes to the highest goal'.

[1405]In our text, the words *divyam amr̥tam*, 'divine immortality' (qualified in the text of Ādiśeṣa by *paramaṃ padaṃ viṣṇoḥ*) constitute a problem in the sense that they could be interpreted in a dualistic manner, as referring to some divine paradise, akin to our 'Elysian Fields' where the departed are indeed happy, but from which they must return eventually — as observes the avat. to PS 102 about the 'divine worlds' (*suraloka*) of kā. 101: 'after one's entitlement to [experience] the pleasures of other worlds terminates'. The words might also refer to a notion of liberation comparable to that of Rāmānuja, who considers *mukti* to be a devotee's residence without end in the proximity of the Lord — a notion more in conformity with the requirements of *bhakti* — where the idea of an 'identification' with the Lord is seen rather as arrogance or *lèse-majesté*. The very notion of *bhakti* or devotional fervor seems to require an

— once he returns to the human condition in this world of transmigration, that is,

— once he acquires [again] a body fit for the realization of yogic practice,

— [and starts] **cultivating** [again] that **yoga**, constantly practicing it[1406] — a discipline that was difficult to acquire in his previous lives due to unsteadiness of mind, but which is now [acquired] effortlessly, [re]awakened thanks to root impressions [bringing to the fore] latent dispositions that were produced by the discipline previously cultivated, which had grown strong through the faith and devotion he had previously given evidence of.[1407]

In other words, he becomes unshakable in [his attachment to] the ultimate principle.[1408] For this very reason, there is thence, for him, no

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object worthy of that fervor — which is evidently not the devotee. Such an interpretation, where 'residence' occupies the place of 'liberation', might hold in the case of the first PS, strongly colored by Vaiṣṇava devotionalism (though even this interpretation is debatable), but it cannot be held in the context of the second PS, strongly nondualist. The substitution, by the second PS, of *yasmād āvartate na punaḥ* for *yat tat paramaṃ padaṃ viṣṇoḥ* of the first (ĀPS 86) is well conceived for dispelling the ambiguity introduced by *divyam amṛtam*. YR's commentary, as well as the organization of the textual ensemble of kā. 97–102, leaves little room for doubt as to the interpretation of what is intended by these words. This 'divine immortality from which one does not return' is a periphrasis, unusual indeed, for 'liberation'. We have seen that kā. 100–102 evoke a type of inferior ascetic 'fallen from discipline' (*yogabhraṣṭa*), whose practice is entirely unsatifactory. To him, whose aspiration to achieve liberation in this life has failed, is ascribed delightful (and lengthier) residence in 'divine worlds' (kā. 100–101); he is then reborn, takes up the practice of yoga where he had left it, and is 'freed' at the end of his second life, without however experiencing *jīvanmukti* (kā. 102). Similarly, YR observes that 'divine immortality' (*divyam amṛtam*), is 'of the nature of the supreme principle', and concludes by citing the *Gītā* (VI 45): 'perfected thru many rebirths,/ [he] Then (finally) goes to the highest goal'. Thus kā. 103 may fairly end by assuring the devotee that he will reach the 'condition of Śiva' (*śivatva*), that is, 'liberation', designated in the commentary of YR ad loc. by terms such as *prakṛṣṭamukti*, *śreyas*, *paraśreyas*, and *paramapuruṣārtha*. As well, it is noteworthy that kā. 103 summarizes kā. 97–102. Cf. BĀU IV 4, 7 (quoted n. 1062), where the adjective 'immortal' (*amṛta*) has been interpreted by Śaṅkara as designating a state of *jīvanmukti*. Cf. also BĀU IV 4, 8, understood by Radhakrishnan in the light of Ś ad loc.: *tena dhīrā apiyanti brahmavidaḥ svargaṃ lokam ita ūrdhvaṃ vimuktāḥ//*, 'By it, the wise, the knowers of *Brahman* go up to the heavenly world after the fall of this body [Ś: *itaḥ: asmāc charīrapātāt*], being freed (even while living) [Ś: *jīvanta eva vimuktāḥ santaḥ*]', and Śaṅkara's exegesis of *svargaṃ lokam*: *apiyanti apigacchanti brahmavidyāphalaṃ mokṣaṃ svargaṃ lokam/ svargalokaśabdaḥ triviṣṭapavācyapi san iha prakaraṇāt mokṣābhidhāyakaḥ/ itaḥ asmāc charīrapātāt ūrdhvaṃ jīvanta eva vimuktāḥ santaḥ/*, '[...] *they go to the heavenly sphere*, or liberation, which is the result of the knowledge of Brahman — 'Heavenly sphere' generally means heaven, the abode of gods, but here from the context it means liberation — *after the fall of this body, being freed* even while living' (tr. Swāmī Mādhavānanda).

[1406]YR does not comment *samabhyasya* (= *abhyasya* of the kā.).

[1407]Cf. a similar phraseology in YR ad 103, obviously inherited from BhG, especially VI 37, which YR quotes, below, at the end of the passage.

[1408]Lit., 'he goes to a condition of unshakability with respect to the essence of the ultimate [principle]'.

return.[1409]

Even a bit of reflection on the important and auspicious subject which is that of Self-knowledge tends not to the perpetuation of the round of existences.

As has been said in the revered *Gītā*:

> In it there is no loss of a start once made,/ Nor does any reverse[1410] occur;/ Even a little of this duty/ Saves from great danger.[1411]

And one should [also] remember the text, recorded by the Sage [Vyāsa], that starts from the question:

> An unsuccessful striver who is endowed with faith,/ Whose mind falls away from discipline/[1412] Without attaining perfection of discipline,/ [To what goal does he go, Kṛṣṇa?][1413]

and ends with the answer:

> ... Perfected thru many rebirths,/[1414] Then (finally) goes to the highest goal.[1415]

[1409]Cf. BhG VIII 21:*yaṃ prāpya na nivartante*, and XV 6b: *yad gatvā na nivartante*.

[1410]The allusion is medical: medicine may sometimes cure, sometimes not; such inconsequences do not affect the path of *karmayoga*, the 'yoga of action', which, according to Śaṅkara, means 'the performance of actions [rites and duties] with detachment after destroying the pairs of opposites, with the intention of adoring God' (*niḥsaṅgatayā dvaṃdvaprahāṇapūrvakam īśvararādhanārthe karmayoge karmānuṣṭhāne*). Also Śaṅkara: *kiṃ ca nāpi cikitsāvat pratyavāyo vidyate*: 'Nor does any contrariety result, as happens in therapy'. Same argument in YR ad PS 103. GAS II 40 offers another image: *yathā ca parimitena śrīkhaṇḍakaṇena jvālāyamāno 'pi tailakaṭāhaḥ sadyaḥ śīto bhavati evam anayāpi svalpayā yogabuddhyā mahābhayaṃ saṃsārarūpaṃ vinaśyate/*, 'Just as a burning pan of oil immediately cools down with [the application of] a small amount of sandal-paste, even so the great terror of *saṃsāra* is destroyed even by a small bit of Yogic doctrine' (tr. Sharma, who does not translate 'mahā' of *mahābhaya*).

[1411]BhG II 40. Cf. the commentary of Śaṅkara: *mahato bhayāt saṃsārabhayāj janmamaraṇādilakṣaṇāt*, 'The great fear, i.e., the fear proper to that world of transmigration characterized by birth, death, etc.'. Same verse quoted in ĪPV I 1, vol. I: 31.

[1412]Śaṅkara comments: *antakāle ca yogāc calitaṃ mānasaṃ mano yasya sa calitamānaso bhraṣṭasmṛtiḥ*, where *calitamānasaḥ* is explained as *bhraṣṭasmṛtiḥ*, 'whose memory/consciousness has been lost'. This explanation may take us back to the argument discussed in the commentary ad kā. 94–95.

[1413]BhG VI 37.

[1414]According to BhGBh VI 45, 'perfected' or 'accomplished' (*saṃsiddhaḥ*) means 'he by whom perfect insight has been attained' (*labdhasamyagdarśanaḥ*), through the accumulated *saṃskāras*: *[...] anekeṣu janmasu kiṃcitkiṃcitsaṃskārajātam upacitya tenopacitenānekajanmakṛtena saṃsiddhaḥ [...] labdhasamyagdarśanaḥ/*, '[...] Accumulating little by little in many births a homogenous mass of root impressions, he is [finally] accomplished (*saṃsiddhaḥ*) through that totality [viz., those root impressions], acquired in many births [...], that is, he attains perfect insight'.

[1415]BhG VI 45. Commenting on this, AG emphasizes that the verse refers to the 'yo-

Kārikā 103

The master now explains that those whose hearts have been softened by reflection (*viveka*) should be wholly attentive to the cessation of birth and death, inasmuch as the excess of glory (*vibhūti*) attaching to one who has even slightly been touched by the ordered discipline leading to [final] insight is so great as to be indescribable:

103. This being the case, [the adept] should bend every possible effort toward that ultimate goal, thinking that whosoever is deeply engaged in this right path [to liberation] reaches the condition of Śiva. [1416]

Because, in this way, the practice of reflecting (*pratyavamarśa*) on one's own Self, thanks to the method just explained, [itself involves] obtaining the highest result, [1417]

therefore it is shown, by the words '**whosoever engages in this** very beautiful **path'** — that is, in the path leading to the most excellent [form of] liberation (*prakṛṣṭamukti*) — that there is no restriction of qualification [on such practice]. [1418]

Now, by **whosoever is deeply engaged** is intended anyone who, stricken with the countless afflictions of birth, death, disease, etc., delights fully in that path with a discerning mind — who is therein immersed, placing there his entire faith. [1419]

Such a man, very soon, that is, without delay, **reaches the condition of Śiva,** [1420] that is, he attains to that goal that has no goal beyond it [1421] within [the confines of] a single birth after having shaken off all the afflictions of this world of transmigration.

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gabhraṣṭa exclusively devoted to God' (*yasyānanyavyāpāratayā bhagavadvyāpārānurāgitvaṃ sa yogabhraṣṭa iti*), who has to practice yoga through several lives before being liberated, and that this liberation takes place only after the dissolution of his body: *na cāsau tenaiva dehena siddha iti mantavyam/ api tu bahūni janmāni tena tadabhyastam iti mantavyam//*, 'He is not perfected [viz., he does not attain realization, or liberation] in that very body; this ought to be noted. And it should be also noted that he has practiced that [yoga] through several births'.

[1416] Note that, inadvertently, this kārikā has been omitted in Silburn's translation.

[1417] The compound *uttamaphalalābhaḥ* is taken as an appositional predicate (a KD) of the subject *svātmapratyavamarśābhyāsaḥ*.

[1418] That is, such practice is subject to no prerequisites, such as the prior qualifications, whether ritual or social, that condition the sacrificer's 'authority' (*adhikāra*) to perform the sacrifice.

[1419] This passage is doubtless intended to echo the portrait of the disciple who comes to question Ādhāra that is sketched in kā. 2–3.

[1420] *śivatvam eti.*

[1421] *paraśreyas* — the terms *paraśreyas* (also YR ad 105) or *niḥśreyas* (YR ad 104) appear to contain, as it were, the memory of an historical evolution, whereby the notion of *mokṣa* replaced (or complemented) the *śreyas* of the ritualists; taken literally, *paraśreyas* means 'that which is beyond, or exceeds, *śreyas*'.

As has been stated in the teaching entitled *Śivadharmottara*:[1422]

> Here is expounded the liberation that takes place within the span of one life [only]. Let it be examined [first]! [But, if that fails,] what prevents you from attaining the liberation that takes place within the span of several lives?

Thinking that such is the case, that is, reflecting on it (*vimṛśya*) [viz., reflecting on the promise that whosoever engages in this path reaches the condition of Śiva], **he should strive in whatever way possible**, by every possible means, **to** reach **that ultimate goal** (*paramārtha*), that is, he should make this preeminently his effort.

Keeping in mind [the maxim]: 'The effort done for the highest [objective], [always] brings [highest] fruit',[1423] not the slightest pride need be presumed [on the part of the adept] in this matter.

Hence, if the formation of one's own self[-awareness] is perfected by practicing the discipline, then the desired [goal] of ours [i.e., liberation] is attained [in this birth]; if not, the attainment of other divine worlds [is ours].

And, once he returns therefrom, he takes up again the discipline, on the strength of the awakening in him of the latent dispositions left by the discipline previously practiced.[1424]

Thus, no hindrance of any sort afflicts the practitioner [of yoga] as a result of engaging with determination in the path leading to the ultimate goal.[1425]

And not the slightest pride need be presumed on the part of the one who

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[1422]Referred to, here, as a 'śāstra', the text has not been edited, but has survived in several MSS; see e.g. Goodall 1998: 375–376 (n. 616), 421; Sanderson 2004: 406 and passim. It belongs to the *Śivadharma* corpus, whose affiliation is that of a '*laukika*' Śaivism, which preaches 'devotion to Śiva for pious laity' (Goodall 1998: 376, n. 616; Sanderson 2004: 231). We are indebted to D. Goodall for the communication of *Śivadharmottara* X 26–30a, from 2 MSS: Cambridge Add. 1645 (dated 1136 AD (*saṃvat* 256); palm-leaf, early Newari script) and a paper transcript in Devanāgarī, IFP, T. 510. Here, YR's quote agrees with the MSS for the second hemistich (X 30a), but the first hemistich does not correspond *verbatim* with what precedes in 1645, namely, *jijñāsyatām iyatāvan muktir ekena janmanā/ yadi nāma na muktiḥ syād ekenaivātra janmanā//* X 29 — from which one could infer that there could have been two different recensions of the text.

[1423]*Mahābhāṣya* (*paspaśāhnika*) which reads: *pradhāne kṛto yatnaḥ phalavān bhavati*. The issue, for Patañjali, is that of interpreting the injunction to study the Veda 'along with its ancillaries' (*vedāṅga*) that is incumbent on any brahmin. According to Patañjali, that means, first and foremost, 'along with grammar (*vyākaraṇa*)', for this is the most important (*pradhāna*) among the six *vedāṅgas*, and by studying it without delay, one arrives more quickly at the desired goal. See also BhG VI 40: *na hi kalyāṇakṛt kaścid durgatiṃ tāta gacchati//*, 'For no doer of the right/ Comes to a bad end, my friend'.

[1424]Cf. YR ad 102.

[1425]*śreyas* — for a similar statement, see YR's commentary ad 102.

devotes himself to the attainment of the ultimate human goal (*paramapuruṣārtha*). Let it be auspicious.[1426]

Kārikā 104

The author of the treatise[1427] [here commented upon, viz., Abhinavagupta] has in this way expounded, in accordance with the system of nondualistic Śaivism, the teachings on the essence of ultimate reality (*paramārthasāra*)[1428] [first] uttered by the revered Śeṣa, with the aid of argumentation, experience and scripture;[1429] he now proceeds to sum up the purpose of the text, indicating that 'it alone is the teaching that serves as means for realizing the highest among the goals of [human] life' — subscribing here his own name with no other goal [in mind] than that of expressing his own delight:[1430]

104. To him who meditates on this transcendental *brahman*, as concisely expounded by Abhinavagupta,[1431] Śivahood comes without delay, once it has pervaded[1432] his own heart.[1433]

[1426] *iti śivam* — the formula signals that kā. 103 is a sort of *praśāsti*. Compare the similar promises found in the epic and purāṇic literature promising success to those who hear even a single word. The text thus magnifies its own efficacy.

[1427] *śāstrakāra*.

[1428] Or 'has set forth the [ensemble of] instructions known as the *Paramārthasāra*'.

[1429] See the avat. to PS 8 and 10–11.

[1430] Probably a pun is intended: the line may also be read '... expressing the delight proper to his [absolute] Self'. The teacher seeks no glory, power nor wealth; like a Bodhisattva, he delights only in the benefit others may derive from his teaching. Not only has he passed on the secret knowledge to someone qualified, but his teaching serves to express his obeisance at the feet of Śiva.

[1431] Or, by punning on Abhinavagupta's name: 'To him who meditates on the transcendental *brahman* in reference to which a concise summary has been stated [in such a way that such a *brahman* is now understood as something] quite novel (*abhinava*), and [heretofore] hidden (*gupta*) [...]'.

[1432] *nijahṛdayāveśam* — this *āveśam* is doubtless to be taken as a gerund of type *ṇamul*, which often appears in composition with its direct object, as here (see Whitney 1983: §995c, Renou 1968: §§104–105). The gloss *āviśya* indicates this as well, and the fact that YR does not take *āveśam* as the direct object of the verb. He also prefaces his gloss of *nijahṛdayāveśam* with the adverb *katham*, implying a circumstantial function of the compound. The *ṇamul* is generally employed, as Renou observes, in order to emphasize 'la rapidité du procès' — which suits very well here the sense of the kārikā: *acirād eva [...]*. We differ therefore from other translators, who apparently understand *āveśam* as an accusative; cf. Barnett: 'The being of Śiva speedily comes to penetrate the very heart of him who meditates [...]'; Silburn: 'Lorsqu'il médite [...], avant peu la nature de Śiva pénétrera dans son propre cœur'; B. N. Pandit: 'An aspirant who meditates [...] attains quickly a *samāveśa* of Śivahood in his heart'; Pelissero: 'La condizione d'identità con Śiva penetra velocemente nell'intimo del cuore di chi mediti [...]'. The 'kṛtvā' that follows in the commentary the *pratīkā* (*nijahṛdayāveśam*) is a gloss intended to flag the odd gerund; it functions thus as a parenthesis, to note that a noun is not at issue, that is, as a grammatical notation of the usage itself.

[1433] That is, his core consciousness. The kārikā is somewhat puzzling in its construction,

This transcendental, or most excellent, ***brahman***, which has been explained as 'that which expands that which is unfolding'[1434] is [so called] because [of its inherent tendency to] grow [or to strengthen] and is [thus] composed of utterly complete bliss (*paripūrṇānanda*), being of the nature of one's own Self.

Now, **to** the person **who meditates on** that [*brahman*], who is able to reflect (*pratyavamṛśat*) effortlessly on his own Self, **Śivahood comes without delay**, that is, speedily, not after numerous births, [for] he has become *brahman* already in the way mentioned. [This means that for him] the ultimate goal[1435] is [now] attainable.

How [does Śivahood come to him]? [Śivahood comes to him ...]

... **once it has pervaded his own heart**, once it has entered into **his own heart**, the very locus of self-awareness (*parāmarśa*).[1436]

What sort of *brahman* is this?

It is like unto [that *brahman*], in reference to which a **concise summary** (*saṃkṣepa*) containing the essential purport (*tātparya*) [of our doctrine] has been stated, and explained, **by Abhinavagupta**, whose name is to be mentioned with reverence [i.e., celebrated].[1437]

And this also may have been intimated [by the author], on the pretext of mentioning his name: 'It is like unto that *brahman* in reference to which a **concise summary** has [here] been **stated**, or revealed, in such a way that the exceeding secret of that transcendental *brahman*, is [now understood as something] **quite novel** (*abhinava*), never before seen by others, and [heretofore] **hidden** (*gupta*), concealed, as it were [from others]'.

And in making this known in this way, the difficulty of access of the

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and in construing it, we have followed the commentary. The participle *dhyāyataḥ* is best understood as a *genitivus commodi*, which implies the ellipsis of the object, for, according to YR, *śivatvam* (as subject) 'comes to' him who meditates (requiring an accusative in sanskrit); such *śivatvam* is not 'his' (genitive); see Renou 1968: §222E. This is probably why the object of *abhyeti* is not mentioned — being clearly, by a sort of *ūha*, understood as the underlying subject of the participle. The construction *śivatvam ... abhyeti* invites normally the reverse parsing: 'goes to Śivahood' (see previous kā.: ... *eti sa śivatvam*). Abhinavagupta may have changed this on purpose, for two reasons. First, to show that Śivahood is produced by itself, and that the meditating subject does not need to act any further. Second, the structure of the whole sentence may avoid the subject/object relation deliberately, to express in grammatical terms that such dichotomy cannot characterize the relation of one's self and Śivahood. The Self is Śiva, and, accordingly, the sentence has only a subject, without any object.

[1434]The translation reflects one of the several possible constructions of this first line of the commentary — one that goes somewhat against expectations. *prathamānam* is not taken as the *incipit* of a gloss of *idam* (which would then refer at least indirectly to 'this' world, *brahman* in its 'extended' form), but is simply an unglossed quotation of the *idam* of the kārikā, pointing to *brahman* itself. The relative clause terminating in *yat* is thus in effect the "gloss" of *brahman*, 'which has been previously expounded as "having expanded" (*vitatya*) that which "is expanded" (*prathamānam*)' — the visible world.

[1435]Or 'ultimate felicity' (*niḥśreyas*).

[1436]On the syntactical construction, see n. 1432.

[1437]Same expression in YR ad 105; see also YR ad 2–3.

teaching is set forth [by the master].

Kārikā 105

Mentioning the size of the text, the master declares his authorship in respect of this manual: [1438]

105. Thus, the supremely recondite core of the teaching has now been condensed in one hundred āryā-verses by me, Abhinavagupta, illumined by remembrance of Śiva's feet.

This core of the teaching (*śāstrasāra*), that is, that essence (*satattva*) spread throughout numerous texts, **has been condensed by me**; that is, has been stated [by Abhinavagupta] after having mastered it himself, within the small span of a hundred verses, though it can hardly be explained in a thousand texts. By this is stated [as well] the resourcefulness [of the author's] luminous consciousness (*pratibhā*).

The pronoun **'me'** [in the phrase **'by me'**] is how qualified?

[The person referred to is said to be] **'illumined** [viz., inspired] **by remembrance of Śiva's feet'.**

[This compound is to be analyzed as follows:]

... **illumined** means 'resplendent with the marvelous experience of supreme ipseity'; [by what is he illumined?]

... **by remembrance** (*smaraṇa*) — that is, with constant awareness (*nibhālana*) when perceiving such [external] objects as sound, etc., never, at any moment, being deprived of the experience of his own Self (*svānubhava*); [by remembrance of what?]

... **of the feet**, that is, the rays of consciousness [1439] [that are]

... **of Śiva**, [appropriation of] whose nature is [for the aspirant] the ultimate goal, who reposes in one's own self (*svātmastha*), who is solely formed of blissful consciousness (*cidānandaikamūrti*).

Hence is the [master's] name to be celebrated.

Otherwise [viz., if not to Abhinavagupta — that is, if his name had not been mentioned], could authority and authorship in a teaching such as this [of limited] size, on ultimate reality (*mahārtha*), [1440] be reasonably

[1438] *prakaraṇa* — see n. 276.

[1439] *caraṇa*, 'foot', is here given an esoteric interpretation, as meaning 'ray', probably after the fashion of *kara*, which means both 'hand' and 'ray' (see p. 269).

[1440] Or 'on ultimate meaning'. Perhaps also an implicit allusion to the Mahārtha mystic tradition, from which the Krama current proceeds; cf. the *Mahārthamañjarī* of Maheśvarānanda (12th cent.), which sets forth a synthesis of the various mystic and philosophical currents of monistic Śaivism as they then flourished in Kashmir, those that are referred to as the Mahārthadarśana (also termed Mahānaya and Krama), the Kula (originating in Assam), the Trika (in the restricted sense of Spanda) and the Pratyabhijñādarśana.

attributed to anyone else, who was beset by the confusion of the body (and the like) and the Self and who had not recognized that his essence is the identity of his Self with the Great Lord? Only he, whose nature is so described, would dare to discriminate [the true doctrine from so many false doctrines]!

Thus, by this expression [**'illumined by remembrance of Śiva's feet'**], it is [also] said that the very nature of the Great Lord has coalesced with the preceptor. Let it be auspicious.

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Thus ends the *Paramārthasāra*, 'The Essence of Ultimate Reality', composed by the master Abhinavagupta, most eminent among the great Śaiva teachers.[1441]

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> This commentary, whose subject is the nondualism of plenitude,[1442] has been composed by me, by name Yoga[rāja], an ascetic, without passion, who resides in the auspicious Vitastāpurī,[1443]
>
> Under the tutelage of the revered Kṣemarāja, a scion of the lineage of true teachers, in whom Maheśa himself is incarnate.[1444]

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Thus ends the commentary on the compendium [entitled] *Paramārthasāra*,[1445] the work of the revered Rājānaka Yogarāja, most eminent among the Śaiva teachers.

[1441] This is the colophon (*puṣpikā*) to the *Paramārthasāra*. YR's formulation echoes that of his direct master, Kṣemarāja, who paid homage similarly to his own direct master, Abhinavagupta, in the colophon to the commentary on the first chapter of ŚS.

[1442] *pūrṇādvaya* — or 'entirely composed of [the doctrine that teaches] non-difference from the plenum'.

[1443] Another name of Pravarapura, the modern Śrīnagar? TĀ XXXVII 48–52 describes it as situated on the bank of the river Vitastā (the modern Jhelum), which, according to legend, has its source in blow struck by Śiva's trident (on the legendary origin of the Vitastā, see Jayadratha's *Haracaritacintāmaṇi* XII 2–34, and RT, vol. II: 411).

[1444] These verses, called *puṣpikāśloka*, precede the colophon to the commentary.

[1445] This is the colophon to the commentary. It is doubtful that *paramārthasārasaṃgraha* should be taken as another title of AG's work. Rather, it is a characterization of the work entitled *Paramārthasāra*, which is a summary, a concise exposition (*saṃgraha*, 'compendium') of nondualistic śaivite teaching. This interpretation is corroborated by the 2nd *maṅgala* verse, where YR refers to himself as the author of a commentary on the compendium (*saṃkṣepa* = *saṃgraha*) that is the *Paramārthasāra* (*paramārthasārasaṃkṣepa*). Both synonyms are most likely intended as oblique references to the *saṃkṣiptam* of AG's final kārikā. It is probably because of this colophon that several manuscripts of the commentary are catalogued as *Paramārthasārasaṃgraha-vivṛti* or *-ṭīkā*.

Appendix

1. Rudra (YR ad 1)

In *rudrakṣetrajña*, Rudra, or, rather, the Rudras, emblematically represent the category of the *adhipatis*, presiding deities of the 'spheres' (*aṇḍa*) constituting the universe, which are at the same time levels of subjectivity and experience; on Rudras, see TĀV VIII 306 (*so 'vyaktam adhiṣṭhāya prakaroti jagan niyogataḥ śaṃbhoḥ/ śuddhāśuddhasroto 'dhikārahetuḥ śivo yasmāt //*): *tacchaktīti tacchabdenānantaparāmarśaḥ / anena ca na kevalamayaṃ kṣetrajñānām eva sthitiṃ vidhatte yāvad rudrāṇām api — ity uktam//*, and MVT V 12. Thus Rudra is 'the one who presides over the condition of pure [limited] subjectivity represented by the Void or by an extremely subtle body formed by the *puryaṣṭaka* — in other words, over the condition in which there is a reabsorption of every other cognizable reality' (ĪPvṛ III 2, 1, tr. Torella ĪPK: 197). The deity presiding over a given level of subjectivity and experience brings his devotees to this plane. Therefore, Rudra is also the model for such a subject: he who is able to reabsorb within himself all cognizable reality, he is Pralayākala seen in his divine dimension (on Pralayākala, see YR ad 14 and 23, n. 625, and Appendix 10, p. 330). Responsible for the withdrawal from phenomenal world, Rudra is thus ontologically higher than Brahmā and Viṣṇu, 'who preside over the manifestation of differentiated cognizable reality, the former causing creation and the latter continuity' (ĪPvṛ III 2, 1, tr. Torella: 197). In the hierarchy of the cognizers, the line is clearly drawn between Rudra (or the Rudras) and the *kṣetrajñas*. Rudra(s) as well as Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc., belong to the category of the Lords (*pati*), for, as stated by ĪPK III 2, 3, 'they see things (*bhāva*) [i.e., the universe (*viśva*)] as their own body (*svāṅgarūpa*) [i.e., as their own Self]'. Thus, they transcend the ordinary dichotomy of subject and object, as do yogins; cf. ŚSV I 14, which comments on *dṛśyaṃ śarīram*, '[The yogin's] body is the perceptible', in almost the same terms: *yad yad dṛśyaṃ [...] tat tat sarvaṃ [...] svāṅgakalpam asya sphurati na bhedena*, 'Whatever is perceptible, all that [...] appears to him [...] as his own body [i.e., as his own Self], and not as different from him'. Therefore, the Lords are endowed with 'sovereignty' (*aiśvarya*); see ĪPvṛ III 2, 3. As such,

Lords (*pati*) rule over their subjects, who thus deserve to be called 'cattle' (*paśu*, viz., 'fettered souls', according to the traditional etymology — TĀV IX 144b–145a): *pāśyatvāt paśur ity ucyate*, 'He is called *paśu* for he has to be fettered' (see also YR ad 5) — for not only do they abide by the law of their Lord, but also by the law of difference. The concluding verse of TS IV, p. 32 (quoted by YR ad 33), shows that the *paśu* is a potential *pati* and vice versa. It is the supreme *pati*, Parameśvara, who opts for servitude, in the free movement of his play. Taking their bodies — as the locus of all worldly experience — to be the Self (or the cognizing subject), instead of consciousness, they are also called *kṣetrajña* or *kṣetravid*, lit., 'knower of the field [viz., of the body in which pure consciousness finds a substratum]'. The notion is defined by BhG XIII 1–2: *idaṃ śarīraṃ kaunteya kṣetram abhidhīyate/ etad yo vetti taṃ prāhuḥ kṣetrajña iti tadvidaḥ// kṣetrajñaṃ cāpi māṃ viddhi sarvakṣetreṣu bhārata/ kṣetrakṣetrajñayor jñānaṃ yat taj jñānaṃ mataṃ mama//*, 'This body, son of Kuntī,/ Is called the Field./ Who knows this, he is called/ Field-knower by those who know him./ Know also that I am the Field-knower/ In all Fields, son of Bharata./ Knowledge of the Field and Field-knower,/ This I hold to be (true) knowledge'. AG comments on these two verses, adding a third verse found only in some versions of the Kashmiri recension of the BhG (see Schrader 1930). For the detailed and most intricate demonstration, see Sharma's translation of the entire passage (GAS: 182–183). We quote here only AG's development of the *kṣetra* metaphor: *saṃsāriṇāṃ śarīraṃ kṣetraṃ yatra karmabījaprarohaḥ*, 'For those involved in the process of *saṃsāra*, the body is the field (*kṣetra*), wherein the seed of *karman* sprouts' (tr. Sharma). See a similar explanation in TĀV IX 144b–145a: *karmabījaprarohāvahaṃ kṣetraṃ śarīram evātmatvena jānānaḥ*, 'He who takes the body, i.e., the field bringing about the sprouting of the seed of karman, to be the Self [is called *kṣetrajña* or *kṣetravid*]'. As such, the *kṣetrajña* belongs to the category of the *aṇu*, the finite soul, thus defined by TĀ IX 144b–145a: *aṇavo nāma naivānyat prakāśātmā maheśvaraḥ// cidacidrūpatābhāsī pudgalaḥ kṣetravit paśuḥ/*, 'The finite souls, indeed, are not different from the supreme Lord who is of the nature of Light. When he manifests his conscious as well as unconscious state, he is [known as] *pudgala*, *kṣetravit* or *paśu*'. See also YR ad 5 and ad 45: 'And it is that Lord alone, ascending through the different levels [of subjectivity], who appears as the different [categories of] cognizers, from ordinary souls to Rudras'.

2. *sarva* (YR ad 1)

Cf. MBh XII 47, 54: *yasmin sarvaṃ yataḥ sarvaṃ yaḥ sarvaṃ sarvataś ca yaḥ/ yaś ca sarvamayo nityaṃ tasmai sarvātmane namaḥ//*, 'To that omnifarious one do I bow, in whom lies all, from whom all starts, who is all, who is everywhere, and who is eternally made of all'. As developed by

Rāmakaṇṭha, in the long avat. of his *Sarvatobhadra* ad BhG (pp. 1–14), that verse is the concluding śloka of the hymn — designated by Rāmakaṇṭha (p. 3) as the *stāvarājan*, 'king among hymns'— addressed to the Lord by Bhīṣma, in the *Mokṣadharmaprakaraṇa* of the MBh. Rāmakaṇṭha quotes (and comments on) it in order to establish the essential meaning of the BhG, which he formulates (p. 3) as: *ātmaivedaṃ sarvam*, 'This entire [world] is the Self', thus agreeing with the upaniṣadic statement: *idaṃ sarvaṃ yad ayam ātmā* (BĀU II 4, 6 [= IV 5, 7]). He emphasizes the interplay of the two pronouns, *yat* and *sarva*, showing how the Lord, represented by *yat*, is described in terms of the [Lord's] relation to the universe (*sarva*): *tasmai yac chabdapañcakaviśiṣṭaviśeṣaṇapratipādyasvarūpāya sarvātmane namaḥ*, 'Salutation to him, who is of the nature of the All [viz., the universe], and whose essence is to be expounded in terms of qualifications determined by the pentad of the word *yat* [i.e., in terms of five relative clauses declining the different modalities that presuppose a commonality of essence between the Lord and the world]'. YV VI 36, 18 also quotes the verse in the chapter entitled *Parameśvaravarṇana*. In turn, AG quotes it, segment after segment, as a part of his argument, while commenting on PT 4 (see PTV: 27–32, Skt. text). It is noteworthy that, in the same passage, AG also cites SpK I 2: *yatra sthitam idaṃ sarvaṃ kāryaṃ yasmāc ca nirgatam/ tasyānāvṛtarūpatvān na nirodho 'sti kutracit*, which establishes the transcendence of the Lord 'in whom all this world (*sarva*) rests and from whom it has come forth [as an 'effect', *kārya*]'. SpN I 2 first develops the logic of the inherent presence of the effect in the cause; cf. SpP ad loc., p. 13 of Dyczkowski ed. (1898 ed. omits it): *satkāryatvāt*. It establishes that the world (*sarva*) as an 'effect' (*kārya*), i.e., a product, is produced by the action of an agent, not by any insentient cause, for the word *kārya*, as a gerundive (*kṛtya*), presupposes the activity of a sentient agent: *kāryapadena cedam eva dhvanitaṃ kartuḥ kriyayā niṣpādyaṃ hi kāryam ucyate na tu jaḍakāraṇānantarabhāvi*, 'The word *kārya*, "effect", suggests only this much: that is said to be an "effect" which is to be accomplished by the action of an agent, and not that which is consequential to an insentient cause'. On this point, Śaivites differ from Buddhists, for whom the inevitable priority and posteriority of cause and effect demonstrate, not the logical priority of the agent, but a mere temporal succession. Then, in the same passage, he demonstrates that the Lord, being all, does not require anything additional in order to create the 'All' (*sarva*) — that is, any material cause, viewed as different from the agent — as does the potter, who needs clay: *sarvaśabdenopādānādinairapekṣyaṃ kartur dhvanitam*, 'The word [viz., the pronoun] *sarva*, "all", suggests that the agent is independent of any material cause, etc.'. Cf. also ĪPK I 5, 7: *cidātmaiva hi devo 'ntaḥsthitam icchāvaśād bahiḥ/ yogīva nirupādānam arthajātaṃ prakāśayet//*, 'Indeed, the Lord, who is consciousness, mani-

fests externally the multitude of objects that reside within him, without having recourse to material causes, through his sole will, as does a yogin'; also ĪPvṛ ad loc. and ŚD I 44–45a: *yoginām icchayā yadvan nānarūpopapattitā/ na cāsti sādhanaṃ kiṃcin mṛdādīcchāṃ vinā prabhoḥ// tathā bhagavadicchaiva tathātvena prajāyate/*, 'The yogins, by their sole will, create various forms, without having recourse to any cause — such as clay — other than the Lord's will. Similarly, it is by his sole will that the Lord generates [all objects] in this way'. This is a way of establishing the absolute freedom (*svatantratā*) of the Lord, which SpK I 6–7 defines as *akṛtrimā*, 'natural', 'non-adventitious', that is, according to Rāmakaṇṭha's SpV ad loc. (p. 33), 'innate' (*sahajā*), insofar as it is 'not dependent on any material cause or other auxiliary cause [in achieving its object]' (*na tūpādānasahakāryādikāraṇāntarāpekṣiṇī*). Similar reflections on *sarva* are found in BhG X 8, which SpV IV 21 (= ad III 19) quotes (along with BhG X 9–11) in the Kashmiri recension, in support of the kārikā celebrating the advent of the supreme Subject (*bhoktṛ*) as the Lord of the Wheel (*cakreśvara*): *ayaṃ sarvasya prabhava itaḥ sarvaṃ pravartate//* [for *ahaṃ sarvasya prabhavo mattaḥ sarvaṃ pravartate//*]/ *iti matvā bhajante māṃ budhā bhāvasamanvitāḥ//*, ' "This is the source of all and all things evolve out of this". Realizing this, enlightened men, filled with fervor, adore Me' (our transl.).

3. *camatkāra* (YR ad 1)

In Trika texts, and especially, here, in YR's commentary, *camatkāra* appears mainly in composition, mostly with *parāhantā* or its synonym *pūrṇāhantā*, or with *sva*, or *svātman*, or *cit*; thus is described as wondrous the experience of supreme ipseity, or of consciousness itself, or of the Self. It seems that the first occurrences of the concept (also in the form of its synonym: *camatkṛti*) are to be found in Ānandavardhana's *vṛtti* ad DhĀl IV 16, quoted below (the only occurrence of *camatkṛti* in DhĀl), and in Utpaladeva: ĪPvṛ I 5, 11; ŚDvṛ I 8, where *camatkāra*, defined as *svarūpaparāmarśarūpaḥ*, 'awareness of one's own essence', glosses *āmoda* of the kārikā; and ŚSĀ XIII 41 (*camatkṛti*). The usual explanation of the term's etymology takes *camat*° as an exclamation of wonder, probably an onomatopoeia. According to V. Raghavan (1942: 269), '[...] originally the word *camatkāra* was an onomatopoeic word referring to the clicking sound we make with our tongue when we taste something snappy, and in the course of its semantic enlargements, *camatkāra* came to mean a sudden fillip relating to any feeling of a pleasurable type'. However, on the basis of ABh ad VI 31, vol. I: 278, and at the cost of correcting the manuscript — *camataḥ karaṇam*, instead of *ca manaḥkaraṇam* — Gnoli (1968: 59–60) has proposed taking *camat* as the present participle of the root *cam*, 'to sip'; *camatkāra* then would be the 'action of one who tastes'. Such an

etymology appears doubtful: not only the *-kāra* here is much more likely the same *-kāra* we have in *oṃkāra*, etc., but the reading *ca manaḥkaraṇaṃ* makes perfect sense (see, below, the complete text). Various characterizations of *camatkāra* have been given. See, for instance, very probably the first description of the experience, that of the *vṛtti* ad DhĀl IV 16: *sphuraṇeyaṃ kācid iti sahṛdayānāṃ camatkṛtir utpadyate*, ' "Here some extraordinary [meaning] flashes forth" — such is the wonderment that arises in sensitive readers'. Cf. YR ad 75, who develops the notion in the context of speculations proper to PS. It is noteworthy that two texts of AG, the ABh and the ĪPVV, one from the sphere of aesthetics, one from Pratyabhijñā, give almost the same definition of the term; compare ABh ad VI 31, vol. I: 278: *bhuñjānasyādbhūtabhogaspandāviṣṭasya ca manaḥkaraṇaṃ camatkāra iti*, 'The word *camatkāra*, indeed, properly means the mental activity of the enjoying subject (*bhuñjāna*) who is immersed in the vibration of a marvelous enjoyment (*bhoga*)', and ĪPVV I 5, 11 (vol. II: 177): *camatkṛtir hi bhuñjānasya yā kriyā bhogasamāpattimaya ānandaḥ*, '*camatkṛti* means the action of an enjoying subject (*bhuñjāna*), that is the bliss (*ānanda*) consisting in the perfect realization of enjoyment (*bhogasamāpatti*)'. Later on, ĪPVV I 5, 11 (vol. II: 179) enumerates a few glosses for *parāmarśa*, among which is *camatkāra*: *[...] rasanaikaghanatayā parāmarśaḥ paramānando nirvṛtiś camatkāra ucyate*, 'Since it is indistinguishable from *rasa* [lit., 'being of one mass with *rasa*'], reflective awareness is called "supreme bliss" (*paramānanda*), "serenity" (*nirvṛti*), "wonderment" (*camatkāra*)'. The immediately preceding passage of the ABh ad VI 31, vol. I: 278 deserves to be quoted. Defining *camatkāra* as 'the form of consciousness that is devoid of obstacles' (*sā [...] avighnā saṃvit*), it adds: *tajjo 'pi kampapulakollukasanādir vikāraś camatkāraḥ/ yathā "ajja vi harī camakkai kaha kaha vi ṇa maṃdareṇa daliāiṃ/ caṃdakalākaṃdalasacchahāiṃ lacchīiṃ aṃgāiṃ"// tathā hi sa tṛptivyatirekeṇācchinno bhogāveśa ity ucyate*, 'The changes proceeding from it, namely, trembling, horripilation, joyful movements of the limbs, etc., are also called *camatkāra*. For instance: "Hari is still in a state of wonder: How, o how is it that the limbs of Lakṣmī, which are as beautiful as fragments of the moon, have not been broken by Mount Mandara [churning the ocean]?" Indeed, this [*camatkāra* may be] likewise [defined as] immersion in an enjoyment that can never achieve satiation and is thus uninterrupted' (tr. Gnoli 1968: 59, modified). Note that such a statement would justify the reading *ca manaḥkaraṇaṃ*, since it contrasts the mental aspect of *camatkāra* (referred to as 'mental activity' or 'consciousness free from obstacles') with its physical effects (trembling, horripilation, etc.). On *camatkāra*, see also Torella ĪPK: 118–119, n. 23.

4. *śaktayo 'sya jagat sarvam ...* (YR ad 4)

This verse is frequently mentioned in Kashmirian Śaiva literature, with a few minor variants: *jagat kṛtsnam, śaktayas tu* (or *śaktayaś ca*); *śaktayo 'sya jagat kṛtsnam* is the reading of TĀ V 40a. It appears, in this form, in JR's long discussion of TĀ VIII 168–174 (vol. IV: 1474, *pāda* c), which, as we have seen, quotes and develops the definition of *aṇḍa* given by the *Raurava*. One should note particularly that all the commentaries on SpK I 1 quote it: Kṣemarāja's SpS I 1 (pp. 14–15; second hemistich) and SpN I 1 (*pāda* c, p. 7), Rāmakaṇṭha's SpV I 1 (p. 9; full verse), and Utpalavaiṣṇava's SpP 1 (p. 12; full verse). This confirms that PS 4 and its gloss should be understood in the light of SpK I 1. See also Utpaladeva's ŚDvṛ III 18–20: 107 (*pratīka* of the second hemistich: *śaktayas tu jagat kṛtsnam*; see below), Kṣemarāja's ŚSV III 8, III 30 (*pāda* c) as well as Varadarāja's ŚSvā III 30 (second hemistich), Abhinavagupta's PTV 1, on *khecarīsamatāṃ vrajet* (second hemistich, in Singh, p. 13), as well as TĀV I 112 (vol. II: 155; full verse), III 67 (vol. II: 428; *pāda* c), III 79 (vol. II: 441; *pāda* c), III 99 (vol. II: 460; second hemistich), III avat. ad 143 (vol. II: 497; second hemistich), III 190 (vol. II: 538; second hemistich), III 205 (vol. II: 549; *pāda* c), III 228 (vol. II: 569; *pāda* c), TĀ V 40 (vol. III: 963; second hemistich) and TĀV V 40 (ibid.; full verse), TĀV V 68 (vol. III: 990; full verse), VIII 174 (vol. IV: 1474; *pāda* c); IX 154 (vol. IV: 1754; *pāda* c), XIII avat. ad 266 (vol. V: 2363; *pāda* c); also in SvYU XI 194 (*pāda* c) and (second hemistich) in *Dīpikā* ad YH III 203 (Dviveda: 390) (and Padoux YH: 401). The *Sarvamaṅgalā* is given as the source of the quotation by YR as well as by the authors of ŚSV III 8 and TĀ V 40; the latter quotes the entire second hemistich and attributes it to the '*Māṅgalaśāstra*' expounded by Śrīkaṇṭha. As observed by Torella (ĪPK: XXX, n. 43), the *Maṅgalā* 'is included in the list of Bhairavatantra given by the *Śrīkaṇṭhīsaṃhitā*'. According to Padoux (TĀ: 270), the *Sarvamaṅgalāśāstra*, known only through this quotation, could be a hymn in praise of Śiva, whose names include Śrīkaṇṭha. Citing the full verse, the SpV (ad 1, p. 9) refers to the *Pārameśvara[śāstra]*; this does not however permit us to conclude that the same work is referred to under a different title; it should be noted that SpV (p. 9), quoted above, attributes the statement to Śiva himself, by referring to the text it quotes as *pārameśvara*, and that TĀV IX 154 uses the term *udghoṣyate*, 'is proclaimed' (*yad abhiprāyeṇaiva śaktayo 'sya jagat kṛtsnam ityādyudghoṣyate*). Other texts make allusions to its source as *āmnāya*, 'Tradition' (in ŚSV III 30), Āgama (in SpN: 7, SpS: 14–15, and Varadarāja's ŚSvā III 30), and *rahasyaśāstra*, 'esoteric Scripture' (in SpP: 12). Similar assertion in ŚD III 2b–3: *na śivaḥ śaktirahito na śaktir vyatirekiṇī// śivaḥ śaktas tathā bhāvān icchayā kartum īhate/ śaktiśaktimator bhedaḥ śaive jātu na varṇyate//*, 'Neither is Śiva devoid of energy, nor is energy

independent [of him]. Empowered in this way, Śiva exerts himself to create objects of his own free will. Indeed, according to Śaiva doctrine, energy and the Possessor of energy [or energies] are not described as different ['as do unauthoritative schools of thought (*aprāmāṇikādarśaneṣu*)', comments Utpaladeva]'; also ŚD III 20b: *[...] sarvaṃ śivātmakam*, which Utpaladeva glosses by quoting the aforementioned passage of the *Sarvamaṅgalā*: *śivātmakam eva sarvaṃ na tu śaktyātmakam/ vyāvahārikaśaktibhedāśrayeṇe tu śaktyātmakam uktam śaktayas tu jagat kṛtsnaṃ iti vastutas tu śivātmakam eva* (ŚDvṛ III 20b); also, TĀ III 168b: *śaktiśaktimadaikātmya°*; cf. TĀV III 205 and avat. ad V 68, which both quote the "maxim": *śaktimataḥ khalu śaktir ananyā ityādinītyā; śaktimataḥ khalu śaktir ananyā ityādyuktayuktyā*, 'Indeed energy is not different from the possessor of energy'. The source of such Trika notions might be MVT II 2a, quoted by TĀV I 196: *śaktimacchaktibhedena dharātattvaṃ vibhidyate/*, 'The *tattva* 'earth' divides into energy and possessor of energy [or energies]'.

5. *aṇḍas, tattvas, adhvans, bhuvanas* (YR ad 4)

Quoted in TĀV XI 8, MVT II 49 enumerates the four *aṇḍas*: *pārthivaṃ prākṛtaṃ caiva māyīyaṃ śāktyam eva ca / iti saṃkṣepataḥ proktam etad aṇḍacatuṣṭayam//*. The word *aṇḍa*, lit., 'egg' or 'envelope', connotes a form which is both impenetrable and constrictive. Underlined by TĀ VIII 169–170 and XI 12b–14a, constriction is a main feature of the *aṇḍas*, in terms of which the infinite is reduced to the finite. Thus Paramaśiva becomes a *paśu*, rather all the varieties of *paśus*. Defined in YR ad 4 (by citing TĀ VIII 169) as an 'aggregate of entities', i.e., as an aggregate of bodies, faculties and worlds, and clearly described in YR's commentary as four sheaths fitted within one another, these *aṇḍas* are not only to be seen as cosmic spheres. They are also metaphors for the different grades of experience, whether this experience takes place at the level of pure manifestation, or pure subjectivity, which is that of *śaktyaṇḍa*, or at the level of phenomenal manifestation and embodied subjectivity which *māyāṇḍa*, *prakṛtyaṇḍa* and *pṛthvyaṇḍa* account for. Everything starts with *śaktyaṇḍa*, lit., the 'sphere of Energy'. In fact, *śakti*, the very power of the Lord, once transformed by him, out of his absolute freedom, into the power of negating his own essential nature, which is plenitude, gives rise to the other three levels of experience which are, as *śaktyaṇḍa* itself, as many levels of bondage.

Why is this theory of the *aṇḍas* set forth at the very outset of the exposition? It is because the entire text, considering the main problem of empirical being to be that of delimitation, aims at explaining how diversity takes place so as to enable the reversal of the process and the recognition and re-experience of one's own fundamental plenitude. This reversal of process takes place through *adhvaśuddhi*, the 'purification of the paths'. In kārikās

14–22, the PS enumerates in decreasing order Paramaśiva's "manifestations", the thirty-six principles that the methodical analysis of perceptual diversity reveals. Nevertheless, before broadening the analysis of the constituents of external and internal reality meant to explain Creation itself, the treatise endeavors to apprehend the manifestation of sensible experience in its totality, in its seemingly paradoxical relation to the deity, the unique entity, the supreme reality, which is defined by its essential freedom. Thus, it is an essentially philosophical effort that produces the theory of the four *aṇḍas*, or concentric 'envelopes', through which the exposition seeks to account for the organization of the Creation — thus giving rise to the concept of the cosmic 'sphere' — as well as to account for the degrees of experience understood as degrees of finitude and bondage, which are to be overcome in order to regain one's essential plenitude. This is the reason why *śaktyaṇḍa*, the first of the four *aṇḍas*, is composed of the three inferior *tattvas* of the 'pure path' (*śuddhādhvan*), starting with Sadāśiva, where first emerges 'this' as an ideal potentiality. Yet it is a finitude and a bondage altogether relative, for what is at stake, at this level of nonduality, is the pure manifestation that has not yet materialized itself into actual creation. As Michel Hulin states: Śiva follows the pure path 'pour faire, si l'on ose dire, le tour de sa nature' [— '... so as to, so to speak, take an overall view of his own nature'] (1978: 305). The position of the *śuddhādhvan* is, for the nondual Śaivism of Kashmir, a way of showing that consciousness 'does call for cosmic manifestation' and that 'far from being defilement and degradation, its relationship to multiplicity is enjoyment, because it expresses its inmost possibility' (Hulin 1978: 286). This is why YR states, in his avat. ad 4, that 'this universe is nothing but the blossoming of the Lord's energies', and later on, that 'the universe is in essence nothing but the marvel of supreme ipseity'. BĀU I 4, 1–3 describes of the Primordial Androgyne as one who 'evokes in imagination a possible cosmic multiplicity and rejoices in realizing that he already encompasses all of it' (Hulin 1978: 302). The same description is appropriate for Paramaśiva, pure consciousness, itself understood in this system as the unity of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*. Yet such a consciousness 'cannot be satisfied to contain the objects as "a bag contains nuts"; it possesses them only if it recovers them at every moment' (Hulin 1978: 301; note that the image is present in SpN I 2, where it is said that the world 'has not come out of him [the Lord], as does a walnut from a bag' — *na prasevakād ivākṣoṭādi tat tasmān nirgatam api*). Thus there is a double movement: on the one hand, cosmic dispersion, when consciousness, disaggregating its host of energies, brings about the creation of the universe; on the other, its reabsorption within consciousness. Moreover, such delimitation, seen as bondage, is nothing else than the alteration, freely chosen by Śiva, of his own *śakti*, energy or power. Hence, his omnipotence, in play (we meet

here the notion of divine *krīḍā*) reducing itself so as a 'this' emerges as antagonist to the 'I', appears as the altered and constrictive form of the *śaktyaṇḍa*, the 'sphere/envelope of Energy', that is the reduced, as well as reducing, energy (or power) of the Lord.

Actual creation begins with the power of division and dichotomization that is *māyā*, associated with the five *kañcukas*. Thus is constituted *māyāṇḍa*, the 'sphere of *māyā*, or Illusion'. Its seven *tattvas*, from *māyā* to *puruṣa*, stand for that level of experience where the one who was pure subject starts seeking, in illusion and delusion, for what is outside of him. As such *māyāṇḍa* is the condition required for the manifestation of *prakr̥tyaṇḍa*, the 'sphere of Nature', which, beginning with *prakr̥ti* and consisting of the following twenty-three *tattvas*, offers the complete delineation of cognizable reality (*meya*) divided into *draṣṭr̥*, the 'seer' (who is but his *karaṇas*), and *dr̥śya*, the 'seen', viz., the five *tanmātras* and the five *bhūtas*.

At the core of *prakr̥tyaṇḍa*, the last 'sphere/envelope' is to be found — which coincides with the grossest *tattva*, earth — which stands for the body itself, according to reasonings first put forth by Sāṃkhya (see kā. 22 on this point). Thus is constituted the *pr̥thvyaṇḍa*, the 'Terrestrial sphere'. It represents the grossest level of experience, where one mistakes the body for the Self, i.e., when pure consciousness fully appropriates to itself those fictitious contents, the body and so forth (*buddhi*, etc.), that are extrinsic to it. Thus the way the four *aṇḍas* are fit into each other expresses the progressive constriction of pure, free, ever-radiating consciousness, in other words, a 'genesis of bondage', to borrow the formula coined by Hulin ('une genèse de la servitude') in the context of the theory of the thirty-six *tattvas* (1978: 304).

Since the entire manifestation exists within the four *aṇḍas*, they may be seen as encompassing an infinite variety of worlds and their inhabitants. Again those inhabitants are endowed with an infinite variety of bodies and faculties which may differ from world to world, as well as, within the same world, from one level of being to another (see YR ad 5). The eighth chapter of the TĀ deals with the *bhuvanas* (as well as with the notion of *aṇḍa*, in 168b–174) in the course of expounding the *deśādhvan*, 'Path of space', of which the *bhuvanas* represent the most concretized aspect. As recorded by TĀ itself, their number varies widely from text to text, although they are fundamentally innumerable, as indicated by SvT X, which posits universes along with their subuniverses. Quoting SvT X 2–5a, JR observes, in his avat. to TĀ VIII 9, that 'since there is an infinite number of *bhuvanas*, there is an infinite number of their presiding deities also. Therefore, nobody would attain the Absolute ever, by meditating on each of them, even if one devoted innumerable births to it. Such a practice would be thus impractical' (*bhuvanānām ānantye tadadhīśānām*

api ānantyam/ iti teṣāṃ pratyekam evam anusaṃdhāne janmasahasrair api na kaścit pāraṃ yāyāt/ ity etad aśakhyānuṣṭhānam). In a reply to such reservations, TĀ VIII 9–10 refers to Śrīkaṇṭhanātha's *Dīkṣottaratantra* (XIII 63–67), according to which there are just five *bhuvanas*, presided over by Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Īśvara and Anāśritaśiva respectively. However, according to SvT IV, TĀ VIII 407–427 reckons 224 *bhuvanas*. TĀ VIII 428–434a refers to the account of the *bhuvanas* in the *Mataṅgatantra*. At the end, TĀ VIII 436–452 adopts the count of the MVT (V 1–33), which TĀ VIII 436b reaffirms to be the main authority in the Kashmirian nondual Śaivism. Thus 118 *bhuvanas* are enumerated, related to just four of the five *kalās*, since the fifth *kalā*, in MVT, does not contain any *bhuvana* (contrary to the SvT which attributes 16 *bhuvanas* to the fifth *kalā*). JR offers an explanation (avat. to TĀ VIII 428) for such discrepancy of classification: the *bhuvanas* are expounded in keeping with the specific *prakriyā*, or process of initiation (*dīkṣā*), adopted by such and such authoritative text, the difference of the *prakriyās* corresponding to the difference of the aspirants' entitlements. However, the common feature of all these expositions is that they are made in the context of *dīkṣā*, which SvTU V 88a (vol. III: 38) defines as *ātmasaṃskāra*, 'perfecting the Self'; thus the Vth chapter of the MVT is entitled *dīkṣāprakaraṇa*, and the Xth chapter of the SvT: *bhuvanādhvadīkṣāviddhi*. This process of *dīkṣā* implies the process of the 'purification of the paths' (*adhvaśuddhi*), whose lower level is the 'purification of the universes' (*bhuvanaśuddhi*).

Apprehended in the light of these spatial correspondences, the four *aṇḍas* are evidently to be seen as cosmic spheres, all the more so as a presiding deity rules over each of them.

Vv. 41–46 of the PS (esp. 41 and 46) deal again with the *aṇḍas*, as related to the mantra *SAUḤ*, the *hṛdayabīja*, which stands for the whole, inasmuch as it is posited that the first three *aṇḍas* (or *kalās*) are pervaded by *SA*, and the fourth by *AU*, whereas the fifth *kalā* is pervaded by the *visarga Ḥ*: such is the teaching (see MVT IV 25 and PTLvṛ 21–24 in Padoux 1975: 110ff., n. 241 and 275). The correspondences do not end here since, in the context of the ritual of absorption within the *hṛdayabīja* (PTLvṛ 27–28), the four *aṇḍas* are again related to four limbs or organs of the body, according to their place and function. In the PTLvṛ, the correspondences are just alluded to. Nevertheless, according to Swami Lakṣman Joo quoted by Padoux in his translation (PTLvṛ: 118, n. 303), the four *aṇḍas* — from *pṛthvyaṇḍa*, the lowest one — are respectively related to *pāda*, *hasta*, *pāṇi* and *mukha*, an interpretation that requires a slight alteration in the order of the text which reads: *pādapāṇihastamukha*°. Similarly, correspondences are established between *kalās* and parts of the body (see Brunner SŚP, vol. III: fig. III, IV), as well as between *tattvas* and parts of the body, in the process of internal worship (see Padoux 1986: 178–180).

6. *spanda* (YR ad 4)

On the notion of *spanda*, see AG's definitions in ĪPV III 1, 3 (vol. II: 221–222): *śuddho 'yaṃ spandaḥ [...] kiṃciccalanātmatayā sphuradrūpatvāt*, '[Sadāśiva] is pure *spanda*, for he manifests himself in a form which is subtle movement', and TĀ IV 184–186a: *kiṃciccalanam etāvad ananyasphuraṇaṃ hi yat*, '[*spanda*] is subtle movement, autonomous glitter' (see also Torella ĪPK: 121). The same definition of *spanda* is found in SpN I 1: *citsvābhāvyād acalasyāpi śrībhagavataḥ svātantryaśaktir [...] kiṃciccalattātmakadhātvarthānugamāt spanda ity abhihitā*, 'The *svātantryaśakti* of the Lord, though he moves not, being of the nature of consciousness, is known as *spanda* in accordance with the root-meaning of the word signifying "subtle movement" (*kiṃciccalattā*)'. That this movement be imperceptible is required in order to prevent the objection that the dynamism of the ultimate principle, consciousness, implies its perishability (for activity implies the transformation of the cause, hence its perishability). The Trika postulates self-awareness in the form of a vibration, or a pulsation, that is, a movement that is not a movement, continuous, yet unchanging, and therefore imperceptible. ĪPV I 5, 14 (vol. I: 256–257) develops this line of thought: *spandanaś ca kiṃciccalanam/ eṣaiva ca kiṃcidrūpatā yad acalanam api calam ābhāsata ity/ prakāśasvarūpaṃ hi manāg api nātiricyate 'tiricyata iveti tad acalam evābhāsabhedayuktam iva ca bhāti/*, '*spanda* means imperceptible movement. And this imperceptibility [of the movement] consists in this, that what is surely motionless appears as if in motion. For, although the essential nature of consciousness is not to change, it appears to change; [in other words,] that [essential nature of consciousness] which shines as motionless appears as endowed with an infinity of manifestations'. Similarly, TĀ IV 183b defines *spanda* as *svātmanyucchalana*, 'expansion in one's own self', before developing it (TĀ IV 184b) through the metaphor of the wave that is not different from the ocean (quoted n. 872).

7. Anāśritaśiva (YR ad 4)

See TĀ VIII 10, giving the exposition of the *bhuvanas* according to the *Dīkṣottaratantra*: *[...] anāśritaḥ śivas tasmād* [viz., *sādākhyagocarād*] *vyāptā [...]*, 'Anāśritaśiva pervades [the *tattvas*] beyond [the realm of Sādākhya, viz., beyond *śuddhavidyā*, Īśvara and Sādākhya (or Sadāśiva)]'. JR ad loc. observes: *tasmād iti sādākhyagocarād arthād ūrdhvaṃ śaktitattvasthāne tu*, 'He pervades [the *tattvas*] beyond the realm of Sādākhya, that is to say, he remains above, at the level of *śaktitattva*'. At this level of experience, the subject, viz., the yogin, is no longer Paramaśiva who contains the universe within himself. As observed by Silburn (*Kālikāstotra*: 37) this yogin does not possess the form of perfect consciousness, which, consisting of the free play of exteriority (*idantā*) within interiority (*ahantā*) and

vice versa, enjoys cosmic bliss (*jagadānanda*). Cosmic bliss, as defined by TĀ V 50–52a, implies a relation of the Self with the universe, in the form of their co-essentiality. It is in this sense that the yogin deprived of this experience of *jagadānanda* is deemed 'unrelated [to the universe]': *cidaikyākhyātimayānāśritaśiva°*, '[...] Anāśritaśiva does not experience the unity of absolute consciousness [in which the universe is identified with consciousness]' (PHvr̥ 4). Nevertheless, Anāśritaśiva is the stage of experience in which the universe yet to come, that is, empirical manifestation, is prepared, since it is the state (*avasthā*) in which Śakti begins to veil the Self temporarily, and, separating the universe from it, to produce *akhyāti*, nescience, or failure to recognize the real nature of the Self. This is the reason why *śūnyātiśūnya*, the 'Void beyond the Void', or 'absolute Void', is given in PHvr̥ 4 (p. 55) as a synonym for Anāśritaśiva: *cidaikyākhyātimayānāśritaśivaparyāyaśūnyātiśūnyātmatayā [...]*. Paramaśiva, the Whole having nothing outside himself, has to create a Void within himself in order to make room for the universe that he wishes to manifest as different from himself. And it is this Void that will assume the form of the objective universe. Cf. TĀ VIII 402: *anāśritaṃ tu vyāpāre nimittaṃ hetur ucyate*, 'In the process [of creation], the cause that is not dependent (*anāśrita*) is called the impelling [cause] (*hetu*)', and TĀV ad loc.: *vyāpāre iti sr̥ṣṭyādikriyāyām/ iha hi sa eva paraḥ parameśvaraḥ svasvātantryāt prathamaṃ śūnyātmatām avabhāsayan anāśritādirūpatayā prathitaḥ*, 'In the "activity", i.e., in the act of creation, etc., the Supreme one, Parameśvara, out of his freedom, first manifests himself as Void, and, manifest in that form, is known as Anāśrita'. In terms of mystical experience, Anāśritaśiva represents the yogin's stage of passive *samādhi*, or extasis (cf. Silburn *Kālikāstotra*: 27, 36–37). ŚSV I 2, quoted n. 226, whose phraseology is similar to that of YR here, describes Anāśritaśiva as the first manifestation of auto-limitation, freely chosen by Paramaśiva, which eventuates in the *māyāpramātr̥*.

8. Gahana (YR ad 4)

TĀ VIII 317–319 has Gahana the first among the six Rudras occupying the lower fold/cavity (*puṭa*) of the *māyāgranthi*, the gross level of *māyā*: *madhye puṭatrayaṃ tasyā rudrāḥ ṣaḍ adhare 'ntare/ eka ūrdhve ca pañceti dvādaśaite nirūpitāḥ// gahanāsādhyau hariharadaśeśvarau trikalagopatī ṣaḍ ime/ madhye 'nantaḥ kṣemo dvijeśavidyeśaviśvaśivāḥ// ṣaṭsu ca puṭageṣu tatparāvr̥ttyā/ parivarttate sthitiḥ kila devo 'nantas tu sarvathā madhye//*, 'Within that [*māyāgranthi*], there is a triad of folds/cavities (*puṭa*). In the lower one, there are six Rudras, in the middle there is one, in the upper one there are five. Thus twelve Rudras have been described. The six [Rudras] are Gahana, Asādhya, Harihara, Daśeśvara, Trikala, Gopati. Ananta is in the middle. [The five Rudras are] Kṣema, Dvijeśa, Vidyeśa,

Viśva and Śiva. [Regarding those five] and those six [Rudras] remaining in their [respective] folds/cavities, the location is liable to change, for they are interchangable. Nevertheless, Lord Ananta always remains in the middle'. Those two lines are a paraphrase of SvT X 1124–1127, as shown by TĀV VIII 317–319, which quotes it (p. 1566). Although SvT X 1124–1127 enumerates thirteen Rudras, placing six Rudras in the upper fold, among which Ananta (to be distinguished from the Anantesa in the middle fold, who is defined as *jagatpati*, the 'Lord of the world'), the two lists are parallel: Daśeśāna in SvT corresponds to Daśeśvara in TĀ; Kṣemeśa to Kṣema; Brāhmaṇasvāmin, the 'Lord of the Brāhmaṇas', to Dvijeśa; Vidyeśāna to Vidyeśa, and Viśveśa to Viśva. One observes that JR's reading of SvT 1124–1127 allows emendation of the SvT ed.: *brāhmaṇasvāmī* instead of *brahmaṇaḥ svāmī* (since Brāhmaṇasvāmin is the synonym of Dvijeśa), *viśveśa* instead of *vidyeśa* (since Viśveśa is the synonym of Viśva).

9. Phonemic emanation (YR ad 10–11)

Such speculations appear to be quite in keeping with those of VP I 1–2 and its *vṛtti*, which establish that since, in our cognition, we identify the objects with their words, the objects are essentially of the nature of the word. Cf. VP I 1–2: *anādinidhanaṃ brahma śabdatattvaṃ yad akṣaram/ vivartate 'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ// ekam eva yad āmnātaṃ bhinnaśaktivyapāśrayāt/ apṛthaktve 'pi śaktibhyaḥ pṛthaktveneva vartate//*, 'Ce Brahman sans commencement ni fin, Parole principielle, Phonème (impérissable), qui se manifeste sous la forme des objets et d'où procède le monde animé, Lui qui, révélé comme un, est le support de pouvoirs différents et paraît divisé sous l'effet de ses pouvoirs, quoi qu'il soit indivis [...]', which may be summarized as follows: *brahman*, which is Word-principle (*śabdatattva*), 'appears as the objects' (*vivartate 'rthabhāvena*). Thus, the creation of the world proceeds from it. The *brahman* is the one appearing as many, for it is the holder [lit., 'substratum'] of a multiplicity of powers (*śakti*). Though not different from its powers, it seems to be so. As Biardeau (VP: 25, n. 1) puts it: 'C'est l'Absolu lui-même qui se manifeste sous la forme des phénomènes par l'intermédiaire de ses pouvoirs. Le śabdabrahmavāda est donc un monisme de type *bhedābheda*' [— 'It is the Absolute itself which manifests in the form of phenomena through its powers. Therefore, the śabdabrahmavāda is a monism of the *bhedābheda* category']. Here also, the process of the Lord's manifestation is nothing but the progressive display and differentiation of his supreme energy — a notion which MVT III 5–9a, quoted in both SpN III 13 and ŚSV III 19, clearly develops: *yā sā śaktir jagaddhātuḥ kathitā samavāyinī/ icchātvaṃ tasya sā devī sisṛkṣoḥ pratipadyate// saikāpi saty anekatvaṃ yathā gacchati tac chṛṇu/ evam etad iti jñeyaṃ nānyatheti suniścitam// jñāpayantī jagaty atra*

jñānaśaktir nigadyate/ evaṃ bhavatv idaṃ sarvam iti kāryonmukhī yadā// jātā tadaiva tad vastu kurvaty atra kriyocyate/ evam eṣā dvirūpāpi punar bhedair anantatām/ arthopādhivaśād yāti cintāmaṇir iveśvarī//, 'When the Master of the world wishes to create, his [supreme] Śakti, the Goddess who is said to be inherent in him, becomes Will [viz., energy of Will]. Listen how she, though one, becomes many. Similarly, when she makes the knowable known as definitely "this" and not as something else, she is named in this world "energy of Knowledge". Similarly, when she becomes intent on acting, considering: "Let all this come to be [just as I have willed and known it]", [that same energy], arisen at the very moment she creates the object, is then named the "[energy of] Action". Thus, though [already] of two forms [Knowledge and Action], she differentiates herself again, becoming innumerable, thanks to those objects, which [function as her] contingent attributes. Therefore, this sovereign Goddess is to be compared to the thought-gem that yields all desires'. MVT III 9b–13a goes on to describe the form assumed by the supreme Śakti when considered from the point of view of phonemic emanation: becoming Mātṛkā, she shifts from the level of *parāvāc* to that of *paśyantī*, again dividing herself into different phonemes or groups of phonemes, grouped into eight *vargas* and presided over by eight *mātṛkās*. Thus emerge from one another in succession the Lord's energies, seen as a 'wheel' — a multitude assuming the forms of all possible words and things.

10. *saptapramātṛs* (YR ad 14)

The notion of a hierarchy of subjects — usually seven in number, but not uniformly — is common to all schools of Śaivism, including those that are dualistic. The notion itself of a 'heptad of subjects' (*pramātṛsaptaka*) seems to be mainly of Saiddhāntika origin, as is suggested in TĀV X 7–8 (avat.), wherein a Traika adept questions the need for the seven just mentioned (TĀ X 6–7a): *nanv asmaddarśane naraśaktiśivātmakam eva viśvam iti sarvatrodghoṣyate tat katham iha siddhāntadarśanādisamucitaṃ pramātṛbhedam avalambyaitad uktam [...]*, 'But, one might object, is it not everywhere proclaimed, in our school, that the world consists of *nara*, Śakti and Śiva? So why has this [doctrine of the seven *pramātṛs*] been stated here [in TĀ X 6–7a] by adopting the types of *pramātṛs* congenial to schools such as the Siddhānta?'

The seven subjects represent different levels, or modes, of consciousness, that is, of cognitive experience, as is made clear by the metaphor of SpN I 1, in which they are said to be different 'roles' (*bhūmikā*) assumed by Śiva: *śrīmān maheśvaro hi svātantryaśaktyā śivamantramaheśvaramantreśvaramantravijñānākalapralayākalasakalāntāṃ pramātṛbhūmikāṃ tadvedyabhūmikāṃ ca gṛhṇānaḥ*, 'By his power of absolute freedom, the glorious Great Lord assumes [on the subjective level] the cognitive roles of Śiva,

the Mantramaheśvaras, the Mantreśvaras, the Mantras, the Vijñānākalas, the Pralayākalas and the Sakalas [, whereas, on the objective level,] he assumes the roles [of the objects that are] made known thereby'. For other examples of the theatrical metaphor applied to Śiva, or the Self, and of the use of *bhūmikā* in the sense of 'role', see ŚS III 9–12, YR ad 1 and 5; see also SvTU VIII 31 (vol. III: 175): *devaḥ parāvākśaktimayaḥ śivabhaṭṭāraka eva sadāśiva iti gṛhītatattadbhūmikaḥ svayaṃ guruśiṣyapade sthitveti*, 'Sadāśiva is Lord Śiva [half-]made of that *śakti* that is supreme Speech (*parāvāc*). And the fact that "he adopts by himself the [double] posture of the teacher and the pupil (*guruśiṣyapade sthitvā*)" means that "he [alone] assumes each of those roles (*bhūmikā*)." ' As modes of consciousness, the seven categories of subject are related to the *tattvas* understood as different levels of experience.

So variable are Śaiva texts, both in describing the levels of subjectivity and in locating them on the scale of the *tattvas* that it would be difficult, within the limits of our exposé, to give an account of them in detail (see, notably, Torella ĪPK: 199ff., Vasudeva MVT: 151–178). It is, however, possible to account for the more systematic classification of the 'heptad of subjects' later proposed by AG and his immediate followers, which is modeled on the MVT (I 14ff., II 1–9), itself reformulated in ĪPK III 2, 6–20. And it should be noted that AG, particularly in his TĀ, emphasizes the regular correspondence not only between the levels of subjectivity and those of manifestation (*tattvas*), but also between the levels of subjectivity and the three impurities (*mala*), or, more exactly, between those levels and the stages of the process by which the aspirant gradually frees himself from those impurities (see TĀ IX 93b–96, translated by Vasudeva MVT: 172). AG elaborates, and, indeed, rationalizes the Śaiva doctrine of a hierarchy of subjects in TĀ IX 84–96, X 6ff. (he refers again to that doctrine elsewhere, such as TĀ XV 339–341, etc.), TS IX, PTV 5–9b, ĪPV III 2 and ĪPVV ad loc. (vol. III: 319–323) and ad I 7, 14 (vol. II: 404–405). So do, on the one hand, his exegetes, Jayaratha ad TĀ and YR ad PS (see kārikās 14 and 23), and, on the other hand, Kṣemarāja, in his PH (sūtra 3) with auto-commentary, and in several other commentaries (SpN I 1, quoted above, ŚSV I 2–3, etc.). We sketch here the hierarchy of the seven subjects in descending order, as does YR in his gloss to PS 14, dealing with the first five, and in his gloss to PS 23, dealing with the last two, according to the distinction between *śuddhādhvan* and *aśuddhādhvan*: 1) As pure, undivided, vibrating consciousness, Śiva (i.e., Śiva/Śakti) is the highest subject. 2) The Mantramaheśvaras, the 'Great Lords of Mantras', are located at the level of Sadāśiva. Thus the level of Sadāśiva is that very high level of consciousness where 'this', although appearing at the horizon of consciousness, remains immersed within the 'I'. Nevertheless, the essential unity of consciousness has been somehow fragmented, as shown

by the plural applied to those Mantramaheśvaras. 3) Then come, a grade below, the 118 Mantreśvaras, the 'Lords of Mantras'. Located at the level of Īśvara, they represent the level of consciousness that operates there. Whatever may be the interpretation of the experience which the Īśvara state symbolizes (see YR's exegesis ad PS 14, which differs in some way of the classical one), it is the level of consciousness corresponding to the state in which one experiences more distinctly the emergence of an ideal objectivity, without deviating from one's own essential ipseity. As different modes of this essential ipseity, Śiva, the Mantramaheśvaras and the Mantreśvaras are free of all impurity. 4) Being located at the level of *śuddhavidyā*, pure, perfect Knowledge, the Mantras still belong to the plane of the *śuddhādhvan*. Nevertheless, although ideal, the clear introduction of differentiation, which characterizes the stage of *śuddhavidyā*, implies the presence of *māyā*, even if not yet fully developed (*aprarūḍhā*), inasmuch as no sense of alterity is generated (see n. 508). Therefore, the experiencers located at this level, the Mantras, are affected by the *māyīyamala* (see ĪPK III 2, 9 on the Vidyeśvaras, with Utpaladeva's *vṛtti*). They are associated with the Vidyeśvaras, a group of eight deities (SpN II 2 mentions two of them: Anantabhaṭṭāraka and Vyomavyāpin; see also ĪPV III 1, 6: *vidyeśvarā bhagavanto 'nantādyā vartante*), whose specific task is that of accomplishing four of the five cosmic functions (*pañcakṛtya*), as well as striving for the liberation of limited souls, 'acting as intermediaries in the revelation of the teachings of Śiva, etc.' (Torella ĪPK: 201, n. 14); see n. 510. Being etymologically 'those who ideate [creation]', the Mantras are perfect instruments for the Vidyeśvaras who employ them in this double task. Thus the plane occupied by the crowd of the seventy million Mantras headed by the Vidyeśvaras represents 'the mode of consciousness in which vast but internally differentiated segments of the universe flash into view' (Sanderson 1986: 192). Facing a reality considered other than themselves, the Vidyeśvaras, residing at the plane of *śuddhavidyā*, are omniscient inasmuch as 'they are identified with consciousness' (ĪPvṛ III 2, 9). For the same reason, since that consciousness is made of both *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* (that dynamic principle which manifests itself as the activity of the 'I' and receives therefore the name of *kartṛtā*, 'agency'), they are endowed with agency, as is shown by their accomplishing four of the five 'duties' (*kṛtya*). Yet, since they conceive the objects of their action as different from themselves, due to the *māyīyamala*, such agency is partial (ĪPK III 2, 9), and can be contrasted with the omnipotence of the Mantreśvaras and Mantramaheśvaras. 'Therefore, ĪPvṛ III 2, 9 concludes, they too must be considered finite souls (*aṇutva*)'; see n. 510. 5) The presence of agency, even though partial, is what distinguishes the Vidyeśvaras/Mantras from the next level of consciousness, namely the Vijñānākalas (or Vijñānakevalas) — defined (ĪPK III 2, 6–7) as pure con-

sciousness (*śuddhabodha*), in the sense that 'they no longer contaminate self-representation with the projection of the impure *tattvas* from *māyā* to earth (*pṛthivī*)' (Sanderson 1986: 191). In other words, they no longer consider what is not the Self, viz., the body, the mind, etc., as the Self (a mode of consciousness which is that of the Sakalas). Therefore, in contrast to the Vidyeśvaras, the Vijñānākalas are free of the *māyīyamala*, the impurity of differentiation, and in contrast to the following states, Pralayākalas and Sakalas, they are also free of the *kārmamala*, the impregnating of consciousness with impressions left by one's good or bad actions; thus do not transmigrate any longer. On the other hand, they are completely devoid of agency (*kartṛtā*), i.e., of I-consciousness (*vimarśa*, or *spanda*), with the result that they consider themselves incomplete or deficient. Thus, they are subject to the *āṇavamala*, the impurity consisting of the intuition of limitedness, that is, they fail to recognize their own creative freedom (*svātantrya*) and own essential plenitude (*pūrṇatā*). Their name, 'those Inert in Gnosis' as Sanderson translates it, accounts for those two symmetric features. So does their location on the scale of the *tattvas*, since, according to some texts (notably YR ad 14, and PTV 5–9b quoted n. 511), they hang suspended between the pure (*śuddhādhvan*) and the impure universe (*aśuddhādhvan*), being placed below *śuddhavidyā* and above *māyā*, in an intermediary *tattva*, created *ad hoc* for purposes specific to Śaiva speculation, namely, the *mahāmāyā*, the 'Great Illusion'. Thus the Vijñānākala represents the mode of consciousness belonging to the yogin engaged on the path leading to liberation. According to the ĪPVV (vol. III: 322), it is a kind of experience (*bhogaviśeṣa*) which may be attained through a special initiation intended to facilitate leaving [behind] the realm of *māyā*, either through meditative realization (*bhāvanā*), or through concentration (*dhāraṇā*), contemplation (*dhyāna*) or absorption (*samādhi*) that have *māyā* for their object (cf. Torella ĪPK: 200, n. 12). Thus, PTV (Skt. text: p. 57) teaches that 'the Vijñānākalas and the Pralayākalas do not have the idea of *mama*, "[this is] mine", [in certain states as *samādhi*]' (*vijñānākalānāṃ pralayākalānāṃ ca [...] mameti vyatiriktaṃ nāsti*). 6) The Pralayākalas, or Pralayakevalas, 'those Inert in Dissolution', represent the mode of consciousness in which the Self is suspended in a state of inertia, which explains the common analogy of deep, i.e., dreamless, sleep. On the meaning of the term 'Pralayākala', see ĪPV III 2, 8 (vol. II: 252), quoted n. 625. The 'dissolution' of their name is a metaphor for the state of total absorption found in deep sleep, which is itself further analyzed as twofold, according to whether some internal sensation (*savedya* or *prāṇa*) persists or not, the latter stage being that of real absorption or 'dissolution'. Thus the doctrine distinguishes between two levels of Pralayākalas (ĪPK III 2, 8). Sanderson (1986: 191) defines the lower one, as 'analogous to dreamless but blissful sleep (*savedyapralayākalatā*) and the other to

dreamless sleep completely void of sensation (*apavedyapralayākalatā*)'. In Utpaladeva's fourfold division of the limited self (*māyāpramātṛ*), the lower Pralayākala is also termed *prāṇapramātṛ*, for he experiences the Self as an internal sensation (*prāṇa*), and the higher one is termed *śūnyapramātṛ*, for he experiences the Self as the Void (*śūnya*). In the *prāṇapramātṛ*, the *māyīyamala* persists, whereas it is transcended in the *śūnyapramātṛ*, with the complete, although transitory, dissolution of the māyic world. However, *kārmamala* remains at both levels, for, though all actions have dissolved in the perfect inertia of deep sleep, 'the impressions of past actions remain, waiting to regenerate world-experience' (Sanderson 1986: 191) when the period of dissolution comes to an end, that is, when one awakes. Thus, as is the immediately inferior Sakala, the lower Pralayākala is subject to the three impurities, whereas the higher Pralayākala is free of the *māyīyamala*. See also YR ad 23, who defines the Pralayākalas as the ones 'who are freed from the particular [that is, from gross materiality] and from the body'. 7) At the bottom of the ladder, the Sakala, 'endowed with factors of fragmentation (*kalā*)', is the ordinary limited consciousness existing solely in the states of waking and dream, immersed in the māyic world, taking as the Self what is not the Self, and denied even the transitory redemption of dreamless sleep. See YR ad 23: 'Are called Sakalas those cognizing subjects who are of a bodily nature because of the factors of fragmentation (*kalā*), beginning with the faculties in their "pure" state [that is, without adjunction of object] (*indriyamātra*) and ending with particular [objects] [that is, with the *mahābhūtas*]'. For a detailed exposition of the reverse process, through which the meditator, gradually freeing himself from the sentiment of differentiation, aims at reaching the intuition of identity with the deity, that is, consciousness itself, see TĀ IX 90b–97a, XIII 275b–76; also Sanderson 1986: 190–193.

11. *guṇatattva* (YR ad 19)

In Sāṃkhya, unconscious nature (*prakṛti*) is the "cause" (at least in the sense of the material cause) of the world; in Trika, consciousness itself is that cause, the world being nothing but its external manifestation. The Trika explains the phenomenal world as resulting from the progressive obscuration and constriction of the Lord's supreme energy, which is his freedom. Thus it establishes a 'genesis of bondage' (Hulin 1978: 304 — une 'genèse de la servitude') against the background of an essential vibration which, though progressively weakened, or so it seems, never ceases to tremble. Śakti is the fundamental principle that distinguishes Trika from Sāṃkhya, despite similarities in the cosmologies of the two systems. The Trika understands empirical diversity in terms of the dichotomy of enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*) and object of enjoyment (*bhogya*). In this context, *puruṣa* is the enjoyer whereas *prakṛti* represents the totality of such objects — an

argument similar to that of the Sāṃkhya concerning the *puruṣa*, who "contemplates" *prakṛti* as though she were a dancer, or an actress, performing before him (SK 59). *prakṛti* offers the entire objective world to the enjoyer, although its objectivity is as yet potential. Thus TS VIII, p. 83 contrasts the actualized world (*prakṛtitattvasya sargaḥ*), with *prakṛti* defined as the homogeneous and quiescent aggregate of the three *guṇas*. *prakṛti* is not only creation *in potentiâ*, it is also the fundamental principle persisting in each and every particular object of enjoyment, once creation has taken place: *[...] eṣa eva sukhaduḥkhamohātmakabhogyaviśeṣānusyūtasya sāmānyamātrasya tadguṇasāmyāparanāmnaḥ prakṛtitattvasya sargaḥ*, '[...] Such is the creation pertaining to *prakṛtitattva*; this *prakṛtitattva*, which is nothing else than the common principle (*sāmānya*) inherent (*anusyūta*) in [each] specific object of enjoyment made of pleasure, pain and delusion, is also termed the equilibrium of those *guṇas* (*tadguṇasāmya*)'. The TS (pp. 84–85) gives an alternative definition of *prakṛti* as *bhogyasāmānya*, 'state of equilibrium of the objects of enjoyment', which makes it the archetype of objectivity itself. Some disturbance of this ideal equilibrium is necessary so that actual objectivity emerges from its potential "cause". So TS (p. 85): *evaṃ kṣubdhāt pradhānāt kartavyāntarodayo nākṣubdhād iti*, 'Thus other effects [*buddhi*, etc.] emerge from the disturbed *pradhāna*, and not from the undisturbed one'. The point is of so much importance that the TS postulates additionally a *guṇatattva*: *kṣobho 'vaśyam eva antarāle 'bhyupagantavya iti siddhaṃ sāṃkhyāparidṛṣṭaṃ pṛthagbhūtaṃ guṇatattvaṃ*, 'One must necessarily accept that this disturbance takes place in-between [the two principles]. Thus has a *guṇatattva* distinct [from *prakṛti* and *buddhi*] been established, which Sāṃkhya has failed to discern'. The term '*kṣobha*' has itself been borrowed from the Sāṃkhya, more precisely from late Sāṃkhya, where it appears intended to gloss over a glaring lapsus in the system — for the initial coming into contact of two utterly unlike principles (for so it conceives *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*) is indeed difficult to justify. A true dualism is thus difficult to maintain, and this may have been the reason for the introduction of the three qualities, which are never, in fact, in a state of equilibrium; their 'resting' being then nothing but an hypothesis motivated by the doctrine itself. This means that, regarding the *guṇas*, the loss of equilibrium is as much a category in its own right as the equilibrium itself, and thus deserves to receive a name, that of *guṇatattva*.

12. Evolution of the phenomenal world (YR ad 19)

In the Sāṃkhya (see SK 22), whereas *puruṣa* stands isolated, neither an effect, nor a cause, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra* proceed successively from *prakṛti*, the primal cause; cf. also SK 3, which defines four types of entities by having recourse to the opposition 'producer-product' (*prakṛti-vikṛti*). Then, from *ahaṅkāra*, the 'group of sixteen' emerges, which includes *manas*, the

five *buddhīndriyas*, the five *karmendriyas* and the five *tanmātras*. A further analysis (SK 25) distinguishes the 'group of eleven' (*manas* and all the ten *indriyas*), effect of the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra* (also named *vaikṛta*), from the five *tanmātras*, products of the *tāmasāhaṅkāra* (also named *bhūtādi*, for it is the secondary cause of the *bhūtas*); see n. 593. And all of them are directly, i.e., horizontally, related to *ahaṅkāra*, instead of vertically evolving from one another (SK 25–28). As for the five *bhūtas*, they proceed from the five *tanmātras*; see Hulin 1978: 73ff. and Larson 1979: 179ff., 236 (chart). On the other hand, although SK 33 defines the *antaḥkaraṇa* as threefold, its identity as a whole is not fixed, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* and *manas* being clearly distinguished from each other and endowed with different status. The Trika also derives the *manas* and the ten *indriyas* from the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra* (see n. 593), whereas the five *tanmātras* proceed from the aspect of the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra* in which *tamas* assumes predominance, as shown by two parallel passages of TS VIII. See TS VIII, p. 87: *tatra sāttviko yasmād manaś ca buddhīndriyapañcakaṃ ca, tatra manasi janye sarvatanmātrajananasāmarthyayuktaḥ sa janakaḥ*, 'From the *sāttvika* [*ahaṅkāra*] *manas* and the pentad of the *buddhīndriyas* proceed. Once the *manas* is evolved [from the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra*], the same *ahaṅkāra* [in the aspect in which *tamas* is predominant] becomes the cause capable of giving rise to all the *tanmātras*', and TS VIII, p. 89: *bhoktraṃśācchādakāt tu tamaḥpradhānāhaṅkārāt tanmātrāṇi vedyaikarūpāṇi pañca*, 'However, from the [aspect of the *sāttvika*] *ahaṅkāra* in which *tamas* assumes predominance, and which veils the enjoyer's part [viz., the subjectivity], proceed the five *tanmātras*, which are only object of knowledge (*vedya*) [and which do no partake of the knower, as is the case with the *manas* and the *indriyas*]'. This conception of the *tanmātras* originating from the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra* (even though it is from its *tāmasa* part) is an innovation as regards the Sāṃkhya scheme. In fact, in the Trika reasonings, the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra* itself is *triguṇātmaka*: although it abounds in *sattva*, some traces of the two other *guṇas* remain; see Mukund Rām Shāstrī ad TS VIII, p. 87, n. 80 (ad *tatra sāttviko yasmād manaś ca*...): *sāttvikaḥ sattvapradhāno yato guṇībhūtatayā rajastamasor api sambhāva ity arthaḥ*. Therefore, one has to understand that, once the *manas* has emerged from the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra* equally characterized by the three *guṇas*, the five *tanmātras* are produced from the subordinated *tamoguṇa* of the *sāttvikāhaṅkāra*. The Trika agrees again with the Sāṃkhya by making the *bhūtas* directly emerge from the *tanmātras*. However, its perspective is altogether different, since it emphasizes, with the concept of *kṣobha*, 'disturbance', the persistence of vibrating consciousness within all the levels of phenomenal diversity. Thus, the entire process of the manifestation of the *tattvas* takes place according to the principle that the cause in its disturbed form is called the effect (see TS VIII, p. 90, in Appendix 13).

13. *tanmātras* (YR ad 22)

Each *tanmātra* is considered to be the quintessential form of the corresponding *mahābhūta*, inasmuch as it constitutes its distinctive quality. Thus sound is associated with ether, or cosmic space, considered to be the substratum of the propagation of waves; touch with air, etc. Yet, with the exception of ether which has sound for its unique quality, one has to admit that other *mahābhūtas* possess more than one sensible quality, or, to put it differently, that one *tanmātra* may be present in more than one *mahābhūta*: for instance sound is present in all the *mahābhūtas*. Thus classical Sāṃkhya (e.g., *Yuktidīpikā* 38) has elaborated the theory of the progressive accumulation of the qualities, furthermore explained — just as in YR ad 22 — as the cumulative combination of the *tanmātras*, according to the principle that the effect is proportionate to the cause. Hence, if space is experienced as sonorous, air as sonorous and tangible, fire as sonorous, tangible and visible, water as sonorous, tangible, visible and savory, earth as sonorous, tangible, visible, savory and fragrant, it is because space proceeds from sound, air from sound and contact, etc. This is also the position of the Trika (see YR's commentary itself) with the difference that emphasis is once more laid on the principle of *kṣobha*, as shown by TS VIII, p. 90 (emending *śabdatanmātraṃ* to *sparśatanmātraṃ*): *tatra śabdatanmātrāt kṣubhitād avakāśadānavyāpāraṃ nabhaḥ — śabdasya vācyādhyāsāvakāśasahatvāt/ sparśa(śabda)tanmātraṃ kṣubhitaṃ vāyuḥ śabdas tv asya nabhasā virahitābhāvāt/ rūpaṃ kṣubhitaṃ tejaḥ pūrvaguṇau tu pūrvavat/ rasaḥ kṣubhita āpaḥ pūrve trayaḥ pūrvavat/ gandhaḥ kṣubhito dharā pūrve catvāraḥ pūrvavat/ anye śabdasparśābhyāṃ vāyuḥ ityādikrameṇa pañcabhyo dharaṇy iti manyante/ guṇasamudāyamātraṃ ca pṛthivī nānyo guṇī kaścit/*, 'From disturbed (*kṣubhita*) sound (*śabdatanmātra*) emerges the ether [or space] (*nabhas*), with its function of providing space — for the word [as articulated sound] gives place to the expressed meaning. Air (*vāyu*) is nothing else than disturbed touch (*sparśa*); however, sound (*śabda*) is also present, for air cannot exist without space (*nabhas*) [whose quintessential quality is sound]. Fire (*tejas*) is nothing else than disturbed form (*rūpa*); however, the two preceding principles [i.e., *tanmātras*] are also present, as in the previous scheme. Water (*āpas*) is nothing else than disturbed savor (*rasa*); however, the three preceding principles are also present, as in the previous scheme. Earth (*dharā*) is nothing else than disturbed odor (*gandha*); however, the four preceding principles are also present, as in the previous scheme. Others maintain that earth proceeds from [all] the five [*tanmātras*] in keeping with a scheme according to which air proceeds from both sound and tangibility. Moreover earth is merely the aggregate of the qualities [i.e., of the *tanmātras*] and there is no substratum of qualities (*guṇin*) which would be different from [earth as aggregate of the qualities]'. For what matters

in soteriological systems as the Sāṃkhya and the Trika is not so much the question of creation as manifestation as the correlated questions of the process of cognition and that of liberation. This is why the Sāṃkhya contends that, during the process of cosmic dissolution, each *mahābhūta* is reabsorbed into the *tanmātra* from which it proceeds, and all the *tanmātras* are in turn reabsorbed into *ahaṅkāra*. ĪPV III 1, 10–11, vol. II: 242, synthesizes the Trika's viewpoint not only on the entire *meya*, that cognizable reality made of twenty-three elements (the thirteen *karaṇas* and the ten *kāryas*) whose cause is *prakṛti*, but also on the entire 'genesis of bondage' which starts with *māyā*. Observing that, in ĪPK III 1, 11, the *bhūtas* are mentioned first, before the *tanmātras*, AG develops all the implications of such an order: *sthūlaṃ kāryaṃ pṛthivy āpaḥ tejo vāyur nabha iti pañca bhūtāni/ sūkṣmam eṣām eva rūpaṃ gandho raso rūpaṃ sparśaḥ śabda iti/ tatraikaikaguṇam ākāśādy ekaikavṛddhaguṇaṃ veti darśanabheda iti na vivecito 'nupayogāt/ tatra sthūlaṃ vibhaktam avibhāgasyānumāpakam iti sthūlarūpopakramam uktam/ atra pṛthivyādyābhāsā eva miśrībhūya ghaṭādisvalakṣaṇībhūtāḥ karmendriyair upasarpitā buddhīndriyair ālocitā antaḥkaraṇena saṃkalpitābhimataniścitarūpā vidyayā vivecitāḥ kalādibhir anurañjitāḥ pramātari viśrāmyanti/ iti tātparyam*, 'The gross effect [manifests itself] as the five physical elements (*bhūta*): earth, water, fire, air and ether. Their subtle forms are odor, savor, color, touch and sound. On this point systems differ. Some hold that ether, etc., have only one quality each. But others maintain that each item, in the order given here, has one quality more than the item succeeding. However, since this point is not very important, it has not been discussed here. The gross, which presents the state of differentiation, is the means of inferring the undifferentiated state. Hence the gross categories are stated here first. According to this system [i.e., to the Trika], the manifested principles (*ābhāsa*) such as earth, etc., mixing with one another, assume the form of a definite object, such as jar, etc. They come to rest in the subject as they are approached by the organs of action, or perceived by the cognitive organs, synthesized, taken as one's own, and ascertained by [the *manas*, the *ahaṅkāra* and the *buddhi* constitutive of] the *antaḥkaraṇa*, differentiated by circumstancial Knowledge (*vidyā*) and affected by [the other *kañcukas* as] *kalā*, etc. This is the implied meaning' (tr. Pandey, modified); see the *Tantrasadbhāva*, quoted n. 545.

14. Doctrines of the Self (YR ad 27)

See also PH 8 and its *vṛtti*: *naiyāyikādayo jñānādiguṇagaṇāśrayaṃ buddhitattvaprāyam evātmānaṃ saṃsṛtau manyante, apavarge tu taducchede śūnyaprāyam/ ahampratītipratyeyaḥ sukhaduḥkhādyupādhibhiḥ tiraskṛta ātmeti manvānā mīmāṃsakā api buddhāv eva niviṣṭāḥ/ jñānasaṃtāna eva tattvam iti saugatā buddhivṛttiṣv eva paryavasitāḥ/*, 'The Naiyāyikas, etc., admit a Self,

which, being the substratum of knowledge and other qualities, is for all intents and purposes (°*prāya*) identical with the category of *buddhi*, as far as worldly experience is concerned. At the moment of liberation, when all [*guṇas*] disappear, the Self is for all intents and purposes identical with the Void. The Mīmāṃsakas are settled [in taking the Self] as *buddhi*, inasmuch as they consider the Self that which is apprehended in the cognition 'I', veiled by the contingent conditions (*upādhi*) of pleasure and pain. The followers of Sugata [i.e., Yogācāra Buddhists] have concluded that [the Self is to be found among the] modes of the *buddhi* (*buddhivṛtti*), holding that the Real (*tattva*) is nothing but a series (or continuum) of cognitions (*jñānasaṃtāna*)'.

15. Vaiśeṣika and Vaiyākaraṇa concepts of *jāti*, *sāmānya*, *sattā*, and *mahāsattā* (YR ad 27)

It is a typically Vaiśeṣika notion that even the 'universal' (*sāmānya*) must be distinguished into at least two varieties: 'being' (*sattā*) — which is devoid of external distinction, therefore, unqualified — and what comes to be known as *jāti*, 'genus' — which is common to various individuals but differs from genus to genus, on which distinctions depends our behavior in the world. Frauwallner observes, apropos (II: 104), that what are called *sāmānyaviśeṣa*, 'Gemeinsamkeit-Besonderheit' ('generality-particularity'), occupy the logical space between *sāmānya* as such, that is, *sattā*, 'being' (untouched by particularity), and *viśeṣa* as such, the 'particular' (the 'atom', untouched by any universal). This '*sāmānyaviśeṣa*' was by the Vaiśeṣikas then termed '*jāti*', so as not to confuse it with their '*ākṛti*', which for them did not mean 'common form' (*op. cit.*: 102). YR seems however to confound 'genus' (*jāti*) with 'universal' (*sāmānya*), which, according to Frauwallner, should be distinguished. *mahāsattā* as such is not a Vaiśeṣika term. It appears in the grammatical tradition, particularly in Helārāja's commentary on Bhartṛhari (avat. to VP III 1, 33), in a characterization of the '*advayanaya*', presumably the *advaya* of Bhartṛhari: *[...] advayanaye paramārthasatyekaiva jātir mahāsattākhyā parabrahmasvabhāvā*, 'In a monistic doctrine, this *jāti* termed *mahāsattā* is of the nature of *parabrahman*, the highest *brahman*, the only ultimate reality (*paramārthasatī*)'. The term *mahāsattā* appears also in the Trika; see ĪPK I 5, 13–14 (quoted n. 238), which passage characterizes consciousness endowed with awareness as supreme Speech (*parāvāk*), freedom (*svātantrya*), sovereignty (*aiśvarya*) of the supreme Self, fulguration (*sphurattā*), 'great being' (*mahāsattā*), unmodified by space and time (*deśakālāviśeṣinī*). In the Trika tradition, the *mahā-* of *mahāsattā* may be understood as a reference, somewhat corrupted, to Vaiśeṣika and Vyākaraṇa doctrine, 'great' signifying 'par excellence', *vis-à-vis* all the other '*sāmānyas*' that are tinged with particularity — as 'great' in the English idiom "God is the one great cause". On the

Vaiśeṣika notion of *sattā*, see further Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 103–104; Lysenko 2007. It is difficult to recognize in YR's idiosyncratic account any particular Vaiśeṣika theory (see Keith 1921: 192–196; Frauwallner 1973, vol. II: 3–180; Halbfass 1992; Scharf 1996; Lysenko 2007). What is implicitly at stake here is the Trika criticism of the Vaiśeṣika system, which distinguishes radically between *dharmin*, 'substance, substrate' [lit., 'that which has the property'], and *dharma*, 'property, quality' — whereas Trika holds the contrary view, namely, that there is no essential difference between *dharmin* and *dharma*, or in Trika terms, between *śaktimat* and *śakti*(s); see TĀV I 158–159 (vol. II: 194): *[...] khalu kāṇādā ātmatvābhisaṃbandhād ātmā ityādinā dharmirūpam ātmānaṃ nirūpya [...]*, 'Verily, the followers of Kaṇāda, having explained that the *ātman* is "that which supports the attributes" (*dharmin*), according to the statement: "The Self (*ātman*) is such due to its connexion with Selfhood (*ātmatva*)". [...]' — meaning that, for Vaiśeṣikas, *ātman* is considered a *dravya*, a substance, and as such is connected with its *jāti*, namely, *ātmatva*, as well as with its qualities (*guṇa*), namely, *jñāna*, *sukhaduḥkha*, etc., and is thus a *dharmin* distinct from its attributes (*dharma*). JR concludes his gloss by affirming the Trika position: *na vastutaḥ kaścit śaktitadvator bhedaḥ*, 'In reality, there is no difference between energy (*śakti*) and its possessor [viz., *śaktimat*]'.

16. Mīmāṃsaka position on the Self, according to the Trika (YR ad 32)

After interpreting SpK I 4 from the Trika viewpoint, according to which *anyatra*, 'elsewhere', refers to the Supreme Lord, or supreme Self, Kṣemarāja shows that the verse may also be understood both as formulating the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine and as its implicit and logical refutation. 'anyatra' thus refers to the *puryaṣṭaka* — a position conditionally adopted by Kṣemarāja in order to demonstrate that one must not stop at that understanding, but should rather recognize, within this *puryaṣṭaka*, a transcendental Subject who is Śaṅkara or Śiva, as a '[uniform] mass of blissful consciousness' (*cidānandaghana*); see SpN I 4: *mīmāṃsakaparihārāya tv etad itthaṃ vyākhyātavyam/ ahaṃ sukhītyādisaṃvido yās tā anyatreti puryaṣṭakasvarūpe pramātari sukhādyavasthābhir anusyūte otaprotarūpe [...] na tv asmadabhyupagate 'smiṃś cidānandaghane śaṅkarātmani svasvabhāve — iti na sarvadā sukhādyupādhitiraskṛto 'yam ātmāpi tu cinmayaḥ/ yadā tu nijāśuddhyā vakṣyamāṇayāyaṃ svasvarūpaṃ gūhayitvā tiṣṭhati tadā puryaṣṭakādyavasthāyāṃ sukhitvādirūpatāsya tatrāpi na nirodhas taiḥ sukhādibhir asya [...]/ ahaṃ kṛśo 'haṃ sthūla ityādipratītiparihāreṇa ahaṃ sukhī duḥkhītyādi vadato 'yam āśayaḥ*, 'In order to refute the Mīmāṃsakas, this [i.e., the term *ātman*] should be interpreted as follows. The cognitions such as "I am happy", etc., exist elsewhere (*anyatra*) [i.e., 'in another substratum', viz.,] in the cognizer (*pramātṛ*) in the form of the *puryaṣṭaka*, which

is threaded through (*anusyūta*) the states of happiness, etc., that is, which is interwoven (*otaprota*) with them. [But] it does not signify for the [Mīmāṃsakas] that essential nature which is accepted by us, namely, Śaṅkara [Śiva] as a uniform mass of blissful consciousness. [As a consequence of our definition], this Self [according to us] is not always veiled by contingent attributes (*upādhi*) of pleasure, etc. [as Mīmāṃsakas say]; rather, it is pure consciousness (*cinmaya*). When, through his own impurity (*aśuddhi*) [that we will later expound], he conceals his own nature and appears [conditionally] (*tiṣṭhati*), he then, being in that state of *puryaṣṭaka*, etc., takes on the form of [the experiencer of] pleasure, etc. Even in this state, there is no obstruction [of his real nature] by those experiences of pleasure, etc. [...]. This is the real intention of him [viz., the Mīmāṃsaka] who says: "I am happy", "I am sad", etc., in rejection of assertions such as "I am thin", "I am fat", etc. [as characterizations of the Self]'; in other words, from the Trika point of view, the Mīmāṃsaka's real intention is that the substratum of such experiences is a transcendent Self, defined as one mass of consciousness and bliss. Showing thus that the Mīmāṃsaka view implies within itself its own completion, Kṣemarāja adds that one has only to submerge the *puryaṣṭaka* along with phenomenal diversity within the supreme Self (SpN I 4): *sukhitvādipratītisaṃbhinnāṃ puryaṣṭakabhūmiṃ antarmukhe pade nimajjayaṃs tadanuṣaṅgeṇa bāhyasyāpi dehaghaṭāder galanāt pratyabhijānāty eva svaṃ śivasvabhāvatvam*, 'Indeed, one recognizes (*pratyabhijānāti*) one's own essential nature as Śiva by submerging one's own condition, that of *puryaṣṭaka*, replete with experiences of pleasure, etc., in the inner state [viz., the Self], and by dissolving along with it the externality that consists of body, jar, etc.' (tr. Singh, modified).

17. *śūnyavāda* (YR ad 32)

According to the avat. of SpN I 12–13, the Śūnyavādins are 'the Vedāntins (*śrutyantavid*), the Naiyāyikas (viz., Ākṣapāda) and the Mādhyamikas, for whom remains only the principle of naught or universal destruction' (*viśvocchedarūpam abhāvātmakam eva tattvam avaśiṣyate*). The Vedāntins (or Brahmavādins) are otherwise called Abhāvabrahmavādins, as this is developed by PHvr̥ 8: *asad evedam āsīd ity abhāvabrahmavādinaḥ śūnyabhuvam avagāhya sthitāḥ*, 'The Brahmavādins, adepts of non-Being (*abhāva*), descend into the region of Void (*śūnyabhū*) on the basis of [ChU VI 2, 1]: "In the beginning, this [world] was just Non-being" and remain [there]'. The discussion of SpN I 12–13 starts with the same quote from the ChU, whose full form is: *sad eva saumya idam agrāsīd ekam evādvitīyam/ taddhaika āhur asad evedam agrāsīd ekam evādvitīyam/ tasmād asataḥ sad ajāyateti*, 'In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone, one only without a second. Some people say "In the beginning, this was non-being alone, one only; without a second. From that non-being, being was

produced." ' Similarly, the Śūnyavādins include the Mādhyamika Buddhists, as stated by PHvṛ 8 (*mādhyamikā apy evam eva*), ŚSV I 1 and TĀ I 33a, which formulates thus the Mādhyamika position: *antaḥśūnyo 'ham*, 'I am internally Void'. SpN I 5 describes the Mādhyamikas as *sarveṣām abhāvavādinaḥ*, 'those who assert the non-existence of everything', whereas SpN I 12–13 quotes and refutes Nāgārjuna. See also ĀŚ II 23, which characterizes the Mādhyamikas as those who take the *ātman* to be *amūrta*, 'without form', which, according to the commentaries, means *niḥsvabhāva*, 'devoid of essence'.

18. *neti neti* (YR ad 32)

This apophatic phrase comes first as a litany in the BĀU at the moment of celebrating the *ātman*. Cf. BĀU II 3, 6: *athāta ādeśo neti neti/ na hy etasmād iti nety anyat param asti*, 'Now therefore there is the teaching not this, not this for there is nothing higher than this, that he is not this', and Ś ad loc.; also BĀU III 9, 26: *sa eṣa neti nety ātmāgṛhyo na hi gṛhyate 'śīryo na hi śīryate 'saṅgo na hi sajyate 'sito na vyathate, na riṣyati*, 'That self is not this, not this. It is incomprehensible, for it is not comprehended. It is indestructible, for it is never destroyed. It is unattached, for it does not attach itself. It is unfettered. It does not suffer. It is not injured'; same text in BĀU IV 2, 4; IV 4, 22; IV 5, 15. See also MāU 7 and ĀŚ III 26 (which quotes the *pratīka* of BĀU III 9, 26): *sa eṣa neti netīti vyākhyātaṃ nihnute yataḥ/ sarvam agrāhyabhāvena hetunājaṃ prakāśate//*, 'De ce que [le passage scripturaire:] "Il n'est, quant à lui, ni ainsi, ni ainsi ..." nie tout ce qui avait été exposé en détail, en invoquant comme raison [son] insaisissabilité, il appert clairement que le [*brahman* est] non-né' (tr. Bouy — 'Since, by stating: "It is not this, it is not that", [the Śruti] denies what it had elaborately expounded, giving as a reason that [the *brahman*] is entirely ungraspable, it clearly appears that this [*brahman*] is unborn'); also ĀŚ IV 83a, where the Śūnyavādins' position is alluded to by *[...] nāsti nāstīti [...]*, in the course of referring to various conceptions of the Self (*ātman*), considered quâ its being or existence. As observed by Ānandagiri ad loc., the repetition (*vīpsā*) of *nāsti* is meant to signify the Void as absolute (*ātyantika*). Note that the Yogācāras have accused the Mādhyamikas of professing nihilism (cf. Bouy ĀŚ: 295–296). So do the Śaivas, as YR demonstrates here. They hold that not only does nihilism amount to an aporia, but also that it has for its corollary the superimposition of a false insentience on the Self. Even though the Mādhyamikas deny the accusation of nihilism, claiming rather that their doctrine of *śūnyatā* is *catuṣkoṭivinirmuktā*, 'free from the tetralemma' — that is, the four alternative propositions: *idaṃ sat, ...asat, ...sadasat, ...na sadasat*, 'X exists', '...does not exist', '...both exists and does not exist', '...neither exists nor does not exist', Śaivas take all this to be mere empty logic.

19. Kallaṭa (YR ad 42)

As stated in the auto-commentary, PH 18 deals with mystical techniques alternative to 'the rigorous disciplines that are *prāṇāyāma*, *mudrā*, *bandha*, etc.'. Kṣemarāja quotes Kallaṭa in the context of the exposition of the *śaktivikāsa*, 'blossoming of energy', which he presents as extraneous to Pratyabhijñā doctrine (*śaktisaṅkocādayas tu yady api pratyabhijñāyāṃ na pratipāditāḥ*), and as 'resorting to the sacred tradition' (*āmnāyika*), which the context further allows us to identify as the Krama (see PHvṛ 19, which refers to the *Kramasūtras*). Kallaṭa's line appears there as an aphoristic definition of the *śaktivikāsa*, a technique of inner absorption with external expansion of the senses, also called *bhairavīmudrā* (*bhairavīmudrānupraveśayuktyā bahiḥ prasaraṇam*), and described as *śakter vikāsaḥ antarnigūḍhāyā akramam eva sakalakaraṇacakravisphāraṇena*, 'The blossoming of the energy hidden internally results from the simultaneous opening of the entire wheel of sense-organs'. It is again defined by the *Kakṣyāstotra* cited in the same passage (also quoted in SpN I 11): *sarvāḥ śaktīś cetasā darśanādyāḥ sve sve vedye yaugapadyena viṣvak/ kṣiptvā madhye hāṭakastambhabhūtas tiṣṭhan viśvādhāra eko 'vabhāsi//*, 'Throwing by will all the powers like seeing, etc., simultaneously and on all sides into their respective objects and remaining [unmoved] within, like a gold pillar (*hāṭakastambha*), you [O Śiva] alone appear as the foundation of the universe' (tr. Singh). Later on, the *vṛtti* relates the *śaktivikāsa* to the practices at work in the *ūrdhvakuṇḍalinī*, according to a process requiring 'the restraint of the *prāṇa* between the two eyebrows, which [restraint] is accomplished by the energy of the subtle *prāṇa* which develops gradually through the regulation of the vibrations in the cavities of the nose' (*nāsāpuṭaspandakramonmiṣatsūksmaprāṇaśaktyā bhrūbhedanena*; tr. Singh, modified); on the details of this esoteric and complex procedure, see the lengthy exposition of PHvṛ 18, Singh PH: 41–42, 150–152. It is noteworthy that the *śaktivikāsa* resorts to the *śāktopāya* (Singh PH: 30), inasmuch as the exposition of PS 41–46 is mainly made from this viewpoint. Therefore, Kallaṭa's aphoristic statement means that the 'blossoming of energy' takes place by means of the transformation of extroverted into introverted consciousness, at the very moment that consciousness turns outward, simultaneously opening all the sense-organs; a paradoxical practice that consists in reaching the greatest interiorization at the moment of, and through, the widest externalization.

The hemistich quoted here by YR is not found in the *Spandakārikā*, if indeed the text is to be attributed to Kallaṭa at all: according to some, among whom Bhāskara (ŚSvā I 4–5: 2–3), and Utpalavaiṣṇava (SpP, 7th liminary verse), Kallaṭa is the author of the SpK, whereas Kṣemarāja (ŚSV II 4–7) ascribes the authorship of the SpK to Vasugupta (on this question, see Dyczkowski SpK: 21–24, and Sanderson 2007: 405–407, who concludes in

favor of Kallaṭa's authorship). Nor is the hemistich found in Kallaṭa's *vṛtti* to the *Spandakārikā* — a brief gloss, which he himself calls *Spandasarvasva* in his first concluding stanza. According to AG (ĪPVV, vol. II: 30), Kallaṭa is also the author of two commentaries on the ŚS, the *Tattvārthacintāmaṇi* [TĀC] and the *Madhuvāhinī*, of which the TĀC is most often referred to and quoted (see Sanderson 2007: 405, n. 578). From all those quotes, it appears that the TĀC had a section dealing with the movement and spiritual properties of breath; cf. TĀ X 187–227, and probably TĀ XXVIII 338–340, on which JR comments by citing three sūtras (among which: *prāk samvit prāṇe pariṇatā*, also quoted in TĀV III 141, V 6, V 44–48a, XV 303, XVII 85, XXVIII 293, 338–339), which he ascribes to Kallaṭa, although without giving a source. It appears also that the TĀC dealt with a peculiar method of animal sacrifice involving the withdrawal and absorption by the officiant of the animal's breath, referred to in TĀ XVI 36–45 and in Kṣemarāja's NTU XX 27ff. (vol. I: 226), where the teaching of this technique is ascribed to Kallaṭa's TĀC. The TĀC seems also to have been famous for its exposition of the mystical practice of *tuṭipāta*, the 'fall of the moment'. It is indirectly referred to by TĀ X 208 (vol. V: 2026), which names Kallaṭa, while JR quotes from TĀC: *tuṭipāte sarvajñatādayaḥ*; SpP 22 [= ad I 22]: 31, quotes it more extensively, although not referring explicitly to TĀC: *tuṭipāte sarvajñatvasarvakartṛtvasarveśitādayaḥ/ eṣa ca gurūpadeśenādārāt parīkṣyaḥ*, 'It is during the "fall of the moment" that omniscience, omnipotence and mastery of all things, etc., (become clearly manifest) and (so) that should be examined with reverence in accord with the Master's teachings' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 159, modified); same quote in PTV 5–9a (Gnoli PTV: 61). Let us note that Utpalavaiṣṇava takes Kallaṭa, whom he considers to be the author of the SpK, to be the author of two other works: the *Tattvavicāra* and the *Svasvabhāvasaṃbodha*, from which he quotes (in SpP 1: 9, and SpP 30 [= II 4a]: 38–39, for the former; in SpP 1: 7–8, for the latter). For lack of other clues, we may only advance the hypothesis that the line from Kallaṭa quoted by YR and Kṣemarāja may belong to the TĀC, insofar as the verse that SpP 21 [= I 21], p. 30, draws from the TĀC agrees with the context in which the PHvṛ (ad 18: 98, in Singh ed.) quotes that same line of Kallaṭa, namely the description of mystical techniques of inner absorption responding to the Krama doctrine. This is this verse from the TĀC: *ittham tattadanalpamohadalanaprāptasvarūpodayo yogī nityam anātmabhāvavirahāt svātmasthito nirvṛtaḥ/ dṛśyadraṣṭṛvivekavid bhavapadavyāpī vimuktāmayo vyutthāne 'pi samādhibhāg bhavati san mokṣaśriyaḥ kāraṇam//*, 'Thus, blissful is the yogin who, cutting through each of the many [forms of] ignorance, has attained the dawning of his own nature. Established within himself, eternally free as he is of [all] that he is not, perceiving the distinction between the seer and the seen, he, from whom every sickness has been expunged, pervades the plane of ordinary

existence. He delights in contemplation (*samādhi*) even when he rises from [his meditation] (*vyutthāna*), and so is the fount of the glory of true liberation' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 158, modified). Similarly, as we have seen, PHvṛ 18 quotes Kallaṭa in order to support its definition of the *bhairavīmudrā*, a Krama practice, and PH 19 describes the great yogin whose *samādhi*-state persists even in *vyutthāna*, i.e., even when he rises from his meditation, which is exactly the purport of the TĀC quoted above. Moreover, Utpalavaiṣṇava's SpP 43 [= III 11] might offer a clue as to whether the line of Kallaṭa (quoted in YR ad 42 and in PHvṛ 18) that deals with the practice of the *bhairavīmudrā* should be ascribed to the TĀC. In effect, Utpalavaiṣṇava identifies the yogin's state described in SpK III 11 as the *vikāsavṛtti*, 'process of expansion', in other words as the *bhairavīmudrā* or *śaktivikāsa* described also in PHvṛ 18 and SpN I 11. In support of his interpretation, Utpalavaiṣṇava not only quotes the passage of the *Kakṣyāstotra* that is also quoted in PHvṛ 18 and SpN I 11, but he explicitly refers to the TĀC as a text describing the same state (*sthiti*), which is called there 'secret *mudrā*' (*rahasyamudrā*): *yā caiṣā sthitiḥ saiva tattvārthacintāmaṇau rahasyamudrety uktā*. In addition, one should consider Kṣemarāja's assertion (SpN I 1: 6) according to which his first two interpretations of *śakticakravibhavaprabhava* (in SpK I 1) [the first taking the *śaktis* to be the twelve Kālīs of the Wheel of energies; the second re-establishing the absolute sovereignty of the Lord] agree with the very terms of Kallaṭa's *vṛtti*: *tad uktaṃ śrībhaṭṭakallaṭena vijñānadehātmakasya śakticakraiśvaryasya utpattihetutvam/ ity etad vṛttyakṣarāṇām atra vyākhyādvaye 'py anurūpyam*, 'The revered Kallaṭa has said: "It is he, whose soul and substance are [nothing but] consciousness, who has [therefore] mastery of the Wheel of energies, who is the cause of the production [of the universe]". The two interpretations given here [by me] agree with the wording of his gloss'; cf. Kallaṭa's *vṛtti* ad SpK I 1 quoted above, where Śiva is said to be 'the cause of the generation of the Wheel of energies', and his *Tattvavicāra* quoted in SpP 1: 9: *śaktiprasarasaṅkocanibaddhāv udayavyayau/ yasyātmā sa śivo jñeyaḥ sarvabhāvapravartakaḥ//*, '[All things] arise and fall away in consonance with the extension and withdrawal of [Śiva's] power. Know that their essential nature is Śiva, Who impels all things' (tr. Dyczkowski SpK: 145).

20. *bhāvanā* (YR ad 68)

On *bhāvanā*, see TĀ II 12–13, which distinguishes between *bhāvanā*, 'realization', and *avadhāna*, 'concentration'; TĀ IV 14b defines it as illumination or revelation: *sphuṭayed vastu yāpetaṃ manorathapadād api//*, '[*bhāvanā*], which discloses suddenly a reality exceeding the realms of desire [that is, a reality that transcends anything one might imagine] ...'. As emphasized by TĀV IV 13–14, *bhāvanā* is nothing but the 'ultimate term

[or limit]' (*parā kāṣṭhā*) of reasoning (*tarka*, in TĀV IV 14, or *sattarka*, in IV 14), namely, the 'ultimate term [or limit]' of the certitude (*niścaya*, in śloka 13) that is proper to 'those who know' (*kovidāḥ*, in IV 14), that is, which consists in knowing that nonduality is ultimate reality: *tarka eva hi parāṃ kāṣṭhām upagato bhāvanety ucyate*, 'When reasoning reaches its ultimate limit, it is called *bhāvanā*' (TĀV IV 14, vol. III: 629). Similarly, TĀV IV 13, vol. III: 629: *sa eva hi mahātmanāṃ dehādyālocanena yathā-yathamabhyāsātiśayāt vikalpaśuddhim ādadhānaḥ, parāṃ kāṣṭhām upagataḥ san, bhāvanātmakatāṃ yāyāt, yenāsphuṭam api saṃvidrūpaṃ sphuṭatām āsādayet//*, 'Indeed, after [reasoning] has effected the purification of the thought constructs (*vikalpaśuddhi*) through one or another of the ways of reaching the end of the stage of repeated practice — [in other words] by studying the revered great Masters' [teachings] concerning the body, etc. — [that reasoning,] thereby reaching its ultimate limit, becomes *bhāvanā*, by which [process] what was unclear, even though of the form of consciousness, reaches clarity'. This passage of JR's commentary sheds light on the organization of PS 39–41, for 'the revered great Masters' [teachings] concerning the body, etc.' alludes to the eradication of the double error expounded in PS 39–40; once that process of eradication is complete (that is, when reasoning has reached its ultimate limit, annulling all idea of difference), that certitude becomes *bhāvanā* (the matter at issue in PS 41), the fulgurating awareness of one's own essence as consciousness. Thus is formulated the experience that transforms the yogin into a *jīvanmukta* (YR ad 39): 'I alone manifest myself as the Self of the universe'. See also the definition of *bhāvanā* given by SpN II 6–7: 52–53, quoting the SvT: *[...] sarvaṃ śivaśaktimayaṃ smaret* [v.l. (KSTS 44) *sarvaṃ śivamayaṃ smaret*] (SvT VII 244b) // *[...] jīvann eva vimukto 'sau yasyeyaṃ* [v.l. (KSTS 44) *yasyaiṣā*] *bhāvanā sadā/ yaḥ śivaṃ bhāvayen nityaṃ na kālaḥ kalayet tu tam* [v.l. (KSTS 44) *śivo hi bhāvito nityaṃ na kālaḥ kalayec chivam*] (SvT VII 259)//, ' "One should consider everything as made of Śiva and Śakti". [...] He becomes liberated, even in this life, who gives himself over once and for all to that realization (*bhāvanā*), for time could not act on him who would realize (*bhāvayet*) Śiva continously'. Thus *bhāvanā* is defined as the 'realization that everything is made of Śiva and Śakti', that is, as perfect knowledge: *tad eva paramaṃ jñānaṃ bhāvanāmayam iṣyate*, 'Supreme knowledge consists of *bhāvanā*' (quoted in TĀV IV 14, vol. III: 630). As such, *bhāvanā* is characterized as instrumental in attaining the state of *jīvanmukti*. Also Silburn 1981: 191; Chenet 1987, and 1998–1999, vol. II: 545ff.

Sanskrit text

On the Sanskrit text

The KSTS edition has been used as the basis of the Sanskrit text reproduced here, for, although it is not a critical edition, it represents a fairly correct Sanskrit text, which appears to need corrections only occasionally. This does not imply of course that a truly critical edition would not be necessary, but it could not be produced for the present publication.

In the course of the preparation of the translation, it has nevertheless turned out that the KSTS edition may need revision at some places, or at least we felt that it would be important to consult several other witnesses. Therefore we have collected a number of manuscripts and collated them on a few occasions on which we thought to have stumbled on a problem. Since such occasions were not frequent, we give a list of variants and changes to the text of the KSTS below, instead of reporting the variants in notes to the Sanskrit text. We also discuss some of these textual problems in more detail in the notes to the translation whenever the problem seems to require it.

In addition, we have made some minor corrections and adjustments. We have noticed and corrected what we considered merely typographical errors, which are listed below. Moreover, we have silently standardized the Sandhi, which was sometimes applied and sometimes not in the KSTS. We have left the text without applying Sandhi only before and after words cited from the kārikās. We have similarly removed geminations that sporadically occur in consonant clusters (as *vibudhyeta* for *vibuddhyeta* in kārikā 66). Words of the kārikās appear in bold face in the commentary. We have not maintained punctuation marks other than *daṇḍas*, for they depend on the reader's interpretation and do not belong to the original text. All identifications of citations are to be found in the notes to the translation, where they are often discussed in detail; therefore we have not kept the references of citations in the Sanskrit text.

List of typographical errors corrected

KSTS	Our text
p. 31, l. 12 tattvavyadeśo	tattvavyapadeśo
p. 34, l. 9 layodayavihīnan	layodayavihīnam
p. 91, l. 16 heyopādheyabhāvāt	heyopādheyābhāvāt
p. 145, l. 5 vyāgrābhistava	vyagrābhistava
p. 145, l. 7 daśarya	darśaya
p. 166, l. 18 svatmajñānā°	svātmajñānā°
p. 169, l. 5 °svatmajñāna°	°svātmajñāna°
p. 181, l. 10 ata eta	ata eva
p. 188, l. 15 °vaśad	°vaśād
p. 191, l. 6 patthānam	panthānam

List of variants in some collated passages

The following list contains, on the one hand, all passages in which we have changed the text of the KSTS, on the other hand, variants of passages for which we have consulted our manuscripts but decided to keep the reading of the KSTS. An asterisk signals when our reading differs from that of the KSTS. For the abbreviations, see the description of manuscripts below. References are to the KSTS edition. In most cases, we explain our choice, sometimes referring to more detailed discussions in our notes to the translation. In all cases, we give the reading of the KSTS first.

*p. 8, l. 11:
iti dīyate paramaṃ jñānaṃ kṣīyate karmavāsaneti ca KSTS KaGaGha: dīyate paramaṃ jñānaṃ kṣīyate karmavāsaneti N: dīyate paramaṃ jñānaṃ kṣīyate vāsaneti ca P_1: *om.* WCKha: iti $P_2P_3P_4$IS
We have chosen to omit this line, which was printed as the second half of a citation. Given the evidence of our manuscripts, it is doubtful whether this line was cited by Yogarāja, and it is more likely to be a scribal addition than an original quote. Moreover, it is also somewhat out of context, for initiation and its *nirvacana* are only indirectly related to the topic of finding a guru.

*p. 12, l .1:
pratiprakāra° KSTS KhaGaGhaCP_4: pratiprākāra° KaW$P_1P_2P_3$INS
Not only does the manuscript evidence point to the fact that the original reading must have been *pratiprākāra*, but also to Yogarāja's usage, for he employs the same word ad kārikā 23 (KSTS, p. 55).

p. 17, l. 12–13:
ayam eva bhedo bhedahetur bhāvānāṃ yat viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedo vā KSTS P_3P_4S: ayam eva bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānāṃ yo

yaṃ viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedo vā *TĀV before XI 98*: ayam eva ca bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānāṃ viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca W: ayam eva hi bhedo bhedahetu (*1 akṣara deleted*) rbhāvānāṃ yad viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedo vā P_1P_2: ayam eva ca bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānāṃ yad viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca I: ayam eva bhedo bhedahetu (*one vertical line*) bhāvānāṃ yad viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kārāṇabhedo vā N: ayam eva khalu bhedo bhedahetur vā bhāvānāṃ viruddhadharmādhyāsaḥ kāraṇabhedaś ca *Gnoli's edition of the* Pramāṇavārttika *p. 21*
In the view of the manuscript evidence and the citation in the *Tantrāloka*, the KSTS's reading has been kept. Yogarāja may be citing from memory or from a manuscript that has a different reading compared to Gnoli's.

p. 59, l. 6:
akṣayam $N^{pc}ISP_1P_3$ KSTS: avyayam $N^{ac}P_2P_4$: avyavam W
The manuscripts have been consulted here to decide whether the KSTS's variant of the *Gītā* should be accepted, although the meaning does not change fundamentally in any case. Almost all Śāradā MSS agree with the KSTS, except the original reading of N, which was then corrected by a second hand. Therefore, it seems possible that *akṣaya* was a Kashmirian variant in this passage of the *Gītā*. This is also corroborated by the fact that the distribution of the variants seems somewhat unusual compared to other cases, which may be explicable if one assumes that some scribes, perhaps mostly of non-Kashmirian origin, wrote down the passage relying on their memory rather than on their exemplar. However, we have not been able to confirm the Kashmirian provenance of this variant with parallels. For Abhinavagupta does not gloss this word in his *Gītārthasaṃgraha*, and the variant does not appear in the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*, nor in Schrader BhG. Whatever is the case, it is quite certain that Yogarāja's text had *akṣayam*.

*p. 82, l. 4:
ajaḍapramātṛsiddhāv KSTS: nareśvaraviveke *Codd*
Although the identification of the work referred to by the manuscript is problematic (see our notes to the translation), the KSTS's conjecture does not seem justified to us.

p. 82, l. 7:
niruddhā KSTS P_1P_2NS: nibaddhā WI: *om. the whole line* P_3P_4
Since all other citations of this passage have *niruddhā* (see notes to the translation), we have kept the KSTS's reading.

*p. 83, l. 13–14:
gaganatayā tathāvaśiṣyate KSTS $P_1{}^{ac}$ P_2P_3 S: gaganatayā tathā viśiṣyate P_4: gaganatayā tathā tathā viśiṣyate WI: gaganatayā tathā tathāvaśiṣyate

P_1^{pc}: gaganatathāvaśiṣyate N
We have accepted the reading of P_4, for *avaśiṣyate* does not yield good sense. The confusion of *a* and *i* is unexceptional. Since W and I have usually secondary readings, we have adopted a single *tathā*, attested by all the other manuscripts. Note that the correction in P_1 is made in a second, more recent, hand.

p. 92, l. 7:
bhāgau KSTS I $P_1P_2^{pc}$ P_3P_4NSW Rau: bhaugau P_2^{ac}: bhāvau Iyer
We have retained the KSTS's reading of this word, which agrees with all our MSS and Rau's edition of the *Vākyapadīya*. Iyer's choice is probably to be rejected, all the more so as his translation appears to follow the reading bhāgau.

*p. 105, l. 8–10:
yad anātmany ātmābhimānalakṣaṇaṃ S: yad ātmani ātmābhimānalakṣaṇaṃ N^{ac}: yad anātmani ātmābhimānalakṣaṇam N^{pc1} P_1: yad anātmani ātmābhimānapūrvam ātmani anātmābhimānalakṣaṇam N^{pc2}: yad anātmani ātmābhimānalakṣaṇa- P_3P_4: yad anātmani ātmābhimānapūrvam ātmani anātmābhimānalakṣaṇaṃ KSTS KaGaGha IW: yad ātmany anātmābhimānapūrvam anātmany ātmābhimānarūpam Kha: yad anātmany anātmābhimānapūrvaṃ anātmany ātmābhimānalakṣaṇaṃ P_2
The KSTS has been rejected here on the basis of our manuscript evidence and because of the meaning required by the context. Our best MSS, S, N (before a secondary correction) and P_3, all attest that the shorter reading is authentic; their readings differ only on minor points: N omits the privative prefix, while P_3 misses the *anusvāra*. The KSTS agrees with the group of manuscripts we have rejected elsewhere as secondary: I and W. Furthermore, the shorter version fits the context much better, for the passage expounds the ignorance of the individual when he identifies himself with what he is not, i.e., when he considers himself the performer of a sacrifice. The original expression was perhaps expanded first as a marginal note and then came to be included in the text. This is not surprising, given that a similar sequence of words and ideas can be found in Abhinavagupta's text itself, see kārikā 39.

*p. 146, l. 15:
bhaṭṭaśrīvīravāmanakaḥ KSTS: bhaṭṭaśrīvīravāmanaḥ W $P_1P_3P_4$S: [bra]-śrīvīravāmanaḥ P_2: bhaṭṭavīravāmanaḥ I
Given the manuscript evidence, we accept the form of this proper name without the suffix *-ka*. (For a more detailed discussion of the identity of this author, see our note to the translation.)

*p. 149, l. 11:
caturviṃśatyuttara GaGha S $P_1P_3P_4$: catvāriṃśaduttara KSTS KaKhaIWP$_2$

The KSTS's reading has been rejected for several reasons. First of all, we have found no other occurrence of 240 *bhuvanas* instead of the standard 224, and it is unlikely that Yogarāja should use an obscure number of *bhuvanas* in this gloss. The *Mālinīvijayottara*, which differs from other texts on this point, also has only 118. Although the relevant folio is missing in our copy of N, two of our best manuscripts, S and P_3, both of them in *śāradā*, have the number 224. The corruption is explicable, since the two words are quite similar. However, it is curious that the editors of the KSTS preferred 240. Did they consider it a *lectio difficilior*?

p. 163, l. 2:
kularatnamālikāyāṃ KSTS $P_1P_2P_3P_4$NS: śrīkularatnamālikāyāṃ WI
The KSTS's reading has been kept.

p. 164, l. 10:
lakṣmīsaṃhitāyāṃ KSTS $P_1P_2P_3P_4$NS: lakṣmīpatisaṃhitāyāṃ WI
The KSTS's reading has been kept.

p. 169, l. 12:
ubhayathā punar KSTS $P_1P_2P_3P_4$NS: ubhayathā WI
The KSTS's reading has been kept.

p. 179, l. 8:
vā parāmarśadaśāṃ KSTS $P_1P_2P_3P_4$NS: parāmarśadaśāṃ W
The KSTS's reading has been kept.

p. 191, l. 10:
prasādasāmarthyena KSTS $P_1P_2P_3$NS: sāmarthyena WP_4
The KSTS's reading has been kept.

p. 192, l. 15. – p. 193. l. 1:
prāgjāta° KSTS $P_1P_2P_3$NS: prāgjāti° WP_4 °yoga° KSTS $P_1P_2P_3$NS: *om.* WP_4 °prabodhaṃ KSTS KaKhaP$_2$: °prabodhabuddham WGaGha P_1P_3 NS: °prabodhabuddhām P_4
The KSTS's reading has been kept.

p. 193, l. 4:
parasvarūpatādārḍhyaṃ KSTS GaGha $P_1P_2P_3$S: svarūpadārḍhyaṃ Ka: [°]-svarūpatādātmyam Kha: parasvarūpatādātmyaṃ P_4NW
The KSTS's reading has been kept.

*p. 196, l. 12:
parapuruṣārthasādanopāyaḥ KSTS Kha: parapuruṣārthasādhanopāyaḥ Ka-GaGhaW $P_1P_2P_3P_4$NS
We have accepted the reading of the majority of the manuscripts against the KSTS. Cf. p. 196. l. 6: paramapuruṣārthasādhanāyāṃ.

Description of the manuscripts consulted

The KSTS edition seems to have relied on four manuscripts, none of which is described by the editor. We can infer their existence from the occasional footnotes referring to manuscripts designated as **Ka**, **Kha**, **Ga** and **Gha**. Judging from the very small number of variants given, they were probably not fully collated. However, sometimes they provide us with important variants of manuscripts that are probably no longer in existence or no longer accessible.

Other manuscripts we have been able to consult include Śāradā and Devanāgarī ones described below. Since we have not prepared a critical edition, we have not attempted to define their relation to each other or to a supposed archetype. Not surprisingly, Devanāgarī manuscripts show many errors and corruptions, while the Śāradā manuscripts tend to be more correct. None of these manuscripts is identical with any of those used for the KSTS edition and all of them are independent witnesses, there are no identifiable apographs. Two manuscripts, W and I, share readings against all the others several times, which shows that they may form a subgroup (W being generally more corrupt than I).

1. $\mathbf{P}_1$ *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona MS no. 459/1875–1876.* Paper, Devanāgarī script (of Kashmirian origin), 37x17 cm. 33 fol., 14 lines to a side, complete. Catalogued as "Paramārthasārasaṃgraha of Abhinavagupta with the vṛtti of Kṣemarāja" (sic! omitting Yogarāja's name).
Some corrections *secunda manu*, using kunkuma. A later pagination is added to the original one.
Beginning: Oṃ śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ / oṃ cidghano pi jaganmūrtyā śāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ svātmapracchādane krīḍāvidagdhaḥ parameśvaraḥ //
End: śrīmataḥ kṣemarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālinaḥ sākṣātkṛtamaheśasya tasyāntevāsinā mayā sampūrṇeyaṃ paramārthasārasaṃgrahavivṛttiḥ //
A photocopy of this manuscript has been used for collation.

2. $\mathbf{P}_2$ *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona MS no. 806/1891–1895.* Paper, Devanāgarī script, 20x29 cm. 88 fol., 20 lines to a side, complete. Catalogued as "Paramārthasārasaṃgrahavivṛti". Corrections *secunda manu.*
Beginning: oṃ namaḥ siddhaṃ // śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ // oṃ cidghanopi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ / svātmapracchādanakrīḍāvidagdhaḥ parameśvaraḥ //
End: śrīmataḥ kṣemarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālinaḥ sākṣātkṛtamaheśasya tasyāntevāsinā mayā 1 śrīvitastāpurīdhāmnā viraktena tapasvinā vivṛttir yoganāmneyaṃ pūrṇādvayamayī kṛtā 2 saṃpūrṇeyaṃ paramārthasārasaṃgrahavivṛttiḥ [°virtti *ante correctionem*] iti śivam //
A photocopy of this manuscript has been used for collation.

3. **P**$_3$ *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona MS no. 166/1883–1884.*
Paper, Śāradā script, 14x25 cm. 80 fol., 16 lines to a side, complete.
Catalogued as "Paramārthasārasaṃgraha saṭika?"
[The cover has the following text:
vedānta
paramārthasāra
paramārthasāraṭīkā 80 / 17 / 19.
The second line is in Śāradā, the others are in Devanāgarī.]
Beginning: oṃ namo vighna ?? // śrīsadāśivāya namaḥ // cidghano pi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ // svātmapracchādane krīḍāvidagdhaḥ parameśvaraḥ //
End: śrīmataḥ kṣemarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālinaḥ // sākṣātkṛtamaheśasya tasyāntevāsinā mayā // śrīvitastāpurīnāmnā viraktena tapasvinā // vivṛtir yoganāmneyaṃ pūrṇādvayamayī kṛtā // saṃpūrṇeyaṃ paramārthasārasaṅgrahavivṛtiḥ kṛtiḥ śrīparamamāheśvaraśrīrājānakayogarājasya // o // o // śubhaṃ bhavatu // o // o // o // o // śubhaṃ bhavatu // o
[This text is followed by two pages of invocations, written in a later hand and less legible. Then, on the last page, the following text figures in two lines, in Devanāgarī: paramārthasārasaṃgrahavivṛtiḥ kṛtiḥ rājānakayogarājasya.]
A photocopy of this manuscript has been used for collation.

4. **P**$_4$ *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona MS no. 167/1883–1884.*
Paper, Devanāgarī script, 10x13 cm. 153 fol., 14 lines to a side, complete. Bound as a book.
Beginning: śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ śrīgurave namaḥ // śreyase // cidghanopi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ svātmapracchādana[svātmapracchadane *ante correctionem*]krīḍāvidagdhaḥ parameśvaraḥ //
End: śrīmato yogarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālinaḥ sākṣātkṛtamaheśasya tasyāntevāsinā mayā śrīvitastāpurīnāmnā tasyāntevāsinā mayā vivṛtiḥ kṣemanāmneyaṃ varṇadvayamayī kṛtā // iti paramārthasārasaṃgrahavivṛtiḥ samāptā śivāya bhavatv anuśīlanavatāṃ // saṃ 26 pauśuti 25 somavāre pāriteti śivaṃ // // [Recent corrections on the margins on the last two pages.]
A photocopy of this manuscript has been used for collation.

5. **C** *Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta. MS no. G-8698.*
Paper, Devanāgarī script, 15x23 cm. 38 fol., 17 lines to a side, complete.
Beginning: Oṃ namo nārāyaṇāya Oṃ cidghanopi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ svātmapracchādanakrīḍāvidagdho hi maheśvaraḥ
End: śrīmataḥ kṣemarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālinaḥ sākṣātkṛtamaheśasya tasyāntevāsinā mayā śrīvitastāpurīdhāmnā viraktena tapasvinā [7 akṣaras are illegible]
A photocopy of very bad quality, containing only the first and last folios

has been obtained of this MS, therefore it has been used only occasionally.

6. **W** *Bodleian Library, Oxford. MS Wilson 531e*
Paper, Devanāgarī. Complete. 5x7 inches. 120 fol. Bound in European fashion. Part 3 of a bundle which contains altogether 328 fol., written by the same hand. Perhaps of the 19th century. (See A.B. Keith: *Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS in the Bodleian Library Appendix to vol. 1.* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1909. Numbers 575 and 557.)
Beginning: śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ // cidghanopi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ svātmapracchādanakrīḍāvidagdho hi maheśvaraḥ //
End: śrīmato yogarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālinā sākṣātkṛtamaheśasya tasyāntevāsinā mayā śrīvitastāpurīdhāmnā viraktena tapasvinā vivṛtir yoganāmneyaṃ varṇadvayamayī kṛtā // [in red:] iti śrīparamārthasāravivṛ
This manuscript was fully collated in the Bodleian Library by Judit Törzsök.

7. **I** *Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi.*
Uncatalogued manuscript, belonging to a group of Śāradā manuscripts the Institute received from pandits who had left Kashmir.
Paper, Śāradā script, approx. 16x12 cm, loosely bound (and preceded by other texts), 71 fol., 16 lines to a side. Incomplete. Ends in the middle of the commentary on kārikās 87–88 (KSTS edition page 171).
Beginning: (1st line in black and red ink alternating between akṣaras) Oṃ gaṇeśāya namaḥ oṃ śrīvāgdevī jayatuḥ (Then in black ink:) oṃ cidghanopi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ svātmapracchādanakrīḍāvidagdho hi maheśvaraḥ //
End: [...] upādhiviśeṣaṇaṃ tato muktaṃ pṛthakṛtaṃ viśeṣaṇāntarābhāvāt (pc, viśeṣāntarābhāvāt ac) tacchivarūpam ābhātyeva dehabhaṅgāt paramaśivatvena bhāsata iti yāvat | yathā samudgakopādhivirahān ma
We are grateful to Prof. Raffaele Torella, who has kindly provided us with photographs in electronic form, which he himself made with the permission of G. C. Tripathi, coordinator of the IGNCA.

8. **N** *National Museum, New Delhi.*
MS catalogue number (card catalogue, for internal use) 57.106/939. MS number 1693 Paper, Śāradā script, approx. 11x14 cm. 117 fol., 9–10 lines to a side. Loosely bound, preceded by the *Parāprāveśikā* (which starts with 'oṃ namo śrīgurave śivāya // oṃ viśvātmikāṃ ...', and ends with 'parāprāveśikā samāptam / saṃvat 97 navamyāśann*au* Complete (but without colophon).
Beginning: oṃ namo gurave sarasvatīr jayāya // śrī jvālāmukhyai namaḥ oṃ cidghano jaganmūrtyā śyāno yas sa jayaty ajaḥ // svātmapracchādanukrīḍāvidagdhā porameśvaraḥ //
End: yato yo yatsvabhāvaḥ sa tatsvabhāvaṃ vaktuṃ pragalbhata iti upadeṣṭuḥ samāviṣṭamaheśvarasvabhāvo nena vākyenoktaḥ syād - iti śi-

vam //
We are grateful to Prof. Raffaele Torella, who has kindly provided us with photographs in electronic form. Unfortunately, two sides must be missing, for the file 3228 ends with bhedabījabhūtasya (KSTS p. 146 middle) and the next one, 3229 starts with the top of KSTS p. 148.

9. **S** *Oriental Research Library, University Campus, Hazaratbal, Srinagar.*
MS no. 1260 - II.
Paper, Śāradā script, 26x17 cm. 28 fol., 27–33 lines to a side.
Catalogued as 'Paramārthsārsangrahvivrtti' of Yogarāja rājānaka with the commentary of Lakṣmaṇa Paṇḍit. (N.b.: As the colophon shows, Lakṣmaṇa Paṇḍit was the scribe's name.)
Dated AD 1730, loosely bound in book form.
Beginning: svasti // śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ // oṃ namaḥ śambhave // oṃ cidghano pi jaganmūrtyā śyāno yaḥ sa jayaty ajaḥ / svātmapracchādane krīḍāvidagdhaḥ parameśvaraḥ //
End: śrīmataḥ kṣemarājasya sadgurvāmnāyaśālinaḥ / sākṣātkr̥tamaheśasya tasyāntevāsinā mayā / śrīvitastāpurīdhāmnā viraktena tapasvinā / vivr̥tir yoganāmneyaṃ pūrṇādvayamayī kr̥tā // // saṃpūrṇeyaṃ paramārthasārasaṅgrahavivr̥tiḥ // kr̥tiḥ śrīparamamāheśvaraśrīrājānakayogarājasya // // // śubham astu // // likhitaiṣā paramārthasārasaṅgrahavivr̥tir mayā paṇḍitasulakṣaṇalakṣmaṇena // saṃ 6 śāke 1652 anuṣṭubgaṇanayā granthaparimāṇaṃ ślokāḥ 1500 // // śubham astu // // // kā *śu* ti 7 gurau śravaṇanakṣattre /// śubham astu // // //
We have obtained an electronic copy of this MS, photographed on May 19, 2005 by the National Mission for Manuscripts (numbered as DS 00001 8940). We are grateful to Prof. Alexis Sanderson for kindly providing us with the PDF file.

Text

ॐ नमश्चिदात्मपरमार्थवपुषे ॥

अथ

परमार्थसारः

श्रीमन्महामाहेश्वराचार्यवर्यश्रीमदभिनवगुप्ताचार्यविरचितः ।

श्रीमद्योगराजाचार्यकृतविवृत्युपेतः ।

चिद्घनोऽपि जगन्मूर्त्या श्यानो यः स जयत्यजः ।
स्वात्मप्रच्छादनक्रीडाविदग्धः परमेश्वरः ॥ १ ॥

योऽयं व्यधायि गुरुणा युक्त्या परमार्थसारसंक्षेपः ।
विवृतिं करोमि लघ्वीमस्मिन्विद्वज्जनार्थितो योगः ॥ २ ॥

इह शिवाद्वयशासने देहादिप्रमातृताप्राधान्यस्वसंकल्पसमुत्थशङ्कातङ्कालस्यसंशयादिरूपविघ्नौघप्रसरप्रध्वंसपूर्विकां शास्त्रनिष्पत्तिं मन्यमानः परिमितप्रमातृताधस्पदीकारेण चिदानन्दैकघनस्वात्मदेवतासमावेशशालिनीं समस्तशास्त्रार्थसंक्षेपगर्भां प्रथमतस्तावत्परमेश्वरप्रवणतां परामृशति ।

परं परस्थं गहनादनादिमेकं निविष्टं बहुधा गुहासु ।
सर्वालयं सर्वचराचरस्थं त्वामेव शंभुं शरणं प्रपद्ये ॥ १ ॥

त्वाम् सर्वप्रमातृस्फुरत्तासारं स्वात्मदेवतारूपमेव **शंभुम्** अनुत्तरश्रेयःस्वभावं सत्तात्मकम् **शरणम्** त्रातारं त्वत्समावेशसमापत्तये संश्रये । **एव**कारः शंभुं स्वात्मदेवताकारमेव प्रपद्ये न पुनर्मायान्तश्चारिणं कंचिद्भिन्नं देवमित्यन्ययोगं व्यवच्छिनत्ति । अन्यच्च किंभूतम् **परम्** पूर्णं चिदानन्देच्छाज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिनिर्भरमनुत्तरस्वरूपं तथा **परस्थं गहनात्** इति गहनान्मायाभिधानात्तत्त्वात्परस्मिन्पूर्ण एव शिवादिविद्यातत्त्वपर्यन्ते शुद्धाध्वनि स्वरूपे तिष्ठन्तं न पुनस्तत्तदवस्थावैचित्र्येणापि स्फुरतस्ततः परस्मात्पूर्णात्स्वरूपात्तस्य प्रच्यावो भवति । यदुक्तम्

जाग्रदादिविभेदेऽपि तदभिन्ने प्रसर्पति ।
निवर्तते निजान्नैव स्वरूपादुपलब्धृतः ॥

इति स्पन्दशास्त्रे । **अनादिम्** पुराणं सर्वप्रतीतीनामनुभवितृतया प्रमातृत्वेनादिसिद्धत्वात् **एकम्** इत्यसाहायं चिदैक्येन स्फुरणाद्भेदस्यानुपपत्तेः । तथा **निविष्टम्** इत्यादि । एवंजातीयकमपि स्वस्वातन्त्र्येण **बहुधा**

नानाप्रकारैर्भेदैः **गुहासु** रुद्रक्षेत्रज्ञरूपासु हृद्गुहास्वन्तराविष्टं चैतन्यरूपोऽपि स्वयं जडाजडात्मतामाभास्य नटवन्नानाप्रमातृतया स्थित इति यावत् । अत एव **सर्वालयम्** इति **सर्वस्य** रुद्रक्षेत्रज्ञादिप्रमातृप्रमेयरूपस्य जगतः **आलयम्** विश्रान्तिस्थानं । सर्वमिदं किल पूर्णप्रमातरि स्थितं सद्ग्राह्यग्राहकयुगलकापेक्षयोन्मग्नमिव भेदेन प्रकाशमानं नानारुपैर्व्यपदिश्यतेऽन्यथैतस्यप्रकाशाद्भिन्नस्य सत्तैव न स्यात्कुत इदं विश्वमिति सर्वनामप्रत्यवमर्शः । नैतावता भगवतः समुत्तीर्णं स्वरूपमित्याह **सर्वचराचरस्थम्** इति । सर्वमिदं यज्जडाजडस्वभावं विश्वं तद्रूपतया तिष्ठन्तं

> कर्तासि सर्वस्य यतः स्वयं वै विभो ततः सर्वमिदं त्वमेव ।

इति न्यायेन हि व्यतिरिक्तस्यान्यस्याप्रकाशमानस्य कार्यत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

> भोक्तैव भोग्यभावेन सदा सर्वत्र संस्थितः ।

इति भगवानेव तथा तथा चकास्तीति । एवंविधं त्वामनुत्तरं सर्वस्य स्वात्मदेवतास्वरूपं पराहन्ताचमत्कारसारमपि गृहीतनानात्वमथ चात्यन्ताखण्डितस्वस्वातन्त्र्यपरमाद्वयप्रकाशस्वभावं भगवन्तं शंभुम् **प्रपद्ये** शरीरादिकृत्रिमाहंकारगुणीकारेणैतादृशं त्वामेव स्वात्मानं पराहन्ताचमत्कारस्वरूपं समाविशामीति यावत् । अनेन ग्रहणकवाक्येन परमोपादेयां स्वस्वभावसमावेशमयीं दशामुपदिशता गुरुणा वक्ष्यमाणहेयोपादेयतया सकलग्रन्थार्थोपक्षेपः कृतः ॥ १ ॥

एवं प्रकरणतात्पर्यमद्वयस्वरूपं स्तुतिद्वारेण प्रतिपाद्येदानीं शास्त्रावतारमभिदधत्संबन्धाभिधेयादिकं ग्रन्थकृदार्याद्वयेनाह

> **गर्भाधिवासपूर्वकमरणान्तकदुःखचक्रविभ्रान्तः ।**
> **आधारं भगवन्तं शिष्यः पप्रच्छ परमार्थम् ॥ २ ॥**
>
> **आधारकारिकाभिस्तं गुरुरभिभाषते स्म तत्सारम् ।**
> **कथयत्यभिनवगुप्तः शिवशासनदृष्टियोगेन ॥ ३ ॥**

कश्चिद्भगवत्प्रसादात्समुत्पन्नवैराग्यः संसाराद्विरतमतिर्गुरोः शासनीयोऽस्मीति मत्वा सद्गुरुम् **आधारं भगवन्तम्** शेषाख्यं मुनिं सम्यगाराध्य परमार्थोपदेशस्वरूपं पृष्टवान् । तदा तद्योग्यतापरिपाकस्वरूपपरिशीलनक्रमेण **तम्** शिष्यं विगलितान्तःकरणं मत्वा सोऽप्यनन्तनाथो निःशेषशास्त्रोपदेशज्ञः परमार्थसारनाम्ना **आधारकारिकाभिः** इत्यपराभिधानग्रन्थेन सांख्यनयोक्तोपदेशानुसारेण प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकज्ञानात्परब्रह्मावाप्तिरित्येवमेतं शिष्यं प्रोक्तवान् । स एव ब्रह्मोपदेशः परमाद्वयस्वरूपस्वस्वातन्त्र्यदृष्ट्या प्रतिपादितः सन्युक्तियुक्तो भवतीति मत्वा सर्वं जनमनुग्रहीतुं परमाद्वयशैवनययुक्त्या **गुरुरभिनवेन** अलौकिकेन चिच्चमत्कारस्फारेण **गुप्तः** गुह्यः सरहस्य इति । सोऽयं पुण्यनामाक्षरावलिः **तत्सारम्** तस्य परमार्थोपदेशस्य यत्सारं दध्नो नवनीतमिवोपादेयं परानुग्रहप्रवृत्तः सन्प्रतिपादयतीति । एवं संबन्धाभिधेयाभिधानप्रयोजनादय उपपादिता नेह पुनः शास्त्रगौरवभयात्प्रतन्यन्ते । कीदृशः स शिष्य इत्याह **गर्भाधिवास** इति । गर्भाधिवासप्रारम्भं जायतेऽस्ति वर्धते विपरिणमतेऽपक्षीयते विनश्यतीति तत्तदवस्थावैचित्र्येण षड्भावविकारनेमियुक्तं यत् **मरणान्तकदुःखरूपम्** आविर्भावतिरोभावात्संसरणस्वभावतया चक्रमिव **चक्रम्** तस्मिन् **विभ्रान्तः** विपरिवृत्तः । अनेनास्य प्राग्जातिस्मरणस्वभावो बोधाविर्भावो द्योतितोऽन्यथा

कथं काष्ठाप्राप्तिलक्षणं प्रश्नकुतूहलित्वं स्यात् । एवं च यः समुत्पन्नवैराग्यः परमेश्वरानुग्रहशक्तिविद्धहृदयः समुदितसम्यग्ज्ञान उपदेशपात्रतामवाप्य परमेश्वराकारं समुचितमपि गुरुं समासाद्य परमाद्वयज्ञानमभिलषते स एव च गुरूपदेशभाजनं स्यादिति । एतदेव चान्यत्रोक्तम्

शक्तिपातवशाद्देवि नीयते सद्गुरुं प्रति ।

इति । इह च पुरस्ताद्वक्ष्यते ॥ ३ ॥

अधुना समुत्पत्तिक्रमेण पीठिकाबन्धं विधाय विश्ववैचित्र्यचित्रेऽस्मिञ्जगति पारमेश्वरमनुत्तमं स्वातन्त्र्यमेकमेव संयोजनवियोजनकर्तृत्वहेतुरिति तच्छक्तिविकासमेव विश्वमण्डचतुष्टयमुखेनावेदयन्ग्रन्थमवतारयति

निजशक्तिवैभवभरादण्डचतुष्टयमिदं विभागेन ।
शक्तिर्माया प्रकृतिः पृथ्वी चेति प्रभावितं प्रभुणा ॥ ४ ॥

चिदानन्दैकघनेन **प्रभुणा** स्वतन्त्रेण भगवता महेश्वरेणाण्डचतुष्टयं विश्वाच्छादकत्वेन कोशरूपतया वस्तुपिण्डभूतम् **इदम्** । यदुक्तम्

... वस्तुपिण्डोऽण्डमुच्यते ।

इति । **प्रभावितम्** प्रकाशितं भवनकर्तृतया वा प्रयुक्तम् । कस्मादित्याह **निजशक्तिवैभवभरात्** इति । **निजः** स्वात्मीयो योऽसावसाधारण इच्छाद्यः **शक्तिप्रचयः** तस्य यत् **वैभवम्** विचित्रः प्रसरस्तस्य योऽसौ **भरः** समुद्रेकस्तस्मादिति । भगवतः किल स्वशक्तिविकासस्फार एव जगन्निर्माणम् । यदुक्तं श्रीसर्वमङ्गलाशास्त्रे

शक्तिश्च शक्तिमांश्चैव पदार्थद्वयमुच्यते ।
शक्तयोऽस्य जगत्सर्वं शक्तिमांस्तु महेश्वरः ॥

इति । किंरूपाण्डचतुष्टयसंख्येत्याह **शक्तिर्माया प्रकृतिः पृथ्वी च** इति । विश्वस्य प्रमातृप्रमेयरूपस्य पराहन्ताचमत्कारसारस्यापि स्वस्वरूपापोहनात्माख्यातिमयी निषेधव्यापाररूपा या पारमेश्वरी **शक्तिः** सैवाच्छादकत्वेन बन्धकतया शक्त्यण्डमित्युच्यते । सदाशिवेश्वरशुद्धविद्यातत्त्वपर्यन्तदलं सद्वक्ष्यमाणमण्डत्रितयमन्तः समन्ताद्गर्भीकृत्यावतिष्ठत इति कोशरूपतयैषा शक्तिरनेन शब्देन संज्ञिता । एतस्मिन्नण्डे सदाशिवेश्वरावेवाधिपती ।

अन्यच्च मलत्रयस्वभावं मोहमयं भेदैकप्रवणतया सर्वप्रमातृणां बन्धरूपं पुंस्तत्त्वपर्यन्तदलं मायाख्यमण्डमित्युच्यते । तच्च वक्ष्यमाणमण्डद्वयमन्तः समन्तात्स्वीकृत्य स्थितम् । अण्डाधिपतिश्चात्र गहनाभिधानो रुद्रः ।

तथा सत्त्वरजस्तमोमयी **प्रकृतिः** कार्यकरणात्मना परिणता सती पशुप्रमातृणां भोग्यरूपा सुखदुःखमोहरूपतया बन्धयित्री प्रकृत्यभिधानमण्डमित्युच्यते । तत्रापि महाविभूतिः श्रीभगवान्विष्णुर्भेदप्रधानोऽण्डाधिपतिः ।

तथा **पृथ्वी** चैवं मनुष्यस्थावरान्तानां प्रमातॄणां प्रतिप्राकाररूपतया स्थूलकञ्चुकमयी बन्धयित्रीति कृ-त्वा पृथ्व्यण्डमित्युच्यते। तत्रापि चतुर्दशविधे भूतसर्गे प्रधानतयाण्डाधिपो भगवान्ब्रह्मेति। एवं परमे-श्वरविजृम्भितमिदमण्डचतुष्टयं भगवतेत्थं प्रकाशितं परिस्फुरति ॥ ४ ॥

एवमेतदण्डचतुष्टयं प्रतिपाद्यात्रैव भोग्यभोक्तृत्वप्रतिपादनपरतया विश्वस्वरूपनिरूपणाय कारिकामाह

तत्रान्तर्विश्वमिदं विचित्रतनुकरणभुवनसंतानम् ।
भोक्ता च तत्र देही शिव एव गृहीतपशुभावः ॥ ५ ॥

तत्र तेषु चतुर्ष्वण्डेष्वागमप्रसिद्धेषु **विश्वमिदमन्तः** मध्ये वर्तते। कीदृशमित्याह **विचित्र** इति। रु-द्रक्षेत्रज्ञभेदभिन्ना नानामुखहस्तपादादिरचनारूपाः **तनवः** आकारा विशिष्टसंस्थानरूपेणाश्चर्यभूताः। त-थान्योन्यभेदेन सातिशयानि **करणानि** चक्षुरादीनि। तद्यथा रुद्रप्रमातॄणां निरतिशयानि सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुण-गणयुक्तानि तैः किल सर्वमिदमेकस्मिन्क्षणे युगपज्ज्ञायते संपाद्यते च। क्षेत्रज्ञानां पुनरेतान्येव करणानि परमेश्वरनियतिशक्तिनियन्त्रितानि सन्ति घटादिपदार्थमात्रज्ञानकरणसमर्थान्येव न तैः सर्वं ज्ञायते नापि क्रियते। तत्रापि योगिनामतिशयः करणानां यन्नियतिशक्तिसमुल्लङ्घनात्तदीयैः करणैः दूरव्यवहितविप्रकृ-ष्टमपि परिच्छिद्यते परप्रमातृगतं च सुखदुःखादि ज्ञायते। एवं च तिरश्चामपि नियतिशक्त्या संकुचिताना-मपि मनुष्येभ्योऽप्यतिशयः करणानां विद्यते। तद्यथा गावः स्वगृहं व्यवहितमपि पश्यन्त्यश्वा रात्रावपि मार्गमीक्षन्ते गृध्रा योजनशतगतमप्यामिषमवलोकयन्ति पक्षिणो मक्षिका मषकपर्यन्ता आकाशविहारिणो दृश्यन्ते सरीसृपा उरसा पन्थानं गच्छन्ति दृशा च शृण्वन्ति शब्दानुष्ट्रा दूरादपि गर्ताच्छ्वासमात्रेण सर्प-माकर्षयन्तीति। एवं सर्वत्र करणवैचित्र्यमूह्यम् । तथा **भुवनानि** आगमप्रसिद्धानि वर्तुलत्र्यश्रचतुरश्रा-र्धचन्द्रच्छत्राकारतया सातिशयसंस्थानानीति। एवम् **विचित्रः** नानातिशयाद्भुतस्वभाव एषाम् **तनुकर-णभुवनानां संतानः** अविरतबन्धप्रवाहो यस्मिन्विश्वस्मिंस्तदेवंविधं विश्वम् । एवंविधे चात्र भोग्यस्वभावे विश्वस्मिन्भोक्ता भाव्यमित्याह **भोक्ता च तत्र देही** इति। मलत्रयाघ्रातो देहो भोगायतनं विद्यते यस्याणोः स **देही** सुखदुःखादिस्वभावः शरीरी सुखदुःखादिमयेऽस्मिन् **भोक्ता** सुखदुःखाद्यनुभविता पशुप्रमातेति कथ्यते। ननु परप्रमात्रपेक्षयाणुमात्रस्यापि न भेदो विद्यते कुतस्तद्व्यतिरिक्तो देही नाम वराकः। यदुक्तम्

प्रदेशोऽपि ब्रह्मणः सार्वरूप्यमनतिक्रान्तश्च अविकल्प्यश्च।

इति।

एकैकत्र च तत्त्वेऽपि षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वरूपता।

इति न्यायाच्चैक एव स्वशक्तियुक्तो महाप्रकाशवपुरेव परमेश्वरः प्रमाता सर्वतोऽभिन्न एवावभासते। ततो भिन्नस्याप्रकाशमानस्य देहिनोऽस्तित्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि प्रकाशमानत्वानुपपत्तेर्न सत्ता निश्चीयते। प्रकाशते चेत्तस्मिन्परब्रह्मात्मनि तर्हि प्रकाशाभिन्न एवैकः प्रमातेति पुनरपि किंपरत्वेनायं भोग्यभोक्तृलक्षणः सन्भेद इति सर्वं समर्थयमान आह **शिव एव गृहीतपशुभावः** इति। योऽयं भगवान्समनन्तरं प्रतिपादितश्चिदान-न्दैकघनः स्वातन्त्र्यस्वभावः **शिवः** स एव स्वरूपगोपनासतत्त्वः सन्स्वेच्छया नट इव देहप्रमातृभूमिकां समापन्नः पाल्यत्वात्पशुत्वात्पशुसत्तालक्षणश्च सुखदुःखादिमये स्वयंनिर्मितेऽस्मिन्भोग्ये भोक्ता देहीति

कथ्यते न पुनः शिवव्यतिरिक्तं किंचित्पदार्थजातमस्ति। एष एव च भगवाञ्शिवः स्वातन्त्र्याद्भोक्तृभोग्य-लक्षणं प्रमातृप्रमेययुगलकं क्रीडनकमिव समुत्थापयति यदपेक्षयायं भेदप्रधानो व्यवहारः। तस्मादेतदेव परमेश्वरस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं निरतिशयं यत्पूर्णस्वरूपतापरित्यागेन भोक्तृभोग्यस्वभावं पशुभावमापन्नोऽपि स-र्वप्रमातॄणामनुभवितृतया स्वात्मनि प्रस्फुरच्चिदानन्दैकघनः शिव एव ॥ ५ ॥

एवमप्येकश्चित्स्वभावः प्रमाता स यदि मायादिप्रमातृप्रमेयवैचित्र्येण नानात्वादनेक इति कथं विरु-द्धयैकतया व्यवह्रियत एकश्चेत्किमिति नानारूप इति च्छायातपवद्विरोधाद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः समापतति न पुनरनेकरूप एकश्च पदार्थः स्यात्। यदुक्तम्

अयमेव भेदो भेदहेतुर्भावानां यद्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासः कारणभेदो वा।

इति। लौकिकमत्र दृष्टान्तं प्रदर्शयन्दार्ष्टान्तिके चोद्यं समर्थयते

नानाविधवर्णानां रूपं धत्ते यथामलः स्फटिकः।
सुरमानुषपशुपादपरूपत्वं तद्वदीशोऽपि ॥ ६ ॥

यथा एकोऽपि **स्फटिकमणिः** तत्तल्लाक्षानीलाद्युपाधिवैचित्र्यसहस्रेण तत्तद्वैचित्र्यं स्वात्मनि धारयं-स्तथा विचित्रितो भवति न पुनस्तस्य स्फटिकताहानिरेतावता समुत्पद्यते। एतदेव स्फटिकमणेर्मणित्वं यत्तत्तद्विशेषेणाच्छुरितेऽपि तस्मिन्स्फटिकमणिरयमित्यबाधिता सर्वस्य सर्वदैव प्रतीतिः। केवलमत्रामी लाक्षादयः स्फुरन्तीति व्यवह्रियते न पुनर्लाक्षाद्युपाधिः पटमिव तं विशिनष्टि येन स्वरूपविप्रलोपोऽस्य स्यात्। तस्मादेतदेवामलत्वं मणेर्यदुपाधिरूपानाकारान्बिभर्ति स्वस्वरूपतया च प्रथते। तथैवायमी-श्वरः स्वतन्त्रश्चिदेकघन एककोऽपि स्वच्छे स्वात्मदर्पणे देवमनुष्यपशुपक्षिस्थावरान्तानां रुद्रक्षेत्रज्ञादि-पदार्थरूपाणां विशेषाणां स्वयं निर्मितानां च **रूपत्वम्** वर्णवैचित्र्यं स्फटिकमणिवत्स्वात्माभेदेन धार-यंस्ततोऽपि समुत्तीर्णत्वादहमित्येवमखण्डचमत्कारोपबृंहितं नानारूपमप्येकं स्वात्मानं प्रत्यवमृशति। इत्थमप्यस्यैकताखण्डनामयो भिन्नरूपो देशः कालो वा न कश्चिद्विद्यते यदपेक्षयैतस्य स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्य विरुद्धधर्माध्यासादिदूषणमुच्येतापि। साक्षात्कारलक्षणं चित्रज्ञानं नानाभेदसंभिन्नमपि परैरप्येकमेव तद-भ्युपगतम्। यथा

नीलादिश्चित्रविज्ञाने ज्ञानोपाधिरनन्यभाक्।
अशक्यदर्शनस्तं हि पतत्यर्थे विवेचयन् ॥

इति प्रमाणवार्तिके। किं पुनः सर्वतः पूर्णस्य ज्ञातुश्चिदेकवपुषः स्वतन्त्रस्य याविमौ देशकालौ भेदकत-याभिमतौ मूर्तिवैचित्र्यक्रियावैचित्र्याभ्यां यस्य समुल्लासकतया स्थितौ कथं तस्यैव भगवतो व्यवच्छेदकौ स्याताम्। यदि नाम देशकालयोः कदाचित्संविदो भेदेन स्थितिरभविष्यत्तदा तत्कृतोऽपि विरुद्धधर्मा-ध्यास उदपत्स्यतेति तत्र संभावना स्यात्। यावता तयोः संवित्प्रकाशेनैव स्वात्मसत्तासिद्धिरिति सिद्ध एवानेकस्वभावोऽप्येक एव महेश्वरश्चिन्मूर्तिर्भेदधर्मे पुनर्विरुद्धधर्माध्यासो दुरुद्धर एवेति ॥ ६ ॥

नन्वेक एव संवित्सतत्त्वः प्रमाताभ्युपगतस्तनुकरणभुवनतां समापन्नः सन्स एवानेकतां यात इति चेत्तर्हि तन्वादिविनाशे स एव विनष्टः स्यात्तदुत्पत्तौ वैष एव तदोत्पद्येत। एवं प्रतिप्रमातृ स एव जाय-तेऽस्तीत्यादिषड्भावविकारतया व्यवच्छिद्यते पुण्यपापस्वभावकर्मवैचित्र्येणैतस्यैव भगवतः स्वर्गनरका-दिभोगः प्राप्त इति कथमुच्यते स्वस्वरूप एव शिव इति। दृष्टान्तद्वारेणैतदपि समर्थयते

गच्छति गच्छति जल इव हिमकरबिम्बं स्थिते स्थितिं याति।
तनुकरणभुवनवर्गे तथायमात्मा महेशानः ॥ ७ ॥

यथा जलप्रवाहे याति सति **हिमकरबिम्बम्** चन्द्रवपुर्वस्तुवृत्तेनाकाशस्थं स्वयमचलत्तात्मकं जलप्रवाहान्तःपतितमपि तत् **गच्छति** प्रयाति **इव** तथा तस्मिन्नेव क्षणेऽन्यत्र जलाशये निःस्तिमिते सति तदेव **हिमकरबिम्बं स्थितिम्** गच्छतीवेत्युभयथा सर्वप्रमातृभिरेतत्संभाव्यते न पुनः परमार्थेन तत्तथैव स्यात् । नापि जलगतौ देशकालौ भेदकतया चन्द्रमसः स्वरूपं गगनस्थं परामृशतः केवलं जलमेव तादृशमथ च तत्प्रतिबिम्बितस्य चन्द्रबिम्बस्य जलगतचलत्ताचलत्तादिको भेदो व्यवह्रियत इत्येतावता गङ्गाजलगतस्य कर्दमपतितस्य वा शशिनः स्वस्वरूपतायां न काचित्क्षतिः । **तथैवायमात्मा** चैतन्यस्वभावः स्वयं निर्मिते **तनुकरणभुवनसमूहे** परिक्षीणे सति समुत्पन्ने वा प्रक्षीणः समुत्पन्नश्चेति मायाव्यामोहितानां व्यवहारमात्रमेतज्जलगतचन्द्रवन्न पुनः स्वात्मा जायते म्रियते वेति । गीतास्वेवमेवोक्तम्

न जायते म्रियते वा कदचिन्नायं भूत्वा भविता वा न भूयः ।
अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे ॥

इति । तस्मादयमात्मा महेशानः स्वतन्त्रः सर्वस्वात्मप्रत्यवमर्शस्वभावः सर्वप्रमातृणामनुभवितृतया प्रथमानस्ततस्तत्तदवस्थाविप्रलोपे समुत्पत्तौ वा स्वस्वरूप एव । एतदेव च दुर्घटकारि महेशानत्वं संवित्तत्त्वस्य यत्तथा तथा पशुप्रमातृतया स्वर्गनरकादिभोगभोक्तापि सर्वानुभवितृतया संवित्स्वरूप एव । प्रत्युत पुण्यपापस्वर्गनरकक्षुत्पिपासादिको योऽयं पशुभावो बन्धकतया नियतः स यदि भगवता स्वात्मप्रकाशेन प्रकाशितः परामृष्टश्च स्यात्तदा यथोक्तां स्वात्मनि सत्तां लभतेऽन्यथा निःस्वभाव एवैष इति कथं स्वात्मनः तस्यैव महेशस्य स्वरूपविप्रलोपायोच्यते । सर्वथा निर्मितमेव वस्तु संहार्यं समुत्पाद्यं वा देहादिरूपं स्यान्न पुनः नित्ये भगवति चैतन्ये समुत्पत्तिविनाशौ कदाचिद्भवेताम् । तस्मादेक एवात्मा ग्राह्यग्राहकतया नानारूपस्वभावः सन्पुनरपि सर्वानुभवितृतया सर्वस्यैकतया प्रथत इति न काचिदद्वयवादक्षतिः ॥ ७ ॥

इत्थमपि सर्वेषामयमात्मा विश्वप्रपञ्चस्वभाव एव संविन्मात्रपरमार्थः सर्वावभासः सर्वत्र संविदनुगमादिति युक्त्यागमाभ्यां प्रतिपादितश्चेत्किमिति लोष्टादावप्यविशेषात्स्वात्मतया स न प्रतीयतेऽभ्युपगमे वा जडाजडव्यवस्थेयं भासमाना न संगच्छते लोकव्यवहारश्च जडाजडरूप इति कथमेतत्स्यादित्याह

राहुरदृश्योऽपि यथा शशिबिम्बस्थः प्रकाशते तद्वत् ।
सर्वगतोऽप्ययमात्मा विषयाश्रयणेन धीमुकुरे ॥ ८ ॥

आकाशदेशे **राहुः** सर्वत्र परिभ्रमन्नपि नोपलभ्यते स एव पुनर्ग्रहोपरागकाले चन्द्रमूर्तिस्थः प्रथमानोऽयं राहुरिति परीक्ष्यतेऽन्यथा स्थितोऽपि भचक्रेऽस्थित इव । तथैवेहापि सर्वान्तरतमत्वेन स्थितोऽपि **अयमात्मा** स्वानुभवैकस्वरूपतया प्रत्यक्षपरिदृश्यमानः सर्वस्य तथा नोपलक्ष्यते । यदा पुनः पुर्यष्टकप्रमातृणां बुद्धिदर्पणे प्रतिभामुकुरे ग्राह्यव्यवस्थाकाले शब्दादिविषयस्वीकारेण शृणोमीत्येवमहंप्रतीतिविषयो भवति तदा ग्राहकस्वभावतया लोष्टादावपि स्थितः सन्स्फुटरूपस्तत्रैव स्वात्मा **प्रकाशते** सर्वैश्च स्वानुभवैकरूपः प्रतीयते लोष्टादावत्यन्ततमोमयत्वात्स्थितोऽप्यस्थितकल्पोऽसौ प्रथते राहुराकाशे यथा । एवमयं

भगवान्मायाशक्त्या स्वात्मकल्पेऽपि भाववर्गे कांश्चित्पुर्यष्टकस्वरूपान्वेद्यखण्डानप्यहन्ताव्यवस्थारसाभिषिक्तान्वेदकीकरोति कांश्चिद्वेद्यीकरोति यदपेक्षयायं जडाजडव्यवस्थास्वरूपो भेदव्यवहारः सुस्थित एवोपपद्यते । तेन लोष्टादिर्वेद्यत्वाज्जडो वेदकत्वात्पुर्यष्टकप्रमाताप्यजडः । न पुनः परमार्थेन परमेश्वरापेक्षया जडाजडव्यवहार इति ॥ ८ ॥

ननु सर्वप्रमातॄणां बुद्धौ चेत्स्वात्मनोऽप्यविशेषेण प्रस्फुरणं तर्हि ते सर्वे किमिति स्वात्मविदो न स्युस्तज्ज्ञानवन्तो मा वा भूवन्विशेषाभावात् । यत्पुनः संसारावस्थायामपि केचन स्वात्मज्ञानाज्जीवन्मुक्ताः सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वकर्तृत्वशालिनः केचन स्वात्मज्ञानयोग्या आरुरुक्षवश्च दृश्यन्तेऽपरे स्वात्मज्ञानरहिताः सन्तो धर्माधर्मनिमित्तशुभाशुभकर्मनिगडप्रबन्धबद्धाः संसारिण एवेति कथमेतत्संगच्छत इत्थमन्तः सर्वं कृत्वा पारमेश्वरः शक्तिपातो विशृङ्खल इति प्रतिपादयति

आदर्शे मलरहिते यद्वद्वदनं विभाति तद्वदयम् ।
शिवशक्तिपातविमले धीतत्त्वे भाति भारूपः ॥ ९ ॥

दर्पणे मालिन्यरहिते यथा निर्विशेषरूपादिगुणगणयुक्तं मुखं चकास्ति । न स देशोऽस्ति यं विनिवृत्तमल आदर्शो न स्वीकुरुते । समले दर्पणे तु मुखमनन्यातिशयमपि ध्यामलत्वाद्वैपरीत्येन प्रकाशते । नापि मलिनस्तदीयान्गुणान्स्वीकर्तुमलम् । प्रत्युत तन्न्यस्तमुखः पुमान्मुखमन्यथैव ध्यामलत्वाद्युपेतमवलोक्य स्वात्मनो लज्जामावहति विकृतं मद्वदनमिति । तथैव **शिवस्य** स्वात्मनो यासावनुग्रहाख्या **शक्तिः** तस्याः **पातः** स्वकिरणविस्फारस्तेन संमार्जिते प्रतिभामुकुर आणवमायीयकार्ममलवासनाप्रक्षयाद्विशदीकृते केषांचिदपश्चिमजन्मनां प्रमातॄणाम् **भाः** प्रकाशः **रूपम्** यस्येति सः **भारूपः** स्वात्मा यावत्सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणगणयुक्तस्तावानप्यवभासते येन केचनैव ते स्वात्मस्वरूपप्रथनात्संसारमध्यपतिता अपि मुक्तकल्पाः सातिशयाश्च । केषांचिदेव परमेश्वरतिरोधानशक्त्याणवमायीयकार्ममलसमाच्छादिते बुद्धितत्त्वे भारूपोऽप्यात्मा मालिन्याद्भातोऽप्यभातकल्पो येन ते सांसारिकाः पशव इत्यभिधीयन्तेऽन्येऽप्युभयशक्तियोगात्प्रमातार आरुरुक्षव इति । इत्थं तीव्रमन्दमन्दतरादिभेदेन शक्तिपातवैचित्र्यं सर्वत्राप्यूह्यम् । अत्र न मायान्तःपातिनियतिशक्तिसमुत्थमश्वमेधादिकं जपध्यानादि वान्यद्यत्किंचित्कर्म मोचनहेतुरात्मनस्तस्य हि मायातः समुत्तीर्णत्वाद्भेदप्रधानं वस्तु तत्साधनाय न प्रकल्पते । यद्गीतम्

नाहं वेदैर्न तपसा न दानेन न चेज्यया ।

इति । तस्मादेकमेवात्र परमेश्वरानुग्रहः कारणमकृत्रिमं भव्यबुद्धीनाम् । यदुक्तम्

ईशितुः शक्तिपातांशो ख्यापयित्री स्वतन्त्रताम् ।
धीः कारणकलाघ्राता नैव किंचिदपेक्षते ॥

इति । पशुप्रमातॄणां तु परमेश्वरतिरोधानशक्तिः संसरणहेतुरेव येनैते स्वस्वरूपाप्रथनाच्छुभाशुभकर्मनिरताः सुखदुःखादिभोगभाजः पुनः पुनरस्मिन्संसरन्ति । तस्मात्प्रमातॄणां साधारणेऽपि स्वात्मनि प्रकाशाप्रकाशरूपे अनुग्रहतिरोधानशक्ती द्वे एव ते मोक्षबन्धप्रविभागहेतू । यदुक्तम्

बध्नाति काचिदपि शक्तिरनन्तशक्तेः क्षेत्रज्ञमप्रतिहता भवपाशजालैः ।
ज्ञानासिना च विनिकृत्य गुणानशेषानन्या करोत्यभिमुखं पुरुषं विमुक्तौ ॥

इति ॥ ९ ॥

एवमिदं सर्वमागमानुभवयुक्तियुक्तं प्रतिपाद्य यत्प्राक्शक्त्याद्यण्डचतुष्टयं प्रतिपादितं तदन्तरालवर्ति समुत्पत्तिक्रमेण षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वात्मकं जगद्यल्लग्नं भाति तत्प्रथमतः कारणकारणं परमशिवस्वरूपं कारिकाद्वयेनाह

भारूपं परिपूर्णं स्वात्मनि विश्रान्तितो महानन्दम् ।
इच्छासंवित्करणैर्निर्भरितमनन्तशक्तिपरिपूर्णम् ॥ १० ॥

सर्वविकल्पविहीनं शुद्धं शान्तं लयोदयविहीनम् ।
यत्परतत्त्वं तस्मिन्विभाति षट्त्रिंशदात्म जगत् ॥ ११ ॥

यत् एवंविधम् **परम्** पूर्णं शिवतत्त्वं तत्र शिवादिधरापर्यन्तं वक्ष्यमाणं विश्वं विश्रान्तं सत्प्रकाशते तदभिन्नमेव चकासद्युक्त्योपपद्यत इति यावत् । ननु तन्यते सर्वं तन्वादि यत्र तत्तत्त्वं तननाद्वा तदाप्रलयं तस्य भाव इति वा तत्त्वमित्येवमपि तत्त्वव्यपदेशोऽयं जाड्यापादकः कथं चिद्रूपे भगवति परमशिवे स्यादुच्यते । उपदेश्यजनापेक्षया यावता शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते तावता तत्र तत्त्वव्यपदेशो न वस्तुतः । कीदृशं तत्परं तत्त्वम् । **भाः** प्रकाशः **रूपम्** स्वभावो यस्य महाप्रकाशवपुरित्यर्थः । तथा **परिपूर्णम्** निराकाङ्क्षम् । निराकाङ्क्षमपि स्फटिकमणिदर्पणादि जडं वस्तु भवतीत्याह **स्वात्मनि विश्रान्तितो महानन्दम्** इति । स्वस्मिन्स्वभावेऽखण्डाहन्ताचमत्काररसे विश्रमान्महानानन्दः परा निर्वृतिर्यस्येति । तदेवं परमाह्लादकस्फुरत्तासारत्वात्प्रकाश्यस्फटिकादेर्जडाद्वैलक्षण्यमुक्तं भवति । अत एवाह **इच्छासंवित्करणैर्निर्भरितम्** इति । इच्छाज्ञानक्रियाशक्तिस्वभावमेव न पुनः शान्तब्रह्मवादिनामिव शक्तिविरहितं जडकल्पम् । अन्यच्च **अनन्तशक्तिपरिपूर्णम्** इति । **अनन्ताः** निःसंख्या घटपटाद्या नामरूपात्मिकाः **शक्तयः** इच्छाज्ञानक्रियाशक्तीनां पल्लवभूता ब्राह्म्याद्याः शक्तयः शब्दराशिसमुत्थास्ताभिः **परितः** समन्तात् **पूर्णम्** व्याप्तं तत एवोल्लसन्त्यस्तत्रैव शाम्यन्तीति । एवं परावाग्रूपं भगवति स्वातन्त्र्यमुक्तं स्यात् । ननु वाग्रूपं चेत्परं तत्त्वं तर्हि काल्पनिकं शब्दसंभिन्नत्वात्कथं शुद्धप्रकाशवपुषि कल्पनायोग इत्याशयेनाह **सर्वविकल्पविहीनम्** इति । परप्रमातरि योऽयं पराहन्ताचमत्कारः स वाग्रूपोऽपि निर्विकल्पः । विकल्पो ह्यन्यापोहलक्षणो द्वयं घटाघटरूपमाक्षिपन्नघटाद्यवच्छिन्नं घटं निश्चिनोति । प्रकाशस्य पुनः पराहन्ताचमत्कारसारस्यापि नाप्रकाशरूपः प्रकाशादन्यः प्रतिपक्षतया विद्यते यद्व्यवच्छेदात्तस्य विकल्परूपता स्यात् । व्यवच्छेद्यो ह्यर्थोऽप्रकाशात्मा प्रकाशवपुषि प्रकाशते चेत्तर्हि

तत्संवेदनरूपेण तादात्म्यप्रतिपत्तितः ।

इत्यादिन्यायेन योऽप्यर्थः प्रकाशस्वभावतां यातः सन्स कथं स्वात्मनस्तस्यैव व्यवच्छेदकः स्याद्येन विकल्परूपतां तत्र समावहेत् । अथ प्रतिपक्षतया न प्रकाशत इति कथमिहाप्रकाशमानः पदार्थः प्रतिपक्षरूपोऽस्तीति परिच्छेत्तुमपि शक्येतेति यत्किंचिदेतत्स्यात् । यतः **सर्वैः** व्यवच्छेदात्मकैः **विकल्पैर्विहीनम्**

अपरिच्छिन्नस्वभावं परं तत्त्वम् । अत एवाह **शुद्धम्** इति विमलं विकल्पमय्या अशुद्धिमष्या अभावात् । तथा **शान्तम्** इति । ग्राह्यग्राहकसमुत्थक्षोभाभावाच्छक्तिसामरस्येन स्वस्वरूपस्थं न पुनरश्मशकलकल्पम् । अन्यच्च **लयोदयविहीनम्** इति ।

सकृद्विभातोऽयमात्मा ।

इति कृत्वा सनातन एव । अतो भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानवपुः कालस्तत्र न क्रमते यतः कालस्य तत एव समुल्लास इति समुत्पत्तिविनाशबहिष्कृते परतत्त्वेऽभ्युपगते विश्वस्य विश्वत्वमुपपन्नमिति प्रतिपादितं स्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

नन्वेवंविधे परतत्त्वे जगद्भातीति यत्प्रतिपादितं तत्कथमेतत्स्याद्यावता परतत्त्वापेक्षया न किंचिद्भेदेन भातुं प्रगल्भेत । ततो भिन्नं चेज्जगद्भासते तदाद्वयवादखण्डनाभिन्नं चेज्जगत्प्रकाशत इति कथं वाचोयुक्तिरिति दृष्टान्तद्वारेण तद्भेदाभेदरूपं तत्त्वमुपदर्शयन्नेतत्समर्थनायाह

दर्पणबिम्बे यद्वन्नगरग्रामादि चित्रमविभागि ।
भाति विभागेनैव च परस्परं दर्पणादपि च ॥ १२ ॥

विमलतमपरमभैरवबोधात्तद्वद्विभागशून्यमपि ।
अन्योन्यं च ततोऽपि च विभक्तमाभाति जगदेतत् ॥ १३ ॥

यथा निर्मले मुकुरान्तराले नगरग्रामपुरप्राकाराट्टस्थलनदनदीज्वलनवृक्षपर्वतपशुपक्षिस्त्रीपुरुषादिकं सर्वं प्रतिबिम्बतया **चित्रम्** स्वालक्षण्येन नानारूपं भासते **अविभागि** दर्पणादविभक्तं सत् **भाति** तदभेदेनैवान्तराकारं समर्पयति तत्राभेदेन भासमानमपि भाति **विभागेनैव च परस्परम्** इत्यन्योन्यस्वालक्षण्येन घटात्पटो भिन्नः पटात्घट इति विभक्ततया स्फुरति । तदन्तर्गता हि भावा एव पृथक्त्वेन परामृश्यन्ते न पुनस्तं दर्पणं त्यक्त्वा पृथक्किंचिदुपलभ्यते किंतु दर्पणसामरस्येन स्थितमपि सर्वतो भिन्नं जगत्प्रतीयते । एवमपि घटादिप्रतिबिम्बेन दर्पणस्तर्ह्यन्तर्हितः स्यादित्येतन्नेत्याह **दर्पणादपि च** इति । न केवलं स्वयं भावा दर्पणान्तर्गता अपि भिन्नाः प्रकाशन्ते यावद्दर्पणादपि व्यतिरिच्यन्ते यतो दर्पणस्तत्तत्प्रतिबिम्बमयोऽपि तेभ्यः प्रतिबिम्बेभ्यः समुत्तीर्णस्वरूपतया चकास्ति न पुनस्तन्मयः संपद्यते येन च न दर्पण इति प्रतीतः स्यात् । सर्वस्य पुनस्तत्तत्प्रतिबिम्बग्रहणेऽपि दर्पणोऽयमित्यबाधिता प्रतिपत्तिः । नापि घटादिर्दर्पणं विशिनष्टि येनायं घटदर्पणोऽयं पटदर्पण इति स्वस्वरूपताहानिरत्र जायते । देशकृतः कालकृतो वा भेदो न तत्र स्वभावविप्रलोपाय भवति । तस्मात्तत्तत्प्रतिबिम्बसहिष्णुः सन्स्वात्मनि दर्पणो दर्पण एवेति न काचित्प्रतिबिम्बवादक्षतिः । अथोच्यते भ्रान्तिरेषा यदुत दर्पणे हस्तीति परामृश्यते न तु पुनर्दर्पणे स कश्चिद्विद्यते तथात्वेनार्थक्रियाविरहाद्भ्रान्त्यैवैष निश्चय इति । एतावता प्रतिबिम्बवादेन दृष्टान्तस्तावत्सिद्धः । भ्रान्तेस्तु स्वरूपं समनन्तरं निरूप्यते । **तद्वत्** तथैव दर्पणनगरादिप्रतिबिम्बदृष्टान्तेन **विमलतमपरमभैरवबोधात्** अतिशयेन विगलितकालिकात्पूर्णानन्दोद्रिक्तात्प्रकाशात् **जगत्** विश्वम् **विभागशून्यमपि** दर्पणप्रतिबिम्बवत्ततः प्रकाशादविभक्तमपि परस्परं च विभक्तत्वेन ग्राह्यग्राहकापेक्षया नानारूपं प्रथते **ततोऽपि च** इति बोधादप्युन्मग्नमिव **आभाति** यतो बोधस्तद्रूपतयापि प्रथमानस्ततः समुत्तीर्णः प्रथते यथा प्रतिबिम्बेभ्यो दर्पणः । एवमपि विश्वभावप्रतिबिम्बसहिष्णुः प्रकाशो विश्वभावेभ्यः समुत्तीर्णः सर्वस्यानुभवितृतया स्वस्वरूपेण प्रथते । भावगतोऽपि देशकालाकारभेदः केवलमत्र प्रकाशते दर्पणवन्न पुनः स्वं रूपं संभिनत्ति ।

अत एवैकानेकस्वरूपोऽपि बोध एक एव बोधाभ्युपगतचित्रज्ञानवत् । किंतु दर्पणप्रकाशात्सचमत्कारस्य चित्प्रकाशस्येयान्विशेषो यद्दर्पणे स्वच्छतामात्रसनाथे भिन्नं बाह्यमेव नगरादि प्रतिबिम्बत्वेनाभिमतं भाति न तु स्वनिर्मितमतो दर्पणेऽयं हस्तीति यो निश्चयः स भ्रान्तः स्यात्प्रकाशः पुनः स्वचमत्कारसारः स्वेच्छया स्वात्मभित्तावभेदेन परामृशन्स्वसंविदुपादानमेव विश्वमाभासयति। विश्वस्याभासनमेव निर्मातृत्वं भगवत इति परामर्श एव प्रकाशस्य जडाद्दर्पणप्रकाशादेर्वैलक्षण्यापादकं मुख्यं रूपमिति। एतदेव ग्रन्थकृता विवृतिविमर्शिन्यामुक्तम्

> अन्तर्विभाति सकलं जगदात्मनीह यद्वद्विचित्ररचना मकुरान्तराले।
> बोधः पुनर्निजविमर्शनसारयुक्त्या विश्वं परामृशति नो मकुरस्तथा तु ॥

इति। इत्थं परमेश्वरापेक्षया स्वाङ्गनिर्मिते भावराशौ न काचिद्भेदभ्रान्तिर्मायाप्रमात्रपेक्षया तु योऽयं भेदावभास एषा पूर्णत्वाख्यातिरूपा भ्रान्तिः पूर्णस्याद्वयात्मनो रूपस्याख्यानमप्रथा पूर्णं न भासते किंत्वपूर्णं द्वयरूपं भासते भेद एव प्रतीयत इति यावत् । तस्मान्निरवद्योऽयं प्रतिबिम्बवादः ॥ १३ ॥

इत्थं परतत्त्वस्वरूपनिरूपणपूर्वं प्रकाशाभेदेन जगतः षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वात्मकस्य स्थितिं विधाय पुनरप्येतस्य समुत्पत्तिक्रमेण प्रतितत्त्वं स्वरूपं कारिकाभिः प्रतिपादयति

> **शिवशक्तिसदाशिवतामीश्वरविद्यामयीं च तत्त्वदशाम् ।**
> **शक्तीनां पञ्चानां विभक्तभावेन भासयति ॥ १४ ॥**

योऽयं परमशिवः परतत्त्वनिरूपणया समनन्तरप्रतिपादितस्वरूपः स्वस्वरूपरूपा याः शक्तयश्चिन्निर्वृतीच्छाज्ञानक्रियाख्याः पञ्चानन्तशक्तिव्रातहेतुभूतास्तासामेव **पञ्चानां शक्तीनाम्** भिन्नत्वेनातद्व्यावृत्त्येमाम् **तत्त्वदशाम्** पञ्चसंख्यावच्छिन्नामेव **भासयति** स्वालक्षण्येन प्रकटयतीत्यर्थः। कीदृशीं तामित्याह **शिव** इत्यादि। शिवश्च शक्तिश्च सदाशिवश्च तेषां भावो यस्याः सा तथोक्ता तां तथा **ईश्वरविद्ये** प्रकृतिर्यस्यां सा तथेति। अत्र प्रतितत्त्वं स्वरूपं प्रदर्श्यते। तथा हि सर्वप्रमातृणामन्तः पूर्णाहन्ताचमत्कारमयं सर्वतत्त्वोत्तीर्णं महाप्रकाशवपुर्यच्चैतन्यमेतदेव शिवतत्त्वम् । अत्र तत्त्वनिरूपणमुपदेश्यजनापेक्षयेति। तस्यैव भगवतश्चिद्रूपस्यानन्दरूपा विश्वं भवामीति परामृशतो विश्वभावस्वभावमयी संविदेव किंचिदुच्छूनतारूपा सर्वभावानां बीजभूमिरियं शक्त्यवस्था। एषैव विश्वगतसृष्टिसंहारोपचारात्कृशपूर्णोभयरूपाप्येकैव सर्वरहस्यनयेषु गीयते। पुनरप्यत्रैव विश्वसमुत्पत्तिबीजभूमौ महाशून्यातिशून्याख्यायां महेशस्याहमिदमित्यभेदेन पूर्णाहन्तामयो यश्चमत्कारो ज्ञानप्राधान्यात्क्रियाभागस्याहन्ताविश्रान्तेः सेयं सदाशिवदशा। अत्र मन्त्रमहेश्वराः प्रमातारस्तिष्ठन्ति। तथात्रैवाहमिदमित्यभेदेनाहन्तेदन्तयोः समधृततुलापुटन्यायेन यः स्वात्मचमत्कारः सैषा तस्येश्वरावस्था। अत्रापि मन्त्रेश्वराः प्रमातारः। अत्रापीदन्ताप्राधान्येनाहन्तागुणीकारेण योऽहमहमिदमिदमित्येवंरूपश्चमत्कारः सद्योजातबालस्येव शिरोऽङ्गुलीनिर्देश्य एतदेव बोधसारत्वाद्भगवतः शुद्धविद्यातत्त्वम् । अत्र विद्येश्वरैः सह सप्तकोट्यस्तु मन्त्राणां वाचकतयानुग्रहस्वभावात्पशूनुद्धर्तुं वाच्यान्मन्त्रमहेश्वरमन्त्रेश्वरान्प्रत्यवतिष्ठन्ते। अत्र विद्यातत्त्वे विद्येश्वरप्रमातृणां बोधरूपत्वाविशेषेऽपि या भेदप्रथा सा मायाशक्तिकृतैवेत्यागमेषु गीयते

> मायोपरि महामाया... ।

इति। येन तत्रस्था मन्त्रा महामायानुप्रवेशादणव इत्युच्यन्ते। मायातत्त्वोपरि शुद्धविद्याधश्च विज्ञानाक-लाः प्रमातार आणवमलभाजनम् । एवमेकमेवेदं शिवस्वरूपं तुर्यातीतमपि तुर्यरूपतया तत्त्वपञ्चकतया गीयते। तस्मादेक एवैष स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता प्रकाशते यस्याहमिदमिति सदाशिवेश्वरभूमौ यः प्रकाश एतदेव शुद्धवेदनरूपं करणं वक्ष्यमाणो मायातत्त्वादिधरान्तस्तत्त्वसर्गश्च कार्यमित्येव कर्तृकरणक्रियारूप एक एव स्वात्ममहेश्वराख्यः परमप्रमाता विजृम्भते ॥ १४ ॥

मायातत्त्वस्वरूपमाह

परमं यत्स्वातन्त्र्यं दुर्घटसंपादनं महेशस्य।
देवी मायाशक्तिः स्वात्मावरणं शिवस्यैतत् ॥ १५ ॥

परमम् अनन्यापेक्षम् **यत्** परमेशितुः **स्वातन्त्र्यम्** विश्वनिर्मातृत्वं सैवेयम् **मायाख्या शक्तिः** त-स्य शक्तिमतः। मीयते परिच्छिद्यते धरान्तः प्रमातृप्रमेयप्रपञ्चो यया सा माया विश्वमोहकतया वा माया। एषा देवस्य क्रीडाशीलस्य संबन्धिनीति कृत्वा **देवी** न पुनर्ब्रह्मवादिनामिव व्यतिरिक्ता काचिन्मायोपपद्यत इति। कीदृशं तत्स्वातन्त्र्यम् **दुर्घटसंपादनम्** इति। दुःखेन घटयितुं शक्यमिति **दुर्घटस्य** कार्यस्य प्रमातृ-प्रमेयरूपस्य **संपादनम्** प्राप्तिप्रापकम् । एषैव माया स्वेच्छया पशुभावमापन्नस्य **शिवस्य स्वात्मावरणम्** स्वरूपगोपनाख्यमाणवादिमलत्रितयम् ॥ १५ ॥

वक्ष्यमाणे च प्राधानिके सुखादिरूपे भिन्ने भोग्ये यद्भोक्तृरूपं पुंस्तत्त्वं तत्स्वरूपमाह

मायापरिग्रहवशाद्बोधो मलिनः पुमान्पशुर्भवति।
कालकलानियतिवशाद्रागाविद्यावशेन संबद्धः ॥ १६ ॥

माया स्वीकारपारतन्त्र्यात्सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वकर्तृत्वमयोऽपि **बोधः** सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणापहस्तनेनाख्यातिरूपमा-णवं मलमापन्नो येन घटाकाशवत्पूर्णस्वरूपाच्चिदाकाशादवच्छेद्य परिमितीकृतः संस्तदेव पुंस्तत्त्वमुच्यते। अतो मायायाः पाल्यः पाश्यश्चेति **पशुः** आणवमायीयकार्ममलस्वभावानां पाशानां भाजनम् । अन्य-च्च **कालकला** इति वक्ष्यमाणस्वरूपैः **कालादिभिः** ओतप्रोततया सम्यक् **बद्धः** दृब्ध इत्येवं तत्त्वषट्कवेष्टितं पुंस्तत्त्वम् ॥ १६ ॥

कालादीनां तत्त्वानां चैतद्वेष्टनक्रमेण स्वरूपमाह

अधुनैव किंचिदेवेदमेव सर्वात्मनैव जानामि।
मायासहितं कञ्चुकषट्कमणोरन्तरङ्गमिदमुक्तम् ॥ १७ ॥

इत्थं स्वतन्त्रोऽपि बोधः स्वमायया यथाणुत्वं प्राप्तस्तथैव तदीये ज्ञानक्रियाशक्ती संकुचिते अस्य पशु-रूपस्य विद्याकले इत्युच्येते। यथा राज्ञापहृतसर्वस्वस्यानुकम्पया जीवनार्थं किंचिद्धनं स्तोकं दीयते त-थैवाणुत्वमापन्नस्य बोधस्यापहृतसर्वज्ञत्वादेः किंचित्कर्तृतापरमार्थं ज्ञत्वमुपोद्बल्यत इति ज्ञत्वस्यैव प्राधा-न्यात्कालादीनां जानातिनान्वयो दर्शितः। **इदं कञ्चुकषट्कम्** उक्तरूपया मायया युक्तम् **अणोः** आणवम-लापहस्तितसर्वज्ञत्वादेः पुंसः स्वरूपाच्छादकं स्वर्णस्य कालिकेव **अन्तरङ्गम्** निजं कथितम् । किंरूपमि-त्याह **अधुना** इत्यादि। **अधुनैव जानामि** इति सोऽणुर्वर्तमानतयेदं प्राक्मया ज्ञातं जानामि ज्ञास्यामीत्येव-मपि कृतं करोमि करिष्ये वेति ज्ञानक्रियास्वरूपेण भावानपि तथा कलयन्नवच्छिनत्ति चेत्येषोऽस्य कालः।

तथा **किंचिदेव** इत्यवच्छिन्नमेव करोति सर्वं कर्तुं नालं घटमात्रकरणाय प्रभवति न पटादावित्येतदस्याणोः कलातत्त्वम् । **इदमेव** इति नियतात्कारनान्नियतं कार्यं यदर्थयते यथा वह्नेरेव धूमोऽश्वमेधादिकर्मण एव स्वर्गादिफलं न सर्वस्मादित्येवं नियमेन स्वसंकल्पकृतकर्मप्रबन्धसमुत्थपुण्यापुण्यैरात्मा नियम्यते येन तदस्य नियतितत्त्वम् । तथा **सर्वात्मना** इति येयमपूर्णम्मन्यता सर्वं ममेदमुपयुज्यते भूयासं मा कदाचिन्न भूवमित्येतत्पशो रागतत्त्वम् । बुद्धिधर्मो यो रागः स एकत्र कुत्रापि कान्तालक्षणेऽर्थेऽन्यदपोह्यात्र मे राग इत्यभिष्वङ्गमात्रं न सर्वाकाङ्क्षामयस्य रागतत्त्वस्य समानः । तथा **जानामि** इति किंचिदेव पुरोवर्ति घटादिकं न पुनर्दूरव्यवहितं वस्त्विति विद्यातत्त्वम् । शुद्धविद्यापेक्षया कारिकायामविद्येति कथितं न पुनर्वेदनाभावात् । **मायासहितम्** भेदप्रथायुक्तमेतत्कञ्चुकषट्कं पशोरिति ॥ १७ ॥

कथमेतस्य कञ्चुकषट्कस्याणुं प्रत्यन्तरङ्गत्वमित्याह

कम्बुकमिव तण्डुलकणविनिविष्टं भिन्नमप्यभिदा ।
भजते तत्तु विशुद्धिं शिवमार्गौन्मुख्ययोगेन ॥ १८ ॥

वास्तवेन वृत्तेन **भिन्नमपि कम्बुकम्** यथा **अभिदा तण्डुलकणविनिविष्टम्** इत्यभेदेन तण्डुलान्तश्चोतं भासते निपुणैरपि यत्नतः प्रक्षिप्यमाणं तण्डुलस्यान्तरङ्गत्वान्न पृथगवतिष्ठते तथैतन्मायादिकञ्चुकमणोस्तण्डुलस्थानीयस्यान्तरङ्गत्वात्कम्बुकस्थानीयं व्यतिरिक्तमप्यव्यतिरिक्ततया पूर्णसंवित्स्वरूपमाच्छाद्य स्थितमिति शेषः । एवमपि दुर्निवारं कथं तद्विलीयत इत्याह **भजते** इत्यादि । **तुः** विशेषे नान्योऽत्रोपायः । **शिवस्य** स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्य योऽसौ **मार्गः** परमाद्वयचिदानन्दैकघनोऽस्मि ममैवेदं विश्वं स्वशक्तिविजृम्भणमात्रमिति या स्वात्मस्वरूपविभूतिप्रत्यवमर्शरूपा सरणिः **तदौन्मुख्यम्** दार्ढ्येन तन्निभालनपरत्वं स एव **योगः** पूर्णरूपतयाणोः स्वात्मनि स्वस्वरूपत्वेन संबन्धस्तेन **तत्** उक्तस्वरूपं कञ्चुकं विशेषेण **शुद्धिं भजते** स्वयमेव निःशेषेण विलयं सेवते । एतदुक्तं स्याद्यदा परमेश्वरशक्तिपातविशुद्धहृदयः पशुर्भवति तदाहमेव महेश्वर इति स्वात्मज्ञानाविर्भावात्स्वयमेव पशुत्वापादकं कञ्चुकावरणं विलीयते न पुनरत्र स्वात्मज्ञानं विहाय मायीयं किंचिन्नियतिशक्तिसमुत्थं कर्म प्रगल्भत इति ॥ १८ ॥

एवंविधस्याणोर्भोक्तुश्च भोग्येन भाव्यमिति प्राधानिकं तत्त्वसर्गमाह

सुखदुःखमोहमात्रं निश्चयसंकल्पनाभिमानाच्च ।
प्रकृतिरथान्तःकरणं बुद्धिमनोऽहंकृति क्रमशः ॥ १९ ॥

सत्त्वरजस्तमसां यत् **सुखदुःखमोहात्मकम्** सामान्यं रूपमङ्गाङ्गिभावो यत्र नोपलभ्यते सा मूलकारणम् **प्रकृतिः**। प्रकृतेरनन्तरं कार्यरूपमन्तःकरणमाह **निश्चय** इत्यादि । **निश्चयः** इदमेतादृगिति **संकल्पनम्** मननम् **अभिमानः** ममतेति क्रमेण **बुद्धिर्मनोऽहंकारः** इत्येवंरूपं त्रितयम् **अन्तःकरणम्** अङ्गाङ्गिभावेन गुणानां कार्यं भूतेन्द्रियाद्यपेक्षया च कारणमिति ॥ १९ ॥

बाह्यकरणमाह

श्रोत्रं त्वगक्षि रसना घ्राणं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि शब्दादौ ।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थं कर्मेन्द्रियाणि पुनः ॥ २० ॥

वक्ष्यमाणे **शब्दादौ** विषये ज्ञानप्रधानानि **श्रोत्रादीनि** पञ्चेन्द्रियाणि क्रियाप्रधानानि चेन्द्रियाणि पञ्च **वागादीनि**। वचनादानविहरणविसर्गानन्दात्मकाः कर्मेन्द्रियाणां विषयाः। इत्युभयथा च शृणोमि कथयामीत्यहंकारानुगमादहंकारकार्याणि ॥ २० ॥

एषां शब्दादिविषयस्वरूपं कथयति

एषां ग्राह्यो विषयः सूक्ष्मः प्रविभागवर्जितो यः स्यात् ।
तन्मात्रपञ्चकं तच्छब्दः स्पर्शो महो रसो गन्धः ॥ २१ ॥

ज्ञेयकार्यतया स्वीकार्यः **य एषाम्** इन्द्रियाणाम् **विषयः** गोचरः **स्यात्**। स कीदृशः **प्रविभागवर्जितः** विशेषेण बहिष्कृतः सामान्यात्मा **सूक्ष्मः** योऽर्थो भवेत् **तदेव शब्दादि** सामान्यरूपम् **तन्मात्रम्** शब्दसामान्यं शब्दतन्मात्रमिति। एवमन्यानि। विषयविषयिणोः परस्परापेक्षित्वादिन्द्रियवदिदमपि **तन्मात्रपञ्चकम्** आहङ्कारिकमेवेति ॥ २१ ॥

विषयाणां परस्परसांकर्येण पृथिव्यादीनि कार्यमित्याह

एतत्संसर्गवशात्स्थूलो विषयस्तु भूतपञ्चकताम् ।
अभ्येति नभः पवनस्तेजः सलिलं च पृथ्वी च ॥ २२ ॥

एतेषां संसर्गवशात् परस्परसंघर्षसामर्थ्याद्यो विशेषः **स्थूलो विषयः** स एव भूतरूपतां याति। तथा हि शब्दतन्मात्राच्छब्दविशेषो नभो जायते शब्दस्पर्शाभ्यां पवनो रूपसंयुक्ताभ्यामेताभ्यां तेजश्चैभ्यो रसयुक्तेभ्यश्चापो गन्धसंयुक्तेभ्यश्च पृथ्वीति पञ्च महाभूतानि **कार्यं कारणानुगुणम्** इति कृत्वैकोत्तरगुणानीति। एवमेषा प्रकृतिः कार्यकारणात्मा पुरुषस्य परमेश्वरस्येच्छया भोग्यतया प्रवृत्तेति षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वात्मकं जगद्विभज्य प्रतितत्त्वं निरूपितम् ॥ २२ ॥

मायाकञ्चुकवत्प्रकृतेः कञ्चुकतां पुरुषं प्रत्याह

तुष इव तण्डुलकणिकामावृणुते प्रकृतिपूर्वकः सर्गः।
पृथ्वीपर्यन्तोऽयं चैतन्यं देहभावेन ॥ २३ ॥

अयमपि प्राधानिकः **सर्गः** धरापर्यन्तः **तण्डुलकणम्** यथा **तुषः** धान्यचर्म **आवृणुते** समाच्छादयति तथैव मायाकञ्चुकेन कम्बुकस्थानीयेन समावृतम् **चैतन्यम्** पुनरपि तुषस्थानीयेन **देहभावेन** एतत्समावृणुते तत्प्रतिप्राकारतया स्थगयति। अत्रेमे प्रमातारः कलाभिरिन्द्रियमात्राभिर्विशेषान्ताभिर्देहस्वभावाः सकला इत्युच्यन्ते विशेषवर्जिता विदेहाः प्रलयाकला इति च। एवं शिवादिसकलान्तप्रमातृसप्तकसनाथं रुद्रक्षेत्रज्ञाधिष्ठितं जगदिति ॥ २३ ॥

कञ्चुकत्रितयस्य परसूक्ष्मस्थूलरूपतामाह

परमावरणं मल इह सूक्ष्मं मायादिकञ्चुकं स्थूलम् ।
बाह्यं विग्रहरूपं कोशत्रयवेष्टितो ह्यात्मा ॥ २४ ॥

चैतन्यस्य स्वस्वरूपापहस्तनसतत्त्वाख्यातिरेवाणवः **मलः** आन्तरः स्वर्णस्य कालिकेव **परम्** अन्तरङ्गम् **आवरणम्** छादनं तादात्म्येन स्थितत्वात् । **मायादि** विद्यान्तं कञ्चुकषट्कम् **सूक्ष्मम्** आत्मन आवरणं तण्डुलस्य कम्बुकमिवावरणं पृष्ठपातित्वेनास्ते येन भेदमयी ज्ञत्वकर्तृत्वादिप्रथा प्रथत इत्येष मायीयो मलः । एतदपेक्षया **बाह्यम्** तुषस्थानीयं प्राधानिकं शरीरसत्तालक्षणमावरणम् **स्थूलम्** त्वङ्मांसादिरूपत्वादेष तृतीयः कार्मो मलो येन प्रमाता शुभाशुभकर्मसंचयभाजनं भवति । एवमनेन परसूक्ष्मस्थूलरूपेण **कोशत्रयेन वेष्टितः** विकस्वरोऽपि घटाकाशवत्संकुचितीकृतः **आत्मा** इत्यणुरिति पशुरित्युच्यते ॥ २४ ॥

एतत्संबन्धादुपहत इव भवतीत्याह

अज्ञानतिमिरयोगादेकमपि स्वं स्वभावमात्मानम् ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकनानावैचित्र्येणावबुध्येत ॥ २५ ॥

एष कोशत्रयसंबद्ध आत्मात्माख्यात्यन्धकारसंबन्धात् **एकमपि** अद्वयस्वभावमपि **स्वम्** निजं नान्यस्मादुपनतम् **आत्मस्वभावम्** चैतन्यमात्मसत्तालक्षणं स्वरूपं प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयनानारचनाप्रपञ्चेन जानात्यभेदविपरीतेन भेदेनाभिमन्यत इति यावत् । यथा रेखातिमिरोपहतः पुरुष एकमपि चन्द्रं पश्यन्द्वौ चन्द्राविमौ नभसि स्त इति परिच्छिन्दँल्लोकमपि दर्शयति द्वौ चन्द्राविमौ पश्येति । वस्तुवृत्तेनैक एवासौ चन्द्र इति तिमिरवशात्तथा भासते येनोद्वेगलक्षणामानन्दलक्षणां वार्थक्रियां स तैमिरिकः प्राप्नोति । तथैवाज्ञानतिमिरप्राप्तभेदप्रथः सर्वं स्वात्मनोऽभिन्नमपि भेदेन व्यवहरन्भिन्नं कर्मफलमर्थयते येन भूयोभूयः स्वर्गनिरयादिभोगभाग्भवति । अतश्चाज्ञानस्य तिमिरेण रूपणा विपरीताभासनात् ॥ २५ ॥

आत्माद्वयं दृष्टान्तेन निदर्शयति

रसफाणितशर्करिकागुडखण्डाद्या यथेक्षुरस एव ।
तद्वदवस्थाभेदाः सर्वे परमात्मनः शंभोः ॥ २६ ॥

रसादयः इक्षुभेदाः **यथा** एकः **एवेक्षुरसः** परमार्थतः सर्वत्र माधुर्यानुगमात्तथैव जाग्रदादि **अवस्थाभेदाः** ग्राह्यग्राहकप्रपञ्चरूपाः **सर्वे** विशेषाः **परमात्मनः** स्वस्वभावस्य **शंभोः** चैतन्यमहेश्वरस्यैव । यतः स एव भगवान्सर्वस्य स्वात्मभूतः स्वस्वातन्त्र्यात्तां तामपि भूमिकां समापन्नस्तथा ग्राह्यग्राहकाद्यवस्थाविशिष्टः प्रथते यथेक्षुरसो न पुनः स्वात्मनस्तस्माद्भिन्नं किंचिदस्तीति स एक एव सर्वावस्थासु संविदनुगमात् । इत्थं सर्वत्रैकरूपतादर्शनात्प्रमाता सर्वदृश्वा भवति । यथाह श्रीशंभुभट्टारकः

एको भावः सर्वभावस्वभावः सर्वे भावा एकभावस्वभावाः ।
एको भावस्तत्त्वतो येन दृष्टः सर्वे भावास्तत्त्वतस्तेन दृष्टाः ॥

इति । भगवद्गीतास्वपि

सर्वभूतेषु येनैकं भावमक्षयमीक्षते ।
अविभक्तं विभक्तेषु तज्ज्ञानं विद्धि सात्त्विकम् ॥

इति ॥ २६ ॥

तीर्थान्तरपरिकल्पितस्तु भेदः संवृत्यर्थमभ्युपगतोऽपि न सत्यभूमाववकल्पत इत्याह

विज्ञानान्तर्यामिप्राणविराड्देहजातिपिण्डान्ताः ।
व्यवहारमात्रमेतत्परमार्थेन तु न सन्त्येव ॥ २७ ॥

विज्ञानम् इति बोधमात्रमेव केवलमनुपाधि नामरूपरहितमप्यनादिवासनाप्रबोधवैचित्र्यसामर्थ्यान्नीलसुखादिरूपं बाह्यरूपतया नाना प्रकाशत इति विज्ञानवादिनः ।

पुरुष एवेदं सर्वम् ... ।

नेह नानास्ति किंचन ... ।

इति न्यायेन **अन्तर्यामि** सर्वस्येति परं ब्रह्मैवानाद्यविद्यावशाद्भेदेन प्रकाशत इति ब्रह्मवादिनः । अत्रोभयत्रापि वेदनस्य स्वातन्त्र्यं जीवितभूतं विश्वनिर्माणहेतुरिति न चेतितम् ।

अन्ये **प्राण** ब्रह्मवादिनस्तु यथाप्राणनमेव विश्वमागूर्य वर्तते नहि प्राणनादृतेऽन्यत्किंचिद्ब्रह्मणो रूपमिति सविमर्शं शब्दब्रह्मेत्याहुः ।

अपरे प्रतिपन्ना यथा **विराड्देहम्** इति वैराजमपि ब्रह्मणः सत्यभूतमिति । यथोक्तम्

यस्याग्निरास्यं द्यौर्मूर्धा खं नाभिश्चरणौ क्षितिः ।
सूर्यश्चक्षुर्दिशः श्रोत्रे तस्मै लोकात्मने नमः ॥

इत्येवमादि ।

जातिः इति महासत्तासामान्यलक्षणं सर्वगुणाश्रयं वस्तु परमार्थसदिति वैशेषिकादयो ब्रुवते ।

अन्ये **पिण्डाः** इति व्यक्तय एव परमार्थसत्यो नहि सामान्यं नाम किंचिदेकमनेकगुणाश्रयं प्रकाशते नाप्युपपद्यते वेति व्यक्तीनामेव व्यवहारः परिसमाप्तः किं सामान्येनेति नानावृत्तिविकल्पैः सामान्यं विवदमाना व्यक्तयो नानुयन्त्यन्यदनुयायि न भासत इत्येवमादि बहु ब्रुवन्तो जातिर्न परमार्थ इति प्रतिपन्ना इत्येव **विज्ञानादिः पिण्डोऽन्ते** येषां भेदानां ते तथोक्ताः **व्यवहारमात्रमेतत्** इत्यस्मिन्स्वातन्त्र्यवादे प्रकाशमानस्य वस्तुनोऽनपह्नवनीयत्वादेते भेदाः संवृतिसत्यत्वेन प्रकाशन्ते **परमार्थेन तु न सन्त्येव** इति न पुनः सतत्त्वतयैते भेदास्तीर्थान्तरपरिकल्पितभेदा विद्यमाना एव । तस्मादेक एव परमप्रकाशपरमार्थः स्वतन्त्रश्चैतन्यमहेश्वर इत्थमित्थं चकास्ति यतोऽन्यस्यैतद्व्यतिरिक्तस्याप्रकाशरूपस्य प्रकाशमानताभावात् । यदुक्तम्

तीर्थक्रियाव्यसनिनः स्वमनीषिकाभिरुत्प्रेक्ष्य तत्त्वमिति यद्यदमी वदन्ति ।
तत्तत्त्वमेव भवतोऽस्ति न किंचिदन्यत्संज्ञासु केवलमयं विदुषां विवादः ॥

इति ॥ २७ ॥

इदानीं भ्रान्तेरसदर्थप्रतिपादनसामर्थ्येन निदर्शनमाह

रज्ज्वां नास्ति भुजङ्गस्त्रासं कुरुते च मृत्युपर्यन्तम् ।
भ्रान्तेर्महती शक्तिर्न विवेक्तुं शक्यते नाम ॥ २८ ॥

भ्रान्तेः पूर्णत्वाख्यातिरूपाया अताद्रूप्यप्रतिभासने **महती शक्तिः** उत्तमं सामर्थ्यम् **न** केनचित् **वि-वेक्तुं शक्यते** न केनचिद्विचारयितुं पार्यत इति यावत् । यथा वस्तुवृत्तेन रज्जुः परिदृश्यमाना दीर्घत्वकु-ण्डलिनीरूपत्वभ्रमात्सर्पोऽयमित्यध्यवसातृणां रज्जुद्रव्येऽप्यसदर्थप्रतिभासोऽयं सर्पाध्यवसायः सदर्थप्र-तिभासाद्भयं मरणावसायं विदधाति । अनुभवसिद्धमप्येतत्स्थाणुं भूतमिति मत्वा स्वयं भीषणीयं वाकारं समुल्लिख्य भ्रान्ताः सन्तो हृद्भङ्गनाशं के नाम न याता इति विभ्रम एवापूर्णत्वप्रथने हेतुरिति ॥ २८ ॥

एतत्प्रकृते समर्थयते

तद्वद्धर्माधर्मस्वर्निरयोत्पत्तिमरणसुखदुःखम् ।
वर्णाश्रमादि चात्मन्यसदपि विभ्रमबलाद्भवति ॥ २९ ॥

एवं यथा रज्जुः परमार्थसती भ्रान्त्या सर्पतया विमृष्टापि सर्पगतामर्थक्रियां करोति तथैव देहात्म-मानिनां चेतसि **धर्माद्यसदपि** तत्त्वतोऽविद्यमानम् **विभ्रम** वशान्मायाव्यामोहसामर्थ्यादेव **भवति** एतदेव तत्त्वमिति भ्रान्त्या सत्तां लभते । **धर्मः** अश्वमेधादिः **अधर्मः** ब्रह्महननादिः **स्वः** निरतिशया प्रीतिः **निरयः** यातना **उत्पत्तिः** जन्म **मरणम्** जन्माभावः **सुखम्** आह्लादः **दुःखम्** राजसः क्षोभस्तथा **वर्णः** ब्राह्म-णोऽस्मीत्यादि **आश्रमः** ब्रह्मचारीत्यादि **आदि** ग्रहणात्तपःपूजव्रतानीति सर्वं कल्पनामात्रसारं विभ्रमविजृ-म्भितमेव मायाशक्त्या देहाद्यात्मतयाभिमन्यते । एतत्सर्वं भ्रान्तेः प्रभवति ययानवरतस्वर्गनरकजन्ममर-णप्रबन्धभाजः पशवो न पुनः परमार्थतः स्वात्मनोऽनवच्छिन्नचिदानन्दैकघनस्य धर्माधर्मादिकं किंचिद्वि-द्यत इति ॥ २९ ॥

एवमसदर्थप्रतिभासने भ्रान्तेः सामर्थ्यं विचार्य तदुत्पत्तिमाह

एतत्तदन्धकारं यद्भावेषु प्रकाशमानतया ।
आत्मानतिरिक्तेष्वपि भवत्यनात्माभिमानोऽयम् ॥ ३० ॥

एतत्तदन्धकारम् इत्येषा सा समनन्तरप्रतिपादिता विश्वमोहिनी पूर्णत्वाख्यातिरूपा भ्रान्तिः **यद्भावेषु** प्रमातृप्रमेयरूपेषु विश्ववर्तिषु पदार्थेषु **प्रकाशमानतया** इति

... नाप्रकाशः प्रकाशते ।

इति प्रकाशमानतान्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रकाशशरीरीभूतेषु **आत्मनः** चैतन्यमहेश्वरादपृथग्भूतेषु सत्स्वपि यः **अयम्** अतिरेकेणामी भावा ग्राह्या बाह्या मत्तो भिन्नाश्चेति **अनात्माभिमानः** वास्तवचिद्रूपतापहस्तनेन यत्तेष्ववास्तवं जडत्वापादनम् । अयमाशयो भावप्रकाशनेऽन्यस्याप्रकाशरूपस्य बाह्यवासनादेर्हेतोरनुप-पद्यमानत्वात्स्वात्मप्रकाश एव स्वतन्त्रोऽर्थान्नीलसुखादिना प्रकाशतेऽतः प्रमातृप्रमेयरूपतया चित्स्वरू-पोऽहमेव प्रकाश इति यद्वास्तवं रूपं तन्न प्रकाशते केवलमेवावास्तवो भेदः प्रथत इति तात्त्विकप्रथनाभा-वाद्भ्रान्तेरन्धकारेण रूपणमिति ॥ ३० ॥

आत्मन्यनात्माभिमानपूर्वोऽनात्मन्यात्माभिमानो भवतीति प्रतिपादयन्भ्रान्तेः सुतरां मोहरूपतामाह

तिमिरादपि तिमिरमिदं गण्डस्योपरि महानयं स्फोटः ।
यदनात्मन्यपि देहप्राणादावात्ममानित्वम् ॥ ३१ ॥

आदौ तावदेकसंवित्सतत्त्वेष्वपि भावेषु भेदमयं जाड्यापादनमख्यातितिमिरेण कृतं यत्स्वात्मनोऽभिन्नानां भावानां ततो भेदेन प्रथनमत एव तिमिरमिव **तिमिरम्** अख्यातिः । यथैकोऽपि चन्द्रः चक्षुस्थेन रेखातिमिरेण द्विधा भास्यते द्वौ चन्द्राविति तथैवाख्यातितिमिरमेकमपि सर्वं स्वात्मस्वरूपं वस्तु भेदेनानात्मरूपं प्रकाशितवत् । एवमवस्थिते **तिमिरम्** अपरमायातं मोहान्मोहोऽयमापतितः **गण्डस्योपरि** पिटकोद्भवश्च **यत्** अख्यात्यपहस्तितचित्स्वरूपेष्वपि विश्ववर्तिषु पदार्थेषु जाड्यमापादितेषु मध्यादुद्धृते व्यतिरिक्ते जडे **देहप्राणादौ** वेद्यखण्डे कृशोऽहं स्थूलोऽहं क्षुधितोऽहं सुख्यस्मि न किंचिदहमिति प्रमातृतयानात्मभूते **आत्ममानित्वम्** अताद्रूप्ये ताद्रूप्यप्रतिपत्तिरेतदतिवैशसम् । यदि तावदात्माभिमानेन विना वैशसमस्ति तन्नीलसुखादिष्वप्यस्तु मा वा कुत्रापि भूद्यत्पुनः कतिपये जडे देहादौ लोष्टप्राय आत्मतयाहन्तारसाभिषेकोऽन्यत्र नीलसुखादावविदन्तयानात्मप्रतिपादनमेष एव पूर्णः संसारः शोचनीयो यदभिमानोपनतो द्वन्द्वाभिघातः कर्षति पशूनिति । यदुक्तं मार्कण्डेयपुराणे योगिन्या मदालसया

यानं क्षितौ यानगतश्च देहो देहेऽपि चान्यः पुरुषो निविष्टः ।
ममत्वमुर्व्यां न तथा यथा स्वे देहेऽतिमात्रं च विमूढतैषा ॥

इति ॥ ३१ ॥

एवमख्यातिवशान्मिथ्याविकल्पैरित्थमात्मानं बध्नातीत्याह

देहप्राणविमर्शनधीज्ञाननभःप्रपञ्चयोगेन ।
आत्मानं वेष्टयते चित्रं जालेन जालकार इव ॥ ३२ ॥

अख्यात्यपहस्तितचैतन्यः सर्वः प्रमाता स्वोत्थैर्विकल्पनिगडैर्व्यापकमपि **आत्मानं वेष्टयते**। कथमित्याह **देह** इत्यादि । **देहप्राणयोर्विमर्शनं धियो ज्ञानम्** निश्चयः **नभसां प्रपञ्चः** विस्तारः **तद्योगेन** देहादिविकल्पसंबन्धेन । यथा कृशः स्थूलो रूपवान्पण्डितश्चास्मीति बालाङ्गनापामराः कार्षिका इत्थं स्वविकल्पेन देहमेवात्मत्वेन प्रतिपन्नाः किंचिद्विवेचकंमन्याः ।

देहस्तावदिहैव प्रलीयते कुतोऽस्यात्मत्वमतो यः क्षुधितः पिपासितः सोऽहमिति प्राणात्ममानिनश्च विवेचकंमन्यतराः ।

देहप्राणौ जडौ लोष्टादिवत्कुतोऽनयोरात्मभावस्ततः सुख्यहं दुःख्यहमिति यः सुखदुःखादि चेतते स आत्मेति पुर्यष्टकाभिमानिनो मीमांसकादयोऽपि विवेचकतमाश्च ।

एतत्सुखदुःखाद्यपि बुद्धिधर्मः कथमात्मतया वक्तुं शक्यस्ततो देहप्राणधीविकल्पानां यत्राभावः स आत्मेति शून्याभिमानिनः । एवं यत्किंचिदिदं भाति तन्नाहमित्यप्रथारूपं शून्यमेव सर्वापोहनस्वभावमात्मेति नभःशब्देनोक्तः । तदपि शून्यं यदा समाधानावसरे वेद्यीकुर्वत एतदपि शून्यं वयं न भवामस्तदा शून्यान्तरमात्मत्वेन विदधाना नेति नेति ब्रह्मवाद्यभ्युपगततत्तच्छून्यपरित्यागेन तां तां शून्यात्मतां परिगृह्णन्तीति नभःप्रपञ्चः कारिकायां निरूपितः । इत्थं संवित्स्वरूपापर्यवसानाच्छून्यात्ममानिनो योगिनः सुषुप्तगुहानिमग्ना जडात्मानो भ्रान्ता एवात्मानं संवित्स्वरूपमपि जाड्येनानुबध्नन्ति । **चित्रम्** इत्याश्चर्यमेतद्यदुत वैशसं नैतत्स्वयं कर्तुं पार्यत इति । अत्र दृष्टान्तमाह **जालेन** इत्यादि । यथा **जालकारः** कश्चित्कृमिर्वा स्वनिर्मितेन फेनेन जालमावरणं निर्माय सर्वतो गतम् **आत्मानं वेष्टयते** स्वं स्वात्मनिधनाय बध्नाति येनोत्तरत्र

तत्रैव निधनं याति तथा देहाद्यात्ममानी तु स्वविकल्पकल्पितैरहं ममेति विकल्पैः स्वात्मानमेव बध्नाति। तथा च बौद्धाः

> सत्यात्मनि परसंज्ञा स्वपरविभागात्परिग्रहद्वेषौ।
> अनयोः संप्रतिबद्धाः सर्वे दोषाः प्रजायन्ते ॥

इत्याहुः ॥ ३२ ॥

कथमेष दुर्निवारो महामोहो देहादिप्रमातृतासमुत्थः प्रलीयत इति भगवत्स्वातन्त्र्यमेवात्र हेतुरित्याह

> **स्वज्ञानविभवभासनयोगेनोद्वेष्टयेन्निजात्मानम्।**
> **इति बन्धमोक्षचित्रां क्रीडां प्रतनोति परमशिवः ॥ ३३ ॥**

स्वस्य आत्मनश्चैतन्यलक्षणस्य यत् **ज्ञानम्** स्वस्वातन्त्र्यावगमस्तस्य **विभवः** देहाद्यभिमानविगलनेन यच्चित्स्वरूपे पराहन्ताचमत्काररूपस्य स्वस्वातन्त्र्यस्य स्फीतत्वं चिदानन्दैकघनः स्वतन्त्रोऽस्मीति तस्य बोधस्वातन्त्र्यस्वरूपस्य विभवस्य **भासनम्** प्रकाशः सर्वो ममायं विभव इति बाह्यतयाभिमतस्य सर्वस्य स्वात्मन्येव स्वीकारस्तस्य **योगः** एवंपरिशीलनक्रमेणात्मनि यद्विमर्शदार्ढ्यमेवमेतेन **स्वज्ञानविभवभासनयोगेन निजमात्मानम्** नान्यत उपनतं चैतन्यस्वभावम् **उद्वेष्टयते** देहप्राणपुर्यष्टकशून्यपरामर्शनानिगडैर्यो वेष्टित आसीत्तमेव चैतन्यस्वरूपः स्वतन्त्रोऽस्मीति विमर्शनेन पुनरपि भगवानेवोद्वेष्टनं विगतवेष्टनं कुरुत इति। एवमख्यातिबलादागतं स्वात्मनो देहाद्यावरणं तत्पुनरपि ख्यातिबलाद्विनश्यतीति स्वविकल्पकल्पित इयान्दोष इति श्रीमद्ग्रन्थकृता तन्त्रसारे निरूपितम्

> यो निश्चयः पशुजनस्य जडोऽस्मि कर्मसंपाशितोऽस्मि मलिनोऽस्मि परेरितोऽस्मि।
> इत्येतदन्यदृढनिश्चयलाभयुक्त्या सद्यः पतिर्भवति विश्ववपुश्चिदात्मा ॥

इति। किमिति बध्नाति मुञ्चति च भगवानित्याह **इति बन्ध** इत्यादि। **इति** प्राक्प्रतिपादितेन क्रमेण भगवान्स्वतन्त्रः **परमशिवः** पूर्णचिदानन्दैकघनलक्षणः स्वरूपगोपनसतत्त्वक्रीडाशीलत्वादख्यात्यवभासनपूर्वं स्वात्मानमेव देहादिप्रमातृतापन्नं विधाय स्वरूपं प्रच्छाद्य च बन्धं विदधाति तथैव पुनः स्वेच्छातः स्वात्मज्ञानप्रकाशक्रमेण देहादिप्रमातृताबन्धं निवार्य स एव तं स्वात्मानं मोचयतीत्युभयथा **बन्धमोक्षचित्राम्** संसारापवर्गस्वरूपाश्चर्यमयीम् **क्रीडाम्** खेलाम् **प्रतनोति** विस्तारयत्येकाकी न रमाम्यहमिति। स्वभाव एवैष देवस्य यत्तां तामप्यवस्थामापन्नः स्वरूपरूपः सन्सर्वत्रानुभवितृतया प्रथत इत्येतदेव स्वातन्त्र्यम् ॥ ३३ ॥

न केवलमेतद्यावदपरः कश्चिदवस्थाविशेषः स्वस्मिन्रूपे विश्रान्त एवावभास्यते भगवतेत्याह

> **सृष्टिस्थितिसंहारा जाग्रत्स्वप्नौ सुषुप्तमिति तस्मिन्।**
> **भान्ति तुरीये धामनि तथापि तैर्नावृतं भाति ॥ ३४ ॥**

विश्वापेक्षया ये सर्गादयो मायाप्रमातृगताश्च ये जाग्रदादयोऽवस्थाविशेषास्त उभयथैतस्मिन्भगवत्यानन्दघने **तुरीये धामनि** चतुर्थे पूर्णाहन्तामये पदे **भान्ति** तद्विश्रान्ताः सन्तः स्वरूपसत्तां कल्पितप्रमात्रपेक्षया बाह्यतया लभन्ते। परमेश्वरभित्तौ यन्न प्रकाशते तद्बाह्यतयापि न प्रकाशतेऽतः

त्रिषु चतुर्थं तैलवदासेच्यम् ।

इति सर्वास्ववस्थासु तुरीयं रूपमनुस्यूतत्वेन स्थितमिति परमार्थः । एतावता तत्र तैः स्वरूपमाच्छादितं स्यान्न वेत्याह **तथापि तैर्नावृतं भाति** इति । इत्थमपि तैः स्वरूपसत्तार्थमावृतमपि तेभ्यः समुत्तीर्णतया सर्वानुभवितृतया सर्वत्रावभासत एव न पुनस्तदावरणेन पूर्णस्वरूपतां तत्र तिरोधत्त इति शिवधाम सर्वावस्थास्वपि सदैव परिपूर्णम् ॥ ३४ ॥

वेदान्तभाषाभिर्जाग्रदादीनां त्रयाणां स्वरूपं व्यवहरंस्तदनुस्यूतमपि ततः परं तुरीयमावेदयति

जाग्रद्विश्वं भेदात्स्वप्नस्तेजः प्रकाशमाहात्म्यात् ।
प्राज्ञः सुप्तावस्था ज्ञानघनत्वात्ततः परं तुर्यम् ॥ ३५ ॥

जाग्रदवस्थैव **विश्वम्** ब्रह्मणो वैराजं स्वरूपं कुतः **भेदात्** शब्दादिविषयपञ्चकस्य बाह्यतया परमेश्वरसृष्टस्यैव सर्वप्रमातृणां चक्षुरादीन्द्रियप्रवृत्तेरित्येकस्यैव ब्रह्मणो विषयविषयिभावेन स्थितस्य नानेन्द्रियज्ञानवैचित्र्यम् । अत एव शिवसूत्रेषु

ज्ञानं जाग्रत् ।

इति । एषा ब्रह्मणो विराडवस्था गीयते । यच्छ्रुतिः

यो विश्वचक्षुरुत विश्वतोमुखो विश्वतोहस्त उत विश्वतस्पात् ।
संबाहुभ्यां नमते संयजत्रैर्द्यावापृथिवी जनयन्देव एकः ॥

इति । तथा **स्वप्नः** तेजोऽवस्था ब्रह्मणः । कुत इत्याह **प्रकाशमाहात्म्यात्** इति । स्वप्ने बहिष्करणानि शब्दादौ विषये तावन्न प्रगल्भन्ते नापि तत्र बाह्यं शब्दादिकं नाम किंचित्परमार्थसद्विद्यते नापि बाह्यतयाध्यवसायस्याविद्यादि किंचिद्भिन्नमभिन्नं वा कारणान्तरमुपलभ्यते युक्त्या विचार्यमाणं वोपपद्यतेऽथ च स्वप्ने सर्वं प्रकाशतेऽत इदमर्थबलादायातं यत्स एव भगवान्स्वस्वभावो देवस्तत्तत्प्रमातृतां समाविष्टः स्वप्नायमानः स्वात्मानमेव प्रकाशस्वातन्त्र्याद्गृहनगराट्टालाद्यनेकप्रमातृवैचित्र्यरूपतया प्रविभज्य प्रतिप्रमातृ स्वप्नेऽसाधारणमेव विश्वं प्रकाशयत्येवेति ब्रह्मणः स्वातन्त्र्यं स्वप्न एव ब्रह्मवादिभिरभ्युपगतम् । यतो वेदान्तेष्विदमुक्तम्

प्रविभज्यात्मनात्मानं सृष्ट्वा भावान्पृथग्विधान् ।
सर्वेश्वरः सर्वमयः स्वप्ने भोक्ता प्रकाशते ॥

इति प्रकाशमाहात्म्यमेवात्र हेतुरतः स्वप्नो ब्रह्मणस्तेजोऽवस्थेति । तथा **प्राज्ञः सुप्तावस्था** इति । सर्वप्रमातृणां या **सुप्तावस्था** सुषुप्तं सा **प्राज्ञः** इति ब्रह्मणः प्राज्ञावस्थेति । यतः सर्वप्रमातृणां ग्राह्यग्राहकप्रपञ्चविलयान्महाशून्यत्वरूपे ग्राह्यादिविलये संस्कारशेषे सुषुप्ते विश्वस्य बीजभूतस्य ब्रह्मण एव प्रज्ञा ब्रह्म प्रज्ञातृतयान्तरतममवशिष्यत इति यावत् । सर्वस्य प्रमातुर्नीलसुखादिविश्ववैचित्र्यप्रथायाः सैषा संस्काररभूमिस्ततः प्रबुद्धस्य प्रागनुभूतवद्व्यवहारदर्शनादन्यथा यद्यस्यां भूमौ स्थिरं प्रज्ञातृस्वभावं सर्वक्रोडीकारेण

ब्रह्म न प्राकाशिष्यत कुतस्तत उत्थितस्य प्रमातुः प्रागनुभूतवस्तुनस्तथैव तदित्यनुभूतचरत्वेन स्मृतिरुदपत्स्यत नापि सुखमहमस्वाप्सं दुःखमहमस्वाप्सं गाढमूढोऽहमासमित्यनुभवः प्रादुरभविष्यदिति। तथा च भट्टदिवाकरवत्सः

> सर्वेऽनुभूता यदि नान्तरर्थास्त्वदात्मसात्कारसुरक्षिताः स्युः।
> विज्ञातवस्त्वप्रतिमोषरूपा काचित्स्मृतिर्नाम न संभवेत्तत् ॥

इति। इत्थं सुषुप्तं चिन्मयमेव ब्रह्मणः प्राज्ञावस्थेति गीयते। कुतः **ज्ञानघनत्वात्** इति। सुषुप्ततुर्ययोः साधारणोऽयं हेतुरित्युभयत्र योज्यम्। एषा सुषुप्तभूमिः **ज्ञानघना** प्रकाशमूर्तिः केवलं विश्वप्रलयसंस्कारेण ध्यामला सती शुद्धचिन्मयी न भवतीति। यदुक्तं स्पन्दशास्त्रे

> ज्ञानज्ञेयस्वरूपिण्या शक्त्या परमया युतः।
> पदद्वये विभुर्भाति तदन्यत्र तु चिन्मयः ॥

इति। तथा **ततः परं तुर्यम्** इति। तस्मात्सुषुप्तात् **परम्** अन्यन्निःशेषपाशववासनासंस्कारपरिक्षयाच्छुद्धपूर्णानन्दमयं ब्रह्मणस्तुरीयं रूपमनुगुणं नाम। यदत्र नामान्वर्थं न किंचिदुपपद्यतेऽतो व्याख्यातस्यावस्थात्रयस्य विश्रामभूतं सर्वान्तरतमत्वेनानुस्यूतमिति चतुःसंख्यापूरणेन **तुर्यम्** इति पूरणप्रत्ययेन संख्याव्यपदेशोऽत्र कृतः कथमवस्थात्रयस्यानुस्यूतमपि ततः परमेतदित्याह **ज्ञानघनत्वात्** इति। यतो जाग्रदादयोऽवस्थाः सर्वा भेदप्रवणत्वात्प्रमातृणामज्ञानमय्यस्तुरीयं ग्राह्यग्राहकक्षोभप्रलयसंस्कारपरिक्षयाज्ज्ञानघनप्रकाशानन्दमूर्त्यतस्तदन्तःस्थमपि ताभ्योऽवस्थाभ्यश्चिन्मयतया समुत्तीर्णत्वात् **परम्** अन्यदिति। एवमवस्थाविचित्रं परमाद्वयस्वभावं स्वतन्त्रं ब्रह्मैव पूर्णं विजृम्भते ॥ ३५ ॥

एवमपि शुद्धस्य परमात्मनः सर्वप्रमात्रनुस्यूतत्वेन स्थितत्वादवश्यं प्रमातृगणगतमख्यातिमालिन्यमायातीति यत्तन्नेति दृष्टान्तेनावेदयति।

> **जलधरधूमरजोभिर्मलिनीक्रियते यथा न गगनतलम्।**
> **तद्वन्मायाविकृतिभिरपरामृष्टः परः पुरुषः ॥ ३६ ॥**

यथा मेघधूमधूलीपुञ्जैराकाशस्थैरप्याकाशपृष्ठममलिनं स्वभावतो न मलिनं विधीयते नापि नित्यतावैतत्यखण्डनां वा नीयते केवलं दर्पणप्रतिबिम्बवत्तत्तदवस्थाविचित्रं गगनं गगनमेव सर्वदा तथात्वेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्। **तद्वत्** इति तथैव **मायाविकृतिभिः** अख्यातिसमुत्थैर्विकारैर्नानाप्रमातृगतैर्जन्ममरणाद्यनेकविचित्रावस्थामयैर्भगवत्स्थैरपि भगवान्न **परामृष्टः** न तैरपहृतस्वरूपो यतः स एव **परः पुरुषः** इति सर्वपुरुषाणां जीवानामाद्य उल्लासो विश्रान्तिस्थानं चेति सर्वानुभवितृतया सदा स्फुरतीति परशब्देन निर्दिष्टः। तस्मान्न स्वसमुत्थैरप्रकाशरूपैर्मायाविकारैरैन्द्रजालिकवद्भगवतः काचित्खण्डनेति परमेष्ठिना नरेश्वरविवेकेऽप्युक्तम्

> यद्यप्यर्थस्थितिः प्राणपुर्यष्टकनियन्त्रिते।
> जीवे निरुद्धा तत्रापि परमात्मनि सा स्थिता ॥
> तदात्मनैव तस्य स्यात्कथं प्राणेन यन्त्रणा।

इति ॥ ३६ ॥

नन्वेकचिन्मात्रपरमार्थां अपि पुरुषा विशिष्टसुखदुःखमोहजन्ममरणादिनानावस्थावैचित्र्यभाजश्चेति कथमेतदिति दृष्टान्तमाह

एकस्मिन्घटगगने रजसा व्याप्ते भवन्ति नान्यानि ।
मलिनानि तद्वदेते जीवाः सुखदुःखभेदजुषः ॥ ३७ ॥

यथा **एकस्मिन्** कुम्भाकाशे धूलिपुञ्जसमाच्छादिते **नान्यानि** घटाकाशानि विमलान्यप्याकाशत्वाविशेषात् **मलिनानि** रजसाच्छादितानि **भवन्ति**। विमलं व्यापकं नित्यमपि हि गगनं यादृशं घटसंकोचसंकुचितं भवेत्तादृशमेव तस्यैव घटस्य तद्भवति न पुनः सर्वाणि घटपटाद्याकाशानि कृष्णागुरुधूपितानि मृगमदाधिवासितानि विठिरगन्धीनि वैकाकाशस्वरूपत्वात्संकीर्यन्ते स्वगतघटादिकृतविच्छेदात्प्रत्युतैकत्रापि गगने वास्तवे स्थिते घटादयः स्वगतभित्तिसंकोचनियन्त्रिताः सन्तो नानागगनवैचित्र्यं प्रथयन्ति। इत्थं घटकृतः संकोच एव गगनतया तथा विशिष्यते तथात्वेनार्थक्रियाकारित्वान्न पुनः गगनस्यैतत्किंचिद्घटगतं मालिन्यादि स्वरूपतिरोधानाय भवति नापि परस्परं घटाद्यवच्छिन्नानां गगनानां व्यामिश्रणेति। **तद्वत्** इति तथैवामी **जीवाः** पुरुषा एकचिन्मात्रपरमार्था अपि पारमेश्वर्या मायाशक्त्याणवमायीयप्राकृतकोशत्रयावेष्टनेन पूर्णं व्यापि चिदानन्दैकघनं स्वरूपमपहस्त्य परिमितीकृता येनैकचैतन्यात्मानोऽपि स्वगतकोशत्रयविच्छेददौरात्म्यात्परस्परं भिन्नाश्चेति घटपटाद्याकाशवत् । इत्थं मायीयकोशकृतो विच्छेद एव जीवतया व्यवह्रियते न पुनः परमेश्वरेऽनवच्छिन्नचिदानन्दैकघने जीवाः पुरुषा आत्मानोऽणव इति दर्शनान्तरदृष्टः कश्चिद्व्यवहारः। एवमाणवादिकोशावच्छिन्ना जीवा अनादिविचित्रकर्ममलवासनाधिवासितनानादेहा नानाशया नानापुण्यपापस्वर्गनरकसुखदुःखजन्ममरणादिद्वन्द्वभेदभाजश्च सन्तो नान्योन्यं संकीर्यन्ते यथा नानाद्रव्याधिवासितानि घटाद्यवच्छिन्नानि घटाकाशानीति सूपपन्नमेकचिन्मात्रपरमार्था अपि स्वविच्छेदादन्योन्यभेदजुषश्चेति ॥ ३७ ॥

इत्थं जीवमण्डलगता अवस्थाविशेषा ये ते केवलं भगवत्युपचर्यन्ते न पुनस्तत्त्वतस्तेऽत्र केचिदित्याह

शान्ते शान्त इवायं हृष्टे हृष्टो विमोहवति मूढः ।
तत्त्वगणे सति भगवान्न पुनः परमार्थतः स तथा ॥ ३८ ॥

तत्त्वगणे इन्द्रियवर्गे **शान्ते** उपरते सति तद्गतः परमात्मा **शान्तः** नष्ट इवाभिमन्यत एवं तस्मिन् **हृष्टे** साह्लादे सति स तथैवोपचर्यते परं तमोमये मूढे मोहवानिति यथा स्थावरयोनौ **न पुनः परमार्थतः** वस्तुवृत्तेन **सः** परमेश्वरः **तथा** तेन प्रकारेण भवति। सर्वो हि जडभाग उत्पाद्यः संहार्यो वा भवति न पुनर्नित्ये भगवति बोधस्वभावे मायादिकञ्चुकगते विनाशोत्पत्ती स्यातामिति भगवान्सदा समः ॥ ३८ ॥

समुत्पत्तिक्रमेणागता भ्रान्तिः पुनर्ज्ञप्तिक्रमेण सुतरां समुन्मूलिता भवतीत्यत्र स्वात्मन एव स्वातन्त्र्यमित्याह

यदनात्मन्यपि तद्रूपावभासनं तत्पुरा निराकृत्य ।
आत्मन्यनात्मरूपां भ्रान्तिं विदलयति परमात्मा ॥ ३९ ॥

अनात्मनि अचेतनलक्षणे देहादौ कृशः स्थूलश्चास्मीत्यादि यत् **तद्रूपावभासनम्** अनात्मन्यात्मतया परामर्शनम् **तत्** तस्मिन् **पुरा** आदावेव **निराकृत्य** अहं चिदानन्दैकघनोऽनवच्छिन्नस्वभावः स्वतन्त्रश्चे-त्यकृत्रिमाहन्तास्फुरणया कृत्रिमदेहादिप्रमातृतामपहृत्यात्मैव विगलितदेहबन्धः परमात्मतां यातः सन् **आत्मनि** अस्मिन्स्फुरद्रूपे विश्वपदार्थे प्रकाशवपुषि स्वाङ्गकल्पेऽपि या **भ्रान्तिः** देहादिप्रमातृताभिमानजनि-ता भेदप्रथा ताम् **विदलयति** अहमेवैको विश्वात्मना स्फुरामीत्येवं चूर्णीकरोति। इदमत्र तात्पर्यं यावद-नात्मनि देहादावात्माभिमानो न गलितस्तावत्स्वात्मप्रथारूपेऽपि जगति भेदप्रथामोहो न विलीयतेऽतश्चा-नात्मन्यात्माभिमानभ्रमविनाशादात्मन्यनात्माभिमानभ्रान्तिं परमात्मैव स्वात्ममहेश्वरो भगवानेव विना-शयति नान्यस्यात्र सामर्थ्यम् ॥ ३९ ॥

एवं भ्रान्तिद्वयापसारणात्परमेश्वरीभूतस्य योगिनो न किंचित्कार्यमवशिष्यत इत्याह

इत्थं विभ्रमयुगलकसमूलविच्छेदने कृतार्थस्य।
कर्तव्यान्तरकलना न जातु परयोगिनो भवति ॥ ४० ॥

इत्थम् कारिकार्थप्रतिपादितप्रकारेण भ्रान्तिद्वयस्य प्ररोहविदारणे **कृतार्थस्य** स्वस्वातन्त्र्यस्य परिज्ञ-प्तेरशेषसंकोचविदलनात् **कृतः** प्राप्तः **अर्थः** पुरुषार्थलाभो येन तस्य प्रकृष्टयोगयुक्तस्य न कदाचित् **क-र्तव्यान्तरस्य** तीर्थाटनक्षेत्रपरिग्रहदीक्षाजपध्यानव्याख्याश्रवणादिरूपस्य कार्यशेषस्य **कलना** मनोव्यापा-रोऽपि न विद्यते

अयमेव परो धर्मो यद्योगेनात्मदर्शनम् ।

इति हि स्वात्मयोगस्य प्राधान्यमतस्तत्प्राप्त्या नान्यत्र परिश्रमः पूर्णयोगिनः। यदुक्तम्

यदा ते मोहकलिलं बुद्धिर्व्यतितरिष्यति।
तदा गन्तासि निर्वेदं श्रोतव्यस्य श्रुतस्य च ॥

इति गीतासु ॥ ४० ॥

संप्रति पृथिव्यादिमायान्तस्य भेदावभासभाजो विश्वस्य भेदाभेदमयशाक्तभूमिकावेशेन पूर्णप्रकाशा-नन्दघनशांभवपदसमापत्त्या भेदविलायनेन तदभेदमयताप्राप्तिमभिधाय ततः शांभवात्पदात्संपूर्णसुधा-म्भोधिकल्पान्महाप्रवाहदेशीयशाक्तप्रसरोल्लासप्रमुखं तत्तत्तरङ्गभङ्गिरूपतामभिदधत्स्वानुभवसिद्धं महाम-न्त्रवीर्यसारं समस्तभेदविलायनपरमाद्वयोदयं नरशक्तिशिवसामरस्यात्मकं परसंविद्धृदयं क्रमेणोन्मीलयि-ष्यन्विश्वस्यागमिकाण्डत्रयात्मतासंकलनयुक्त्यैकीकारं तावदाह

पृथिवी प्रकृतिर्माया त्रितयमिदं वेद्यरूपतापतितम् ।
अद्वैतभावनबलाद्भवति हि सन्मात्रपरिशेषम् ॥ ४१ ॥

पार्थिवप्राकृतमायीयाण्डात्मकं यत्स्थूलसूक्ष्मपररूपं त्रिविधम् **वेद्यरूपतापतितम्** ज्ञानगोचरतां प्रा-प्तम्

तत्तद्रूपतया ज्ञानं बहिरन्तः प्रकाशते ।
ज्ञानादृते नार्थसत्ता ज्ञानरूपं ततो जगत् ॥
नहि ज्ञानादृते भावाः केनचिद्विषयीकृताः ।
ज्ञानं तदात्मतां यातमेतस्मादवसीयते ॥

इति श्रीकालिकाक्रमोक्तन्यायेन यत् **अद्वैतभावनम्** तद्बलात्तत्प्रकर्षात् **सन्मात्रपरिशेषम्** प्रकाशमानतात्मकसत्तामात्रात्मकम् **भवति। हिः** यस्मादर्थे ॥ ४१ ॥

एतदेव भेदस्यावास्तवत्वप्रतिपादनाभिप्रायेणोपपादयति

रशनाकुण्डलकटकं भेदत्यागेन दृश्यते यथा हेम।
तद्वद्भेदत्यागे सन्मात्रं सर्वमाभाति ॥ ४२ ॥

यथा किल सौवर्णं रशनाद्याभरणं सुवर्णार्थिनो रशनाविशेषपरिहारेण हेममात्रतयैवाभाति हेमरजतकांस्यताम्रनागादि तावन्मात्रार्थिनो लोहरूपतया **तद्वत्सर्वम्** इदं त्यक्तहानादानादिविकल्पकलङ्कस्याविकल्पप्रतिभासमात्रनिष्ठस्य योगिनो

रूपादिषु परिणामात्तत्सिद्धिः ।

इति भट्टश्रीकल्लटोक्तनीत्या **भेदत्यागे** सति **सन्मात्रम्** सत्तामात्रात्मकम् **आभाति**॥ ४२ ॥

तदियतः सर्वस्य संकोचावभासपरित्यागादागमप्रसिद्ध्या नररूपस्य शाक्तरूपोपारोहं मन्त्रसंप्रदायं कटाक्षयन्नभिदधाति

तद्ब्रह्म परं शुद्धं शान्तमभेदात्मकं समं सकलम् ।
अमृतं सत्यं शक्तौ विश्राम्यति भास्वरूपायाम् ॥ ४३ ॥

तत् एतत्सत्तामात्रात्मकं सर्वं बृहत्त्वात् **ब्रह्म**। यदाहुः श्रुत्यन्तविदः

सदेवेदं सोम्य अग्र आसीत् ।

इति पूर्णत्वात् **परम्** हेयोपादेयाभावात् **शुद्धम्** पृथक्त्वोपशमात् **शान्तम्** अत एव **अभेदात्मकम्** प्रकर्षापकर्षाभावात् **समम्**

प्रदेशोऽपि ब्रह्मणः सार्वरूप्यमनतिक्रान्तश्चाविकल्प्यश्च ।

इति स्थित्वा **सकलम्** अत एव **अमृतम्** अविनाशि

सत्यासत्यौ तु यौ भागौ प्रतिभावं व्यवस्थितौ ।
सत्यं यत्तत्र सा जातिरसत्या व्यक्तयः स्थिताः ॥

इति ।

यदादौ च यदन्ते च यन्मध्ये तस्य सत्यता ।

इति तत्रभवद्भर्तृहरिनिरूपितनीत्या **सत्यम्** तदेव सत्तामात्रात्मकमेतत्सर्वम् **भास्वरूपायाम्** इच्छाज्ञान-क्रियारूपशक्तिसामरस्यात्मिकायां परस्यां शक्तौ विश्राम्यति

संविन्निष्ठा विषयव्यवस्थितिः ।

इति स्थित्या तन्मयीभवतीति ।

अथ च **शान्तम्** शकारस्यान्ते यन्मूर्धन्यरूपं ततः परं यत् **अमृतम्** अमृतबीजात्मकं **ब्रह्म** सन्मात्रात्मकं सादाख्यपदस्पर्शात् **शुद्धम्** अत एवाहमिदं सर्वमिति सर्वसमरसीकरणात् **समं सकलम्** चातश्चाख्यातिगलनात् **सत्यम्** । यदादिष्टं भगवता

तृतीयं ब्रह्म सुश्रोणि ... ।

इति श्रीत्रिंशिकायाम् । तदिदममृतीभावावमृष्टं सदाशिवपदोपारूढमेतद्विश्वात्मकं ब्रह्म प्रागुक्तायां शक्तौ विश्राम्यति ॥ ४३ ॥

क्रियाज्ञानेच्छामुखेन परशक्तौ यन्न विश्राम्यति तन्न किंचिदित्याह

इष्यत इति वेद्यत इति संपाद्यत इति च भास्वरूपेण ।
अपरामृष्टं यदपि तु नभःप्रसूनत्वमभ्येति ॥ ४४ ॥

यद्वस्तु वस्तुवृत्तेन बहिर्विद्यमानपि तद्यदीच्छाज्ञानक्रियामुखेन भास्वरेणैतच्छक्तित्रयसामरस्यात्मकपराशक्तिस्फारमयेन बोधेन **न परामृष्टम्** तत्प्रख्योपाख्याविकलं गगनपुष्पतुल्यम् । अनेन च सद्वृत्त्यूर्ध्ववर्तित्रिशूलात्मकवृत्तिवीर्यं सूचितम् ॥ ४४ ॥

एतच्छाक्तपदावेशमस्यानुवदञ्शांभवपदसमापत्त्या तन्मयीभावमाविर्भावयति

शक्तित्रिशूलपरिगमयोगेन समस्तमपि परमेशे ।
शिवनामनि परमार्थे विसृज्यते देवदेवेन ॥ ४५ ॥

तदित्थम् **समस्तमपि** एतत्सत्तामात्ररूपत्वात्प्रोक्तब्रह्मपरमार्थम् **शक्तित्रिशूलपरिगमयोगेन** निर्णीतयुक्त्या पराशक्तिसमापत्तिक्रमेण **शिवनामनि परमार्थे** अनवच्छिन्नचिदानन्दैकघने परमेश्वरे स्वस्मिन्स्वभावे **विसृज्यते** अन्तर्मुखविमर्शनप्रकर्षात्तत्समावेशेन तन्मयीभावमापाद्यते **देवानाम्** ब्रह्मादिसदाशिवान्तानां सर्वप्रकाशानामिन्द्रियाणां च **देवेन** प्रभुणा परमशिवेनैव नह्यत्रान्यस्य कस्यचित्कर्तृत्वं घटते नाप्येतद्व्यतिरिक्तोऽन्यः कश्चित्प्रमातास्त्यस्यैव च भगवतस्तत्तद्भूमिकाधिरोहिणस्तत्तद्रुद्रक्षेत्रज्ञादिप्रमातृरूपतया स्फुरणमिति **देवदेवेन** इति युक्तैवोक्तिः । तदित्थं विसर्गवृत्तिर्दर्शिता ॥ ४५ ॥

एवमियता भेदात्मनो नररूपस्य जगतो भेदाभेदात्मकशाक्तपदाध्यारोहेणाभिन्नचिद्घनशिवसामरस्यापत्तिमुपसंहारदशा प्रदर्श्येदानीं चिदेकघनः शिव एव शक्तिरूपतयोल्लास्य नरात्मकविश्वरूपतया स्फुरति न तु शिवव्यतिरिक्तं शक्तिनरयोः किमपि रूपं शिव एव त्वित्थं निजरसाश्यानतया स्फुरतीति प्रसरयुक्तिं महामन्त्रस्फारमयीं दर्शयति

पुनरपि च पञ्चशक्तिप्रसरणक्रमेण बहिरपि तत् ।
अण्डत्रयं विचित्रं सृष्टं बहिरात्मलाभेन ॥ ४६ ॥

चिदानन्देच्छाज्ञानक्रियाख्यशक्तिपञ्चकसामरस्यात्मा यः परमशिवस्तेन चिदादिशक्तिप्राधान्यप्रथनात्मकशिवशक्तिसदाशिवेश्वरशुद्धविद्याख्यभूमिकोन्मीलनयुक्त्या **तदण्डत्रयं विचित्रम्** इति तत्तद्भुवनादिरूपम् **सृष्टं बहिरात्मलाभेन** इति बाह्याभासात्मतया स्वात्मनः प्रदर्शनेन। **पुनरपि** इत्यनेनैतद्दर्शयति यत्परमशिव एव स्वतन्त्रः सदा स्वभित्तौ विश्वप्रपञ्चोल्लासनविलापनक्रीडां स्वात्मानतिरिक्तामप्यतिरिक्तामिवादर्शयन्नेवमित्थं स्थितो न तु तद्व्यतिरिक्तं किमप्यस्तीति ॥ ४६ ॥

इत्थं विश्वोल्लासनविलायनक्रीडाशीलो भगवान्यः **शिवः** इति व्यपदिश्यते स कतमः कुत्र तिष्ठति कतमेन वा प्रमाणेन प्रसिद्ध इत्याशङ्क्य सर्वेषां स्वात्मैव शिवः सर्वत्रादिसिद्धतया स्फुरन्सर्गादीन्विदधातीत्यस्मच्छब्दवाचकैः शब्दैः प्रतिपादयति

इति शक्तिचक्रयन्त्रं क्रीडायोगेन वाहयन्देवः ।
अहमेव शुद्धरूपः शक्तिमहाचक्रनायकपदस्थः ॥ ४७ ॥

मय्येव भाति विश्वं दर्पण इव निर्मले घटादीनि ।
मत्तः प्रसरति सर्वं स्वप्नविचित्रत्वमिव सुप्तात् ॥ ४८ ॥

अहमेव विश्वरूपः करचरणादिस्वभाव इव देहः ।
सर्वस्मिन्नहमेव स्फुरामि भावेषु भास्वरूपमिव ॥ ४९ ॥

द्रष्टा श्रोता घ्राता देहेन्द्रियवर्जितोऽप्यकर्तापि ।
सिद्धान्तागमतर्कांश्चित्रानहमेव रचयामि ॥ ५० ॥

इति व्याख्यातेन प्रकारेण चिदादिशक्तिपञ्चकाक्षिप्तोऽनन्तो यः शक्तिसमूहस्तदेव **यन्त्रं क्रीडायोगेन वाहयन्** अरघट्टघटीयन्त्रन्यायेन सृष्ट्याद्युन्मज्जननिमज्जनहेलाक्रमेण विपरिवर्तयन्नहमेवेति **देवः** सर्वप्राणिनाम् **अहम्** इत्यनाहतो नादात्मा पराहन्ताचमत्कारसारः स्वात्मपरामर्शः स एव सर्वस्यानपह्नवनीयोऽयं स्वात्मैव **देवः** क्रीडनशीलः स्फुरतीति। अनेन स्वस्वरूपनिष्ठ एव शिव इति प्रतिपादितम् । तथा शुद्धरूप इति कल्पनातिक्रान्तगोचरः। अन्यच्च **शक्तीनां** करणदेवतानां विषयाहरणत्यागादिव्यवहारस्वातन्त्र्यदातृ यत् **महाचक्रनायकपदम्** तत्र तिष्ठति **तत्स्थः**। यतः करणशक्तीनां चैतन्यविश्रान्तिं विना स्वरूपसत्ता न विद्यतेऽतः शक्तिमन्तमेव स्वरूपासादनायानवरतं भजन्त इत्यनेन सर्वप्रमातृहृदयाधिष्ठातृत्वाद्भगवतो नियतभुवनाधिष्ठातृत्वं परिहृतम् । तथा यदिदं किंचिद्विश्वतयाभिमतं तत्सर्वमादर्शप्रतिबिम्बन्यायेन **मय्येव भाति** व्याख्यातरूपास्मदर्थविश्रान्तमेवावभासतेऽहन्तासारमेव स्फुरतीति यावत् । तथा **मत्तः** इति पूर्णादहमिति रूपात्स्वात्मनः सकलं निःशेषमिदं विश्वम् **प्रसरति** प्रमात्रपेक्षयापहृततया स्फुरति। कथमित्याह **स्वप्नविचित्रत्वमिव सुप्तात्** इति यथा निद्रितात्प्रमातुः स्वप्नावस्थायां बाह्यपदार्थाभावेऽपि पुरप्राकारदेवगृहादि नानाश्चर्यं स्वप्नपदार्थवैचित्र्यमविद्यादिपरिकल्पितकारणान्तराभावात्स्वसंविदुपादानमेव प्रसरति तथैव तीर्थान्तरनियमितकारणान्तरानुपपत्तेरनवच्छिन्नचिदानन्दैकघनादहमिति रूपाद्विश्वमिति।

तथा **अहमेव विश्वरूपः** इत्यादि। अहमित्येव यः पूर्णश्चैतन्यपरामर्श एष एवास्मि नानादेहादिप्रमातृतासमापन्नो विश्वरूप आगोपालबालाङ्गनादिष्वन्तरभेदेन स्फुरणाद्विश्वानि ममैव रूपाणीति यावत्। क इव करचरणादिस्वभावो देह इव यथा सामान्येन सर्वेषामेको देहः करचरणादिस्वभावः प्रतिप्रमातृ स्वालक्षण्येन नानारूपस्तथैवैकश्चैतन्यलक्षणः पदार्थः सर्वावासत्वाद्विश्वरूप इति। तथा **सर्वस्मिन्** प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयरूपेऽस्मिन् **अहमेव स्फुरामि** सर्वस्य स्वात्मानुभवितृत्वेन प्रकाशनात्। कथं **भावेषु भास्वरूपमिव** इति यथा नानावस्तुषु **भास्वरूपम्** अतिशयेन द्योतनशीलं वस्तु देदीप्यते तथैव जडेऽस्मिञ्जगत्येकश्चिद्रूपोऽहमिति। अतश्च **द्रष्टा** इत्यादि **देहेन्द्रियवर्जितोऽपि** चिन्मूर्तत्वादहमेव पश्यामि शृणोमि जिघ्रामि रसयामि स्पृशामीति सर्वत्र पूर्णाहन्ताविश्रान्तेः कृतकृत्यता। देहेन्द्रियवर्गो हि पश्यामीत्यादि मन्यते परं स्वापाद्यवस्थासु द्रष्टृत्वाद्यभावात्तस्माद्देहेन्द्रियादिवर्गसमुल्लासकस्तद्वर्जितोऽपि चिदानन्दैकघनः सर्वभूतहृदयान्तरचारी विषयोपभोगभोक्तास्मच्छब्दवाच्यः परः पुरुष एव। तथा च श्रुतिः

> अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता पश्यत्यचक्षुः स शृणोत्यकर्णः।
> स वेत्ति वेद्यं न च तस्यास्ति वेत्ता तमाहुरग्र्यं पुरुषं महान्तम्॥

इति। तथाकर्तापि सिद्धान्तागम इत्यादि स्वयमविधातापि देवमुनिमनुष्याद्याशयाविष्टः संक्षेपविस्तारविवक्षयान्तःप्रतिभास्वरूपोऽहं सिद्धान्तादीन्नानाश्चर्यान्करोमि न पुनर्जडानां लोष्टस्थानीयानां देहेन्द्रियाणां तत्करणं शक्यमिति तत्तद्व्यवधानेनाहमेव सर्वप्रमाणनिर्मातेति। अनेन पराहन्तास्वरूपस्य स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्य सत्तायां न प्रमाणोपयोग उपपद्यत उपयुज्यते वेत्युक्तं स्यात्। एवमनपह्नवनीयः **अहम्** इत्येवमनुभवितृतया सर्वेषां स्वात्मैव शिवः सर्वत्रावस्थितः सर्वप्रमाणेष्वादिसिद्ध इति॥ ४७॥ ४८॥ ४९॥ ५०॥

तदेवं व्याख्यातेन क्रमेण सर्वो ममायं विभव इति दार्ढ्येन स्वात्मानं प्रत्यवमृशन्परब्रह्मस्वरूपो योगी भवतीत्याह

> **इत्थं द्वैतविकल्पे गलिते प्रविलङ्घ्य मोहनीं मायाम्।**
> **सलिले सलिलं क्षीरे क्षीरमिव ब्रह्मणि लयी स्यात्॥ ५१॥**

अनेन प्रकारेण सर्वाहंभावपरिशीलनयुक्त्या **द्वैतविकल्पे गलिते** भेदप्रथायां विलीनायां **मोहनीं मायां प्रविलङ्घ्य** अनात्मन्यात्माभिमानरूपामख्यातिं भेदप्रथाहेतुमहमेव विश्वात्मेति संकोचापसरणेन समुत्सृज्य ज्ञानी **ब्रह्मणि** बृंहणात्मके पूर्णे चिदानन्दैकघने स्वरूपे **लयी स्यात्** संकोचविलयाद्ब्रह्मतादात्म्यं यायात्। किं यथेत्याह **सलिले** इत्यादि। यथा **सलिलम्** उद्धृतं नानाघटादिभिर्जलं क्षीरं वा विविधशावलेयबाहुलेयाद्यनेकगोसहस्रसंभिन्नं पुनरपि घटशावलेयादिकृतभेदसंकोचपरिक्षयात् **सलिले सलिलं** प्रविष्टम् **क्षीरे क्षीरम्** वेत्येकमेव तद्वस्तु न तत्र भेदः स्फुरति तथैव देहप्राणपुर्यष्टकशून्यात्मकप्रत्यवमर्शभङ्गाद्ब्रह्मैव संपद्यते। यथाह भट्टदिवाकरवत्सः

> जाते देहप्रत्ययद्वीपभङ्गे प्राप्तैकध्ये निर्मले बोधसिन्धौ।
> अव्यावर्त्य त्विन्द्रियग्राममन्तर्विश्वात्मा त्वं नित्य एकोऽवभासि॥

इति कक्ष्यास्तोत्रे ॥ ५१ ॥

एवं ब्रह्मसत्तामधिरूढस्य योगिनो द्वन्द्वाभिभवोऽपि ब्रह्ममय एव न स्वरूपविप्रलोपाय प्रगल्भत इत्याह

इत्थं तत्त्वसमूहे भावनया शिवमयत्वमभियाते ।
कः शोकः को मोहः सर्वं ब्रह्मावलोकयतः ॥ ५२ ॥

एवं निर्णीतेन प्रकारेण गलितकञ्चुकबन्धस्य योगिनः **तत्त्वसमूहे** भूतविषयेन्द्रियव्राते **भावनया** सर्वमिदमेका स्वसंविदिति दृढप्रतिपत्त्या **शिवमयत्वम्** प्राप्ते परमाद्वयरूपतां याते शोकमोहोपलक्षिता द्वन्द्वाभिभवाः **सर्वम्** इदं तत्त्वव्रातम् **ब्रह्म** पश्यतोऽस्य न केचनैव ते ब्रह्ममयत्वात्सर्वे स्वरूपरूपा इति न खेदाय प्रभवन्ति ॥ ५२ ॥

ननु परमाद्वयरूपस्यापि ज्ञानिनोऽवश्यं स्थिते शरीरेऽपि तद्धेतुकशुभाशुभकर्मफलसंचयः किमिति न स्यादिति परिहरति

कर्मफलं शुभमशुभं मिथ्याज्ञानेन संगमादेव ।
विषमो हि सङ्गदोषस्तस्करयोगोऽप्यतस्करस्येव ॥ ५३ ॥

अश्वमेधब्रह्महननादिरूपपुण्यापुण्यकर्मफलप्रचयसंचयोऽपि **मिथ्याज्ञानेन संगमादेव** प्रादुर्भवत्यहं शारीरीदमश्वमेधादि ममोपायतयास्त्विति यदनात्मन्यात्माभिमानलक्षणं वैपरीत्येन ज्ञानं तेन योऽभिष्वङ्गस्तस्मादेव पशोः शुभाशुभकर्मफलसंचयो येनानवरताधिवासितः संसारक्लेशभाजनं भवति। ननु ब्रह्मात्मकस्यापि प्रमातुः किमित्येतावता पशुत्वमायातीत्यत्रार्थान्तरमुपक्षिपति **विषमो हि** इत्यादि। यस्मात् **सङ्गदोषः** सर्वथाविषह्यो यथासाधुयोगोऽत्यन्तसाधोरपि स्वगतदोषसमर्पणं कुरुते तथैव शुद्धस्यापि प्रमातुरख्यातिजनितो मोहयोगः पशुत्वमापाद्य शुभाशुभकर्मसंबन्धं ददाति ॥ ५३ ॥

जन्ममरणाद्यपि न ब्रह्मरूपस्य योगिनोऽपि तु मायाप्रमातॄणामेवेत्याह

लोकव्यवहारकृतां य इहाविद्यामुपासते मूढाः ।
ते यान्ति जन्ममृत्यू धर्माधर्मार्गलाबद्धाः ॥ ५४ ॥

ये प्रमातारो देहात्ममानिनो भूत्वा फलकामनाकलुषिता लोकाचाररूपां पुण्यापुण्यमयीम् **अविद्याम्** भेदप्रथारूपां मायां जगति स्वर्गनरकादिफलप्राप्त्युपायत्वेन सेवन्ते **ते मूढाः** अज्ञाः पुण्यापुण्यनिगडबद्धास्तत्फलोपभोगाय पुनः पुनर्जायन्ते म्रियन्ते चेत्यनवरतसंसारक्लेशभाजो भवन्ति न पुनः प्रक्षीणमोहावरणो विगलितधर्माधर्मबन्धो ब्रह्मस्वभावो योगी जायते म्रियते वेति ॥ ५४ ॥

एवमविद्योपार्जितान्यपि कर्माणि ज्ञानाविर्भावादेव क्षीयन्ते नान्यथेत्याह

अज्ञानकालनिचितं धर्माधर्मात्मकं तु कर्मापि ।
चिरसंचितमिव तूलं नश्यति विज्ञानदीप्तिवशात् ॥ ५५ ॥

अज्ञानकाले कृत्रिमप्रमातृताभिमानावसरे पुण्यापुण्यरूपम् **कर्म** अनुगुणफलप्रार्थनया यत् **निचितम्** स्वीकृतं तत् **विज्ञानदीप्तिवशात्** विशिष्टज्ञानदीप्तिवशात् **नश्यति** अहमेव परं ब्रह्मेति कृत्रिमप्रमातृतादाहसमर्थं विज्ञानं तस्य या पौनःपुन्येन प्रत्यवमर्शनात्प्रभा तत्सामर्थ्यात्तददर्शनं याति। किमिवेत्याह

चिरसंचितं तूलमिव यथा चिरसंचितं तूलं हंसरोम वह्निप्रदीप्तिवशाज्झटित्येव भस्मसाद्याति तथैव सर्वः कर्मफलप्रचयो विज्ञानवह्निसामर्थ्यात्क्षणमध्ये प्रलयमुपगच्छतीति। गीतासु

> यथैधांसि समिद्धोऽग्निर्भस्मसात्कुरुतेऽर्जुन।
> ज्ञानाग्निः सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात्कुरुते तथा॥

इति॥ ५५॥

न केवलं प्राक्कृतं कर्म ज्ञानप्रसादादुपलीयते यावदिदानीन्तनमपि कर्म ज्ञानेद्धया दृष्ट्या न फलोपभोगाय पर्यवस्यतीत्याह

> **ज्ञानप्राप्तौ कृतमपि न फलाय ततोऽस्य जन्म कथम्।**
> **गतजन्मबन्धयोगो भाति शिवार्कः स्वदीधितिभिः॥ ५६॥**

आत्ममहेश्वरप्रत्यवमर्शप्ररूढौ **कृतमपि** शुभाशुभादिकम् **कर्म** कृत्रिमप्रमातृताभिमानाभावान्नानुगुणफलदानाय प्रगल्भत इति कर्मफलाभावात्तदुपभोगयोग्यस्य जन्मनः केन प्रकारेण सत्ता स्यान्न भवेद्योगिनः पुनर्जन्मेत्यर्थः। ननु स पिण्डपातात्पुनर्न जायते चेत्तर्हि कीदृशः स्यादित्याह **गतजन्म** इत्यादि। गतो जन्मरूपस्य बन्धस्य योगः संबन्धो यस्य स एवमिति प्रक्षीणमोहावरणः **स्वदीधितिभिः** चिन्मरीचिनिचयैः सः **शिवरूपोऽर्को भाति** स्फुरति न पुनस्तीर्थान्तरपरिकल्पितोऽस्य मोक्षः कुत्रचित्प्राप्तिरिति केवलं मायादिकञ्चुककृतसंकोचविनाशात्स्वशक्तिविकस्वरतामापद्यत इति॥ ५६॥

अत्रैव युक्तिमाह

> **तुषकम्बुककिंशारुकमुक्तं बीजं यथाङ्कुरं कुरुते।**
> **नैव तथाणवमायाकर्मविमुक्तो भवाङ्कुरं ह्यात्मा॥ ५७॥**

यथा किंशारुकतुषकम्बुकेभ्यः पृथक्कृतं शालिबीजं बीजस्वभावकिंशारुकादिसामग्र्यभावात्क्षितिजलातपमध्यवर्त्यपि **नैव** अङ्कुरजननलक्षणकार्ये हेतुर्भवति **तथैव** कम्बुकस्थानीयेन **आणवेन** मलेन तुषस्थानीयेन मायामलेन किंशारुकस्थानीयेन कार्ममलेन च **मुक्तः** पृथग्भूतः **आत्मा** चैतन्यं मलत्रयरूपसामग्र्यभावान्न पुनः **भवाङ्कुरम्** संसारप्ररोहं विदधाति केवलं विश्वगतनानापदार्थसार्थप्रादुर्भावविनाशवैचित्र्यं स्वात्मनि परामृशन्महेश्वर एव भवति॥ ५७॥

एवं ज्ञानाग्निदग्धकञ्चुकबीजस्य ज्ञानिनो न किंचिच्छङ्कास्थानं हेयोपादेयं वेत्यत आह

> **आत्मज्ञो न कुतश्चन बिभेति सर्वं हि तस्य निजरूपम्।**
> **नैव च शोचति यस्मात्परमार्थे नाशिता नास्ति॥ ५८॥**

यः **आत्मज्ञः** स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्वातन्त्र्यवित्सः **न कुतश्चन बिभेति** न स कस्मादपि राज्ञः शत्रोः प्राणिभ्यो वा भयमादत्ते। कुत एतदित्याह **सर्वं हि तस्य निजरूपम्** इति यतः **तस्य** स्वात्ममहेश्वराद्वयवेदिनः **सर्वम्** पदार्थजातमिदं विश्वम् **निजस्य** स्वात्मनो महाप्रकाशैकवपुष एव **रूपम्** आकारः सर्वत्र प्रकाशानुगमादिति प्रकाश एव स्वातन्त्र्यात्स्वपरात्मना प्रकाशतेऽत एव भयस्थानं लोके यत्किंचित्प्रतिभाति तत्तस्य तथैव

स्वाङ्गकल्पमेव कथं भयजनकं स्याद्यदुत स्वात्मनो व्यतिरिक्तः पदार्थो भयहेतुर्भवेत्कः पुनः सर्वतः परिपूर्णस्यावधिभूतो भिन्नो यमादिरस्ति यस्माज्ज्ञान्यपहस्तितदेहात्ममानित्वोऽपि बिभियादिति सर्वत्र निजरूपोपलब्धेः संसारस्थितोऽप्येकको विगलितस्वपरविभागतया निःशङ्कं विचरत्येव। यथोक्तं परमेष्ठिपादैः

> योऽविकल्पमिदमर्थमण्डलं पश्यतीश निखिलं भवद्वपुः।
> स्वात्ममात्रपरिपूरिते जगत्यस्य नित्यसुखिनः कुतो भयम् ॥

इति। ग्रन्थकारोऽपि

> एककोऽहमिति संसृतौ जनस्त्रासससाहसरसेन खिद्यते।
> एककोऽहमिति कोऽपरोऽस्ति मे इत्थमस्मि गतभीर्व्यवस्थितः ॥

इति। अन्यच्च **नैव च शोचति** इत्यादि। नाप्यात्मज्ञः **शोचति** यथा धनदारादिकं मम नष्टं रिक्तोऽस्मि व्याधिनाक्रान्तोऽहं म्रिये वेत्यादि यतो व्याख्यातेन क्रमेण **परमार्थे** तात्त्विके वस्तुनि चैतन्यरूपेऽन्तर्मुखे प्रमातृमात्रे **नाशिता** क्षयधर्मित्वं न विद्यते। सर्वं ह्यभिमानसारं कार्यत्वेन प्रतिभासमानमिदन्तावाच्छिन्नमुत्पद्यते क्षीयते च न पुनः संविन्मयस्यात्मनोऽहन्तासारस्याकृत्रिमस्य स्वतन्त्रस्य कार्योन्मुखप्रयत्नानुपलब्धेः। न चैतावता स्वरूपविप्रलोपः स्यादिति विमृशतो योगिनो देहस्थस्यापि तद्धेतुकः शोकाद्याविर्भावः स्वरूपाच्छादकत्वेन न भवेदिति ॥ ५८ ॥

नापि स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्वरूपपरिशीलनदार्ढ्यादस्य ज्ञानिनश्चेतस्यपूर्णत्वादिदोषः स्यादिति प्रतिपादयति

> **अतिगूढहृदयगञ्जप्ररूढपरमार्थरत्नसंचयतः।**
> **अहमेवेति महेश्वरभावे का दुर्गतिः कस्य ॥ ५९ ॥**

अतिगूढम् अतिशयेन गुप्तम् **हृदयमेव गञ्जम्** सर्वपरमार्थस्वस्वरूपविश्रान्तिस्थानस्वभावं भाण्डागारं तत्र योऽतितीव्रतमसमाश्वासप्ररूढः **परमार्थः** सद्गुरूपदिष्टः स्वात्मज्ञानसतत्त्वः स एव सर्वविभूतिहेतुत्वाद्रत्नसंचय इव **रत्नसंचयः** तेन हेतुना **अहमेवेति** सर्वमिदमस्मीति य आविर्भूतः पूर्णः पराहन्ताविश्रान्तिलक्षणः **महेश्वरभावः** शरीरिणोऽपि स्वात्मप्रकाशस्वातन्त्र्यं तस्मिन्स्थिते सति **का** नाम वराकी **दुर्गतिः** दरिद्रभावस्तदुपलक्षितो वा कश्चित्कृत्रिमो विभूत्याद्यतिशयः स्यात्। आभाससारा हि सर्वे पदार्था यदैवाभासन्ते तदैव योगिनः स्वात्मकल्पाः सन्तः कथमुत्कर्षापकर्षादौ प्रगल्भन्त इति न किंचिद्दौर्गत्यादिकं भवेत्। **कस्य** वेति को वास्या दुर्गतेः समाश्रयो देहाद्यात्माभिमानिनो ह्यस्या दुर्गतेः समाश्रया भवन्तु यतस्ते व्यतिरिक्तस्यैषणीयस्य प्राप्त्येश्वरास्तदपहाराद्रिक्ता इति। यः पुनरकृत्रिमाहन्ताप्रत्यवमर्शपरमार्थो ज्ञानी सर्वमस्मीत्यव्यतिरिक्तेनैषणीयेन महेश्वरः स कथं व्यतिरिक्तप्राप्त्यप्राप्त्यभावाद्दौर्गत्यादेर्भाजनं स्यादत एव गञ्जशब्दस्य रत्नसंचयशब्दस्येश्वरशब्दस्य च हृदयप्ररूढपरमार्थो महानित्यकृत्रिमार्थवाचकानि विशेषणान्युपपादितानि ॥ ५९ ॥

इदानीं मोक्षस्वरूपमाह

> **मोक्षस्य नैव किंचिद्धामास्ति न चापि गमनमन्यत्र।**
> **अज्ञानग्रन्थिभिदा स्वशक्त्यभिव्यक्तता मोक्षः ॥ ६० ॥**

मोक्षस्य पराहन्ताचमत्कारसारस्य कैवल्यस्य **धाम** व्यतिरिक्तं स्थानं न विद्यत एव देशकालाकाराव-च्छेदाभावादत एव **न चाप्यन्यत्र** कुत्रचिद्व्यतिरिक्ते **गमनम्** लयो मोक्षो यथा भेदवादिनां मतेनोत्क्रान्त्या चक्राधारादिभेदनादूर्ध्वं द्वादशान्ते लय एषैव मुक्तिरिति। यदुक्तम्

व्यापिन्यां शिवसत्तायामुत्क्रान्त्या किं प्रयोजनम् ।
अव्यापिनि परे तत्त्वे ह्युत्क्रान्त्या किं प्रयोजनम् ॥

इति। एवंविधाप्यन्ये तीर्थान्तरपरिकल्पिता बहवो मोक्षभेदाः सन्ति ते प्रतन्यमाना ग्रन्थगौरवभयमानय-न्तीति नेह प्रतन्यन्त इति सर्वत्र द्वैतमलस्य संभवादमोक्षे मोक्षलिप्सा मोक्षाभास एव। किं पुनर्मोक्षलक्षण-मित्याह **अज्ञान** इत्यादि। **अज्ञानम्** अख्यातिजनित आत्मन्यनात्माभिमानपूर्वोऽनात्मनि देहादावात्मा-भिमानलक्षणो मोहः स एव पूर्णस्वरूपसंकोचदायित्वाद्ग्रन्थिरिव **ग्रन्थिः** स्वस्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणस्य निजस्य व्या-पित्वादेर्देहाद्यभिमानतया बन्धस्तस्य **भित्** भेदनं निजपूर्णस्वात्मस्वातन्त्र्यपरिशीलनदार्ढ्याद्देहाद्यभिमा-नलक्षणस्य ग्रन्थेर्विदारणं तेन हेतुना **स्वशक्तिभिः** स्वात्मस्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणैर्धर्मैः **अभिव्यक्तता** स्वात्मशक्ति-विकस्वरतैष एव निरतिशयः **मोक्षः** इति। अयमाशयो यथा सहजनित्यव्यापकत्वादिधर्मयुक्तमाकाशमपि घटादिभित्तिबन्धसंकुचितं तत एव तदेवाव्यापकत्वादिधर्मयुक्तं घटाकाशमित्युच्यत आकाशाद्भिन्नमिव प्र-थते पुनरपि घटादिभित्तिकृतसंकोचभङ्गात्तदेव घटाद्याकाशं तदेव व्यापकत्वादिधर्मयुक्तं स्यान्न पुनस्तस्य घटादिभङ्गान्नूतनः कश्चिद्धर्माविर्भाव आयातीति। तथैव देहाद्यभिमानकृतसंकोचसंकुचितं चैतन्यं बद्धमि-वेत्युच्यते तदेव पुनः स्वस्वरूपज्ञानाभिव्यक्तेर्देहादिप्रमातृताबन्धसंक्षयात्स्वशक्तिविवेकविकस्वरं मुक्तमि-वेत्यभिमानमात्रसारौ परिमितप्रमात्रपेक्षया बन्धमौक्षौ न पुनः परमार्थे संवित्तत्त्व एवं किंचित्संभवतीति। तस्मान्मुक्तौ नूतनं न किंचित्साध्यते निजमेव स्वरूपं प्रथते। एतदेव विष्णुधर्मेष्वप्युक्तम्

यथोदपानकरणात्क्रियते न जलाम्बरम् ।
सदेव नीयते व्यक्तिमसतः संभवः कुतः ॥
भिन्ने दृतौ यथा वायुर्नैवान्यः सह वायुना ।
क्षीणपुण्याघबन्धस्तु तथात्मा ब्रह्मणा सह ॥

इति ॥ ६० ॥

एवं प्रक्षीणाज्ञानबन्धो ज्ञानी परानुग्रहार्थं शरीरमपि धारयन्मुक्त इत्यावेदयति

भिन्नाज्ञानग्रन्थिर्गतसंदेहः पराकृतभ्रान्तिः ।
प्रक्षीणपुण्यपापो विग्रहयोगेऽप्यसौ मुक्तः ॥ ६१ ॥

शरीरसंबन्धेऽपि स्वात्मज्ञानविच्छरीराद्यभिमानाभावाज्जीवन्नपि **मुक्तः** विकस्वरशक्तिर्भवेत् । ननु वि-ग्रहयोग एव बन्धः कथं तत्संबन्धेऽप्यसौ मुक्तः स्यादित्याह **भिन्न** इत्यादि। भिन्नो विदारितोऽज्ञानरूपो ग्रन्थिरपूर्णत्वख्यातिसमुत्थो देहाद्यभिमानरूपो बन्धो येन स एवम् । तथा **गतसंदेहः** इत्यत एव नष्टसं-शयः। **पराकृता** न्यक्कृता परमाद्वयज्ञानलाभात् **भ्रान्तिः** द्वयरूपो भ्रमो येन स तथेति। एवं परिशीलनेन प्रक्षीणानि पुण्यापुण्यानि विगलितसंस्काराणि देहात्ममानित्वाभावाद्धर्माधर्माणि यस्य स एवंविध इति।

अनेन **अज्ञानमेव बन्धः** इति प्रतिपादितम् । तच्च विग्रहयोगेऽपि यस्य प्रक्षीणं स तदैव जीवन्नेव मुक्तो न पुनः शरीरयोगो बन्धस्तदपगमो मुक्तिरिति किं तु देहपातात्पूर्णो मोक्ष इति ॥ ६१ ॥

जीवन्मुक्तस्य कर्महेतौ शरीरे स्थितेऽपि शरीरयात्रामात्रार्थं ज्ञानेद्धं कुर्वाणस्य कर्म न फलाय तस्य भवतीत्यत्रोपपत्तिमाह

अग्न्यभिदग्धं बीजं यथा प्ररोहासमर्थतामेति ।
ज्ञानाग्निदग्धमेवं कर्म न जन्मप्रदं भवति ॥ ६२ ॥

वह्निनिर्भृष्टं शालिबीजं क्षितिसलिलातपमध्यवर्त्यपि सामग्रीवैकल्याद्यथाङ्कुरादिजननेऽशक्ततां याति तथैव **ज्ञानाग्निना दग्धम्** परमाद्वयबोधदीप्त्या प्लुष्टम् **कर्म** यथाहमेवेत्थं विश्वात्मना स्फुरामीत्येवंरूपेण देहाद्यात्ममानित्वहानेर्हेयोपादेयबुद्धिपरित्यागेन यत्किंचिच्छुभाशुभं कर्म क्रियमाणं तद्दग्धवीर्यं न पुनर्ज्ञानिनः पिण्डपातादनन्तरं जन्मफलप्रदम् **भवति** देहनिर्माणहेतुः संपद्यते दग्धं बीजमिवाङ्कुरे । तस्मान्न सर्वाहंभावरूपायाश्चितिशक्तेरफलाभिसंधानतया कृतं कर्म भूयो जन्म दातुं प्रभवतीति ॥ ६२ ॥

एवं पुनर्विकस्वरापि चितिशक्तिः कथंकारं देहवती स्यादित्याह

परिमितबुद्धित्वेन हि कर्मौचितभाविदेहभावनया ।
सङ्कुचिता चितिरेतद्देहध्वंसे तथा भाति ॥ ६३ ॥

यस्मात् **परिमितबुद्धित्वेन** अख्यातिजनितेन देहाद्यभिमानवासनापूर्वककामनाकालुष्यनिश्चयेन यत्कृतम् **कर्म** यथाहमश्वमेधेन यक्ष्य इहामुत्र च सुखी भूयासं मा कदाचन दुःख्यहं भूयासममुना कर्मणा वैन्द्रं पदं प्राप्नुयामित्येवं वासनाविशिष्टस्य कर्तुरेवमनुगुणं कर्म तस्य मनोवासनालब्धप्ररूढेः कर्मणः **उचितः** तदनुगुणफलभोक्तृतायोग्योऽसौ **भावी देहः** प्रारब्धकर्मफलभोक्तृशरीराधिकारपरिक्षयाद्यदुत्तरत्र भविष्यच्छरीरं तस्य या **भावना** अमुनाश्वमेधादिकर्मणा साम्राज्याद्याप्नुयामित्यभिमतकर्मफलवासनाधिरूढिस्तया कर्मौचितभाविदेहभावनयेयं सर्वतः पूर्णापि चितिशक्तिराणवमायीयमलमूलेन कार्ममलेनाघ्राता **संकुचिता** व्यापिन्यपि घटाकाशवत्कर्मानुगुणफलभोक्तृशरीरवासनावच्छेदवती संपन्ना सती **एतद्देहध्वंसे तथा भवति** इति । **एतस्य** प्रारब्धस्य कर्मफलस्य यो भोक्ता **देहः** तस्य भोगपरिक्षयाद्यः **ध्वंसः** मृतिस्तस्मिन्देहध्वंसे सति सा **चितिः** उद्भूतकर्मवासना **तथा भवति** येनाशयेन पूर्वकर्मफलमुपार्जितं तत्कर्मफलभोक्ता यो देहस्तद्वती संपद्यते यद्वशाच्चितिरपि स्वर्गनरकादिभोगभाजनं स्यात् । तस्माच्छरीरीभूत्वा परिमितफललौल्याद्यत्कृतं कर्म तत्फलभोक्तृ जन्म दातुमवश्यं प्रभवति । यत्पुनरशरीरीभूत्वा सर्वं ब्रह्मास्मीति संविद्रूपतया कृतं तद्वासनाप्ररोहानासादनात्कथं व्यापिन्याश्चितिशक्तेर्जन्मने स्यादिति तात्पर्यार्थः ॥ ६३ ॥

एवमनात्मतया समुचितं कर्म संसरणाय प्रमातुर्भवतीति चेत्तर्ह्यात्मस्वरूपं वक्तव्यं येन संसारी न स्यादिति प्रतिपादितमपि शिष्यजनहृदयङ्गमीकर्तुं पुनः कथयति

यदि पुनरमलं बोधं सर्वसमुत्तीर्णबोद्धृकर्तृमयम् ।
विततमनस्तमितोदितभारूपं सत्यसंकल्पम् ॥ ६४ ॥

दिक्कालकलनविकलं ध्रुवमव्ययमीश्वरं सुपरिपूर्णम् ।
बहुतरशक्तिव्रातप्रलयोदयविरचनैककर्तारम् ॥ ६५ ॥

सृष्ट्यादिविधिसुवेधसमात्मानं शिवमयं विबुध्येत ।
कथमिव संसारी स्याद्विततस्य कुतः क्व वा सरणम् ॥ ६६ ॥

यदि पुनः परशक्तिपातविद्धहृदयः प्रमाता देहादिप्रमातृताभिमानमधस्पदीकृत्य **स्वात्मानं शिवमयं विबुध्येत** चिदानन्दैकघनं विजानीयात्स परिज्ञातस्वात्ममहेश्वरभावः **कथमिव** केन प्रकारेण **संसारी** संसरणशीलो भवेन्न स्यादिति यावद्यतश्चिदचिद्रूपपुर्यष्टकात्मा कार्ममलसंबन्धेन संसरति यः पुनश्चिदेकमूर्तिः शिवमयः प्रक्षीणाणवादिमलकञ्चुकः स कथं संसारीति तात्पर्यम् । ननु चिदेकमूर्तिः स्यात्संसारी च भवेदिति किं दुष्येदित्येवमाशङ्क्याह **वितत** इत्यादि । **विततस्य** अनवच्छिन्नदेशकालाकारस्य प्रमातुर्देहाद्यभिमानपूर्वस्वकृतवासनापरिक्षयात्पूर्णस्य तस्य **कुतः सरणम्** सर्वव्यापित्वात्तदतिरिक्तं किमस्ति यद्वस्त्वपेक्ष्य ततो विश्लिष्टोऽन्यत्र भिन्ने संसरणं गमनं कुर्याद्यतो देहादिप्रमातृताभिमानावच्छिन्नस्य किलापादानाधिकरणादिकारकसंभवो यः पुनश्चिदेकघनो ब्रह्मभूतोऽनवच्छिन्नदेशकालः प्रमाता तस्य संसरणे वाचोयुक्तिरपि न भवेदिति । कीदृशं शिवरूपमात्मानं विबुध्येतेत्याह **अमलं बोधम्** इत्यादि । अपगत आणवादिमलप्रचयो यस्य तमत एव वैमल्यात् **बोधम्** शुद्धचैतन्यम् । तथा **सर्वसमुत्तीर्णम्** निरतिशयं ज्ञानक्रियास्वातन्त्र्यं प्रकृतं यस्येति तम् **विततम्** देशादिकृतविच्छेदाभावाद्व्यापिनम् । तथाविद्यमानेऽस्तोदिते प्रलयोदयौ यस्याः **भासः** बोधदीप्तेः सैव **रूपम्** देहो यस्य तम् । अन्यच्च **सत्याः** परमार्थाः **संकल्पाः** स्वेच्छाविहारा यस्य यद्यदिच्छति तत्तथैव भवतीति तमेवंविधम् । तथा दिक्कालाकारकलनाभिश्चर्चाभिर्विरहितं व्यापित्वनित्यत्वधर्मयोगादत एव **ध्रुवम्** कूटस्थम् **अव्ययम्** अविनाशिनम् । तथा **ईश्वरम्** स्वतन्त्रम् । अन्यच्च तथा **सुपरिपूर्णम्** सुष्ठु निराकाङ्क्षम् । तदनु **बहुतराणि** प्रभूतानि शब्दराशिसमुत्थानि ब्राह्म्यादिशक्त्यधिष्ठितानि घटपटादिशक्तिव्रातानि तेषां लयोत्पत्तिविधौ स्वतन्त्रम् । अन्यच्च **सृष्ट्यादिविधिसुवेधसम्** सुप्रवीणम् **वेधसम्** विधातारमित्येवमादिविशेषणैः सर्वतः परिपूर्णं स्वात्ममहेश्वरं जानानो यत्किंचिदपि कुर्वाणो दग्धकर्मबीजो न पुनः संसारभाग्जीवन्नेव विमुक्तो भवेदिति यावत् ॥ ६४ ॥ ६५ ॥ ६६ ॥

एवं स्वात्मप्रत्यवमर्शोपपत्त्या ज्ञानिना विगलितकर्मफलाभिलाषेण कृतमपि कर्म न फलायेत्यावेदयन्स्वानुभवसिद्धं लोकदृष्टान्तमाह

इति युक्तिभिरपि सिद्धं यत्कर्म ज्ञानिनो न सफलं तत् ।
न ममेदमपि तु तस्येति दार्ढ्यतो नहि फलं लोके ॥ ६७ ॥

अहमेव चिद्घनः स्वतन्त्रः सर्वप्रमात्रन्तरतमत्वेन सर्वकर्मकारी नाहं वा कर्ता पारमेश्वरी स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिरित्थं करोतीति मम शुद्धचैतन्यरूपस्यैतावता किमायातम् **इति युक्तिभिः** प्राक्प्रतिपादितस्वरूपाभिरुपपत्तिभिर्व्याख्यातस्वात्मस्वरूपविदः प्रमातुरुभयथा देहाद्यहंभावाभावाद्धेयोपादेयशून्यत्वेन **यत्सिद्धं कर्म** निष्पन्नमपि कृतम् **न सफलम्** न तत्फलेन युज्यते तस्यात्मज्ञानिनः प्रतिपादितवदुभयथा कृत्रिमत्वाभावात्कृतमपि कर्म कुत्र फलेन योगं कुर्याद्देहादिप्रमातृताभिमानस्वभावाश्रयाभावान्न कुत्रचिदिति यावत् । कृतस्य कर्मणो या प्रमातुः फलाभिमानरूढिरेष एवाश्रयो ज्ञानिनस्त्वभिमानाभावात्स्वस्मिन्नूप एव प्रक्षीणं

कर्म न फलेन संबध्यत इति। नन्वभिमानादेव कर्म फलेन युज्यत इति कुत्र यथेत्याह **न ममेदमपि** इत्यादि। दृष्टं चैतन्नापूर्वं यथा **न ममेदम्** यज्ञादिकं कर्म **अपि तु तस्य** कस्याप्यर्थवतो यजमानस्य **इति** अनया बुद्ध्या कृतमपि यज्ञादिकं कर्म **लोके** मूल्यार्थितया फलाभिमानाभावान्न यतस्तत्कर्म पारलौकिकेन फलेन युक्तं कल्पते। तथा हि यजन्ति याजका यजते यजमान इति न्यायेन यजतामृत्विजां यज्ञकर्म स्वयं कृतवतामपीदमश्वमेधादिकं यज्ञकर्म नास्माकं किंचिदपि तु दीक्षितस्य पुण्यवतो वयं किलेह यज्ञकर्माणि नियमितमूल्यमात्रार्थिनोऽत्र न केचनैव यजमानः पुनरमुना कर्मणा स्वर्गादिफलभागपीति तेषां कर्मफलाभिमानाभावान्न स्वयं कृतमपि कर्म तदीयेन स्वर्गादिना फलेन युज्यते यजमानस्तु तत्र यज्ञकर्म स्वयमकुर्वाण ऋत्विग्भिर्निर्वर्त्यकर्ममुखप्रेक्ष्यपि ममेदमश्वमेधादिकं यज्ञकर्म मदीयेन धनेनाम्यृत्विजः कर्मणि प्रवृत्ता इति ममैव स्वर्गादिफलं देहपातादवश्यंभावीत्यकुर्वाणस्यापि यथा समीहितकर्मफलाभिमानदार्ढ्यात्तत्तस्य कर्म फलेन युज्यते। अत एव कर्त्रभिप्राये क्रियाफल इति दीक्षितात्कर्तुर्यजते यजमान इत्यात्मनेपदं कर्त्रनभिप्राये तु परस्मैपदं यजन्ति याजका इति। इयान्महिमा दुर्लङ्घ्यो विकल्पस्वातन्त्र्यस्य यत्स्वयं कृतमपि कर्म फलाभिमानाभावात्तत्फलेन न युज्यतेऽन्यैः कृतमपि कर्म **ममेदम्** इत्यभिमानदार्ढ्यात्फलयुक्तं स्यात्तस्मादृत्विग्व्यापारवत्क्रियमाणं योगिना कर्म फलाभिमानाभावान्न तत्सफलं भवेदिति ॥ ६७ ॥

एवं सर्वकर्मसु हेयोपादेयकल्पनाकलङ्कपरित्यक्तबुद्धिर्ज्ञानी दीप्तः स्यादित्याह

इत्थं सकलविकल्पान्प्रतिबुद्धो भावनासमीरणतः।
आत्मज्योतिषि दीप्ते जुह्वज्ज्योतिर्मयो भवति ॥ ६८ ॥

इत्थम् व्याख्यातेन प्रकारेण या **भावना** अहमेव चैतन्यमहेश्वरः सर्वात्मना सर्वदैवं स्फुरामीति यात्मनि विमर्शरूढिः सैव शनैः प्रसरन्ती **समीरणः** वायुरिव तेन ज्ञानी **प्रतिबुद्धः** भस्मच्छन्नो वायुना प्रतिबोधितो वह्निर्यथा **सकलविकल्पान्** पशुरस्मि कर्मबन्धबद्धो देहरूपी ममेदं पुत्रदाराद्यमुना कर्मणा स्वर्गो निरयो वा भविष्यतीत्यादिसर्वाः कल्पना अहमेवेदं सर्वमिति परामर्शशेषीभूताः **आत्मज्योतिषि** चैतन्यकृशानौ **दीप्ते** पराहन्ताचमत्कारसारे **जुह्वत्** अविकल्पकसंविद्रूपानुप्रवेशेन समर्पयन्स **ज्योतिर्मयो भवति** दाह्यविकल्पेन्धनपरिक्षयाद्दाहकाकारश्चिदग्निरेव संपद्यते परप्रमात्रेकवपुरसाववशिष्यत इति यावत् ॥ ६८ ॥

एवं व्याख्यातेन प्रकारेण यः प्रकृष्टज्ञानयोगाभ्यासरतः स शेषवर्तनया कथं कालमतिवाहयतीत्याह

अश्नन्यद्वा तद्वा संवीतो येन केनचिच्छान्तः।
यत्र क्वचन निवासी विमुच्यते सर्वभूतात्मा ॥ ६९ ॥

यत्किंचित्पुरः पतितमदनयोग्यं पदार्थम् **अश्नन्** चमत्कुर्वन्न पुनर्नियमेनेदं पवित्रमिदमपवित्रमिदं कदन्नमिदं मिष्टान्नमिति हेयोपादेयकल्पनाविरहादयत्नेनापतितं यदपि तदपि समाहरन् । तथा **संवितो येन** इत्यादि। कन्थया चर्मणा वल्कलेन वा तूलपटादिना दिव्यात्मवस्त्रैर्वा समाच्छादित इत्युभयथोत्कर्षापकर्षाभावाच्छरीराच्छादनार्थक्रियार्थी भूत्वा नापि किंचिद्द्वेष्टि नापि स्तौतीति। कथमेतद्यतः सः **शान्तः** सुखदुःखादिविकल्पनातिक्रान्त इति। तथा **यत्र क्वचन निवासी** इति। **यत्र क्वचन** यादृशे तादृशे स्थाने स्वपरिश्रयमात्रार्थी न पुनस्तस्य क्षेत्रायतनतीर्थादि पवित्रत्वात्स्वीकार्यं भवति नापि श्मशानश्वपचसदनाद्यपवित्रत्वात्परिहार्यं स्यादयत्नेन यद्यत्स्थानमापतितं तत्तदधिवसति पवित्रापवित्रकल्पनाकलङ्कविरहात् ।

विमुच्यते इत्येवमपि शेषवर्तनया परानुग्रहार्थप्रवृत्तः कालमतिवाहयन् **विमुच्यते** परमशिवीभवति। उ-क्तं च

> येन केनचिदाच्छन्नो येन केनचिदाशितः।
> यत्र क्वचन शायी यस्तं देवा ब्राह्मणं विदुः ॥

इति। मोक्षधर्मेष्वपि

> अनियतफलभक्ष्यभोज्यपेयं विधिपरिणामविभक्तदेशकालम् ।
> हृदयसुखमसेवितं कदर्यैर्व्रतमिदमाजगरं शुचिश्चरामि ॥

इति। कथमेवमपि कुर्वञ्ज्ञानी स्वयं मुच्येतेत्याह **सर्वभूतात्मा** इति। यतः स ज्ञानी सर्वभूतात्मा सर्वेषां भूतानामात्मा सर्वाणि च भूतानि तस्यात्मेति कृत्वा न किंचिद्बन्धकतया भवति सर्वं विमुक्तयेऽस्य संपद्यत इति ॥ ६९ ॥

नाप्येवंरूपस्य निरभिमानस्य यत्किंचित्कुर्वतोऽपि पुण्यपापसंभव इत्याह

> **हयमेधशतसहस्राण्यपि कुरुते ब्रह्मघातलक्षाणि।**
> **परमार्थविन्न पुण्यैर्न च पापैः स्पृश्यते विमलः ॥ ७० ॥**

य एवम् **परमार्थवित्** स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्वभावसतत्त्वज्ञः सोऽश्वमेधराजसूयाप्तोर्यामादियज्ञान्निःसंख्यान्फलकामनाभिमानविरहात्कर्तव्यतामात्रमिदमित्येवं कृत्वा क्रीडार्थं यदि कदाचिद्विहितानि कर्माणि विदधात्यथवा ब्रह्महननसुरापानस्तैन्यादीनि प्रमादोपनतानि महापातकान्यविहितान्यप्यशरीरतया चेत्युभयथाहं ममेत्यभिमानाभावात्परमेश्वरेच्छैवेत्थं विजृम्भते मम किमायातमिति बुद्ध्या न **पुण्यैः** शुभफलैर्नापि **पापैः** अशुभैः स ज्ञानी **स्पृश्यते** मलिनीक्रियत इति। कथमेतदित्याह **विमलः** इति। यतस्तस्य विगताः प्रक्षीणा आणवमायीयकार्ममलाः संसरणहेतव इति। एवं मलिनस्य हि प्रमातुर्विच्छिन्नदेहादिप्रमातृतयात्मात्मीयाभिमानभावो येन ममेदं कर्म शुभमिदमशुभमित्यभिमानदौरात्म्यात्पुण्यपापसंचययोगः स्याद्यस्य कर्मफलसंचयो ममत्वहेतुर्मलप्रचयो विगतः स्यात्तस्याभिमानाभावात्कथं पुण्यपापस्पर्शः। यथा श्रीभगवद्गीतासु

> यस्य नाहंकृतो भावो बुद्धिर्यस्य न लिप्यते।
> हत्वापि स इमांल्लोकान्न हन्ति न निबध्यते ॥

इति ॥ ७० ॥

एवंविधस्य ज्ञानिनो नियतचर्यां परामृशन्नाह

> **मदहर्षकोपमन्मथविषादभयलोभमोहपरिवर्जी।**
> **निःस्तोत्रवषट्कारो जड इव विचरेदवादमतिः ॥ ७१ ॥**

मदः देहप्रमातृताभिमानः **हर्षः** अलब्धस्य लाभात्प्रमोदः **कोपः** क्रोधः **मन्मथः** संभोगाभिलाषः **विषादः** इष्टवियोगान्मूढत्वम् **भयम्** शत्रोः सिंहव्याघ्रादेर्वा दरः **लोभः** कार्पण्यम् **मोहः** भूतेष्वात्मात्मीयभाव इत्येतान्देहसंस्कारप्रत्यवमर्शान्मध्ये मध्ये समायातानपि सर्वं ब्रह्मास्मीति परिवर्जयत्यविकल्पकसंविद्रूपानुप्रवेशेन स्वात्मप्रत्यवमर्शशेषीभूतान्संपादयति। तथा निर्गतः स्तोत्रवषट्कारेभ्यो यः स एवं स्तुत्यस्य व्यतिरिक्तस्याभावान्न तस्य स्तोत्राद्युपयोगो नापि वषडादिमन्त्रसंश्रयो भिन्नस्य देवताविशेषस्य विरहात्केवलं सः **जड इव विचरेदवादमतिः** इति। पूर्णत्वादाकाङ्क्षाविरहाच्चोन्मत्त इवेतिकर्तव्यतारूपे शास्त्रीये कर्मणि प्रमाणोपपन्ने वा प्रमेयसतत्त्वे प्रमातृभिः सहेदमुपपन्नमिदं नेति विचारबहिष्कृतबुद्धिर्नापि स्वात्मन्युपदेशमपेक्षते परानुपदेष्टुं वा प्रमेयमुपन्यस्यतीति दान्तप्रायो भूत्वा सर्वं ब्रह्मावलोकयन्क्रीडार्थं विहरेदेवेति जडत्वेन निरूपितः ॥ ७१ ॥

एवमपि परिवर्ज्यमानेनापि मदादिवर्गेण वयमिव ज्ञानी सति शरीरे किमिव न स्पृश्यत इत्यत्र कारणमाह

मदहर्षप्रभृतिरयं वर्गः प्रभवति विभेदसंमोहात् ।
अद्वैतात्मविबोधस्तेन कथं स्पृश्यतां नाम ॥ ७२ ॥

समनन्तरकारिकाव्याख्यातः **मदादिवर्गोऽयं विभेदसंमोहात्** इत्यात्मात्मीयरूपो यः **विभेदसंमोहः** अपूर्णत्वख्यातिस्ततः **प्रभवति** पशुप्रमातृभ्यो द्वैतभ्रान्त्या हेयोपादेयतया समुत्पद्यते। यः पुनः सर्वं ब्रह्मास्मीति परमाद्वयात्मबोधः प्रकृष्टज्ञान्याकाशकल्पः सः **तेन** मदादिवर्गेण **कथं नाम स्पृश्यताम्** केन प्रकारेणाबिलीक्रियतां भिन्नं वस्तु भिन्नस्य हि कदाचित्स्वरूपमर्पयतां ब्रह्मभूतत्वेन गृहीतो मदादिवर्गो ब्रह्मभूतस्य ज्ञानिनः समानजातेः कथं विरोधाय स्यादिति ॥ ७२ ॥

बाह्यस्तवनहवनवर्गोऽपि द्वैतसमाश्रय एव न तस्य परितोषायालमित्याह

स्तुत्यं वा होतव्यं नास्ति व्यतिरिक्तमस्य किंचन च।
स्तोत्रादिना स तुष्येन्मुक्तस्तन्निर्नमस्कृतिवषट्कः ॥ ७३ ॥

स्तुत्यम् किंचिद्देवतारूपम् **होतव्यं वा** किंचिज्ज्ञानिनोऽद्वयबोधरूपस्य **न व्यतिरिक्तम्** भिन्नरूपं विद्यते यत्स्तूयते हूयते वेति। नापि **कर्तव्यम्** इत्येवंरूपतया च **स्तोत्रादिना सः** आत्मज्ञः परितोषं यात्यभेदबोधसंभोगेन हि नित्यानन्दमयत्वात्कृत्रिममानन्दं नाद्रियते तस्मान्निर्गतो नमस्कृतिवषट्केभ्यो यः स एव **मुक्तः** वेदान्तेषु एवंस्तुत इति ॥ ७३ ॥

न च तस्य भिन्नेन देवगृहेणोपयोगः स्वशरीरमेवात्मदेवताधिष्ठानं संविदाश्रयो वा नान्यः कश्चिदिति नो भिन्नं देवगृहमस्येत्याह

षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वभृतं विग्रहरचनागवाक्षपरिपूर्णम् ।
निजमन्यदथ शरीरं घटादि वा तस्य देवगृहम् ॥ ७४ ॥

तस्य ज्ञानिनो निजः परकीयो वा देह एव देवतावेश्म स्वात्मदेवताया भोग्याधारत्वात् । बाह्यस्तु मेर्वादिप्रासादस्तदा देवगृहीभवति यदा गुरुणा शरीरव्याप्त्या षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वकलनरूपया परिकल्पितः स्यात्तद्गतो बाह्योऽपि देवः स्वात्मव्याप्त्या चिद्घनत्वेन परिगृहीतश्चेत्तदा सोऽपि तत्र देवो भवेदन्यथोभयमेतज्जडं

शिलाशकलकल्पमेव कथं भक्तानुद्धरेन्मृतान्सामीप्यादि वा नयेदित्येवं मुख्यया वृत्त्या **शरीरम्** संविदाश्रयत्वाद्देवगृहं तद्वतः सर्वेषामपि स्वात्मा देव इति देह एव संप्रबुद्धस्य देवगृहम् । कीदृशं तदित्याह **षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्व** इति। बाह्यं षट्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वव्याप्त्या परिकल्प्यते परं देहदेवगृहं पुनः साक्षात्षट्त्रिंशता तत्त्वैः **भृतम्** पोषितम् । बाह्यदेवगृहे गवाक्षरचना भवतीदं तु **विग्रहरचनागवाक्षपरिपूर्णम्** इति **विग्रहे** शरीरे **रचना** इन्द्रियद्वारपरिपाटिः सैव तमोरिकल्पना तया **परिपूर्णम्** अक्षुण्णमिति बाह्यदेवगृहसदृशम् । न केवलं सरीरं संविद् आश्रय इति कृत्वा देवगृहं यावद्यत्किंचिद्वा संविदधिष्ठितं तत्सर्वं तस्य देवगृहमित्याह **घटादि वा** इति। घटाद्युपलक्षितं विषयपञ्चकमिदं भोग्यरूपं चक्षुरादिद्वारेण संविदाधिष्ठितम्

भोक्तैव भोग्यभावेन सदा सर्वत्र संस्थितः ।

इति स्पन्दशास्त्रोपदेशदृशा संविन्मयमेव ज्ञानिनो भूतशरीरवद्घटादि विश्वं भावशरीरमिति कृत्वा तदप्यभिन्नं स्वशरीरवत् **देवगृहम्** देवस्य क्रीडावतः स्वतन्त्रस्य स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्य **गृहम्** भोग्याधिष्ठानमिति ॥ ७४ ॥

बाह्यदेवगृहे किल भक्तः पुष्पाद्याहरणपूर्वं देवपूजापरो दृष्टो देहदेवगृहे पुनर्ज्ञानी किं कुर्वन्नधितिष्ठतीत्याह

तत्र च परमात्ममहाभैरवशिवदेवतां स्वशक्तियुताम् ।
आत्मामर्शनविमलद्रव्यैः परिपूजयन्नास्ते ॥ ७५ ॥

तस्मिन्स्वदेहदेवगृहे प्रकृष्टयोगी **परमः** सर्वातिशायी यश्चैतन्यलक्षणः **आत्मा** स एव निःशेषशब्दादिविषयोपभोगविलायनप्रगल्भत्वात् **भैरवः** भरणरवणवमनस्वभावः स एव **शिवदेवता** प्रकृष्टश्रेयोरूपो देवस्ताम् **परिपूजयन्नास्ते** अनवरतं वक्ष्यमाणेन क्रमेण तां तर्पयन्परिस्फुरेत् । ननु बाह्यदेवता परिवारयुता भवत्येतां किंपरिवारयुतां समर्चयेदित्याह **स्वशक्तियुताम्** इति। **स्वाः** चैतन्यरश्मिरूपाश्चिन्निर्वृतीच्छाज्ञानक्रियाशक्तीनां विभवात्मिकाश्चक्षुरादिकरणशक्तयस्ताभिः **युताम्** समन्तादावृताम् । कैः परिपूजयन्नास्त इत्याह **आत्मामर्शन** इत्यादि। स्वात्मैवेदं सर्वमिति यत् **आमर्शनम्** सर्वपदार्थानां संविद्रूपतया पूर्णाहन्ताविश्रान्तिलक्षणो यः परामर्शस्तेन द्वैतकालुष्यकलङ्कपरिक्षयात् **विमलानि** यानि शब्दादिविषयपञ्चकरूपाणि पूजार्थम् **द्रव्याणि** जाड्यापगमेन विशुद्धानि तैरात्मामर्शनविमलद्रव्यैरिति। अयमाशयो ज्ञानी हेयोपादेयभेदकलङ्कपरित्यागेनायत्नोपनतं शब्दादिविषयपञ्चकं श्रोत्रादिकरणदेवीभिः समाहृत्यान्तश्चमत्कुर्वन्स्वात्मनाभेदमापादयतीत्येवमनवरतं प्रतिविषयस्वीकारकाले योऽन्तरभेदेन चमत्कारः पूर्णाहन्तास्फुरणमेतदेव स्वात्मदेवतापूजनमत एव शब्दादयो विषयाः पूजोपकरणमित्यवधानवता विषयग्रहणकाले प्रतिक्षणं स्वात्मदेवतापूजकेन भाव्यमिति रहस्यविदः। एतदेव स्तुतिद्वारेण राजानकरामो दृब्धवान्यथा

नित्योद्दामसमुद्यमाहृतजगद्भावोपहारार्पण-
व्यग्राभिस्तव तैजसीप्रभृतिभिर्यच्छक्तिभिस्तर्प्यते ।
तन्मांसास्रवसास्थिकूटकलिले काये श्मशानालये
रूपं दर्शय भैरवं भवनिशासंचारवीरस्य मे ॥

इति ॥ ७५ ॥

पूजान्ते तावदग्निहवनेन भाव्यमिति ज्ञानिनः कथं तदित्याह

बहिरन्तरपरिकल्पनभेदमहाबीजनिचयमर्पयतः ।
तस्यातिदीप्तसंविज्ज्वलने यत्नाद्विना भवति होमः ॥ ७६ ॥

तस्य एवंविधस्य स्वात्मदेवतापूजकस्य **अतिदीप्ते** पराहन्ताचमत्कारभास्वरे चैतन्याग्नौ **यत्नाद्विना** तिलाज्येन्धनादिस्वीकारकदर्थनाया ऋते **होमः** वह्नितर्पणं संपद्यते । किं कुर्वत इत्याह **बहिरन्तर** इत्यादि । **बहिः** नीलादौ प्रमेये यत्स्वपरप्रमातृकल्पनमन्तर्ग्राह्ये सुखादौ च यत्संकल्पनमित्येवंरूपो यः **भेदः** बाह्याबाह्ययोः प्रमातृप्रमेययोर्निश्चयसंकल्पनाभिमानवृत्तिस्वभावं नानात्वमेतदेव **महाबीजम्** प्रमातृप्रमेययोस्ततः समुत्पत्तेस्तस्य कल्पनारूपस्य भेदबीजभूतस्य **निचयः** भेदस्यानन्त्याद्राशिस्तम् **अर्पयतः** परमाद्वयदृष्ट्याविकल्पकसंविद्रूपानुप्रवेशेन स्वात्मवह्नौ जुह्वत इति । अयमाशयः परब्रह्मात्मकस्य योगिनो देहादिप्रमातृताभिमानाभावाद्यः स्वरससिद्धः स्वपरप्रमातृप्रमेयकलनपरिक्षयः स एवाकृत्रिमो होमः । यथाह भट्टश्रीवीरवामनः

यत्रेन्धनं द्वैतवनं मृत्युरेव महापशुः ।
अलौकिकेन यज्ञेन तेन नित्यं यजामहे ॥

इति ॥ ७६ ॥

एवंरूपस्य याजकस्य ध्यानमाह

ध्यानमनस्तमितं पुनरेष हि भगवान्विचित्ररूपाणि ।
सृजति तदेव ध्यानं संकल्पालिखितसत्यरूपत्वम् ॥ ७७ ॥

नियताकारचिन्तितस्याकारस्यान्यत्र मनोवृत्तेर्गमनात्क्षयोऽस्तीदम् **पुनरनस्तमितं ध्यानम्** यस्मात् **एष भगवान्** अप्यनन्तः स्वात्मरूपो महेश्वरः क्रियाशक्तिस्वभावविकल्पस्वातन्त्र्येण यानि **विचित्राणि रूपाणि सृजति** अनवरतं नानापदार्थान्विकल्परूपानाकारान्बुद्धिदर्पणे समुल्लिखति **तदेव** अस्तोदयवर्जितमेतस्य **ध्यानम्** चिन्तनं नातोऽन्यत्किंचित् । इतरत्र तु देवताविशेषे नानावक्त्राङ्गपरिकल्पनया नैयत्यं स्यात् । सर्वो मनोव्यापारः पराशक्तिस्फारपल्लवभूत इति जानानस्यानवच्छिन्नमिदं सर्वं परमेश्वरीभूतम् । तथा **संकल्पेन** मनसा **आलिखितम्** संविद्भित्तौ चित्रीकृतम् **सत्यरूपत्वम्** परमार्थता यस्य ध्यानस्य तत् । एवं यतः सर्वमिदं प्रकाशमानं विकल्पोल्लिखितं मनोव्यापाररूपमपि प्रकाशानतिरिक्तं सत्यं सर्वत्र संविदनुगमादिति । तदुक्तं श्रीमत्स्वच्छन्दशास्त्रे

यत्र यत्र मनो याति तत्र तत्रैव धारयेत् ।
चलित्वा कुत्र गन्तासि सर्वं शिवमयं यतः ॥

इति । तथा शैवोपनिषदि

यत्र यत्र मनो याति बाह्ये वाभ्यन्तरे प्रिये ।
तत्र तत्र शिवावस्था व्यापकत्वात्क्व यास्यति ॥

इति । तस्मात्स्वरसोदितमेतद्योगिनो ध्यानमिति ॥ ७७ ॥

जपश्चास्य कीदृशः स्यादित्याह

भुवनावलीं समस्तां तत्त्वक्रमकल्पनामथाक्षगणम् ।
अन्तर्बोधे परिवर्तयति च यत्सोऽस्य जप उदितः ॥ ७८ ॥

वक्ष्यमाणेन क्रमेण यो विश्वस्य प्रतिक्षणमभेदेन पराहन्ताप्रत्यवमर्शः **सः** अयम् **अस्य जप उदितः** अकृत्रिमत्वेन कथितः । कोऽसावित्याह **भुवनावलीं समस्ताम्** षड्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वसमूहान्तर्वर्तिनीं चतुर्विंशत्युत्तरशतद्वयसंख्यातां प्राकारपङ्क्तिं निःशेषां तथा **तत्त्वक्रमकल्पनाम्** इति **तत्त्वक्रमस्य** आत्मविद्याशिवाख्यस्य **परिकल्पनाम्** परिच्छेदम् **अथाक्षगणम्** इत्यन्तर्बहिष्करणरूपमिन्द्रियसमूहं चेति **अन्तर्बोधे** मध्यमप्राणशक्त्यक्षसूत्रभूतायां स्वसंवित्तौ नादबिन्दुप्रवाहक्रमेण **यत्परिवर्तयति** अरघट्टघटीयन्त्रवत्प्रतिप्राणविक्षेपसृष्टिस्थितिसंहारक्रमेण सर्वमेतत्स्वसंवित्तौ परिभ्रमयति प्रतिक्षणं नादात्मना परामृशतीति यावत् । स एव पूर्णाहन्ताविश्रान्तिलक्षणोऽकृत्रिमोऽस्य जपः । अयमाशयो जपः किल वाच्यरूपाया देवताया वाचकस्य मन्त्रस्योच्चारः स चाक्षमालया प्राणशक्तिव्याप्तिकयाक्षपरिवर्तनक्रमेण संख्येयः । परमाद्वययोगिनस्तु स्वा प्राणशक्तिस्तन्तुभूता मध्यमप्राणे प्रवाहक्रमेण नदन्ती स्वरसोदिता सर्वाक्षक्रोडीकारेण सहजैवाक्षमालोच्यते यतः सर्वमिदं वाच्यं षड्त्रिंशत्तत्त्वात्मकं विश्वं प्राणशक्तावेव प्रतिष्ठितं सत्प्रतिप्राणविक्षेपमुदयव्ययक्रमेण परास्वभावा भगवती प्राणस्वरूपमाश्रित्य विमृशन्ती प्रतिप्राणस्पन्दमवधानवतो योगिनो जपमकृत्रिमं साधयति । अत्र जपसंख्या

एकविंशत्सहस्राणि षट्शतानि दिवानिशम् ।
जपो देव्याः समुद्दिष्टः सुलभो दुर्लभो जडैः ॥

इति शैवोपनिषदि । शिवसूत्रेषु

कथा जपः ।

इति । एवमेष वन्द्यचरणानामवधानवतामेव गोचर इति ॥ ७८ ॥

इदं व्रतमस्येत्याह

सर्वं समया दृष्ट्या यत्पश्यति यच्च संविदं मनुते ।
विश्वश्मशाननिरतां विग्रहखट्वाङ्गकल्पनाकलिताम् ॥ ७९ ॥

विश्वरसासवपूर्णं निजकरगं वेद्यखण्डककपालम् ।
रसयति च यत्तदेतद्व्रतमस्य सुदुर्लभं च सुलभं च ॥ ८० ॥

एवम् **यत्** वक्ष्यमाणम् **एतदेवास्य** ज्ञानिनः **व्रतम्** स्वात्मदेवतासमाराधनाय नियमः । कीदृशं तदाह **सुदुर्लभं च सुलभं च** इति । सुष्ठु कृत्वा दुःखेनाख्यातिपरिक्षयादन्योपायपरिहाररुपेण परमेश्वरानुग्रहेण लभ्यत इत्यतः **सुदुर्लभम्** तथा सुखेन बाह्यास्थिभस्माद्याभरणाहारनियमादिस्वीकारकदर्थनां च विना लभ्यत इत्यतः **सुलभं च**। किं तद्व्रतमित्याह **सर्वम्** इत्यादि । यत्सर्वमिदं प्रातीतिकं भेदावभासरूपं युक्त्यागमानुभवपरिशीलनेनाभेददृशा सर्वमिदमेकः स्फुरामीति समीक्षते । यथा श्रीभगवद्गीतासु

सर्वभूतस्थमात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चात्मनि।
ईक्षते योगयुक्तात्मा सर्वत्र समदर्शनः ॥

इत्यादि। एवमभेदबुद्धिदार्ढ्यमेव व्रतम् । अन्यच्च **यद्विश्वश्मशाननिरतां संविदं मनुते** तदपि व्रतम् । यथा **विश्वम्** ग्राह्यग्राहकस्वभावं घटदेहादिजडलक्षणपदार्थशवशतसमाक्रान्तमिति कृत्वा तदेव **श्मशानम्** पितृवनं यतः संविदेका भगवत्यजडातोऽन्यत्तदुल्लासितं सर्वमिदं शवस्थानीयं जडमतो विश्वस्य श्मशानेन साद‍ृश्यम् । तस्मिन् **विश्वश्मशाने** निःशेषेण **रतां संविदम्** समुत्पत्तिनिधनतया महाभीषणे मध्यवर्तिनीम् **मनुते** अवबुध्यते। व्रती किल श्मशाने वसत्ययं पुनरलौकिको व्रती सर्वत्राहमेवैकचित्ततत्त्वपरमार्थ इति मत्वा जडैः पशुप्रमातृभिर्घटादिभिः प्रमेयैश्च परेतस्थानीयैः सहोन्मत्तवत्क्रीडां कुर्वाणः संसारभुवमिमां सर्वप्रमातृप्रमेयनिधनतया भीषणं श्मशानस्वभावामध्यास्ते। अन्यच्च यत् **विग्रहखट्वाङ्गकल्पनाकलितां संविदं मनुते** इति। **विग्रहः** शरीरं स एव **खट्वाङ्गकल्पना** कङ्कालविधिर्योगिनः किल स्वशरीरप्रमातृताभिमानदुर्ग्रहसंक्षयाच्छरीरातीतं स्वात्मानं मन्यमानस्य संस्कारशेषीभूतो विग्रहः शवप्रायमेवेत्यवधारयतः स्वशरीरमेव कङ्कालमुद्राकल्पना तया **कलिताम्** भोग्याधारत्वेन मुद्रिताम् । वीरव्रतिनो हि श्मशानस्थस्य खट्वाङ्गमुद्रया भाव्यमतोऽस्य स्वसंविद्वपुषः स्वशरीरमपि वेद्यतया भिन्नमवधारयतः सैव खट्वाङ्गमुद्रेत्येतदप्यस्य व्रतम् । तथा **वेद्यखण्डककपालं रसयति** चर्वयति यच्च शब्दादिविषयपञ्चकलक्षणं सर्वभोग्यरूपमिदम् **वेद्यम्** ज्ञेयत्वकार्यत्वाभ्यां परिच्छिन्नमिति **खण्डकम्** कर्परप्रायं तदेव **कपालम्** शिरोऽस्थिशकलम् **यद्रसयति** साराहरणक्रमेण पूर्णाहन्ताविश्रान्त्या चमत्कुरुत इत्येतदपि व्रतम् । व्रतिना किल कपालस्थं वीरपानं रस्यत इत्याह **विश्वरस** इति। **विश्वस्मिन्** वेद्यशब्दादिविषयपञ्चकरूपे कपालखण्डे योऽसौ सारभागश्चर्वणामृतमयोंऽशः स एव परमानन्ददायित्वात् **रसासवः** उत्तमं पानं तेन **पूर्णम्** निर्भरम् । एतदुक्तं स्याद्विश्वस्य यः शल्कस्थानीयः कठिनोंऽशः पात्रकल्पः स एव कपालं तद्गतः सारभागश्चमत्कारक्षम आह्लाददायित्वात्पानमिति। कपालं तु व्रतिनः करगतं भवतीत्याह **निजकरगम्** इति। **निजाः** स्वात्मीया ये **कराः** चक्षुरादिकरणदेवीस्वभावाश्चिन्मरीचयस्तेषु भोग्यतया तद्वेद्यखण्डकं विषयत्वं गच्छतीति निजकरगं यथा पाणिस्थेन कपालेन पानं पीयते तथैव वेद्यखण्डककपालेन विश्वरसासवश्चक्षुरादिसंवित्करैर्योगिना समाहृत्यास्वाद्यते। अयमाशयो योगी सर्वदैव यथोपनतं विषयपञ्चकं करणदेवीभिराहृत्य युक्त्या स्वचैतन्यभैरवविश्रान्तिमव्युच्छिन्नां भजमानश्चरमक्षणपर्यन्तं यथोपदिष्टमद्वयदृशा निर्वाहयतीत्येतदेवास्य परिशीलितसद्गुरुचरणपङ्कजस्य व्रतमतोऽन्यच्छरीरशोषणमात्रमिति ॥ ८० ॥

प्राक्प्रतिपादितं संकलयन्नस्योपदेशस्योत्कृष्टत्वमाह

इति जन्मनाशहीनं परमार्थमहेश्वराख्यमुपलभ्य।
उपलब्धृताप्रकाशात्कृतकृत्यस्तिष्ठति यथेष्टम् ॥ ८१ ॥

इति समनन्तरोक्तेन प्रकारेण यत्प्रतिपादितं रहस्यम् **परमार्थमहेश्वराख्यम्** तात्त्विकं महेश्वरम् **उपलभ्य** स्वात्मनि दृढप्रतिपत्त्या सम्यगनुभूय। कीदृगाह **जन्मनाशहीनम्** इति येनाधिगतेनोत्पत्तिमरणे न स्यातामिति यावत् । **कृतकृत्यस्तिष्ठति यथेष्टम्** इति योग्येतत्प्राप्य कर्तव्यतान्तरस्याभावान्निष्पन्नपरपुरुषार्थः **यथेष्टम्** स्वेच्छातिक्रमं विना स्वातन्त्र्येण चक्रभ्रमवद्धृतशरीरः **तिष्ठति** कालमतिवाहयन्नास्ते। कथमाह **उपलब्धृताप्रकाशात्** इति। एतद्रहस्यपरिशीलनेन सर्वासु दशास्वनुभवितृतया **प्रकाशः** परिस्फुरणं तस्मादिति शरीरस्थोऽपि पूर्णानन्दमय इति यावत् ॥ ८१ ॥

इत्थं स्वात्मानं यः कश्चिज्जीवतां मध्याज्जानानः स सर्वस्तद्रूपः स्यादित्यधिकारिनियमाभावमाह

व्यापिनमभिहितमित्थं सर्वात्मानं विधूतनानात्वम् ।
निरुपमपरमानन्दं यो वेत्ति स तन्मयो भवति ॥ ८२ ॥

इत्थम् इत्युक्तेन प्रकारेण **व्यापिनम्** अनवच्छिन्नचिदानन्दैकघनं शिवम् **अभिहितम्** युक्त्यागमानुभवपरिशीलनक्रमेणावेदितम् **यो वेत्ति** यः कश्चिदेव प्राणिप्रायो जानाति **सः** सर्वस्त्यक्तसंकोचः **तन्मयः** शिव एव स्यादिति । अत्र स्वात्मज्ञाने नाधिकारिनियमो यतो ये केचन जन्ममरणादिदोषाघ्रातास्तिर्यञ्चोऽपि वा ते सर्वे स्वात्ममहेश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञानात्तन्मया भवन्तीति यच्छब्दस्य परामर्शः । कीदृशं च **सर्वात्मानम्** इति । सर्वेषां प्रमातृप्रमेयाणामात्मा सर्वाणि वा प्रमातृप्रमेयाणि यस्यात्मा तं सर्वोत्तीर्णं सर्वमयमिति यावत् । अत एव **विधूतम्** न्यक्कृतं सर्वदा सर्वत्र चिद्रूपतया स्फुरणात् **नानात्वम्** भेदानन्त्यं येन तमेवमाकाङ्क्षाविरहात् **निरुपमः** विशेषणरहितः प्रकृष्टः **आनन्दः** यस्य तमेवंविधमिति स्वात्मानं जानानः सर्वः शिवरूपी स्यादिति ॥ ८२ ॥

एवमधिगतस्वात्ममहेश्वरः स्वशरीराधिकारपरिक्षये कुत्र शरीरं परित्यजेत्किं वा यातीत्यादिसंशयं परिहरति

तीर्थे श्वपचगृहे वा नष्टस्मृतिरपि परित्यजन्देहम् ।
ज्ञानसमकालमुक्तः कैवल्यं याति हतशोकः ॥ ८३ ॥

एवं परिशीलितस्वस्वरूपो ज्ञानी सर्वमिदं स्वात्मप्रकाशस्वातन्त्र्यमिति परमाद्वयदृशा गाढं समाश्वस्तहृदयः **तीर्थे** प्रयागपुष्करकुरुक्षेत्रादौ महापुण्ये स्थानेऽथ वा श्वपचसदनेऽन्त्यजनगृहोपलक्षितेऽतिपापीयसि शरीरं मुञ्चन्नित्युभयथा स्वीकारपरित्यागकदर्थनाविरहितोऽप्यात्मज्ञानादेव **कैवल्यं याति** कलेवरपरिक्षयात्प्रधानादिकार्यकारणवर्गेभ्योऽन्यां चिदानन्दैकघनां तुर्यातीतरूपां केवलतां यातीति यावत् । यतोऽस्य सर्वमिदं विश्वं स्वात्मना पूर्णं समदृशा परमेश्वराधिष्ठितं पश्यतो न क्षेत्राक्षेत्रप्रविभागोऽत एव **हतः** पराकृतो विकल्पशङ्कासमुत्थः **शोकः** येन स एवम् । यथोक्तम्

हिमवति गङ्गाद्वारे वाराणस्यां कुरौ प्रयागे वा ।
वेश्मनि चण्डालादेः शिवतत्त्वविदां समं मरणम् ॥

इति श्रीनिर्वाणयोगोत्तरे । नाप्यस्य देहपातावसरे स्मृत्युपयोग इत्याह **नष्टस्मृतिरपि** इति । आस्तां संस्मृतिरित्यपिशब्दार्थः । यदि वा स ज्ञानी शरीरत्यागकाले तदुत्थवातपित्तश्लेष्माभिभवात् **नष्टस्मृतिः** काष्ठपाषाणतुल्यत्वाद्विगतस्वात्मसंबोधः कलेवरमवशो भुत्वा त्यजति तथापि प्रागधिगतस्वात्मज्ञानः कैवल्यमवश्यं याति ततो न स्वात्मज्ञानाधिगमे प्रमयसमये स्मरणास्मरणे विशेषोऽस्ति । ननु तीर्थातीर्थप्रविभागोऽस्य स्वात्मज्ञानविदो मा भूद्यत्पुनरन्तकाले स नष्टस्मृतिरपीति यदेव स्वात्मज्ञानमुपायतया गृहीतं तस्य देहपातावसरे तु विस्मरणं चेत्तर्हि कथं स मुक्तः स्यात् । यदुक्तम्

अन्तकालेऽपि मामेव स्मरन्मुक्त्वा कलेवरम् ।
यः प्रयाति स मद्भावं याति नास्त्यत्र संशयः ॥

इति श्रीगीतासु। एवमप्यत्र स्मरणस्यैव उपयोगो यदपि परमेश्वरस्मरणाभावेऽप्यन्तकाले तद्भावापत्तिः स्यात्तर्हि सर्वः पशुजनः प्रमयसमये मूढोऽपि विशेषाभावात्परमेश्वरसमापत्तिं यायाद्वाक्यानि चैवमादीन्यप्रमाणानि स्युर्न चैवमित्यत्रोत्तरमाह **ज्ञानसमकालमुक्तः** इति। सत्यं नास्य स्मरणेनोपयोगः किंतु सद्गुरुणा यदैव तस्य कर्णमूले स्वात्ममहेश्वरज्ञानोपदेशः कृतस्तस्मिन्नेव कालेऽहमेव सर्वमिदमित्यधिरूढस्वात्मज्ञानपरमार्थो विगलितमायादिकञ्चुकभावो नान्यत्किंचिदपेक्षते केवलं संस्कारशेषतया चक्रभ्रमवच्छरीरं वहमान इति न पुनस्तस्योत्तरकाले स्मरणास्मरणकदर्थना यस्मादज्ञानजनिताणवमयीयकञ्चुकसंबन्धे सति देहकञ्चुकं प्रभवति स्वात्मज्ञानोपदेशेनाज्ञानजनितकञ्चुकक्षयात्कथं देहकञ्चुकं विनष्टप्रायं पर्यन्ते ज्ञानिनो यन्त्रणां कर्तुमलमिति स्वात्मज्ञानकथनावसर एव स जीवन्नेव मुक्तः स्यात्। यथोक्तं कुलरत्नमालिकायां साहस्रिकायाम्

> यदा गुरुवरः सम्यक्कथयेत्तदसंशयम्।
> मुक्तस्तत्रैव कालेऽसौ यन्त्रवत्केवलं वसेत्॥

इति। श्रीमन्निशाटनेऽपि

> गोदोहमिषुपातं वा नयनोन्मीलनात्मकम्।
> सकृद्युक्तः परे तत्त्वे स मुक्तो मोचयेत्परान्॥
> यस्मात्पूर्वं परे न्यस्तो येनात्मा ब्रह्मणि क्षणम्।
> स्मरणं तु कथं तस्य प्राणान्ते समुपस्थिते॥

इति। अथ वात्मविदः पर्यन्तक्षणः स्वानुभवैकसाक्षी केनानुभूयते यद्वशात्तस्य स्मरणमस्मरणं वा परिकल्प्यते यावता तत्रार्वाग्दृशां नास्ति गोचर इति सर्वज्ञास्तत्र प्रष्टव्या न पुनः शरीरचेष्टामात्रान्मरणावसरेऽधिगतपरमार्थस्यापि देहत्यागक्षणः शुभाशुभत्वेनानुमातुं शक्यः। तस्मादवश्यमेव सदा तद्भावभावितं स्वात्मज्ञानविदं स्वात्मस्थ एव परमेश्वरो मरणावसरे स्वं स्वरूपं काष्ठपाषाणतुल्यमपि स्मारयति। यदुक्तम्

> स्वस्थचेष्टाश्च ये मर्त्याः स्मरन्ति मम नारद।
> काष्ठपाषाणतुल्यांस्तानन्तकाले स्मराम्यहम्॥

तथा

> स्थिरे चेतसि सुस्वस्थे शरीरे सति यो नरः।
> धातुसाम्ये स्थिरे स्मर्ता विश्वरूपं च मामकम्॥
> ततस्तु म्रियमाणं तं काष्ठपाषाणसंनिभम्।
> अहं स्मरामि मद्भक्तं नयामि परमां गतिम्॥

इति भगवता लक्ष्मीसंहितायामुक्तम्। एवमत्र सदातद्भावभावितत्वमेव हेतुरन्यथा पूर्वानुभवसंस्कारदार्ढ्यं विना कथमन्ते स्मृतिरपि स्यादिति न केनचिदपि ज्ञानिनो मरणावसरे समुपयोग इति॥ ८३॥

यदि पुनस्तीर्थाद्याश्रयणमुक्तप्रकारेण न कुत्रचिदप्यङ्गभावं याति तर्हि किमिति विद्वद्भिस्तत्समाश्रीयत इति विषयविभागमाह

पुण्याय तीर्थसेवा निरयाय श्वपचसदननिधनगतिः ।
पुण्यापुण्यकलङ्कस्पर्शाभावे तु किं तेन ॥ ८४ ॥

येषां विदुषामपि देहादिप्रमातृताग्रहः साम्प्रतं न विगलितः स्वात्मज्ञानचर्चायां च न तथा समाश्वासस्तेषामिष्टापूर्तादिधर्मसंग्रहं कुर्वतामधर्मसंग्रहं वा प्रयागादितीर्थसेवा मरणावसरे क्षेत्रपरिग्रहः **पुण्याय** उत्तमलोकप्राप्तये निश्चितं स्यादेव। तथैव **श्वपचसदननिधनगतिः** इति। श्वपाकादिगृहोपलक्षिते पापीयसि स्थाने **निधनगतिः** प्रमयप्राप्तिः **निरयाय** अवीच्यादिनरकपातायैतेषां किमिति न भवेद्देहप्रमातृताग्रहस्य विद्यमानत्वात् । मरणस्थानानुगुणं भोगमपि भुक्त्वा शुभाशुभेषु देहेषु जायन्ते पुनर्म्रियन्ते चेत्यनवरतजन्ममरणप्रबन्धा देहाद्यात्ममानिन एवंप्रायाः स्युः। यस्य पुनः स्वात्मज्ञानप्रत्यवमर्शदार्ढ्याद्देहादिप्रमातृताभिमानो निःशेषेण विगलितस्तस्य चिन्नभःस्वभावस्य धर्माधर्मस्वभाववासनास्पर्शप्रक्षये वृत्ते सति किं तेन। एवं स यतः शुभाशुभकर्मभाजां तीर्थादिपरिग्रहस्ततस्तेन तीर्थसेवादिना विमलस्य ज्ञानिनो नास्त्युपयोगः। यदुक्तं मानवे धर्मशास्त्रे

यमो वैवस्वतो राजा यस्तवैष हृदि स्थितः ।
तेन चेदविवादस्त्वं मा गङ्गां मा गयां गमः ॥

इति। अत्र देहात्ममानितैव हृदयवर्तिनी यमः सा यैः पूर्णस्वात्ममहेश्वरस्वभावमुपलभ्य संभक्षिता तेषां कथमेष तीर्थादिसेवाप्रयास इति सिद्धान्तः ॥ ८४ ॥

ननु प्राक्प्रतिपादितं यथा ज्ञानदग्धाणवमायीयकार्ममलस्वरूप आत्मा पिण्डपातात्स्वस्वरूपस्थ एव न पुनर्भवप्ररोहं विधत्ते दग्धबीजमिवाङ्कुरमिति। स्वात्मज्ञानाविर्भावसमकालं देहकञ्चुकभङ्गश्चेत्तर्ह्युत्तरत्र मा विधत्तां यत्पुनर्विद्यमाने देहादिकञ्चुकबन्धे कथंकारं स तद्गतधर्माच्छुरितो न स्यात्तदाच्छुरितः सन्मृतः कथं न संसारीति चोद्यमपवदति

तुषकम्बुकसुपृथक्कृततण्डुलकणतुषदलान्तरक्षेपः ।
तण्डुलकणस्य कुरुते न पुनस्तद्रूपतादात्म्यम् ॥ ८५ ॥

तद्वत्कञ्चुकपटलीपृथक्कृता संविदत्र संस्कारात् ।
तिष्ठन्त्यपि मुक्तात्मा तत्स्पर्शविवर्जिता भवति ॥ ८६ ॥

तुषकम्बुकाभ्याम् सुष्ठु **पृथक्कृतः** विश्लिष्टो यः **तण्डुलकणः** तस्य यः **तुषदलान्तरक्षेपः** प्रागिव पुनस्तत्रैव विन्यासः स यथा तुषदलान्तरप्रक्षेपः **तण्डुलकणस्य** तद्रूपतयाङ्कुरजननक्षमत्वेन स्थितोऽपि **तादात्म्यम्** गाढावष्टम्भम् **न कुरुते** अयःशलाकावद्भिन्नावेव तुषतण्डुलौ तिष्ठतो न पुनरेककार्यजननव्यग्रौ भवतः **तद्वत्** तथैव ज्ञानिनि इयम् **संवित्** चेतना **कञ्चुकपटल्याः** आणवमलादिकञ्चुकसमूहात् **पृथक्कृता** अहमेव स्वात्ममहेश्वरस्वभावो विश्वात्मना सर्वदा सर्वत्र स्फुरामीति स्वात्मज्ञानपरिशीलनदार्ढ्यात्समुद्धृता

अत्र इत्यस्यां कञ्चुकपटल्यां कंचित्कालं शेषवर्तनया देहभावेन **तिष्ठन्त्यपि** स्थिता सती **विमुक्तात्मा** प्रध्वस्तबन्धा **तत्स्पर्शविवर्जिता भवति** तस्या देहादिकञ्चुकपटल्याः **स्पर्शः** पुण्यापुण्यरूपकार्ममलोपजनितो य उपरागः संसाराङ्कुरजननक्षमस्तेन **विवर्जिता** परिहृता संपद्यते यथा तुषदलान्तरे क्षिप्तस्तण्डुलोऽङ्कुरप्ररोहस्पर्शरहितो भवतीति। इदमुक्तं स्यादज्ञानकारणकस्तावत्संसारस्तत्र समुदितस्वात्मज्ञानदलितकञ्चुकस्य योगिनः संविन्न पुनः संसारहेतुरज्ञानजनितसामग्रीवैकल्यान्नापि तस्य शेषवर्तनया संस्कारवशेन तिष्ठन्नयं देहकञ्चुकबन्धो ज्ञानाग्निदग्धाज्ञानमूलः स्वगतधर्माविर्भावेन संसारप्ररोहं दातुमलमिति ज्ञानी जीवन्नेव तुरीयरूपो देहाभावात्तुर्यातीतरूप इत्युभयथा पुनर्न काचित्संसारशङ्केति ॥ ८६ ॥

ननु शेषवर्तनया यावच्छरीरावस्थितं योगिसंवेदनमधिगतस्वस्वरूपमपि देहोपाधिकृतमालिन्यस्यापि तावदंशेन विद्यमानत्वादशुद्धमेवेति दृष्टान्तेन परिहरति

कुशलतमशिल्पिकल्पितविमलीभावः समुद्रकोपाधेः।
मलिनोऽपि मणिरुपाधेर्विच्छेदे स्वच्छपरमार्थः ॥ ८७ ॥

एवं सद्गुरुशासनविमलस्थिति वेदनं तनूपाधेः।
मुक्तमप्युपाध्यन्तरशून्यमिवाभाति शिवरूपम् ॥ ८८ ॥

यथा **मणिः** अतिप्रवीणवैकटिकसमुद्योतितनैर्मल्यः सन्समुद्रकविश्लिष्टत्वात् **मलिनोऽपि** धूसरप्रायो भवति स एव पुनः **समुद्रकोपाधिविच्छेदे** आवरणविशेषाभावे **स्वच्छपरमार्थः** यथावन्निर्मलस्वरूपः संपद्यते। **एवम्** अनेनैव प्रकारेणेदम् **वेदनं सद्गुरुशासनविमलस्थिति** परिपूर्णस्वात्मज्ञानविद्यो दैशिकप्रवरस्तस्य यत् **शासनम्** स्वात्मज्ञानरहस्यमुखाम्नायस्तस्य परिशीलनेन विगता कालिकारूपस्याणवमलस्य मायीयकार्ममलभित्तिभूतस्य स्थितिर्यस्य तदेवंविधं मौलिकमलप्रक्षयान्नभोरूपमपि वेदनम् **तनूपाधेः तनुः** शरीरं तल्लक्षणा **उपाधिः** विशेषणं ततः **मुक्तम्** पृथक्कृतं विशेषणान्तराभावात्तत् **शिवरूपमाभात्येव** देहभङ्गात्परमशिवत्वेन भासत इति यावत्। यथा समुद्रकोपाधिविरहान्मणिः स्वस्वरूपो भाति तथैव स्वस्वरूपावबोधाद्विमलमप्यशुद्धाभिमतशरीरोपाधिक्षयाद्विशुद्धमेव संवेदनं भासते। ननु मणिर्यथा समुद्रकोपाधेर्विमुक्तोऽपि पुनरन्यतमोपाधिपरिग्रहात्समलः संपद्यते तथैव तनूपाधेर्मुक्तमपि संवेदनं मणिवदुपाध्यन्तरं चेद्गृह्णाति तर्हि पुनरपि सोपाधित्वादशुद्धमेवेति परिहरति **उपाध्यन्तरशून्यमपि** इति। न दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः सर्वथा साम्यं यतः पिण्डपातात्तस्य महाप्रकाशवपुषः परमाद्वयरूपस्य सर्वमिदमुपाध्यभिमतं स्वाङ्गकल्पं भासतेऽतो व्यतिरिक्तस्योपाध्यन्तरस्याभावान्न पुनस्तदुपाध्यन्तरेण विशिष्यत इति न मणिनोपाधिग्रहणस्य साम्यम्। अज्ञानमूलं किल शरीरोपाधिग्रहणं तच्चेत्स्वात्मज्ञानकुठारेण दलितं कथंकारं पुनरुपाधिसंश्रयो भवेत्। यदुक्तम्

अज्ञानेनावृतं ज्ञानं तेन मुह्यन्ति जन्तवः ॥
ज्ञानेन तु तदज्ञानं येषां नाशितमात्मनः।
तेषामादित्यवज्ज्ञानं प्रकाशयति तत्परम् ॥

इति श्रीगीतासु। तस्मात्स्वस्वरूपज्ञानाद्योगिनः स्वसंवेदनं सदैव शुद्धमेवेति ॥ ८८ ॥

सर्वोपाध्युत्पत्तौ यथावत्परिशीलितव्यापारमनःसंस्कारप्ररूढिरेव निमित्तं न पुनर्नूतनत्वेन किमप्यायातीत्यावेदयति

शास्त्रादिप्रामाण्यादविचलितश्रद्धयापि तन्मयताम् ।
प्राप्तः स एव पूर्वं स्वर्गं नरकं मनुष्यत्वम् ॥ ८९ ॥

आगमप्रामाण्याद्गुरूपदेशपारम्पर्यकथनाद्युक्तिपरिशीलनात्प्राग्वासनाप्ररूढया श्रद्धया वा स्वात्मज्ञान इष्टापूर्ते पाशवे कर्मणि वा कृताभ्यासः प्रमाता तदैव तत्संस्कारप्ररोहेण **तन्मयताम्** तत्तदभ्यस्तवस्तुस्वरूपताम् **प्राप्तः** सन्नुत्तरत्र देहपाताद्वासनानुगुण्येन **स्वर्गम्** निरतिशयां प्रीतिम् **नरकम्** अवीच्यादिदुःखम् **मनुष्यत्वम्** सुखदुःखोभयरूपं मनुष्यभावं प्राप्नोति न पुनरनभ्यस्तवासनस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहपातादेव यत्किंचिदापतति । यतः सर्वः प्रमाता येनाशयेन यदभ्यस्यति तदैव स तद्रूपो भवति किंतु मरणसमये स्फुटतया यदभिलषितं वस्तु तत्प्रमातुरभिव्यक्तिं यातीति नाभ्यस्तवस्तुनः कदाचिद्विपर्ययः स्यान्नाप्यनभ्यस्तवस्तुस्वरूपं किंचिदपूर्वत्वेनापतेदिति सर्वत्र पूर्वाभ्यास एव कारणमिति भावः ॥ ८९ ॥

एवं सदा तद्भावभावितत्वं स्वात्मविदो देहत्यागावसरे पूर्णप्रथाहेतुर्न पुनर्लोकपरिदृश्यः पुण्यापुण्यरूपो मरणावसरः कश्चित्स्वर्गनिरयादिकारणं परिकल्पनीयमित्याह

अन्त्यः क्षणस्तु तस्मिन्पुण्यां पापां च वा स्थितिं पुष्यन् ।
मूढानां सहकारीभावं गच्छति गतौ तु न स हेतुः ॥ ९० ॥

येऽपि तदात्मत्वेन विदुः पशुपक्षिसरीसृपादयः स्वगतिम् ।
तेऽपि पुरातनसंबोधसंस्कृतास्तां गतिं यान्ति ॥ ९१ ॥

एवंप्रतिपादिते ज्ञानिनि **अन्त्यः क्षणः** चरमो देहविनाशसहभावी कालो धातुदोषवशेन दुष्टव्याध्यनुभवाद्वा समीपस्थितैः प्रमातृभिरनुमिताम् **पुण्यां पापमयीं वा स्थितिं पुष्यन्** सेवमानः सन् **मूढानाम्** देहात्ममानिनां प्रमातॄणामेव **सहकारीभावम्** कारणत्वं **गच्छति**। गच्छतु वराको नैतावता निर्भग्नदेहात्ममानित्वे सदा स्वात्ममहेश्वरनिभालनचतुरे **तस्मिन्** योगिनि **सः** अन्त्यः क्षणः **गतौ** देहाद्देहान्तरप्राप्तौ **हेतुः** कारणं भवेत् । कुत एतदागतमिति निदर्शयन्नाह **येऽपि** इति। **येऽपि** केनाप्याशयवशेन शापादिना वा पापयोनयः पशुरूपतामपि प्राप्ताः **स्वगतिम्** आत्मस्थितिं मरणावसरे **आत्मत्वेन** जानीयुः **ते** मूढाः सन्तोऽपि प्रागभ्यस्तस्वात्मज्ञानवासनाप्रबोधानुगृहीताः स्वात्मस्थितिं च लभन्ते । गजेन्द्रमोक्षणादौ यथा हस्तिना पशुस्वभावेनापि सता प्राक्परिशीलितपरमेश्वरभक्तिसंस्कारप्रबुद्धेन विष्णुं भगवन्तं स्तुत्वा सम्यक्कञ्चुकं विहाय स्वस्वरूपमुपलब्धं कस्तत्र स्मरणे हेतुरभूत् । अयं भावः शरीराद्युत्थधातुदोषवशात्काष्ठपाषाणचेष्टो ज्ञानी पुण्यं पापमालबिडालादिकं वा यत्किंचित्प्रलपन्देहं त्यजति नैतावता स्वस्थचेष्टतया यदभ्यस्तं ज्ञानादिकं तस्य विप्रलोपः स्याच्छरीरादिगता धर्माः शरीरादावेव निपतन्ति न पुनः सदा भावितं वस्तु स्थगयितुं प्रभवन्तीत्यामरणक्षणं सर्वत्र प्ररूढिरेव परमार्थः । यथा गीतासूक्तम्

यं यं वापि स्मरन्भावं त्यजत्यन्ते कलेवरम् ।
तं तमेवैति कौन्तेय सदा तद्भावभावितः ॥

तथा

तेषां सततयुक्तानां भजतां प्रीतिपूर्वकम् ।
ददामि बुद्धियोगं तं येन मामुपयान्ति ते ॥

इति भावितान्तःकरणतैव पर्यन्तगतिदानहेतुः ॥ ९१ ॥

एवं दर्शितदृष्ट्या यतः सदा तद्भावभावितत्वमपहस्त्य नूतनत्वेन शरीरविनाशे नापूर्वं किंचित्समापते-ज्ज्ञानिनो यतो देह एव विनाशी केवलं स एव विनश्यति न पुनर्वासनाप्ररोह इति दर्शयन्नाह

स्वर्गमयो निरयमयस्तदयं देहान्तरालगः पुरुषः ।
तद्भङ्गे स्वौचित्याद्देहान्तरयोगमभ्येति ॥ ९२ ॥

एवं ज्ञानावसरे स्वात्मा सकृदस्य यादृगवभातः ।
तादृश एव तदासौ न देहपातेऽन्यथा भवति ॥ ९३ ॥

तत् तस्माच्छरीरघटादिनिविष्टः **पुरुषः** सर्वस्य कार्ममलाधिवासित आत्मा स्वर्गाद्यभिप्रायपूर्वकृत-कर्मफलवासनावासितान्तःकरणः **स्वर्गमयः** प्ररूढस्वर्गफलवासनाविशिष्टत्वात्स्वर्गफलभोक्तेति यावत् । एवं दुष्कृतपूर्वकर्मवासनाप्ररूढो नरकफलभोक्ता केवलं देह उभयकर्मफलभोगायतनम् **तद्भङ्गे स्वौचि-त्यात्** इति तस्मिन्देहक्षये **स्वस्य** आत्मनो यथाहितवासनानुगुण्यादन्येन भोगायतनेन शरीरान्तरेण सम-नन्तरं संबन्धमुपयात्युत्तरकालं येन विशिष्टकर्मवासनादत्तफलभोगभागी भवति । तथैव **ज्ञानावसरे** उपदे-श्यस्य गुरूपदिष्टस्वात्मप्रकाशनकाले **स्वात्मा** चैतन्यम् **सकृत्** एकवारं **यादृक्** यादृशः **अवभातः** उपदे-शक्रमानुसारेण परिपूर्णस्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणां मितां वा परामर्शदशां गतः **तदृश एव** सदा **असौ** येनैव स्वरूपेण ज्ञानिना स्वात्मा सर्वकालं परामृष्टः ताद्रूप्येण वासनाप्ररोहात्तस्य प्रथते **न** पुनः **देहपाते** प्रकाशितोऽपि स्वात्मा ज्ञानिनः **अन्यथा** समाच्छादितः **भवति**। न हि भातमभातं स्यादपरथा न कश्चित्किंचिदभ्यसेदिति सर्वव्यवहारविप्रलोपो भवेत्

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥

इत्यादि सर्वं च त्रुट्येत्तस्मान्मरणकाले शरीरं यथास्तु तथास्तु केवलं वासनाप्ररोहः स्वात्मगतः सर्वस्य बन्धे मोक्षे च हेतुरिति ॥ ९३ ॥

यदि पुनर्धातुवैषम्याच्छरीरे मरणव्यथोपलब्धिः स्यान्नैतावताभ्यासप्ररोहे काचित्क्षतिरित्यावेदितामेव स्थितिमुपलब्धुं परिघटयते

करणगणसंप्रमोषः स्मृतिनाशः श्वासकलिलता च्छेदः ।
मर्मसु रुजाविशेषाः शरीरसंस्कारजो भोगः ॥ ९४ ॥

स कथं विग्रहयोगे सति न भवेत्तेन मोहयोगेऽपि ।
मरणावसरे ज्ञानी न च्यवते स्वात्मपरमार्थात् ॥ ९५ ॥

करणगणस्य बाह्यान्तर्गतस्य त्रयोदशात्मकस्य सम्यक् **प्रमोषः** स्वरूपविप्रलोपो यथा चक्षुरादीनीन्द्रियाणि रूपादिविषयालोचनायां न प्रगल्भन्ते वागादिकर्मेन्द्रियाण्यप्येवं वचनादानादौ न प्रवर्तन्ते नापि बुद्धिर्यथार्थमर्थमध्यवस्यति मनसोऽनवस्थितिरहङ्कारोऽपि मध्ये मध्ये संस्कारतयास्ते । तथा **स्मृतिनाशः** अनुभूतविषयस्य संप्रमोषो बन्धुभिरर्थ्यमानोऽपि मुमूर्षुः पुरोऽवस्थितं वस्तु शतशोऽनुभूतमपि न प्रत्यभिजानात्यत एव सदा तद्भावभावितत्वं विना ब्रह्मविद्यादिकथनमन्तकाले दानमन्यत्किंचिद्वा तस्यामवस्थायां नभश्चित्रमिव न चित्ते प्ररोहति किंतु तदितिकर्तव्यतामात्रं कार्यमिति नियोगः । तथा **श्वासः** कण्ठ्यो वायुस्तस्य **कलिलता** कण्ठदेशे गद्गदिका हिक्का वा । अन्यच्च **मर्मसु छेदः** अस्थिसंधिषु त्रोटः । तथा **रुजाविशेषाः** ज्वरातीसारप्रभृतय इति । एवं यः **शरीरस्य** भूतकञ्चुकस्य वातपित्तश्लेष्मधातुवैषम्यात् **शरीरसंस्कारजो भोगः** देहजो दुःखानुभवः **स कथम्** केन प्रकारेण **विग्रहयोगे सति** ज्ञानिनोऽपि **न भवेत्** स्यादेव । **तेन** हेतुना **ज्ञानी** सदाधस्पदीकृतदेहाद्यभिमानः समाविष्टस्वात्ममहेश्वरभावश्च मरणक्षणजनितशारीराज्ञानसंबन्धेऽपि **स्वात्मपरमार्थात्** प्ररूढचैतन्यप्रत्यवमर्शसतत्त्वात् **न च्यवते** नान्यथाभावं याति । यतोऽसौ ज्ञानी न्यक्कृतदेहसंबन्धो न तज्जेन भोगेन तन्मयीकर्तुं पार्यते केवलं लोकवच्चेच्छरीरपातसमनन्तरं क्षणं नोपलभत इत्येतावता तस्य स्वस्थहृदयस्य स्वसंकल्पिताभिप्रायेण स्वस्थचेष्टतयाभ्यस्तभगवद्भक्तेर्न किंचिदपूर्वं समापतति तस्माज्ज्ञानी स्वात्मप्रथासमनन्तरमेव मुक्तो न शरीरसंस्कारोऽस्य बन्धदायीति शतशः प्राक्प्रतिपादितम् । यस्तु सदा देहात्ममानी पुण्यपापमयः स कथं देहसंस्कारोद्भूतसुखदुःखादिभोगजनितं तन्मयत्वं नायाति । यदुक्तम्

> यदा सत्त्वे प्रवृद्धे तु प्रलयं याति देहभृत् ।
> तदोत्तमविदां लोकानमलान्प्रतिपद्यते ॥

इत्यादि । सत्त्वादयो गुणाः प्रकृतिधर्मास्तन्मयस्यैव नियन्त्रणां विदधते येन पुनस्ततो विविक्ततया परिशीलिता न तं प्रत्येते केचनेति ज्ञानिनोऽन्य एव पन्थाः । ये पुनरदृष्टगुरुचरणाः पशुप्रमातारस्ते स्वगतान्धर्मानन्यत्रापादयन्ति । यथा यद्ययं ज्ञानी स्यात्किमिति व्याध्याद्युपहतशरीरो भुङ्क्ते परिदधाति च यदि वा मरणसमये जाड्यमायातः स्मृतमनेन न किंचिदित्येवं बहुप्रकारमविद्योपहतत्वाद्विवदमानाश्च केन पर्यनुयुज्यन्ताम् । यद्ययं ज्ञानी स्याद्देहधर्मसंस्कारयुक्तश्च भवेत्किमेतावता च तस्य दुष्येत् । ज्ञानिनः स्वात्मप्रकाशस्तत्तदवस्थाविचित्रोऽपि स्वात्मप्रकाश एव न पुनस्तस्य स्वात्मानुभवितृतया विप्रलोपः स्याद्येन ज्ञानं नश्येत् । पूर्णषाड्गुण्यमहिमापि भगवान्वासुदेवः कृष्णावतारे व्याधशराघातजनितव्यथो भूतशरीरं त्यक्तवानित्येवं कृत्वा किं तस्य जगत्प्रभोः स्वस्वरूपविप्रलोपोऽभूदित्या कीटात्सदाशिवान्तस्यापि देहसंस्कार एतादृश एव किंत्वेकः स्वात्मप्रत्यवमर्शमात्रसनाथदेहोऽपरस्तु देहाद्यात्ममानितासतत्त्व इतीयान्विशेषः । तस्माच्छरीरधर्मा ज्ञान्यज्ञानिनोः सदृशा एव नैतावता फलसाम्यमित्येतदेव गीतासूक्तम्

> सदृशं चेष्टते स्वस्याः प्रकृतेर्ज्ञानवानपि ।
> प्रकृतिं यान्ति भूतानि निग्रहः किं करिष्यति ॥

इति ॥ ९५ ॥

इदानीमक्रमेण क्रमेण च ज्ञानयोगपरिशीलने विचित्रपरशक्तिपातमेव कारणं प्रतिपादयन्फलभेदमाह

परमार्थमार्गमेनं झटिति यदा गुरुमुखात्समभ्येति ।
अतितीव्रशक्तिपातात्तदैव निर्विघ्नमेव शिवः ॥ ९६ ॥

यस्मिन्नेव काले जनः पश्चिमजन्मा **गुरुमुखात्** प्रवरदैशिकवक्रात् **एनम्** शतशः प्रतिपादितम् **परमार्थमार्गम्** पूर्णस्वातन्त्र्यलक्षणं स्वात्मसंबोधमुखाम्नायरहस्यसरणिं यः कश्चित् **अभ्येति** समभियाति सः **तदैव** तस्मिन्नेवावसरे गुरूपदेशसमनन्तरमेवानन्तरायं कृत्वा **शिव एव** स्यात् । श्रीकुले यथोक्तम्

हेलया क्रीडया वापि आदराद्वाथ तत्त्ववित् ।
यस्य संपातयेद्दृष्टिं स मुक्तस्तत्क्षणात्प्रिये ॥

इति । ननु कथमेवंविधं मुखाम्नायरहस्यमेवोपनयेदित्याह **अतितीव्रशक्तिपातात्** इति । अतिशयेन **तीव्रः** कर्कशो योऽसावनुग्रहाख्यायाः पारमेश्वर्याः **शक्तेः पातः** पशुहृत्कमलावतरणं येन पशुरपि गुर्वाम्नायवेदनाच्छिवीभवति जीवन्नेव मुक्त इति यावत् । यथा ताम्रद्रव्यं सिद्धरसपातात्सुवर्णीभवति । अयमर्थः परमेश्वरानुग्रहोपाय एव स्वात्मज्ञानलाभ इति नात्र नियतिशक्तिसमुत्थं जपध्यानयज्ञादिकमुपायतया क्रमते । अनुग्रहशक्तिविद्धहृदयस्य तु हठादेवाक्रमं देवतामुखाम्नायरहस्यं हृदयमावर्जयति येन झटित्येव परमेश्वरीभावं यातीत्यपर्यनुयोज्यो विचित्रः पारमेश्वरः शक्तिपात इति ॥ ९६ ॥

यस्य पुनर्मध्यमन्दमन्दतरादिभेदेन प्रवृत्तः शक्तिपातस्तस्य गुरूपदेशमामरणक्षणं यावद्योगक्रमेण विमृशतः पिण्डपाताच्छिवत्वं स्यादिति प्रतिपादयति

सर्वोत्तीर्णं रूपं सोपानपदक्रमेण संश्रयतः ।
परतत्त्वरूढिलाभे पर्यन्ते शिवमयीभावः ॥ ९७ ॥

एवं किल शक्तिपातमन्दत्वात्पूर्णज्ञानोपदेशानासादनेन **सर्वोत्तीर्णं रूपम्** सर्वतत्त्वपर्यन्तवर्तिस्वभावम् **संश्रयतः** साक्षात्कुर्वतः कथमित्याह **सोपानपदक्रमेण** इति । कन्दनाभिहृत्कण्ठलम्पिकाबिन्दुनादशक्तिरूपाणि **सोपानानि** ऊर्ध्वमाक्रमणाय तीर्थान्येव तेषां **पदम्** आसादनं तत्र हानादानरूपः **क्रमः** शनैः-शनैः कन्दे ततो नाभौ ततो हृदीत्येवमाक्रमणं तेनेति । एवं यावत्परमार्थप्ररोहोपलब्धौ पिण्डपातावसरे योगिनस्तस्य क्रमेण शिवतास्वभावा स्थितिर्भवतीत्येषा क्रमयुक्तिः कथिता ॥ ९७ ॥

एवमपि क्रमयोगमभ्यस्यतो योगिनः समाश्वस्तस्यापि सततस्तथारूढिर्न स्यादभीष्टप्राप्तावन्तरायो जायते यदि परमनासादिततत्त्वस्य मरणं स्यात्तदा किं भवेदित्याशङ्कां परिहरति

तस्य तु परमार्थमयीं धारामगतस्य मध्यविश्रान्तेः ।
तत्पदलाभोत्सुकचेतसोऽपि मरणं कदाचित्स्यात् ॥ ९८ ॥

योगभ्रष्टः शास्त्रे कथितोऽसौ चित्रभोगभुवनपतिः ।
विश्रान्तिस्थानवशाद्भूत्वा जन्मान्तरे शिवीभवति ॥ ९९ ॥

एवमुल्लङ्घनक्रमेण योगमभ्यस्यतः केनाप्यन्तरायेण **मध्यविश्रान्तेः** कुत्रचिच्चक्राधारेऽप्यनुभवोपलब्धेस्तत्रैव परितोषं गतस्यात एव **परमार्थमयीं धारामगतस्य** परतत्त्वरूपां प्रतिज्ञातां दशां सर्वाध्वोत्तीर्णामप्राप्तवतो यदि वा **तत्पदलाभोत्सुकचेतसोऽपि** प्रतिज्ञातपरमार्थसत्तासादनसाभिलाषस्यापि **कदाचित्** मध्ये

विपत्तिः संभाव्यते तदैतस्यालब्धलाभस्यापि पिण्डपातात्का गतिरित्याह **योगभ्रष्टः** इत्यादि । सः **योगात्** समाधेरुभयथा **भ्रष्टः** चलितः **शास्त्रे** आगमग्रन्थे **कथितः** उक्तः । कीदृग्भवेदित्याह **चित्र** इत्यादि । पिण्डपातादेव **चित्रभोगानि** नानाश्चर्यरूप्यन्नपानमाल्यवस्त्रानुलेपनगीतवाद्यादिप्रधानानि यानि **भुवनानि** स्वविश्रान्त्यनुगुणानि तत्त्वेश्वरस्थानानि तेषु **पतिः** ईश्वरो भवति मरणसमनन्तरमेव दिव्यैर्भोगैर्युज्यत इति यावत् । तद्भोगाधिकारपरिक्षये पुनरपि स योगभ्रष्टः कथं स्यादित्याह **विश्रान्ति** इत्यादि । **विश्रान्तिस्थानस्य** कन्दादेः प्रदेशस्य **वशात्** तदभ्याससंस्कारप्रबोधसामर्थ्यात्सः **जन्मान्तरे** द्वितीये जन्मनि **भूत्वा** संसारेऽधिकारिशरीरं योगाभ्यासयोग्यं प्राप्य पूर्वाभ्यस्तं योगं प्रयासेन स्वीकृत्य हेलया परमार्थमयीं प्राग्जन्मप्रतिज्ञातां दशामधिरुह्य पिण्डपाताच्छिव एव भवति ॥ ९९ ॥

अथाभ्यस्यतोऽपि योगं योगिनो मनश्चाञ्चल्याद्विश्रान्तिमेकदेशेऽपि मनागप्यलभमानस्य योगं प्रति श्रद्धावतश्च पिण्डपातात्का गतिः स्यादित्याह

परमार्थमार्गमेनं ह्यभ्यस्याप्राप्य योगमपि नाम ।
सुरलोकभोगभागी मुदितमना मोदते सुचिरम् ॥ १०० ॥

विषयेषु सार्वभौमः सर्वजनैः पूज्यते यथा राजा ।
भुवनेषु सर्वदेवैर्योगभ्रष्टस्तथा पूज्यः ॥ १०१ ॥

एनम् इति शतशः प्रतिपादितं स्वात्मज्ञानसतत्त्वं पन्थानम् **अभ्यस्य** श्रद्धाभक्तिभ्यां सेवित्वापि चित्तदोषानवस्थानेन यथावद्योगलक्षणां विश्रान्तिं जन्ममध्येऽप्यनधिगतः सन्मृतश्चेत्तदा स योगभ्रष्टो ज्ञानयोगविषयप्ररूढश्रद्धाभक्तिप्रसादसामर्थ्येन देवलोकभोगभागी साह्लादचित्तः **सुचिरम्** कालं हर्षं प्रयाति सुरैरपि भुवनेषु निजनिजस्थानेषु पूज्यो भवति । क इवेत्याह **सार्व** इत्यादि । **यथा सार्वभौमो राजा** सप्तद्वीपेश्वरो राजा चक्रवर्ती **विषयेषु** नानामण्डलेषु **सर्वजनैः पूज्यते** समभ्यर्च्यते **तथैव** अयं प्रक्षीणपुण्यापुण्यविषयः समुत्पन्नवैराग्यः पश्चिमजन्मा वन्द्योऽस्माकं यस्य स्वात्मनि जिज्ञासार्थं प्राग्जन्मन्युद्यमोऽभूदिति सुरैरपि स्तूयत इति यावत् ॥ १०० ॥ १०१ ॥

तस्य लोकान्तरभोगाधिकारनिवृत्तेरनन्तरं किं स्यादित्याह

महता कालेन पुनर्मानुष्यं प्राप्य योगमभ्यस्य ।
प्राप्नोति दिव्यममृतं यस्मादावर्तते न पुनः ॥ १०२ ॥

देवलोकेषु यथानिर्दिष्टेषु भोगान्भुक्त्वातिदीर्घेण **कालेन** स योगभ्रष्टः संसारेऽस्मिन्मनुष्यभावमागत्य योगाभ्याससाधनयोग्यं शरीरमासाद्य प्राग्जन्मनि मनश्चाञ्चल्याद्यो योगो दुष्प्रापोऽभूत्तमेव **योगम्** प्राग्जातभक्तिश्रद्धाप्ररूढयोगवासनासंस्कारप्रबोधमनायासेन **प्राप्य** समभ्यस्य च देहान्ते **दिव्यममृतम्** परतत्त्वस्वरूपमुपलभते परस्वरूपतादार्ढ्यं गच्छतीति यावत् । अत एव तस्मात्पुनरावर्तनं तस्य न स्यादिति । एवं महति कल्याणे स्वात्मज्ञानविषये मनागपि प्रत्यवमर्शः संसारसरणाय न भवति । यदुक्तं श्रीगीतासु

नेहाभिक्रमनाशोऽस्ति प्रत्यवायो न विद्यते ।
स्वल्पमप्यस्य धर्मस्य त्रायते महतो भयात् ॥

इति। तथा

> अयतिः श्रद्धयोपेतो योगाच्चलितमानसः।
> अप्राप्य योगसंसिद्धिम् ... ॥

इत्यादिप्रश्नादारभ्य

> अनेकजन्मसंसिद्धस्ततो याति परां गतिम् ॥

इत्युत्तरपर्यन्तो ग्रन्थो मुनिना प्रतिपादितोऽपि स्मर्तव्य इति ॥ १०२ ॥

एवमनेन ज्ञानयोगक्रमेण जन्तोर्मनागपि स्पृष्टस्य सत इयान्विभूत्यतिशयो यः प्रवक्तुं न पार्यते तस्मात्सर्वात्मना विवेकार्द्रहृदयैर्जननमरणनिवृत्तौ सावधानैर्भाव्यमिति निरूपयति

> **तस्मात्सन्मार्गेऽस्मिन्निरतो यः कश्चिदेति स शिवत्वम् ।**
> **इति मत्वा परमार्थे यथातथापि प्रयतनीयम् ॥ १०३ ॥**

यत एवं स्वात्मप्रत्यवमर्शाभ्यासः प्रतिपादितक्रमवशादुत्तमफललाभः **तस्मात्** एतस्मिन्सुशोभने **मार्गे** प्रकृष्टमुक्तिप्रापके पथि **यः कश्चिन्निरतः** इत्यधिकारिनियमाभावः प्रदर्शितः। **यः कश्चित्** जनो जननमरणव्याध्यादिक्लेशशतपरिपीडितः **निरतः** विवेकबुद्ध्या निःशेषेण रतस्तत्रैव श्रद्दधानो भूत्वा निमग्नः **सः** जन्तुरचिराल्लघुनैव कालेन **शिवत्वमेति** सकलसांसारिकक्लेशानवधूय परश्रेयोरूपदशामेकेनैव जन्मना प्राप्नोति। यथा शिवधर्मोत्तरे शास्त्रे

> इहैकभविको मोक्ष एष तावत्परीक्ष्यताम् ।
> अनेकभविका मुक्तिर्भवतां केन वार्यते ॥

इति। **इति मत्वा** एवं विमृश्य तस्मिन् **परमार्थे यथातथा** येन तेनापि प्रकारेण **प्रयतनीयम्** प्रकर्षेण समुद्यमः कार्यः। प्रधाने यत्नः फलवानिति कृत्वात्रार्थे मनागप्यवलेपो न विधेयो येन योगाभ्यासेन स्वात्मप्ररूढिश्चेत्समुत्पन्ना सिद्धं नः समीहितं न चेद्दिव्यलोकान्तरप्राप्तिः। ततोऽपि प्रत्यावृत्तस्य प्राक्समभ्यस्तयोगवासनाप्रबोधबलेन पुनरपि योगसंबन्ध इति श्रेयोमार्गपरिशीलनान्न विरुद्धं किंचित्कर्तुः समापततीति परमपुरुषार्थसाधनायां मनागप्यवलेपो न कार्य इति शिवम् ॥ १०३ ॥

एवं शास्त्रकारः शेषभट्टारकोक्तं परमार्थसारोपदेशं शिवाद्वयशासनक्रमेण युक्त्यनुभवागमसनाथं प्रतिपाद्य स्वात्मनः परितोषमात्रार्थितया स्वाभिधानप्रदर्शनपूर्वकमयमेवोपदेशः परपुरुषार्थसाधनोपाय इति निरूपयन्ग्रन्थार्थोपसंहारमाह

> **इदमभिनवगुप्तोदितसंक्षेपं ध्यायतः परं ब्रह्म ।**
> **अचिरादेव शिवत्वं निजहृदयावेशमभ्येति ॥ १०४ ॥**

इदम् प्रथमानं वितत्य प्रतिपादितं यत् **परम्** प्रकृष्टम् **ब्रह्म** बृंहकत्वात्परिपूर्णानन्दमयं स्वात्मस्वरूपम् **ध्यायतः** अनायासेन स्वात्मनि प्रत्यवमृशतो जनस्य **अचिरात्** शीघ्रमेव न तु पुनर्बहूनां जन्मनामन्त

इति। तदेवंविधस्य ब्रह्मभूतस्य **शिवत्वमभ्येति** निःश्रेयसप्राप्तिः संभवति। कथम् **निजहृदयावेशम्** कृ-त्वा **निजं हृदयम्** परामर्शस्थानमाविश्य। कीदृशं तद्ब्रह्म कीर्तनीयनाम्ना **अभिनवगुप्तेनोदितः** प्रकाशितः **संक्षेपः** तात्पर्यं यत्र तदेवंविधम् । अत्र च नामव्याजेनेदमप्युक्तं स्याद्यथा **अभिनवः** योऽन्यैरदृष्टः परब्र-ह्मरहस्यातिशयः **गुप्तश्च** अवच्छन्न इवाभूत्स एवंविधः **उदितः** प्रकाशितः **संक्षेपः** यत्र तदेवंविधं ब्रह्मेति। एवमावेदयता दुर्लभतोपदेशस्य प्रतिपादिता स्यात् ॥ १०४ ॥

ग्रन्थपरिमाणं निरूपयन्नस्मिन्प्रकरणे कर्तृत्वमाह

आर्याशतेन तदिदं संक्षिप्तं शास्त्रसारमतिगूढम् ।
अभिनवगुप्तेन मया शिवचरणस्मरणदीप्तेन ॥ १०५ ॥

इदं शास्त्रसारम् बहूनां ग्रन्थानां यत्प्रकृष्टं सतत्त्वं तत् **मया संक्षिप्तम्** ग्रन्थसहस्रैरप्युपपादयितुम-शक्यं तदेव लघुना वृत्तशतपरिमाणेन स्वीकृत्योक्तमित्यनेन प्रतिभाकौशलमुक्तं भवेत् । कीदृशेण मया **शिवचरणस्मरणदीप्तेन** इति। **शिवस्य** परश्रेयःस्वभावस्य स्वात्मस्थस्य चिदानन्दैकमूर्तेर्यानि **चरणानि** चिद्रश्मयस्तेषाम् **स्मरणम्** शब्दादिविषयग्रहणकाले निभालनं प्रतिक्षणं स्वानुभवाप्रमोषस्तेन **दीप्तः** प-राहन्ताचमत्कारभास्वरोऽत एव कीर्तनीयाभिधानेन। अन्यथा कथं देहाद्यात्ममानिनोऽज्ञातस्वात्ममहेश्व-रसतत्त्वस्येयति महार्थोपदेशेऽस्य कर्तृताधिकारित्वमुपपद्यते यतो यो यत्स्वभावः स तत्स्वभावं विवेक्तुं प्रगल्भत इत्युपदेष्टुः समाविष्टमहेश्वरस्वभावोऽनेन वाक्येनोक्तः स्यादिति शिवम् ॥ १०५ ॥

इति श्रीमहामाहेश्वराचार्याभिनवगुप्तविरचितः
परमार्थसारः ॥

श्रीमतः क्षेमराजस्य सद्गुर्वाम्नायशालिनः ।
साक्षात्कृतमहेशस्य तस्यान्तेवासिना मया ॥ १ ॥
श्रीवितस्तापुरीधाम्ना विरक्तेन तपस्विना ।
विवृतिर्योगनाम्नेयं पूर्णाद्वयमयी कृता ॥ २ ॥

संपूर्णेयं परमार्थसारसंग्रहविवृतिः कृतिस्तत्रभवत्परममाहेश्वरश्रीराजानकयोगराजस्य ॥

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Abbreviations

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ABh	*Abhinavabhāratī*
AG	Abhinavagupta
APS	*Ajaḍapramātṛsiddhi (Siddhitrayī)*
ĀpDhS	*Āpastambadharmasūtra*
ĀPS	Ādiśeṣa's *Paramārthasāra*
ĀPSV	*Paramārthasāravivaraṇa*
ĀŚ	*Āgamaśāstra*
ĀŚV	*Āgamaśāstravivaraṇa*
BĀU	*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*
BĀUBh	*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya*
BhG	*Bhagavadgītā*
BhGBh	*Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*
BS	*Brahmasūtra*
BSBh	*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*
ChU	*Chāndogyopaniṣad*
DhĀl	*Dhvanyāloka*
GAS	*Gītārthasaṃgraha*
GBh	*Gauḍapādīyabhāṣya*
ĪPK	*Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*
ĪPV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*
ĪPvṛ	*Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikāvṛtti*
ĪPVV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛttivimarśinī*
JUB	*Jaiminīyopaniṣadbrāhmaṇa*
KauBU	*Kauṣītakibhrāmaṇopaniṣad*
KāU	*Kāṭhakopaniṣad*
KS	*Kāṭhakasaṃhitā*
LT	*Lakṣmītantra*
MāU	*Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad*

MBh	*Mahābhārata*
MDhŚ	*Mānavadharmaśāstra*
MM	*Mahārthamañjarī*
MNP	*Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*
MuU	*Muṇḍakopaniṣad*
MVT	*Mālinīvijayottaratantra*
NBh	*Nyāyabhāṣya*
NT	*Netratantra*
NTU	*Netratantroddyota*
P.	Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*
PH	*Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya*
PHvṛ	*Pratyabhijñāhṛdayavṛtti*
PM	*Parimala*
PP	*Pūrṇatāpratyabhijñā*
PS	Abhinavagupta's *Paramārthasāra*
PSV	*Paramārthasāravivṛtti*
PT	*Parātriśikā/Parātriṃśikā*
PTLvṛ	*Parātriśikālaghuvṛtti*
PTV	*Parātriśikāvivaraṇa*
PU	*Praśnopaniṣad*
PV	*Pramāṇavārttika*
R	Rāghavānanda
RĀ	*Rauravāgama*
RSS	*Rauravasūtrasaṃgraha*
RT	*Rājataraṅgiṇī*
ṚS	*Ṛksaṃhitā*
SK	*Sāṃkhyakārikā*
SpK	*Spandakārikā*
SpN	*Spandanirṇaya*
SpP	*Spandapradīpikā*
SpS	*Spandasaṃdoha*
SpV	*Spandavivṛti*
SpVṛ	*Spandavṛtti*
SŚP	*Somaśaṃbhupaddhati*
SvT	*Svacchandatantra*
SvTU	*Svacchandatantroddyota*
Ś	Śaṅkara
ŚB	*Śatapathabrāhmaṇa*
ŚD	*Śivadṛṣṭi*
ŚDvṛ	*Śivadṛṣṭivṛtti*
ŚS	*Śivasūtra*
ŚSĀ	*Śivastotrāvalī*

ŚSV — *Śivasūtravimarśinī*
ŚSvā — *Śivasūtravārtika*
ŚvU — *Śvetāśvataropaniṣad*
TaiU — *Taittirīyopaniṣad*
TAK — *Tāntrikābhidhānakośa*
TĀ — *Tantrāloka*
TĀC — *Tantrālokacintāmaṇi*
TĀV — *Tantrālokaviveka*
TK — *Tattvakaumudī*
TS — *Tantrasāra*
VBh — *Vijñānabhairava*
VP — *Vākyapadīya*
VPvr̥ — *Vākyapadīyavr̥tti*
YājS — *Yājñavalkyasmr̥ti*
YH — *Yoginīhr̥daya*
YR — Yogarāja
YS — *Yogasūtra*
YV — *Yogavāsiṣṭha*

Institutions, journals and series

ABORI — *Annals of the BORI*
ALS — Adyar Library Series
ĀSS — Ānandāsrama Sanskrit Series
BEFEO — *Bulletin de l'EFEO*
BORI — Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
BSOAS — *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*
BSPS — Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series
CNRS — Centre national de la recherche scientifique
CSS — Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series
CSSt — Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies
EFEO — École française d'Extrême-Orient
GOS — Gaekwad's Oriental Series
HOS — Harvard Oriental Series
IFI — Institut français d'indologie, Pondichéry
IFP — Institut français de Pondichéry
IIJ — *Indo-Iranian Journal*
IsIAO — Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente
IsMEO — Istituto per lo studio del Medio ed Estremo Oriente
JA — *Journal asiatique*
JAOS — *Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JRAS — *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* [of Great Britain and Ireland], Londres

KSS	Kashi Sanskrit Series
KSTS	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
NGMCP	Nepalese German Manuscript Cataloguing Project
PDI	Publications du département d'indologie (IFP)
PIFI	Publications de l'IFI
POS	Poona Oriental Series
PSS	Parimal Sanskrit Series
Publ. EFEO	Publications de l'EFEO
Publ. ICI	Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne (Collège de France)
SBE	Sacred Books of the East
SOR	Serie Orientale Roma
SUNY	State University of New York
TSS	Trivandrum Sanskrit Series
WZKS	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*

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See *Kāvyaprakāśa*

Baudhāyanadharmasūtra
See *Āpastambadharmasūtra* (Olivelle)

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